The secret service of the Confederate States in Europe, or, How the Confederate cruisers were equipped

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THE SECRET SERVICE

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE

OR,

39oti3 the QTonfebcratc (Eruiscrs toere (Equippcb.

BY

JAMES D. BULLOCH,

NAVAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CONFEDERATE 'STATES IN EUROPE DURING
THE CIVIL WAR.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

NEW YORK :

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS.
27 & 29 WEST 23rd STREET.
1884.

CheekfirJ

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EERATA.

Vol. I.
Page- 14, line 28, /or "ten of tlie Constituent Republics " read
" eleven of the Constituent Republics."
Page 171, line 15, for "Dr. Bennett" read " Dr. Barrett."
Page 190, line 19, /or "Danish Island" read " Swedish Island."
Page 269, line 18, for " food " read " fuel."

Vol. n.
Page 224, line 10, for " Charles R. Prioleau," read " Charles K.
Prioleau."

clitterent kmrl. iliis worK: Has not, tlieretore, Deen
written with the expectation of suppl}n.ng a pubHc
demand, but from a sense of duty, and in compliance
with the urgent request of many persons who took
opposite sides in the Civil War, and who have thought
that the future historian should be furnished with the

PEEFACE.

The American Civil War of 1861-65 will always remain
a notable event in history ; and its effects upon the
character of the American people and the political in-
stitutions of the country are questions which have not
yet received a final solution. Thus it is probable that
every addition to the history of that great struggle which
is founded upon facts not hitherto known, will be received
mth some favour by those who were actors in the events,
or who, from their position as statesmen, are led to ob-
serve and to carefully note the political disasters Avhich
periodically disturb contemporary nations.

But it is, nevertheless, manifest that the subject has
already lost its interest with the general public, who are
mostly absorbed in practical affairs of present impor-
tance, or who seek amusement in literature of a wholly
different kind. This work has not, therefore, been
written with the expectation of supplying a j^ubHc
demand, but fi'om a sense of duty, and in compliance
with the urgent request of many persons Avho took
opposite sides in the Civil War, and who have thought
that the future historian should be furnished with the

i\- rHEFACE.

facts relatinii" to the foreign-built navvoftlie Confederate
States.

Many unavoidable hindrances have prevented the
steady, continuous completion of the work ; and the
necessity of reading a very large mass of diplomatic cor-
respondence, official reports, and legal proceedings^ not
always readily accessible, has added to the difficulty and
delay. The Introduction and Chapter I. were written
in the autumn of 1881 ; the greater portion of the re-
mainder was written from April to August, 1882 ; and
two chapters not until April-May, 1883. As it has been
impossible to revise the manuscript critically, the fore-
going explanation is necessary to account for the
apparent discrepancy in the illustrations taken from
current events, which, upon the supposition that the
whole work was written at about the date of the opening
chapter, Avould place some of the incidents in the anoma-
lous position of being used for demonstration before they
happened. The events thus used had verj' lately or just
occurred, at the time when the chapters in which they
appear were in course of composition ; and it is hoped
that the context will sufficiently mark the time when
they transpired, even if the date has not been altered.

A thorough revision of the whole work would have
made it necessary to rewrite a large portion of several
chapters and to abridge others, in order to bring them all
into precise harmony in respect to the dates of those
incidental and transitory occurrences which have been
chosen for illustrations, and also to avoid the appearance
of unnecessary repetition in applying the principles of
law and the actions of public officials to the case of each
separate ship.

PREFACE. V

But while the want of a careful revision has left many
defects which mar the excellence of the narrative as a
literary production, it does not in any way aifect the
historical accuracy of the statements, and I have had no
other purpose than to furnish a truthful record of the
efforts made by the Confederate Government to organize
a naval force during the Civil War.

The facts connected with tlie building and equipping
of the ships are stated upon my own knowledge. Such
incidents in their cruises as involved questions of belli-
o^erent or neutral risfhts and duties are taken from the
letters of their commanding officers to me at the time of
the occurrences, or have been epitomized from subse-
quent conversations with them. All that has reference
to the origin, armament, and commissioning of the ships
has been stated specifically and without reserve.

Their adventures afterwards have not been told Avith
much particularity, because special histories of their
cruises have already l3een published, and because the
chief purpose of this work is to explam the naval policy
of the Confederate Government, and the controversies
Avhich that policy provoked between the United States
and some of the neutral Powers.

I would have gladly avoided any allusion to the causes
of the war, and criticism of the diplomatic and other corre-
spondence of United States officials on the subject of the
Confederate cruisers, but that correspondence was not
confined to complaints and remonstrances against the
alleged encouragement and facilities granted to the Con-
federate States by the neutral Powers. It was made the
medium for prejudicing those Powers against the South
by ex parte statements in reference to the causes of the

vi PREFACE.

war, and of disseminating charges and insinuations
wholly unsupported b}' evidence, whose manifest j)ur-
])ose was not only to discredit the policy, but the honour
of the Confederate Government.

To have pointed out the inaccuracies of the statements
affecting the conduct of neutrals, and of those which
specifically referred to the equi]:)ment of the ships, and to
have omitted all reference to the political disquisitions
and allegations contained in the same despatches, would
have borne the appearance of tacitly admitting their
truth and the justice of their application.

I hope it Avill be understood that the names of official
persons are mentioned historically, and that the criticisms
are directed ao:ainst the contents of the documents and
not against the writers.

Liverpool, June, 1883.

CONTENTS OF VOL. I.

PAGE

Introduction . , . . . . .1

CHAPTER I.

Sketch of the anomalous condition of the whole country, North
and South, during the period between the election of Mr.
Abraham Lincoln as President of the United States and the
beginning of hostilities, in theory an undivided Republic, in
fact two separate Governments : one at Washington, one at
Montgomery. — The organization of the Confederate Navy
Department. — The poverty of the South with respect to
naval resources. — The naval policy of the Confederate
Government. — The necessity of looking abroad for the means
to carry on naval operations. — The commencement of hostili-
ties.— The Louisiana 'Board of War' and the Bienville. —
Personal incidents. — Journey South. — Blocking the Missis-
sippi 18-50

CHAPTER n.

Messrs. Eraser, Trenholm and Co. — The Confederate Commis-
sioners.— Major Huse, the Military Agent. — Early opera-
tions.— Restrictions of the Proclamations of Neutrality. —
Their effects upon United States and Confederate Cruisers.
— The Oreto {Florida). — Messrs. Laird and the Alabama. —
The Equipment of the Alabama. — Counsel's Opinion on the
Foreign Enlistment Act. — Despatch of the Bermuda vnth
supplies for the Confederate Army. — Second Voyage and

viii CONTENTS.

I'ACE

Capture of the Bermiuia. — The Trial at Philadelphia. — The
United States and belligerent rights. — Decree of Court in
the Bermuda case. — Contrast between the action of the
United States as a belligerent and as a neutral concerning
belligerent rights. — The United States and neutral vessels
during the Crimean War. — The Bahama Islands 'Regula-
tions ' of the British Government. — Eeasons for the seeming
indifference of the British Government. — Precedents estab-
lished by the United States favourable to Great Britain. —
European Naval Ai-maments. — British Ship-building. — Im-
portance of British Mercantile Marine. — Weakness of the
United States as a Naval Power. — Former efficiency of the
American Navy, — Seamanship in the Past and the
Present ....... ol-QS

CHAPTEE III.

Financial emban-assments of the Confederate Agents. — Incom-
plete organization of the Confederate Executive at this period.
— The financial arrangements of the Confederate States in
Europe. — Incompleteness of the instructions of the Naval
Rei:»resentative, and insufficiency of the arrangements to
meet financial requirements. — Purchase and equipment of the
Fingal, afterwards the Atlanta. — Shipment of war material.
— Mr. Low, second officer of the Flngal. — An unfortunate
start. — The island of Terceira. — The crew agree to run the
blockade. — Arrival in the Savannah river. — The state of the
Southern forces. — Correspondence concerning the future
operations of the Fingal. — Enlargement of powers as Naval
Representative in Europe. — Flag-officer Josiah Tattnall. —
Conversion of the Fingal into the armour-clad Atlanta. —
Her engagement with and capture by two United States
•Monitors.' — Return to Endand . . . 99-1.51

CHAPTER IV.

The Florida. — Captain Duguid. — CoiTespondence concerning
the Florida. — Her arrival at Nassau. — Commander Maffitt. —
The United States blockade of the British Bahama Channel.
— The equipping of the Florida. — Vellow fever. — The Florbla

CONTENTS. ix

PAGE

runs the blockade at Mobile. — An unparalleled chase. — The
Florida's cruise in the West Indies. — Vessels captiu-ed by the
Florida. — Her stay at Brest, — Her second cruise. — Her
assassination by the JVachusett. — Justification of the use of
the term 'assassination.' — The Brazilian Government and
the capture of the Florida. — United States treatment of
prisoners-of-war ...... 152-224

CHAPTER V.

The building of the Alabama. — Suspicions of the United States
Consul at Liverpool. — Captain Butcher. — The equijiping of
the Alabama. — Quitting Liverpool. — Bond, the Pilot. — Official
Correspondence. — Captain Semmes. — The Alabama handed
over to his charge. — Some matters connected with the clear-
ance of the Alabama from Liverpool. — Mr. Price Edwards,
the Collector of Customs at that Port. — The Alabama's first
engagement. — The uilabama a legitimate vessel-of-war. —
Action of the United States in regard to commissioning
vessels at sea. — Influence of the cruisers on the United
States carrying trade. — The Alabama's action with the
Kearsarge. — Mr. Seward and Earl Russell , . 225-294

CHAPTER YI.

The Confederate cruisers and the Foreign Enlistment Act. —
The protest of the United States against the ' laxity ' of the
British Government. — The answer of the British Govern-
ment.— The Confederate States admitted to be belligerents
by the Supreme Court of the United States, and acknow-
ledged as such by the European Powers. — Debate in the
House of Commons. — European recruits for the United States
Army in England. — Review of the situation of the belligerents
in regard to neutral States. — The American and the English
Foreign Enlistment Acts, — The Alexandra Case. — The Crown
witnesses. — Conclusions to be drawn from this case. — After-
history of the Alexandra. — Other vessels searched at the
instigation of the United States Consul. — United States pur-
chases in England. — The Board of Trade Returns. — Messrs.
Baring Brothers and Co. and the United States. — Condition
of the Confederates during the War . , . 295-375

conti:nts.

CHAPTER VII.

Review of the Situation in November, 1861. — Changed pur-
poses of the Confederate Government in regard to their naval
oi)erations. — Armour-clad vessels required. — Two contracted
for with Messrs. Laird Brothers. — Correspondence concerning
them. — Their transfer to Messrs. Bravay, and their ultimate
purchase hy Government and enrolment in her Majesty's na^y
as the Scorpion and the Wicern. — Action of her Majesty's
Government and that of the United States in reference to
these vessels. — Inconsistency of the declarations and actions
of the British Government .... 376-4G0

THE SECEET SEEVICE

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE.

INTRODUCTION.

Since the end of the great Civil War which convulsed
the States of the American Union during the years
1861-5, many partial histories of the causes which pro-
duced the struggle, and the events which marked its
progress, have been published.

Some of these were written under the influence of the
heat and passion aroused and fostered by the magnitude
and bitterness of the contest, and cannot therefore be
received with the confidence which every narrative must
inspire in order to win and to maintain that worthy and
lasting credit which distinguishes history from fiction.

Others have been published to defend the writers from
charges of neglect or incapacity in military or civil
offices, and are too personal and controversial to interest
the general reader.

Lastly, there have been many accounts of events both
in the field and in the Cabinet which the writers them-
selves took part in, and they have narrated the incidents

VOL. I. 1

2 THE SECRET SERVICE OE THE

with the clearness and precision which arc always mani-
fest in the evidence of an eye-witness.

It is now well known that the Confederate Government
made great efforts to organize a naval force abroad during
the Civil War, and that a few armed cruisers were got
afloat, which destroyed many American .ships and well-
nigh drove the American commercial flag from the high
seas.

The almost romantic cruise of the Alabama, and the
account of her tragic burial in the stormy Norman Sea
off" Cherbourg, have been graphically narrated by the
late Admiral Semmes, wdio commanded her during her
short career ; and there have been brief histories of the
cruises of the Florida, Shenandoah, and other Confederate
ships, so that their performances afloat are familiar to all
who feel interested in such adventures.

No account, however, has yet been published which
even approaches to a correct statement of the building
and equipment of those vessels, nor Avere the real facts
lirought out in the well-known suit of the Attorney-
General V. Sillem and others (commonly called the
Alexandra Case), tried before the Lord Chief Baron of
her Majesty's Court of Exchequer in London, nor yet in
that of the Oreto {Florida) in the Vice- Admiralty Court
of Nassau.

When the time comes for some wholly independent
and impartial historian to WTite a full and complete
record of the great Civil War, he will perceive that the
naval operations of the Confederate States, which were
organized abroad, possess an importance and attraction
greater than their relative effect upon the issue of the
struggle, as compared with the stupendous military
movements and the gigantic campaigns which were
carried on within the contending States.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 3

He will perceive that they gave rise to many important
legal and diplomatic questions, that they gave much
occupation to her Majesty's Courts, and employment
to many barristers who occupied the very highest
positions at the English bar, a list of whose names
would include two who have since been Lord Chancellors
of England, one a Lord Justice of Appeal, and one a
Vice-Chancellor. He will learn that they were the sub-
ject of much negotiation and some rather acrimonious
correspondence between her Majesty's Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs and the United States Minister;
that they created the necessity of a special mission to
Washington, and the negotiation of a special treaty
between Great Britain and the United States, by which
a material change was made in the rules defining the
obligations of neutrals ; and finally, that the}' were the
cause of that great international suit known as the
Geneva Arbitration, by whose judgment the British
taxpayer was unhappily mulcted in damages to the
substantial amount of £3,000,000 sterling.

When the future historian contemplates these results,
he mil naturally look for the facts relating to them, and
he will look in vain among the records thus far pub-
lished to the world.

Much misapprehension has heretofore prevailed in
reference to the acts of the Confederate Government
in the effort to oro'anize a naval force abroad.

o

The allegations and affidavits collected by the Ameri-
can Consul at Liverpool, upon which the United States
Minister founded his complaints, were in almost every
particular either inaccurate or greatly exaggerated ; and
the ' Case of the United States ' presented to the Arbitra-
tors at Geneva was full of errors and misstatements, many
of which could have been disproved by very direct and

VOL. I.* 1 — 2

4 THE SECRET SEE VICE OF THE

positive evidence if her Majesty's representatives liad
called upon the parties concerned for the real facts.

It surely is not to the interest nor to the permanent
advantage of the people of this or any other country to
form a conclusion or shape a policy upon a hasty con-
sideration or misapprehension of facts ; and the time has
arrived when it would seem to be advisable for anyone
who is in possession of the authentic records to make
them public, both as an act of justice to those whose
conduct has been misrepresented, and as a trustworthy
historical record.

I was the agent selected by the Confederate Govern-
ment to manage and direct the general naval operations
in Europe, and I was the chief representative of the
Navy Department abroad, during the whole period of
the war. All of the ships that got to sea, except the
Georgia, were despatched and equipped under my in-
structions ; and all the documents pertaining to their
origin and the means adopted to get them to sea as
cruising ships are in my possession.

It would be difficult for anyone not personally con-
versant with every incident to decipher and arrange the
documents, or to edit a narrative of the transactions,
which extended throughout a period of four years, and
Avere attended with many complications and perplexities,
and not a few disappointments.

Often since the end of the war I have been urged to
write an account of those interestimr adventures, but have
heretofore been unwillino; to do so, for the following'
reasons, among others not necessary to mention :

First, it was necessary to hav^e important dealings
with a great many persons — shipbuilders, tradesmen,
and manufacturers — who probably would not have liked
to see their names j)ut in print while the animosities and

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 5

ill-will aroused by the war continued. I made it a rule
never to deal with any but people of the highest character
and credit in their respective branches of business. They
were never asked, nor did they offer, to do anything'
inconsistent with the strictest principles of commercial
honour ; and I have the hapj^iness to feel conscious that
every contract I made in England was fulhlled by the
contractor with, scrupulous fidelity, although it was often
quite impossible for me to supervise the work while in pro-
gress, or even to inspect the materials before shipment.

In recurring now, after the lapse of sixteen years, to
those literally vast transactions, it is a consolatory and
satisfactory conviction to feel that the good under-
standing between us was never once disturbed by doubt
or suspicion ; and if any of them happens to see his
name mentioned in these pages, he will find no record
of anything to his discredit, and I pray him to accept
my apology for nammg him at all without his leave,
which I could not very well get.

The second reason for my reticence up to the present
time arose from the reluctance most men feel to write of
events which must necessarily appear to be largely of
the character of personal adventures, and therefore re-
quire the frequent and embarrassing use and repetition
of the personal pronoun

I have got over this difiiculty by reflecting that every
business or enterprise must have an active agent to
manage and direct it ; and if it is meet and right to
publish a histor}^ of these naval affairs at all, no mere
squeamishness should deter me from giving them pub-
licit}^ and furnishing the future historian with the facts
pertaining to an interesting episode in that great Civil
War which set the Western World in painful commo-
tion, and disturbed the rejDose of Europe as well.

6 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

1^0 one who is attracted by the title, and feels disposed
to read this hook, need be deterred by tlic fear of beini;-
di'awn into an exposition of the causes of the war, ortlie
right of secession ; nor will he l)e asked to join in a Avail
over the mortification of defeat, or the agonies of ' Re-
construction.' AVhatevei- o])ini()ns ma}' now prevail in
regard to the constitutional right or expediency of
.secession, hostile and depreciatory criticism of the
Southern j)eople has long ceased to liave any influence.

It is admitted that they fought gallantly, and exhibited
admirable qualities in attack and defence, in victory and
defeat. When the last hope of success was extinguished ;
"svhen the drain of battle and the combined forces of hunger,
toil, and exposure had consumed their energies and ex-
hausted the j)Ower of resistance, the remnant laid down theu'
arms, and took to the plough and the pruning-hook with
as little murmuring as any reasonable critic could expect.

It was, literally, beginning a new life from the very
start. The Avhole land was impoverished. Towns had
been burned and fields devastated. Throughout large
districts every corn-mill and implement of husbandry
had been destroyed. There was scarcely food for the
people to eat, and the only currency in the country was
the paper promises of the dead Confederacy.

Sixteen years have passed, and the South is again in
blossom. Railways have been reconstructed and towns
reljuilt. Milk and honey, corn and wine, can be had in
plenteous profusion, and there is money to buy them ;
and, lastly, in this year of grace 1881, G, 700,000 bales
of cotton have been grown on Southern soil, picked and
baled by Southern hands, and there is cheer}' music
among the spindles of Lancashire, in place of the silence
and gloom which overshadowed them while the people
w^ho grow the fleecy staple were fighting for their cotton-

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 7

fields. Men who can refer to such a record m the
past, and point to such a position to-day, need make no
plaintive appeals for pity. They had much s}'mpathy
during the struggle, and many kind things were said of
them. These served to cheer and inspirit them in the
day of adversity, and are gratefully remembered now.
Those in England and elsewhere who predicted that the
South would win, have failed in their prophecy, but
they can at least feel that their sympathies were given
to no mean people. The South was defeated, and seces-
sion from the Federal Union was shown to be inad-
missible. That is all that has been determined by the
appeal to arms. Wars do not define principles. They
neither analyze nor solve political problems. The sword
cuts the knot, and does not unravel it. No Southern
man can efface from his mind the conviction that among
the reserved rights of the States was that of withdrawing
from the Union, and to den}' that lie lield that opinion
in the year 1861, and to shrink from confessing it to
have been an article of his political faith at that time,
would prove that with the loss of his cause he had also
been bereft of his honour, and he would be without
excuse for the part he took in resisting the authority of
the United States Government at the bidding of his own
State. When the Southern leaders laid down their arms,
they admitted the supremacy of the Federal Congress,
and surrendered the right of separate State action ; but
they did not renounce their belief that the Constitution
as it stood at, and previous to, 1861, was an agreement
between Sovereign States, and that each State had the
first claim to the allegiance and service of her citizens.
But the South has ' accepted the situation,' and as
a condition of restoration to the political privileges
common to all the States, she has relinquished her

8 THE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE

own interpretation of the Constitution, and lias agreed
to accej)t that of the majority. Every Southerner is
bound by that compact, and there is no evidence that a
single sane or reasonable man -wishes to break, to
evade, or to modify it. In fact, causes are already at
work in the Southern States which are likely to effect
very important and notable changes in the political
princijiles of the i)eople. The large increase in the
number of cotton mills in the South since the war, and
the tendency to embark in other mechanical industries,
will })robably ere long attach the capitalists of that
section to the Union, and its fostering system of pro-
tective tariffs, with the same ardour which has in these
latter years distinguished the national affinities of the
manufacturing States of the i^orth.

Secession was not indigenous to the South. The
doctrine was broached in the early days of the Kepublic
by Massachusetts and other New England States, and
was very clearly and forcibly enunciated by a Conven-
tion of those States which met at Hartford in 1814-15,
as the following extract from the Journal of the Conven-
tion will prove :

' That Acts of Congress in violation of the Constitu-
tion are absolutely void, is an undeniable position. . , .
In cases of deliberate, dangerous, and palpable infractions
of the Constitution, affecting the soverei<inty of the State
and liberties of the 'peojAe^ it is not only the right, but
the duty of such State to interpose its autliority for
their protection, in the manner best calculated to secure
that end. When emergencies occur which are either
beyond the reach of judicial tribunals, or too pressing to
admit of delay incident to their forms. States which have
no common umpire must be their own judges, and
execute then* own decisions.'

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUBOPE. 9

Anyone at all familiar with the political history of the
United States from the adoption of the Constitution to
the year 1815, must admit that the right of secession
was a doctrine which did not originate at the South, and
was not peculiar to Southern men. After the purchase
of Louisiana in 18U3, the Legislature of Massachusetts
j^assed the following resolution : ' Resohed, that the
annexation of Louisiana to the Union transcends the
Constitutional power of the L^nited States. It formed
a new Confederacy^ to which the States united by the
former compact are not bound to adhere.'

The sjjeech of the Hon. Josiah Quincy, of Massa-
chusetts, delivered in the Congress of the United States,
January 14, 1811, in opposition to the Bill for the
admission of Louisiana into the Union as a State, has
been often quoted. He said, ' If this Bill passes, it is
my deliberate opinion that it is virtually a dissolution
of the Union ; and as it will be the right of cdl, so it imll
be the duty of some, definitely to prepare for separation —
amicably if they can, violently if they must.^

The States which withdrew from the Union in 1860-61
merely exercised a prerogative which had been previously
claimed as an inherent ' State right ' by ^Massachusetts
and other Xew England States, and which had been
asserted and defended by many prominent N^orthern
men.* Georgia, the Carolinas, and Virginia made

* I might fill pages with extracts from the Journal of the Hartford
Convention, the writings and speeches of eminent Northern politicians
before the secession of the Southern States, and leading articles from
Northern papers published at or about the time of the secession, in sup-
port of this statement. But 1 have no wish to recriminate, or to even
approach controversial topics, except in so far as may be necessary to
repudiate the crime of ' treason ' which has been so recklessly alleged
against the South. Those who wish to test the accuracy of the
statement may refer to the following American works : ' Is Davis a

10 THE SECRET SEnVICE OF THE

common cause with the Xortliern Provinces, and were
loyal to the Confederation dm'inf;- the trying times of the

Traitor f by Professor Bledsoe ; ' The Rise and Fall of the Confederate
Government,' by Mr. Jefierson Davis ; and 'Buchanan's Administra-
tion ;' in all of which will be found copious extracts from the speeches
and writings of Northern men who occupied high and influential
l^ositions, with jjarticidar references to the original sources from
which the quotations are taken.

I mention the above works, not with the purpose of directing
attention to the arguments of the authors in support of ' State
rights,' but solely because they contain indisputable proof that the
assumption was not a new doctrine in 18G1, but that it was co-
existent with the Union itself, and had some of its staunchest
supporters among Northern statesmen and expounders of Constitu-
tional law.

It is a just subject for surprise, and is equally a matter of regret,
that two such eminent men as ]\Ir. John Lothrop Motley and the
late Mr. Alexander Everett, when Avriting and delivering public
addresses during the Civil War, Avith the purpose to enlighten public
opinion at home and abroad in respect to the action of the Southern
States, should have suppressed, or at least omitted to mention, those
facts which would have tended to diminish the alleged criminal
culpability of the Southern peoi)le, and a knowledge of which was
absolutely necessary to a fair, impartial judgment. No cause is ever
benefited in the long run by an over-statement of its merits, or
by exaggerated depreciation of the opposite side ; and when public
oi)inion has been influenced by appeals founded upon insufficient
evidence, Avhether by assertion of what is false, or by the suppression
of essential facts, there is always a reaction in the opposite direction.
This has been notably manifest in regard to foreign opinion in the
matter of secession. It is now quite exceptional to meet a European
among the reading class who does not believe that the Southern States
acted within their constitutional rights.

For the opinion of intelligent foreigners in regard to the right of
secession, I may refer to T)e Tocqueville's ' Democracy in America '
and 'The American Union,' by Mr. James Spence, published by
Eichard Bentley, London, 1861. The allusions in 'Buchanan's
Administration ' to the ' VieAv of the Constitution of the United
States,' by William liawle of Philadelphia, are much to the point ;
and the extracts from a correspondence between Mr. John Quincy

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 11

Kevolution, though they had far less cause for com-
plaint against the mother country*.

Again, tlie Southern States were loyal to the Union
in the war of 1812-15, although their special interests
had not heen hurt or interfered with b}' Great Britain.

When Massachusetts and other Eastern States, through
the action of the Hartford Convention, manifested their
purpose to dissolve the Union, the country was engaged
in a foreign war — namely, in defence of Xew England
commerce, and for the protection of Xew England
seamen.

The right which Great Britain affirmed to the

Adams and Mr. Harrison Gray Otis, both of Massachusetts, are
worthy of especial notice. Mr. Adams charges the Federal Party in
New England with a deliberate pm-pose to dissolve the Union. He
says, 'I had no doubt in 1808 and 1809, and have no doubt at this
time (December .30, 1828), that it is the key of all the great move-
ments of the Federal Party in New England from that time forward
until its final catastrophe in the Hartford Convention.' Mr. John
Quincy Adams's opinion in respect to the right of secession is very
clearly set out in an address before the New York Historical Society
in 1839. A very full quotation from that address will be found in
'The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government,' p. 190, etc. ;
and the following extract from a leading article in the Neio York
Tribune of November 9, 1860, manifests not the isolated feeling and
opinion of Mr, Horace Greeley, its editor and proprietor, but the
views and sentiments of a large number of Northern men at that
time :

' The right to secede may be a revolutionary right, but it exists,
nevertheless ; and we do not see how one party can have a right to
do what another party has a right to prevent, AYe must ever resist
the asserted right of any State to remain in the Union and nullify
or resist the laws thereof ; to withdraw from the Union is quite
another matter. And whenever a considerable section of our Union
shall deliberately resolve to go out, we will resist all coercive measures
designed to keep her in.

' We hope never to live in a Eepublic whereof one section is pinned
to the other by bayonets.'

12 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

I^erpetual unalienal)le allegiance of all natural-born
subjects, the rejjeated and vexatious vindication of tbat
right by the stoppage of American ships on the high
seas, and the violent removal of alleged British subjects
fi'om them, were the chief causes of that war. The
South had neither ships nor seamen, and there was
nothing to arouse the interest of the Southern people, or
to ])ind them to a participation in the contest, but the
sense of loyal obligation to the Union.

When the Southern States seceded in 18(j1, the
country was vexed by no foreign complications, and
their action did not add to any existing troubles. This
difference in the conditions under which Massachusetts
threatened to secede and the Southern States actually
did secede, should, in common fairness, be borne in mind
by those who extol the loyalty of New England and
have so vehemently denounced the Southern people as
traitors and rebels.

]>ut the result of the Civil War has been to produce a
general disavowal of the principles so emphatically laid
down by the Hartford Convention. The Xew England
States helped with all their energies to force a contrary
admission from the South, and the authority of the
Federal Congress has now been made paramount from
Maine to Texas, from N'ew York to California, by the
compulsory, but still by tlie unanimous, consent of the
people of all the States.

The bitterness and the passionate heat of family
quarrels are proverbial, and many unhappy incidents of
the war between the States of the American Union have
confirmed tlie experience upon which the proverb is
based. But old associations and the memory of past
troubles, tribulations, and triumphs, shared in common,
are drawing the people again together ; and it will be

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 13

Avell for tlieni earnestly to reflect ujDon the causes of the
es trail o-enient, and to devise the means of preventing
their repetition, in a spirit of fraternal regard alike for
the common welfare and the separate, if not conflicting,
interests of the various communities embraced in the
vast domain of the Union. Americans have learned
from the sad experience of the Civil War that Demo-
cratic institutions are not exempt from the dangers
which beset other forms of government. History
furnishes no record of any people who have been fused
into one cohesive and durable nationality without much
internal commotion and many internecine struggles.

It is eight hundred years since the last foreign con-
quest of England ; but since the battle of Hastings there
have been the bloody AYars of the Roses and the fierce
contest between Cavalier and Roundhead, besides
lesser revolutions and much border strife. Only within
the present century have the three kingdoms been
brought into willing union, and even now the unhappy
condition of Ireland excites fears for the peace and quiet
of the realm.

The United States could not have reasonably hoped
to escape the political afllictions which other people have
had to suff'er, nor could they have expected to grow
from their birth into the family of indej^endent Powers
to the full maturity of national life without passing
through some political convulsions. The territory is
vast, and even at the present rate of increase in population
it will be many years before the people are brought into
as close contact as in the countries of Europe.

Celt and Saxon, Teuton and Scandinavian, are flowing
in a seemingly exhaustless stream towards the great
prairies of the West, and the problem of amalgamating*
those divers races with the descendants of the original

U THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

colonists, and fusini;- tlieni into one nation, with lang'uage,
feeling, tastes, and interests in common, must be left for
its solution to those laws of nature or of Providence
which have united equally variable materials to form
the existing European t3^pes.

The theor}'- that the late Civil AVar was a mere insur-
rectionary movement can deceive no one now. The
fact that the secession of the Southern States divided
the American Union into two separate Federal liepublics,
cannot be destroyed by the counter-fact that the Union
has been restored. The judgment of every foreign power
declared that there was for four years a de facto Govern-
ment at Richmond, which was wholly independent of
the power and control of the Congress at AVashington,
and every department of the United States Government
confirmed that judgment by practical acts of recognition.

The Union founded by Washington, Adams, Jefferson,
Hamilton, Madison, and the other 'Fathers,' was a
Federal Republic, that is to say, it was a Government
constituted of several Constituent Republics, which were
united by an agreement or compact between themselves
as distinct and separate States. That Union proved to
be inadequate to the exigencies of the conflicting forces
to which it was exposed. It resisted several severe
strains, and was maintained by one or more compromises,
which served to demonstrate its imj^erfection and its
inherent weakness.

In 18G1 the disintegrating forces prevailed, and ten of
the Constituent Republics withdrew from the Unioii
on the plea that the original conditions of Union had
been broken by the others, and they formed a fresh
confederation among themselves.

The remaining States or Republics resisted that act of
separation, and affirmed that the people of the whole

CONFEDEBATE STATES IX EUROPE. 15

United States were, or should be fused into, one nation,
and that the division of the Union into States had, or
should hereafter have, no greater political significance
than the division of the several States into counties.

The States which remained in the original Union, and
supported the foregoing dogma, proved to be stronger
than those which clung to the opinions of the ' Fathers,'
and they succeeded, after a long and bloody war, in
compelling the latter to admit tliat ' the people of the
United States ' meant the aggregate population of all the
States, and that the majority, as represented in the Con-
gress at Washington, was the true and only Sovereign
of the whole country, irrespective of geographical State
lines or separate State Constitutions. I am broaching
no theory, but am simply stating facts. And they are
facts which it behoves every American who wishes to
practise a broad and comprehensive patriotism, and hopes
to maintain a hearty and l^rotherly union among the
reunited States, to admit and to thouglitfully consider in
the future arrangement and policy of political parties.
It is folly and ruin for men in trade to act without
reference to the clear manifestations of suj^ply and
demand; it is equally unwise and disastrous for poli-
ticians and statesmen to deny or to take no account of
the difference between theories for which it has been
thought necessary to strive even to the shedding of
blood, and principles which are fundamental and
unchangeable.

The Union of 1787 was dissolved in 18 Gl by the
action of ten of the constituent republics. A new Union
was formed in 1865 by the military power of the
majority of the States, compelling the minority to
accept their view of the national compact. The former
Union was a confederation of States, and was of course

IG THE SECRET SEEVICE OF THE

a Federal Republic ; the latter Union is founded upon a
fusion of the people into one nation, with a supreme
centralized executive and administrative Government at
Washington, and can no longer be called a Federal
Republic ; it has become an Imperial Republic. The
latter name gives some promise of greater strength and
cohesion tlmn the former, but the duration of the re-
stored Union will depend very much upon whether the
peoj^le of the whole country fully realize, and are really
reconciled to, the new dogma that each State is only an
aggregate of counties, and that its political functions
are only to consist in regulating such purely domestic
concerns as the central autliority at Washington may
leave to its discretion. The principle upon which the
new Union is founded may or may not be sound m
theory, but there can be no doubt that the increased
influence and power granted to the national executive
and lefrislative authorities will make it more than ever
necessary for the educated classes in the United States to
interest themselves in politics, and to see that the repre-
sentatives sent to Washington are not the mere creatures
of the corrupt organizations commonly known as the
' Machine.' If the majority who have effected the change
in the conditions of the American Union are content to
leave the management of public affairs to the pro-
fessional politicians, the ' caucuses,' and the ' wire-
pullers,' they A\dll have fought in vain, and will find that
to secure the semblance of a strictly national Union
they have sacrificed the substance of individual liberty.

Those who are accustomed to closely scrutinize
current political events, must perceive the tendency of
both North and South towards a re-assertion of the
doctrine of State rights, and a tacit admission of that
claim by the Federal Government.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 17

A specific manifestation of the revival of the principle
may be seen in tlie action of California witli reference
to Chinese immigration, and the cautious conciliatory
treatment of the subject by Congress and the executive
authorities at Washington. It is hardly possible to
doubt that the pretension of each State to regulate
its own affairs without the intervention of any other
authority will, before many years, l)e as rampant
as ever, and unless the statesmen and political leaders
have the wisdom and prudence necessary to keep
national party lines distinct from geographical boun-
daries, the danger of another secession will be imminent.

It is earnestly to be hoped that the reunion of the
States may be cemented and perpetuated ; that bicker-
ings and recriminations may cease ; that notliing furtlier
may be done or spoken on either side through strife or
vain-glory, and that neither diversity of interests, dis-
criminating tariffs, nor State jealousies, will again set
the hearts of the people against each other. But, Avhat-
ever may happen in the distant and inscrutable future,
it may be safely predicted, that if there should be a
second violent struggle for ' State rights,' the issue will
be fought on very different geographical lines fi'om those
which separated the contending parties in the Civil War
of 1861.

VOL. I.

18 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

CHAPTER L

Sketch of the anomalous condition of the whole country, !N'orth and
South, duiing the period between the election of Mr. Abraham
Lincoln as President of the United States and the beginning of
hostilities, in theory an undivided Republic, in fact two separate
Governments : one at Washington, one at Moutgomerj'. — The
organization of the Confederate Navy Department. — The poverty
of the South with respect to naval resources. — The naval policy
of the Confederate Government. — The necessity of looking abroad
for the means to carry on naval operations. — The commencement
of hostilities. — The Louisiana 'Board of "War 'and the Bienville. —
Personal incidents. — Journey South.— Blocking the Mississippi.

South Carolina was the first of the Southern States
to secede from the American Union. Her ' Ordinance
of Secession' was passed on the 20th of December, 1860,
about one month after the election of Mr. Abraham
Lincohi to the Presidency of the United States. Missis-
sippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, and Louisiana soon
followed. Delegates from those States met at Mont-
gomer}' in February, 1861, organized a Legislative
Assembl}', and formed a Provisional Government, with
Mr. Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, as President.

Arkansas, Texas, and ISTorth CaroUna followed at
short intervals, and were not long in joining the Con-
federacy. Tennessee, with Maryland, and the great
border States of Missouri, Kentucky, and Virginia, still
faltered, not from want of sympatli}' with the movement,

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 19

but because they hoped to act as a barrier between the
two sections, and to secure a peaceful separation by
negotiation. Events moved rapidly. Tennessee and
Virginia withdrew in time to save serious complications;
but while Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri hesitated,
the ' Union men ' Avithin their borders, aided by active
partizans from without, got partial control of affairs,
and the United States authorities were able to arrest
the leading Secessionists, to disperse the local Legis-
latures, and to maintain possession of those States
durino; the war. B\- withdrawinof- from the Federal
Union in this irregular way, the South demonstrated
that there was no concert of action, and no premeditated
purpose to break up the Federal Government. The
political organization of the seceded States remained
intact, although the l^nion between them had been
dissolved. Each preserved its complete autonomy as a
Commonwealth, with Executive Judiciary and Legis-
lative Departments unbroken, and there was, therefore,
no confusion and no disturbance of the ordinary routine
of civil government. The delegates at Montgomery had
no difficulty in settling the terms of a fresh compact
between the States represented by them, and the Pro-
visional Government was soon in working order. The
chief and most urgent business of the newly • created
Executive was to prepare for the great struggle which
was becoming more and more imminent day by day.
The lack of military resources, and the efforts which
were made to organize an army, have been described
by many previous writers, and especially with much
minuteness and effect by ex- President Jefferson Davis in
his great exposition of the ' Rise and Fall of the Con-
federate Government/ a work which may be called his
' Apologia.'

20 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

My business is witli tlie concerns of the Navy alone.
When President Davis arranged his Cabinet, the Navy
Department was assigned to the Hon. Stephen R. Mal-
lory, of Florida. ]\Ir, Mallory had much experience in
the management of public business.

He had been a Senator in the Congress of the United
States, and had served as a Member of the Committee
on Naval Affairs in that branch of the National
Legislature.

He was well versed in naval usage and naval law,
and had a thorough knowledge of the organization,
equipment, and general disciplinary rules of the United
States Navy. If he had been placed at the head of that
service, he would have been a popular and efficient
administrator, but at Montgomery he was like a chief-
tain without a clan, or an artizan without the tools of
his art. It would have been comparatively eas}^ to
orsfanize and administer, but the task before him
was to create, and the means for constructing and
equipping a naval force for offensive warfare, or even
for a vigorous resistance, were practically nil. The pine
belts of Georgia and the Carolinas, the live oak groves
of Florida, and the forests of other States, contained
inexhaustible supplies of what are called ' naval stores '
and materials for ship-building of the old wooden type,
but they were still in the raw state. The masts and
frames of navies were there, but they were sprouting
and blooming in the green- tree, and there was great
lack of skilled workmen to fell and fashion them. Iron, so
indispensable in the equipment of ships of war, even at that
time, was scarce to the degree of poverty, and before the
end there was a famine. Between March, 1861, and
January, 1865, the price of iron advanced from $25 to
$1,300 per ton, and although this extreme advance was

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 21

not wholly due to the scarcity of the article, but arose
to some extent from the depreciation of the paper cur-
rency, yet it is well knoAvn that the home product was
never equal to the ordinary wants of the country, and
during the Civil War the supply could only be supple-
mented by driblets through the blockade.

At the beofinnino- of the war there was not a mill in
the whole country which could roll a 2^-incli plate, and
in tlie entire Confederacy there was but one shop capable
of turninf*' out a first-class marine engine. There Avas
pressing need of everything required to build, equip, and
maintain a ship of war. Ordnance and ordnance stores,
even medical supplies, provisions, and clothing, were
scarce from the very outset ; and the Tredegar Iron
Works, at Richmond, Virginia, was the only establish-
ment south of the Potomac where a gun of large calibre
could be cast or AATOusfht : and Virginia, when Mr.
Davis and his Cabinet began their labours, was not
amonfj- the Confederate States.

Norfolk, in A^irginia, and Pensacola, in Florida, con-
tained the only public dockyards within the limits of
the Confederacy. The Xavy-yard at Norfolk before the
war was an extensive and efficient establishment. It
contained a dry dock, foundry and machine shops, and
a fair supply of materials had generally been kept there.
But just at the time Avhen Virginia was in the throes
of secession, before there was any organized force at
Norfolk capable of effective resistance, the United States
naval officers were ordered to evacuate the dockyard,
wdiich they did hastily, taking ship to Hampton Roads,
after settinir fire to and scuttling the vessels that could
not be carried off, and destroying as much of the
propert}^ on shore as possible. (See Note, p. -tO.)

Pensacola was in an isolated position, and its dock-

22 THE SECRET SELTICE OF THE

yard was not one of construction, but only of slielter
and repair.

But even if these two naval arsenals had been com-
plete in every particular, and there had been no want of
material, machinery, and skilled workmen, they would
still have been well nigh useless as places of outfit for
vessels suited to cruise at sea, because the Federal
Government held the fortifications at their entrances,
and there was safe and ample anchorage within reach
of the oruns on shore, so that a thorough and efficient
blockade could be, and indeed was, maintained at those
points during the whole war, by a powerful combination
of ships and land batteries.

If the Confederate Government had been able to build
and equip cruisers at Norfolk, they could not have got
to sea, unless they had been strong enough in number
and armament to defeat the blockading squadron in
Hampton Roads, and had remained after their victory
in condition to engage and pass the forts.

There was equal deficiency and want in respect to
private ship-yards. The conditions of labour, soil, and
climate which prevailed in the South had made the
people agricultural and not commercial. They produced
valuable and bulky stajjles, and ships chiefly from the
Northern States and from England performed the
carrying trade. The merchants who lived and did
business at the Southern ports owned few if any ships, and
as there was no home Avant for large shipping, there had
been no demand for architects to design and build them.

It is quite safe for me to state that at the beginning
of the year 1861 there was not, within the whole boun-
dary of the Confederacy, a single private yard having the
plant necessary to build and equip a cruising ship of the
most moderate oftensive power.

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EVllOPE. 23

When President Davis and liis Cabinet contemplated
this paucity of supply and poverty of home resources,
they did not renounce the purpose or abandon the hope
to harass the enemy's commerce, to interrupt his lines of
maritime communication, and to break through his
blockading- fleets, but they perceived that an efi'ective
effort to accomplish all or either of those aims must of
necessity be made abroad; and as early as April, 1861,
it was determined to send an a2:ent to Eno-land to set
on foot and <lirect such naval operations as it might be
possible to organize beyond the limits of the Confederate
States.

At a very early period of the war it became a matter of
common conjecture that ships were building in England
for the service of the Confederate States, and it was not
many months before the depredations of the Alabama
and Florida confirmed those suspicions. To build or
even to buy ships suitable for either attack or defence,
to get them out of English ports, and then to equip
and arm them, were undertakings requiring the utmost
secrecy and reserve, the success of every effort depending
upon the fidelity and discretion of many subordinate
agents, and the precise correspondence of many com-
plicated arrangements. It was necessary, first, to build
or buy a ship, and to disguise or omit the semblance of
equipment for purposes of war ; to obtain the guns from
one maker, and often their carriages and gear from
another ; to get the shot and shells from a third, and
the small arms and ammunition from at least two other
parties. The large quantity of stores, clothing, ham-
mocks, etc., etc, required for a cruising- ship could not,
with prudence, be obtained from one dealer, and a tender
was needed to receive and carry abroad the whole of
those essential effects, which it was necessary to forward

2i THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

to tlie port of shipiiieiit witli (jiiick despatch and at short
notice.

AVlicn e^■crything■ Avas rcadw it was no easy matter
to so combine movements that ship and tender, sailing
from different ports, sliould meet at the appointed
rendezvous ; and then, after the meeting, there was
always much difficulty and many obstacles to the safe
and speedy transfer of stores and tlie completion of the
armament. The necessity for these perplexing and
intricate proceedings arose not fi'om the fact that there
Avas the slightest degree of moral criminality in their
performance, but because there is in England, as there
is in other countries, a statute known as the Foreign
Enlistment Act, or other cognate title, which forbids
either of two belligerents to equip, furnisli, fit out, or
arm any vessel within the realm, for the purpose of
making war upon the other. A violation of that statute
involved the forfeiture of the wdiole of the property ;
and, as the Act might also be so interpreted as to bring
the parties concerned inider its penal provisions, every^
detail in the fitting of a ship, which could by any pos-
sible construction of the laAV be considered ' equiimient,'
was of necessity dispensed with.

During tlie war, when the partizans of both sides
were irritated and excited, and each spoke and wrote
about the other with heat and passion, it was common
to denounce the secession of the Southern States as an
act of criminal rebellion, and the efforts made by their
agents to obtain abroad the supplies which the resources
of the country at home could not furnish, were con-
demned in rather stronof lanofuau'e.

That view of the subject has been almost universally
discarded in Europe, and even in tlie Xorthern States
there are now but a scant minority, chiefly of the pro-

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 25

fessional politician class, who affect to regard the late
Civil \Yar in any other light than that of a revolution
justified by innumerable j^recedents in history. If the
Confederate army had been defeated at Bull Run, and
General ^McDowell, by a rapid pursuit, had captured
President Davis, with Johnston and Beauregard red-
handed from the fight, those gentlemen would probably
have l)een summarily tried, and possibly executed, as
traitors.

With equal probability that would \\^xe been the fate
of Washington, Hancock, and Adams if General Gage
had been able to disperse the ' Continental forces ' at
Cambridge, Massachusetts, at the beginning of the War
of Independence, and to obtain possession of their
persons. The \icissitudes of the late war often gave
to the Confederacy a preponderance of advantage, both
as regards success in the field, and the numl)er of
prisoners.

Under those conditions it was manifestly impossible
to treat the captive Confederates as traitors, and since
the two opposing parties negotiated with each other for
years upon equal terms, arranged conditions of sur-
render, and exchanged prisoners in accordance with the
universally admitted rules of Avar, sensible men every-
where have perceived the irrelevancy of such expressions
as ' treason ' and * traitor.' They have ceased to be used
in dignified and grave discussions, and will not pro-
bably be revived in any fair and impartial histor}' which
may be written in the future.

It will be my effort in the following pages to
demonstrate that nothino- was done bv the asrents of
the Confederate Government in Great Britain which
was not justified by the rules of fair and honourable
Avarfare, nothing contrary to English law as construed

26 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

by Eiig-Hsli jurists, and confirmed by the judgment of
English com*ts, and nothing in abuse of the hospitality
and refuge England lias ever offered to the exiled and
oppressed. But it will be necessary, or at least it
Avill be convenient and jjroper, to give a brief account of
the condition of the country during the period between
the election of Mr. Abraham Lincoln to the Presidency
of the United States and the beo-innino; of hostilities,
and to describe the maimer in which the agent w^as
selected, and with what instructions he Avas sent to
Europe.

The personal incidents are neither important nor
peculiar. Adventures similar in kind, and involving
greater personal risk to the actors, are without doubt
preserved in the memories of many, but they have not
been narrated in connection with the general course of

o

events.

It is my wish and purj^ose to mention no circum-
stance whose mterest is of a purely personal character,
but only such as may help to illustrate the very peculiar
condition of affairs durini>- those eventful months Avhich
immediately preceded the great Civil War.

From the date of the formation of the Provisional
Government at Montgomery to the beginning of hos-
tilities, the political condition of the country had been
anomalous.

There were two Presidents, two Cabinets, tAvo Con-
gresses. The Government at Washington retained all
the regalia and prestige of the supreme power. It con-
trolled the army and navy, and held the national
treasury and the national domain. The foreign Diplo-
matic Corjjs still recognised it as the only national
authority, and no foreign PoAver had yet questioned
Mr. Abraham Lincoln's title to be the President of the

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 27

whole Union in its entirety, both by privilege of law
and by right of possession. Notwithstanding all this,
there had been for several months a rival Executive and
a rival Congress at Montgomery, to whom at least six
States liad given their adherence, and within the limits
of those States no United States writ could run, and
no United States soldier could remain.

The Government at Montgomery had, moreover,
assumed control of the postal routes within the seceded
States, and the Custom Houses throughout their coasts
were administered under the same authority.

By a law of the United States, a vessel sailing from
one liome port to another was required to have a regular
Custom House clearance, under penalty of seizure and
forfeiture. The authorities at Washington did not, of
course, recognise tliose at Montgomery, and a certificate
of clearance from Xew Orleans, verified by a Collector
of Customs appointed l)y the Confederate Treasury De-
partment, was not admissible at any port in the United
States. In spite of this embarrassing condition of afi'airs,
the coasting trade and the postal intercourse between
the Xorth and South were not for some months inter-
rupted or seriously disarranged. The Customs officers
at New York and elsewhere made some seizures of
vessels arriving with irregular Confederate Custom
House clearances, but they were released by orders from
AVashington. As a test case, the mail- steamship Bien-
ville., under my command, was seized at New York in
March, 1861, for alleged violation of the United States
revenue laws, and I Avas requested to go to Washington,
where I had an official interview Avith the Secretary of
the Treasury, the Hon. Salmon P. Chase, on the sub-
ject. I pointed out that there was no United States
official of any kind at New Orleans, and that I was

28 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

compelled either to take a clearance from the dc facto
authority or to remam at that port indefinitely.

Mr. Chase perceived the j)ecnliarities and perplexities
of the situation, and released the ship from all liability,
but he was manifestly puzzled, and asked me if it was
the intention of the Com])any to send the ship back to
New Orleans. I replied that it was.

He then said that the right of the so-called Con-
federate Government to assume control of the Custom
Houses at the Southern ports could not be admitted
even by implication ; bat still it was obvious that for
the moment those who had usurped the legitimate au-
thority had the power to enforce it against private
persons, and he directed me on the next occasion of ap-
plying for a clearance to make a formal notarial protest
setting forth the precise circumstances. Before the
Bienville returned again to Xew York, hostilities had
begun, and questions of civil jurisdiction had been
silenced by the clamour of war. All thinking men per-
ceived that this dual authority, and this conflict of
prerogative, could not continue for an indefinite time.
Virginia was still mediating, and a ' peace commission '
was sent from the South to Washington to treat for a
friendly separation. But neither intercession nor nego-
tiation could effect that purpose. The South wanted
to withdraw from the Union, peaceably, if possible.
The North Avished to preserve it, peaceably if ])ossible.
The South urged the distinct autonomv and the com-
plete individual sovereignty of each State. The North
.saw in that doctrine an indefinite extension of the
secession movement and a final dissolution of the whole
Union.

That was the real issue. None other could have
imited the Southern people or have nerved them to

CONFEDERATE STATES' IX EUROPE. 29

suffer as they did ; none other could have overcome the
repugnance of many in the Xorth to engage in a war of
conquest against their brethren of the South. The
charge often made, that the North fought for empire in
the sense of coveting more territory, appears to me to
have been as unfounded as the counter -allegation that
the South took up arms to extend the area of slaver v, or
even to preserve that institution in perpetuity.

Political parties had ceased to be divided uj^on prin-
ciples and interests common to both sections of tJie
country, and had come to be separated by a geographical
line. Thus had arisen a condition which the Fathers of
the Republic foresaw might happen, and which they had
predicted would be dangerous, if not destructive, to the
Union.

There were, unhappily, many men of extreme views
in tlie dominant party at the North wlio had got control
of the party machinery. They appeared determined to
force upon the country measures which would have
placed the South at the mercy of a sectional majority.
But I believe that the great mass of the people on both
sides Avere very desirous to find a peaceful solution of
the difficulties. The principles at issue were, liowever,
too antagonistic to be reconciled, and the tension was
approaching nearer day by day to the breaking strain.
The fuel was laid in order, the kindling materials were
abundant. A spark might at any moment light a con-
flagration, and the spark soon fell. When Louisiana
seceded, the Governor of that State, the Hon. Thos. 0.
Moore, appointed a committee of experienced and influ-
ential men to advise and help him to put the State in a
condition to meet any emergency that might arise.
Among the members were General Braxton Bragg and
Colonel J. K. Duncan, both of whom were ex-artillery

30 THE SECRET SEliJlCE OF THE

officers of the United States army, and the conmiittee
■vvas called the ' Board of War.' The board had been
sitting- for some time at Xew Orleans, and State troops
had occupied the old forts, built many years before for
the protection of the river ap])roaches, and had put them
in habitable and fairly defensible condition against a
sudden attack. These circumstances had somewhat
accustomed the people of Xew Orleans to the prospect
of a possible conflict. During the early days of April,
1801, there was a general feeling that aifairs could not
be peaceably arranged, and there appeared to be a ner-
vous solicitude, and a seeming impatience of further
delay, together with a suppressed inclination to preci-
pitate a direct and immediate issue.

On the 13th day of April, 1861,1 was in New Orleans
in command of the United States mail steamer BienviUc.
The ship was apj^ointed to sail on the following mornmg,
and a large number of passengers had booked for the
vovao'e, some for their customary mio-ration durino- the
hot months, and some to escape the danger and privations
of battle and siege, which they already scented in
the air.

Early in the morning of that day there were flying-
rumours that fighting had begun somewhere, and
about ten o'clock it was known with certainty that
Beauregard had opened fire at Charleston upon Fort
Sumter.

The tidings soon spread, and the whole city Avas alert
to learn the particulars and to discuss the consequences.
There Avas no excitement. Groups of men collected
about the street corners, at the hotels, and other places
of public resort, and talked earnestly, but gravely, about
the possibilities of the future.

Every man who has had to face extreme danger

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 31

probably remembers ever afterwards his feelings on the
first occasion. There was a tingling of the flesh a
chilliness of the scalp, and a sensation as if each hair was
slowly lifting itself on end. It was not fear, because
the bravest of the brave are thus affected. It was only
the keen consciousness of peril.

It is narrated of the great Henri Quatre, that once,
at the beginning of a battle, he felt this premonitory
shiver creeping over him, and looking down at his knees,
Avhich appeared to be shaking, he addressed them thus :
' Ah ! you tremble. You would tremble much more if
you knew where I am going to take you.' New Orleans
seemed to be in that sort of tremor.

There was no appearance of bravado, which is never
the mark of true self-reliant courage, neither were there
any signs of despondency or distrust. There was an
effervescence among the younger men, and a few talked
of arming and marching to the frontier without waiting
for a call ; but the majority of the j^eople sj)oke and
acted like men who were conscious that a great crisis
had arisen, and they were ready to meet it.

The Southern officers of the United States army and
navy had, with remarkabl}' few exceptions, resigned
their commissions when their respective States seceded,
and the Confederate Congress very soon passed an Act to
incorporate them into the new service with the same
relative rank which they had held in the old. I was
one of a small number of lieutenants in the United
States navy who had been detailed by the Government
to go into the Mail Service some years before the war,
with the object to enlarge the school for experience in
steam. The Steam Packet and Mail Service increased,
and there was a demand for commanders. In the navy
promotion was slow, and the certainty of remaining in

32 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

a sul)or(linate position until age had sapped tlic energies
ajid ambition had ceased to inspire was depressing.

Private companies offered good positions and satisfac-
tory emolument, and several lieutenants resigned their
naval commissions and remained in tlie private Mail
Service. I was one of those who retired, and when
Georgia seceded I was only a })rivate individual engaged
in the ordinary business of life. I had become com-
pletely identified Avith the shipping enterprises of Xew
York. I had no property of any kind at the South, nor
any pecuniary interests whatever in that part of the
country.

^lanv persons thought to the very last that some-
how or other an agreement would be come to, and there
u^ould be no war, and I did not feel that there was
either a necessity or obligation requiring me to give up
my occupation and business connections prematurely.
All to whom my opinions were of any interest or import-
ance knew wliat they were. I liad never concealed or
even disguised the fact that in respect to tlie issues
at stake my heart and my head Avere with the South.
My sympathies and convictions were both on that side,
although my personal interests Avere Avholly, and my
2)ersonal friendships were chiefly, in the Xorth. What-
ever had ha})pened, neither friend nor foe could haA^e
said Avith truth that I was not ready to act in harmony
Avith my convictions at the proper time. When Beaure-
gard fired the first shot at Fort Sumter m the early
daAvn of April 13th, 1861, he sounded a call Av^hich
summoned every man to fall into line on his own
side, and there could no longer be either hesitation or
delay. Those officers Avho had retired fi-om the United
States navy to enter the Mail Service, and who still
remained in it, were noAv drawn by a natural laAv to

CONFEDEBATE STATES IN EUROPE. 33

their own side of the dividing- line. Those from the
N^orthern States thought it their dutj^ to offer their
services to the Government at Washington, and were
restored to their former positions in the United States
j*^avy. Those from the Southern States were impelled
by corresponding motives to offer their services to the
Government at Montgomery, and were incorporated into
the Confederate Navy. At 10 a.m. on tlie 13th of
April, 1861, all doubt in regard to the condition of
affairs at Charleston had vanished, and I Avrote a letter
to the Hon. J. P. Benjamin, w^ho Avas then the Attorney-
General of the Confederate States, requesting him to
offer my services to the Government.

Some members of the Cabinet knew of my naval
education and employment in the Mail Service, and I
explained to Mr. Benjamin, that being* in command of
the steamship Bienville^ it w^as necessary for me to take
her back to N^ew York, and return her to those to w^hom
she belonged, but that on arrival in New York I Avould
be ready for any service. After posting that letter I
went on board ship, to hasten the preparations for sailing
on the next morning'.

In the course of the afternoon two members of the
* Board of War ' came to tlie ship with the company's
agent, and informed me that it had been thought im-
portant to secure the Bienville for the naval service of
the Confederate States, and if I w^ould name a price, the
Governor would order the amount to be paid.

I replied that I had no authority to sell the ship, and
therefore could not fix a price, nor could I make any
arrangements for transferring her to the Confederate
States. We had some further conversation on the sub-
ject, the members of the Board urging me to accept the
Governor's offer, and I repeating, in substance, what I

VOL. I. 3

34 THE SECRET SEllVICE OF THE

liad said at first. Finally, they told me that if I did
not accept the terms offered, it Avould probably be
necessary to take the sliip by force, but they would
inform me of the Governor's decision at a later
hour.

The Governor of the State and the members of the
Board of War knew precisely my position, and the pro-
posal for the purchase of the ship was made in a very
friendly way to me personally. I felt assured that
nothino' would be done in a harsh or violent manner,
but still I felt that I could neither sell the ship nor give
her up without resistance, and it was inexpressibly
painful to contemplate the possibility that I might be
forced into collision with the Government I was willing
and had just offered to serve.

Late in the afternoon, one of the gentlemen who had
previously called came again to the ship, and told me
that the Governor had decided to refer the matter to the
authorities at Montgomery, and he had telegraphed for
instructions. The agent of the Mail Steamship Company,
Mr. John Fox, spent the evening on board with me.
He was a Southern man, and a Secessionist, and, I
believe, in his heart hoped that the ship would be seized ;
but he was loyal to me and to the New York owners,
and said I was quite right in refusing to give her up on
any terms.

I told him I could not, of course, fight, but I could
run, and I meant to. To that end I had the mooring
lines shifted, so that they could be slipped from on board,
and I directed the engineer to get up steam. My pur-
pose was to swing off from the pier, or ' levee,' at the
first show of force, and ' skedaddle ' down the river.
There was a good four or five knot current, for the
Mississippi was in the spring freshets, and I had no fear

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUBOPE. 35

of being stopped by the forts ; but I felt both grieved
and annoyed at the prospect of having to run from my
friends, to save the property of those who were con-
structively my enemies.*

Happily, the necessity for the race did not arise. At
about 10 p.m. I had the pleasure to receive a message
from the Governor to the effect that the offer for the
purchase of the ship was still open, but that nothing-
would be done to prevent my departure witli her in
the morning. The two gentlemen who brought me
this very agreeable assurance were authorized by the
Governor to show me the reply which had been received
from Montgomery to his own despatch about the pur-
chase or seizure of the ship.

The reply was from President Da^'is. I believe I
remember the very words. ' Do not detam the Bienville ;
we do not wish to interfere in any way with private pro-
perty.' These j)ersonal incidents are of no importance
in themselves, but they may be of some interest as de-
monstrating the comparatively trivial circumstances
which mark the beginning of great events, and they
manifest the purpose of the Confederate authorities to
act with prudence, and without the heat and passion
which commonly mark the conduct of men when driven
into revolutionary enterprises. At 8 a.m., April 14, the

* The question of the ability of the forts to stop an ascending
fleet by their fire, independently of an artificial obstruction in the
river, had been frequently discussed in New Orleans after the
secession of the State. On the previous voyage of the Bienville, I
had noted the time required to pass from a position in Avhich the
first gun could be brought to bear upon the ship, until she reached a
point at which the curve of the river interposed the protection of
the shore. I had found it to be fifteen minutes when descending,
and twenty-five minutes when ascending, and I had furnished the
Board of AVar with a memorandum to that efi'ect.

3—2

36 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

BienviUe sailed from New Orleans for Havana ai route
for New York. As the ship neared the forts, every one
on board came on deck to look at them. We saw the
sentinels standing at ease on the parapets. At our peak
flew the United States ensign. The flag at the stafl" on
Fort Jackson bore the familiar red and white stripes,
with blue Union in the corner, but the stars representing
the States which still remained in the Union had been
erased. The Confederacy had not yet adopted an en-
tirely distinctive flag. The BienviUe carried, I believe,
the first report to Havana that hostilities had begun,
and there was much excitement there in consequence.
The United States steamer Corwin was in port, and two
transports en route for New York with a dismounted
regiment of United States cavalry on board. The troops
had been serving on the frontier of Texas, and when that
State seceded, they had been called upon to surrender
the public property to the State authorities and to
evacuate the State.

Many officers came on board the Bienville to learn the
new^s. The officers of neither army nor navy had been
fired with the war-fever at that early date, and all ex-
pressed regi'et at the unhappy turn of affairs. They
were nevertheless Northern men, who meant to retain
their commissions, and fight it out on that side, and I
listened to their comments, but maintained a prudent
reserve.

In due course the Bieiiville sailed for New York, and
arrived there on the evening of April 22. Off the bar
we met two outward-bound steamers, standing to the
southward. Both were crowded with troops. One of
them hailed in passing, and reported that she was bound
for Washington.

It was about 9 p.m. when the Bienville reached her

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 37

berth. Off the pierhead there was lying at anchor a
large Long Island Sound steamer. She loomed up
grandly in the thin mist that lay upon the river. Her
lofty tiers of saloons were brilliantly lighted, and she
appeared to be swarming with passengers.

As soon as the Bienville was berthed, one of the
managing directors of the company came on board.
The information he had to give was important. ' There
had been fears that the Confederates would make a
sudden dash and seize Washington, and troops were
hurrying forAvard for its protection. There had been a
collision between a regiment of United States volunteers
and a mob in Baltimore, and some lives had been lost.
The steamer off the pierhead was the Empire State, "with
a regiment from Rhode Island on board.

' The Government had chartered the Bienville to take
troops to Washington, and the Rhode Island regiment
must embark as soon as possible.'

Of course, I could not go on that enterprise, and I told
the director so.

Fortunately I was not pressed for reasons. The
directors of the company were friendly to me, and
another commander was appointed in such a way that
no especial attention was attracted to my retirement.
Very shortly afterwards the steamers belonging to the
company were bought by the United States Govern-
ment, and they w^ere soon armed and sent to blockade
the Southern j^orts.

At a later period of the war I recognised the Bienville
off the port of Savannah, where she formed a part of
Admiral Dupont's fleet.

It was only nine days since Beauregard's guns had
opened fire upon Fort Sumter, but their echoes had
already reached the farthest limits of the country. They

38 THE SECIiET SERVICE OF THE

had lighted a conflagration which spread with electric
speed and burned with consuming energy for four years.

On the morning after the arrival of the Bienville at
New York, I went at an early hour to the office of the
Steamship Company.

I was in some doubt how to act, because I had
received no reply to the letter I had written to the Hon.
J. P. Benjamin from New Orleans, and it was manifest
that postal and telegraphic intercourse between the North
and South would not be kept open, even if it had been
safe or prudent to communicate by those means. My
embarrassment was happily relieved by finding a letter
from Mr. Benjamin awaiting me. It must have been
among the last to come through the regular United
States mail. The letter was brief, but to the point.

'Department of Justice, C.S.A.

^lontgomery, Alabama.

' The Secretary of the Navy desires you to come to
Montgomery without delay.

' Yours, etc.,

' ( Signed) J. V. Benjamin.'

The document was too compromising to be retained
about me, and I destroyed it at once. It was necessary
to wind up my affairs with the company, and to settle
other matters of business, and safety required that I
should act without precipitancy. It is probable that my
return to New York with the Bienville had removed any
suspicion of my ' loyalty ' which the public authorities
might have had, and my friends either thought that I
intended at least to remain neutral, or else they were too
considerate to ask questions or to suggest doubts. I was
detained about ten days in New York, and the com-

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 39

pulsory sojourn there at that time was not agreeable.
Subsequent information has assured me that if I had
shown any haste in my movements, I should have been
arrested. I mentioned to a few personal friends that I
purposed going to Philadelphia, and possibly to Cincin-
nati, and in the early days of May I started southward
with light luggage, as if for a short journey.

In the train to Philadelphia I met a commander in the
United States navy, an old shipmate of former days.
The war was uppermost in our minds, and we could
talk of nothing else. My friend knew that I was a
Southerner, and he had the tact and prudence not to
ask any embarrassing questions, but he told me that he
was going to Washington to apply for a command
in the East Indies, and said that he wanted to get
on foreign service, where he could not be employed
against the South, and wished no professional honour or
preferment which might be gained in such a struggle.

This feeling was common to the majority of the
regular officers of the United States army and navy
whom I met during the memorable period between the
election of Mr. Abraham Lincoln and the attack upon
Fort Sumter, and there is no doubt that many took up
arms, if not mth reluctance, at least witli the[feeling that
they were performing a painful duty.

I stopped one night in Philadelphia. In the public
squares and parks large bodies of men w^ere drilling,
and the streets were thronged with detachments of
troops. Everjrvvhere the din and bustle of preparation.
I hurried on via Pittsburgh to Cincinnati, arriving at the
latter place at six o'clock in the morning.

Here it was necessary to take steamer for Louisville,
and the boat did not start until 4 p.m. I walked down
to the steamboat landing and looked across the Ohio

40 THE SEC RET SEiniCK OF THE

river at the Kentucky hills beyond. Kentucky was still
' ill the Union,' but I knew that the feeling of the people
was with the South, and once across the border I should
be free from^the danger of being asked at any moment to
stop and give an account of myself At the steamboat
landing there Avere a military guard, and two ci\'il officers
who examined the packages of freight, and I learned that
passengers and their luggage would be searched. AVlien
I went to embark in the afternoon, the guards were
examining and questioning passengers at the ship's side
but a local gentleman whom I accidentallv met told
them I was a friend of his, Avho Avas goini>- to Louisville
on business, and I was permitted to pass without ques-
tion and without search. There Avere a number of Ken-
tucky people on board the boat. The elder were grave
and silent, but some of the younger men were loud and
vehement in denouncing the examination of their lu<>'£>age
It was a relief to me when the lines Avere cast off and
we moved SAA^ftly doAA'n the river. I took the first train
after my arriA'al at Louisville for Nash\T.lle, Tennessee,
and arriA^ed there at mid-day. May 5th. Tennessee had
not yet seceded, but the CouA^ention elected especially to
determine the important question of secession was sitting
in the State Capitol, and the town AA'as full of A'olunteer
corps and j^eople from the country. There was no
doubt about the feeling here ; it A\'as intensely Southern,
and everyone Avith AA'hom I spoke, at the hotel and else-
where, expressed both the hope and belief that the Con-
vention Avould ' A'ote the State out of the Union.' The
telegraph Avas working to Montgomery, and as it Avas
quite safe to communicate, I telegraphed Mr. Benjamin
that I was in Xashville en rovtc for the Confederate
capital.

While Avaiting for the dej)arture of a train for the

CONFEDEBATE STATES IN EUROPE. 41

South, I walked to the building in which the Convention
was sitting, and saw there General Barrow, a prominent
citizen, ayIio had been in the diplomatic service of the
United States. General Barrow was a member of the
Convention. I mentioned to him that I was on my
way to Montgomery to report for duty, and he requested
me to say to President Davis, confidentially, that
although the vote might not be taken for several days,
he mio'ht feel confident that Tennessee would secede.

In due time the train started, and I got on rapidly
through Chatanooga, Atlanta, etc., to ^lontgomery. It
was nearl}' midnight. May 7th, when I reached the hotel
at Montgomery, but no one seemed to think or care
about sleeping. Everywhere on the journe\- from Xew
York I had heard but one topic of conversation, and
ever}'where I beheld the same feverish excitement, the
same hastening to prepare for the now inevitable conflict.

At an early hour next morning I called at Mr. Ben-
jamin's office. He said the Secretary of the N^avy had
been expecting me from day to day, and would be
desirous to see me as soon as possible. He took me at
once to the Navy Department, and introduced me to
its chief.

Mr. Benjamin was a busy man at that time, and so
were all the members of that hastily constructed Pro-
visional Government at Montgomery. No useless phrases
were emplo}'ed in the presentation.

' Mr. Secretary, here is Captain Bulloch.'

' I am glad to see you : I want you to go to Europe.
When can you start ?'

' I have no impedimenta, and can start as soon as you
explain what I am to do.'

The announcement of this foreign mission took me
aback, to use a nautical phrase. I iiad somehow become

42 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

possessed with the expectation that I would be sent to
New Orleans.

The insufficiency of the forts to prevent the pass-
ing of a hostile fleet up the ]\Iississippi had been a
frequent subject of discussion by the ' Board of AVar,'
and among the leading citizens of New Orleans there
had been much argument and many suggestions as to
the best means of obstructing the channel. The diffi-
culties to be met were the depth and volume of water,
the great strength of the current, especially during the
spring-freshets, when the Mississippi flows to the sea
with the velocity of a mill-race, and the quantity of drift;
wood and timber which are borne along by the stream.

The question was thought to lie within the scope of
nautical experience, and I had been dra^n into the dis-
cussion and asked as a naval man to give an opinion.
It was manifest, I thought, that no permanent immov-
able obstruction could stand the strain of flood and
drift-wood, and I suggested the follomng plan :

' Float down to the bight, between Forts Jackson and
St. Philip, a large number of logs fi'om 60 to 100 feet
long, some with the stumps of the branches remaining.
Bore large auger holes through the butts of the logs, reeve
chains through the holes, and toggel or staple the ends.
Anchor a line of the logs a short distance below Fort
Jackson, say 20 feet apart, using for this line logs with
the stumps of their branches remaining, to form a sort of
marine chevaux de /rise. Anchor a second line a short
distance above the first, with about half of each log
trailing in the space between two logs of the first line ;
and a third line trailing in like manner between the
openings in the second line, etc., etc. Multiply the
lines to any extent that may be thought necessary.
Anchors being scarce, stones of suitable weight, which

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 43

would soon sink in the soft mudd}^ bottom and hold
well, can be used, and timber being abundant, the
cost of such an obstruction will be moderate, and it will
offer no impediment to the current, while the drift
timber will cant and pass between the logs. When the
attacking fleet enters the lower reaches of the river and
appears to be preparing to force a passage, make fast to
the ends of the lower line of logs 6 or 8-incli hawsers,
so that they will trail down the river. Between the
forts the river takes a great curve, and the action of the
current will keep the logs constantly sheering from star-
board to port, and they will thus be so completely
interlaced as soon to bring up ships attempting to force
through them, and the hawsers will foul the screws.
While the ships are clearing their screws, and trying to
drift out of the obstructions, the fire of the forts can be
directed upon them with deliberation, and therefore with
precision.'

I proposed that field-pieces or howitzers, covered
by a protecting force, should be masked on the river-
banks opposite the lower line of logs, to prevent the
enemy sending boats to cut the hawsers and the log
chains. I am not at all sure that the foregoing plan
was ever formally submitted to the Governor in Council
— indeed, I suspect it was not ; but it was unofiicially dis-
cussed with me by one or two members of the Board,
and when I was in New Orleans with the steamship
Bienville in March, 1861, I was asked to put the sugges-
tion in writing, and would have done so on my next
return in April, but the suddenness of the crisis at that
time, the rapidity with which events then moved, and my
necessary departure fi'om New Orleans, either prevented
my doing so, or other pressing questions took precedence-

The military men on the Board probably thought the

44 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

])lan too simple; at any rate, it was not adopted. When
Admiral Farragut attem])ted to pass the forts on the
night of April 23-2J:, 18G2, just one year afterwards, he
found the passage obstructed by ' a chain which crossed
the river, and Avas supported by eight hulks strongly
moored.'*

Parties were sent in ad\"ance to blow uj) the hulks
and break the chain. ' This duty was not thoroughly
performed, in consequence of the failure to ignite the
petards with the galvanic batter\', and the great strength
of the current.' ' The vessel boarded by Lieutenant -
Commanding Caldwell appears to have had her chains
so secured that they could be cast loose, which was done
by that officer, thereby making an opening sufficiently
large for the ships to pass through.'

The fleet does not appear to have been delayed by the
obstructions, for ;; Admiral Farragut says, ' We soon
passed the barrier chains,' and the forts could only
therefore get flying shots at the ships as they steamed
up the river. From Confederate accounts it appears
that the obstruction was a rafl, the logs and hulks com-
posing it being held together by chains, and the whole
kept in position by numerous anchors.

This stationary and rigid structure could not resist
the strain of flood and drift-wood, and was frequently
broken. Its condition excited both interest and fears at
Richmond. A fcAv days before Admiral Farragut's attack,
Mr. Secretary Mallory telegraphed to the officer com-
manding the naval defences at New Orleans, ' Is the
boom, or raft, below the forts in order to resist the
enemy, or has any part of it given way ? State con-
dition.' Captain Whittle replied (April 18), ' I hear the

* Admiral Farragut's rci)ort, dated May 6, 1862, in his 'Life ' by
his son, p. 243, etc.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 45

raft below the forts is not in best condition Tliey are
strengthening it by additional lines. I have furnished
anchors.' The Commanding General at Xew Orleans
had exclusive charge of the construction of the raft, or
obstruction, and the Naval Commander was simply
required to supply anchors and assistance when asked.

Discussions in respect to the best mode of obstructino-
the river channel are useless at this late date, and con-
jectures whether any other mode than the one adopted
would have been effectual in stopping the attacking
fleet, would seem to imply some reproach upon the
defenders, who doubtless did their best with the
materials at hand.

Remembering the discussions on the subject at New
Orleans, I got the impression, when summoned to
Montgomery, that I was wanted about the Mississippi
river defences, and the Secretary of tlie Navy's laconic
query, Avhen could I start for Europe, rather surprised
me. There was, however, no time for parley. The
Confederate Government had been scarcely three months
in existence, and yet it was pressed by the requirements
of a great emergency.

The South was outnumbered in population at least
five to one. In military and naval resources the dis-
proportion was many times greater. The only hope of
success lay in the prompt and energetic use of her whole
strength, and it was the bounden duty of everyone to
accept the position and employment allotted to him
without cavil or remonstrance.

Many of the Southern officers were on foreign
stations when their States seceded. They had not only
to return to the United States by long routes, but, after
arrival, they were compelled to find their way to the
South through the Northern States, whose people were

46 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

daily becoming more and more hostile. They had
often to take circuitous and expensive routes, and hence
most of them reached their homes with pecuniary
resources exhausted, and they had nothing to offer to
their country ' but their patriotism and their swords.'
Even their experience and their technical knowledge
were at first of little profit, because the Confederacy had
no ships for them to serve in, and no seamen to be
organized and drilled.

Mr. Mallory briefly touched upon the condition of his
Department. Very few^ of the naval officers who had
resigned from the United States Service had found their
w^ay to ^Montgomery, and not many had yet come into
direct communication with him. He had been able to
buy one small steamer at New Orleans, and Commander
Semmes had been ordered to fit her out for a cruise.

A committee of naval officers were examining the
few vessels at the different Southern j^orts, but up to
that date had found only the one Semmes had in hand
"which could be converted into a ship-of-war.

There were no machine shops, nor yards, no ship-
wrights, and no collection of material for ship-building.
It was thought to be of prime importance to get cruisers
at sea as soon as possible, to harass the enemy's com-
merce, and to compel him to send his own ships-of-war
in pursuit, which might otherwise be employed in
blockading the Southern ports. These were the chief
points of Mr. Mallory's explanatory remarks. He then
discussed the description of vessel best suited to the
requirements of the service, and the possibility of being-
able to buy or build them in England, and finally he
told me to go to m}' hotel, turn the whole subject over
in my mind, and make such notes of the conversation as
might be necessary to impress the substance on my

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 47

memory, and to call on liim again the next day. Even
at that early date, the blockade of the chief Southern ports
had been established more or less rigidly, and it was
thought better that I should find my way into Canada
through the Western States, and from thence to Europe,
than to attempt an exit fi*om one of the home ports in a
sailing vessel, the only description of craft then avail-
able ; besides which, the route via Canada promised
quicker transit, and time was of the essence of the
enterprise. This mode of departure manifestly pro-
hibited the carrying of any documents, or even memo-
randa, which could betray the object of my mission in
case of capture ; hence the necessity for committing the
chief points of the instructions to memory.

In compliance with Mr. Mallory's request I called at
the N'avy Department on the following morning, May 9.
He examined my notes of the previous day's conversa-
tion, and enlarged upon the A^arious subjects. He dwelt
especially upon the probable course of the European
Powers, and expressed the belief that they would
recognise the de facto Government at Montgomery, and
would grant to the commissioned cruisers of the Con-
federate States the shelter and privileges conceded to all
belligerents by the comity of nations. He did not
expect a formal recognition of the Confederate Govern-
ment as an independent Power until the probability of
success had been demonstrated by some substantial
victories in the field. He warned me to be prudent
and heedful, so as not to involve the diplomatic agents
of the Confederate States in embarrassing complaints for
alleged violation of neutral law or obligation, and he
directed me to acquaint myself, as soon as possible after
my arrival in England, with the nature and scope of the
Foreign Enlistment Act, and the Queen's Proclamation

48 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

of Neutrality, if one should be issued. Reverting- to
the special objects of my mission, he impressed upon
me the wish of the Government to get cruising ships of
suitable type afloat Avith the quickest possible despatch,
and urged me to buy and forward naval supplies of all
kinds without delay. Me authorised me to ])ractise a
wide discretionary power within the limits of his general
instructions, and discussed at some length the financial
question, and the mode of placing funds in Europe. He
informed me that Messrs. Fraser, Trenholm and Co., of
Liverpool, would be the bankers or ' depositaries ' of the
Confederate Grovernment, and directed me to communi-
cate with them, and with the Plon. W. L. Yancey and
the Hon. Dudley Mann, the Confederate Commissioners,
immediately upon my arrival in England. Finally, he
requested me to start as soon as possible, and said that
written instructions, with anytliing further he might
wish to communicate, would be sent me by the first
opportunity through one of the seaports.

I left Montgomery by that night's train. Before
reaching the Kentucky line I destroyed all notes and
memoranda, and from Louisville I proceeded, without
let or hindrance, to Detroit, Michigan.

The whole North appeared to be in military com-
motion. Volunteer corps in uniform, and large detach-
ments of men without uniform, were seen drilling in
every town through which I passed, and * the war ' was
the one absorbing topic of conversation among the
passengers in the trains, and the crowds assembled at
the railway stations.

Crossing from Detroit to the Canada side of Lake
Erie, I took the Grand Trunk Railway to Montreal, and
the Allan Line steamer Nortli American to Liverpool,
arriving at that port on the 4th of June, 1861.

CONFEDERATE STATES LY EUllOPE. 49

Note to Page 21.

The dockyard at Norfolk Avas at that time under the command
of Commodore C. S. McCauley, U.8.X. He had not sufficient force
on shore to have held possession of the dockyard if an attack had
been made upon it from the land side. But such an attempt was
not contemplated by the local authorities — indeed, it Avas not possible.
The Cumberland, a powerful sailing corvette, with a crew of 300 men,
had lately arrived from sea, and was lying close at hand. Her
batteries commanded the neighbouring town, and not only afforded
ample protection to the dockyard, but in fact made Commodore
McCauley master of the situation. Virginia had not yet seceded,
but the Convention to determine that important question was in
session at Richmond, and the signs pointed to the expectation that
she would soon cast in her lot with the States which had already
withdrawn from the Union. General Taliaferro had been appointed to
the local military command at Norfolk on behalf of the State of Virginia,
but he had no organized force under his control. Confederate accounts
state that he had carried on some negotiations with Commodore
McCauley in respect to the dockyard, and that it had been agreed
that * none of the vessels should be removed, nor a shot fired, except
in self-defence.' During the night of April 20th the ship-houses in
the yai'd were set on fire, one of which contained the frame of a line-
of-battle ship. These, with a long line of store-houses and offices
adjoining them, were soon enveloped in flames, and were burned.
The ships afloat, including the sailing line-of-battle ships rennsyhania
and Delaware, the frigates Haritan and Columhus. and the corvettes
Plymouth and Germanfouii, were set on fire and scuttled. The above-
named vessels were completely destroyed. The screw-frigate Merriniac
was burned nearly to the Avater's edge, but the fire was extinguished
after the United States forces had evacuated the yard, and she
afterwards became famous as the Confederate ironclad ram Virginia.
While Commodore McCauley was preparing for the work of
destroying the dockyard and its contents, Commodore Paulding
arrived with the screAv-corvette Pawnee, having a detachment of
troops on board, and the further operations were carried on under
his orders. The greater portion of the guns in the parks Avere
spiked, the machinery in the shops was broken, and an attempt Avas
made to blow up the graving-dock, but this failed. Finally Com-
modore McCauley, with the officers, embarked ; and the PoAvnee, with
the Cumberland in tow, proceeded doAvn the river. As much of the
VOL. I. 4

50 THE SECEET SERVICE OF THE

naval stores as could he got on board the CumhedandvfSi^ carried off;
the remainder -vvas either destroyed or greatly damaged. No effort
was made by the Virginia State authorities to stop the ships, for
the simple reason that there was no military or naval force capable
of opposing them.

It will thus be manifest that when Virginia joined the Con-
federacy she could offer but a small contribution to the naval
resources of her allies — only the wreck of her great dockyard.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 51

CHAPTER 11.

Messrs. Fraser, Trenholm and Co. — The Confederate Commissioners.
— Major Huse, the Military Agent. — Early operations. — Eestrictions
of the Proclamations of Neutrality. — Their effects upon United
States and Confederate Cruisers. — The Oreto (Florida). — Messrs.
Laird and the Alabama. — The Equipment of the Alabama. —
Counsel's Opinion on the Foreign Enlistment Act. — Despatch of
the Bermuda with supplies for the Confederate Army. — Second
Voyage and Capture of the Bermmla. — The Trial at Philadelphia.
— The United States and belligerent rights. — Decree of Court in
the Bermuda case. — Contrast between the action of the United
States as a belligerent and as a neutral concerning belligerent
rights. — The United States and neutral vessels during the Crimean
War. — The Bahama Islands ' Regulations ' of the British Govern-
ment.— Reasons for the seeming indifference of the British Govern-
ment.— Precedents established b}^ the United States favourable to
Great Britain. — European Naval Armaments. — British Ship-
building.— Importance of British Mercantile Marine. — Weakness
of the United States as a Naval Power. — Former efficiency of the
American Navy, — Seamanship in the Past and the Present.

My first duty after arrival at Liverpool was to com-
municate Tvith the financial agents of the Confederate
Government, but it was already late in the day, and
places of business were for the most part closed. At an
early hour on the next morning I called at the counting-
house of Messrs. Fraser, Trenholm and Co., and went up
to London the same afternoon, to see the Confederate
Commissioners, who at that time were the Hon. William
L. Yancey and the Hon. Dudley Mann.

4—2

62 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

I had no credentials, and nothiiifi' to prove my personal
identity, or the nature of my mission ; but wlicn men
are moved by a common sympathy, and their minds are
eai'nestly set upon the same object, the powers of dis-
cerning seem to be quickened, and they recognise each
other by intuitive perception. At any rate, the Com-
missioners gave me a cordial welcome, and we were
soon deep in Confederate affairs. They explained the
diplomatic situation. They had not been officially
received by Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, and did not think the Confederate States would
be recognised until they had demonstrated their ability
to Avin and to maintain their independence ; nevertheless,
the chief European Powers had admitted that there was
a de facto Government at Montgomery, with power to
raise armies and to levy war, and they thought we would
be permitted to obtain supplies in England upon
the same conditions as any other belligerent, and the}''
encouraged me to set to work with due precaution, but
with, alacrity, promising their hearty support whenever
1 miofht need their intervention.

Messrs. Eraser, Trenholm and Co. received me with
equal cordiality and equal trust. Ko funds had yet
reached them, and they had no advice of remittances on
behalf of my mission ; but Mr. Charles K. Prioleau, the
resident partner, perceiving the necessity of prompt
action, authorized me to give out such orders as were of
pressing importance, and to refer to his firm for the
financial arrangements. Captain, afterwards Major
Caleb Huse, of the Confederate Army, had preceded me
to England, and had already made some large purchases
of arms, and still larger contracts, upon the credit
of Messrs. Eraser, Trenholm and Co.

Major Huse was a graduate of the MiHtary Academy

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 53

at West Point, and after serving a number of years in
the United States artillery, had retired from active
service, and when the Southern States seceded he was
superintendent of the Alabama State Military Academy.
When the Provisional Government at Montgomer}' was
formed, Major Huse was sent to Europe to buy
arms and other ordnance supplies for the army,
and he represented tlie War Department, and especi-
ally the Ordnance Bureau, during the whole war.
This officer was a man of ability, and of unusual energy,
but his services were scarcely known beyond the office
of his departmental chief. I have always felt that the
safety of Richmond at the time of General McClellan's
advance from Yorktown up the peninsula, in the
spring of 1862, was largely due to the efforts of
Mr. Charles K. Prioleau and Major Huse, because the
former furnished the credits, and the latter bought and
forwarded the rifles and field artillery without which
the great battles of Seven Pines and the Chickahominy,
could not have been successfully fought.

It is an unquestionable fact that the Confederate
Government had great financial difficulties to meet, and
the ' depositaries ' in England were often under heavy
advances to the various Bureaux of the War Depart-
ment, and on one or two important occasions to the
Navy Department also. Major Huse showed both skill
and energy in pressing the credit of the Government,
and he often made large contracts, and even got delivery
of arms and other ordnance stores, when there were no
public funds at all in England.

My early operations Avere greatly helped by the
generous confidence of Messrs. Eraser, Trenholm and
Co. Within a month after my arrival, I had not only
been able to buy a fair quantity of naval supplies on

^i THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

tlieir credit, l)iit had laid the keel of the first foreign-
built Confederate cruiser, and she was partly in frame
before the Navy Department had found it possible
\ to place any funds in Europe. The vessel thus early
Vbegun (June, 1861), was the Oreto, afterwards Florida.

As it is tiie purpose of this narrative not only to
show that a Confederate naval force was organized
vjibroad during the Civil War, but that the operations
were carried on with strict regard to local law, I feel
the necessity of being somewhat minute in describing
the manner in which all contracts for ships were made.

The great Maritime Pouters in Europe issued pro-
clamations of neutrality* at a very early date after the
beginning of hostilities, and these proclamations were
supjDlemented from time to time by Admiralty orders
and regulations defining the conditions upon which the
ships of both belligerents would be allowed refuge
in the neutral ports, to make repairs and to obtain
supplies. The chief restrictions specified in those
orders were, that no ship should reinforce her crew, or
make greater alterations and repairs than were necessary
to ensure her safety ; that the armament should not be
changed or increased, and that no ordnance or other des-
cription of stores classed as 'contraband of war' should
be taken on board ; that the quantity of coal to be taken
should be no more than enough to carry her to the
nearest port of her own country, and after receiving that
quantity she should not enter any harbour of the same
neutral power for another supply until the expiration of
three months, except by special permission.

The example of England and France was followed by
the minor Powers. Spain and l^ortugal proclaimed
their neutrality, and announced the conditions upon

* Proclamation of Her Britannic ^Majesty dated May 13, 1861.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 55

which their ports might be used by the two belligerents.
Even Brazil and the South American Kepublics soon fell
to definmg their views, and swelled the general chorus of
' impartial neutrality ' in the great struggle between the
North and South which the easterly trade-winds wafted
over to them from Europe. If the restrictions thus
imposed u23on the cruisers of both parties in the
Civil War were vexatious and inconvenient to the
Federal Government, they were manifestly more burden-
some and perplexmg to that of the Confederacy.

The United States had four ample and well-found
dockyards on the Atlantic coast (Portsmouth, Boston,
Xew York and Philadelphia), at which their ships could
be efficiently and completely equipped. In addition to
this advantage, the home ports were always open to them
for shelter, repair and supply, and everywhere abroad
there were diplomatic and consular agents to appeal
to for aid in case of difficulty or undue exactions on
the part of local authorities. Besides this, the United
States Navy Department could furnish each cruising
ship with ample credits through bankers whose financial
position had long been assured the world over. A
Confederate cruiser, on the contrary, had no home port
for outfit or retreat. She w^as compelled to be as nearly
as possible self-supporting. Her flag was tolerated
only, not recognised. Once upon the seas, she could
never hojje to re -supply the continual waste of her
powers of offisnce or defence, and could obtain but
a grudging allowance of the merest necessaries. Her
^ military chest ' was the paymaster's safe, and her
financial resources were the moderate supply of
sovereio'ns with Avhich she beo^an her cruise. In case
of difficulty, there was no resident Minister to whom
the captain could refer for counsel or support, no

r.C THE SECliET SEllJ'ICE OF THE

consular representative who could set liis case before
the authorities in the neutral ports.

In the home ports of England and France the Con-
federate cruisers Avere fairly and courteously treated — at
any rate, the treatment was uniform and consistent —
hut in the distant colonies, and at the ports of other less
powerful and independent countries, the manner in which
they were received, and the spirit in which the neutrality
regulations were enforced, depended ver}^ much upon
the individual symj^athies and opinions of the local
Governor, or the amount of influence the resident United
States Consul could exert.

I believe this to be a very moderate statement of the
contrast between the conditions under which the United
States and Confederate cruisers were kept at sea during
the war.

If it had not been for the limitations and restrictions
of the ' Admiralty orders ' previously referred to, many
more vessels might have been got to sea under the
Confederate flag ; but it would have been manifestly
improvident, and a purposeless waste of the limited
resources of the Navy Department, to commission ships
for distant and continuous cruising, unless the}' could
carry ample supplies of all necessaries, especially of
ordnance stores, and could sail as well as steam at a
good rate of speed. A vessel without good sailing
qualities, and without the arrangement and means for
lifting her screw, would have been practically useless as
a Confederate cruiser. She could only have made
passages from one coaling station to another ; and as
she could only coal at a port of the same country once
in three months, her career would soon have been
brought to an untimely and not very creditable end.

The necessities of the case, then, dictated the type of

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE, 57

the Confederate slii]), and the Oreto (Florida) and the
Alabama were especially designed to meet those require-
ments.*

The Florida was a wooden vessel. Messrs. William
C. jMiller and Sons were the builders, and she was built
at their yard in Liverpool. That firm was selected to
build the hull of the ship, and to supply the masts,
rigging, boats, and general sea-outfit, because the senior
of the firm had been in the Royal Xavy as a shipwright,
and had served in her ^lajesty's dockyards as a naval
constructor. He had therefore much experience in the
construction of wooden sliips designed to carry heavy
weiglits on deck and to berth large crews. ^Messrs.
Miller and Sons Avere not engineers, and, as it was
advisable, for many reasons, that ship and engines
should be as near together as possible, Messrs. Fawcett,
Preston and Co., of Liverpool, were chosen to design
and build the engines. The financial arrangements
were made with Messrs. Fawcett, Preston and Co. ex-
clusively. They took the whole contract for both ship
and engines, and the preliminary discussions Avere of the
ordinary business character.

Mr. W. C. Miller had a scale drawing of one of her
Majesty's gunboats, Avhicli Ave adopted as a base to start
fi-om. She Avas draAA'n out in the midship section, and
the floor AA'as flattened to get greater carrying capacity.
The increased length thus obtained admitted of finer
entrance and clearance lines, which secured higher speed.

* The t\yo vessels built at Liverpool, and which Avere afterwards
commissioned abroad as Confederate cruisers, are generally mentioned
in this narratiA^e as the Florichc and Alabama, to avoid frequent ex-
planation. It Avill, hoAveA^er, be understood that they Avere ncA^er
known by those names in the port of their construction, and Avere
never alluded to in the arrangements Avith the Iniilders, except as
the Oreto and No. 290.

58 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

The rigging scale was also largely increased, so as to
get a good spread of canvas, especially when close
hauled, or with the wind a-beam. The type and rig
of ship being satisfactorily adjusted, Messrs. Fawcett,
Preston and Co. desimed the enmnes, which were care-
fully discussed. The contract Avas made with me as a
private person, nothing whatever being said about the
ultimate destination of the ship, or the object for which
she was intended. It is not usual for buildino- firms to
ask questions, or to express opinions as to the motives
or purposes of tliose from whom they take orders.
Before the completion of the ship, Messrs. Fawcett,
Preston and Co. and the Messrs. Miller may both have
had a tolerably clear notion that she would at some
future time, and by some subsequent arrangement, pass
into the possession of the Confederate Government ; but
they never mentioned their suspicions, and they under-
took nothing more than to build and deliver in Liver-
pool a screw- steamer, according to certain specified
plans and conditions, fitted for sea in every respect, but
without armament or equipment for fighting of any kind
whatever. To provide an answer in advance for any
inquisitive comments or surmises, Oreto was chosen as
the dockyard name for the ship. It was incidentally
mentioned among the workpeople that she would pro-
babl}'^ be sent to a mercantile firm doing business in
Palermo, and a local representative of that firm under-
took the details of supervising and despatching her.

While the negotiations for the Oreto (Florida) were
in progress, I went with a friend to visit the Birkenhead
Ironworks, and was introduced to the Messrs. Laird.
After an interesting examination of their extensive
establishment, I led the conversation to the subject of
wooden despatch vessels, and described with some

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. ' 59

minuteness the type which appeared most desirable in
my judgment. The subject was naturally of interest to
the Messrs. Laird, and the}^ gave me their opinions and
the result of their experience with freedom. A few
days after, I called again, re-opened the conversation
about a screw despatch vessel, discussed the matter
somewhat more in detail, and finally told them that I
wished to build such a ship, and asked if they would be
willing to go into the necessary calculations, draw up
specifications, and make drawmgs and a model, upon my
assurance that I meant business and was ready to give
them the necessary financial guarantee. They were
satisfied with my proposals, and in a very short time all
the details of the Alabama were settled to our common
satisfaction.

The origin of the Alabama, her departure from
England, and her career afloat, have been much dis-
cussed. Probably no single ship has ever given occasion
for so much diplomatic correspondence, or has furnished
the grounds for so many complaints, and the foundation
for so great an alleged international grievance. She has
been called a ' British pirate ;' many persons believed
that she was paid for by a subscription among English
merchants. The builders were often accused of risking
the peace of the realm by supplying a vessel of war to
cruise against the commerce of the United States, and
they have been openly charged with committing a
flagrant breach of the Queen's proclamation of neutrality
for their own selfish profit — bartering, as it were, their
loj^alty as subjects, and their duty as citizens, for a
pecuniary consideration, which it has been erroneously
alleged they received in an extravagant price for the
ship.

The great Commonwealth which forms one of the

60 THE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE

mighty union of States across the Atlantic is scarcely
known in Europe except as the producer of some half-
million bales of cotton per annum ; but her little name-
sake of a thousand tons, in a lifetime of barely two
years, has spread the name to the uttermost parts of the
earth, and has made it familiar to thousands A\dio know
nothing of geographical State lines, and at the mention
of it now would probably think of the '"Alabama Claims,'
and not of the ' Alabama State.'

This notoriety of the ship, and the long-current mis-
statements affecting her builders and all who w^ere in
any way concerned with her origin, seem to impose
upon me the duty of dwelling upon the purely business
arrangements with the Messrs. Laird more particularly
than would be at all necessary, or even expedient, under
ordinary circumstances.

The contract for the vessel afterwards called the
Alahama was made in my own name as a private
individual, and the nesfotiations Avere carried on between
the members of the firm and myself, without the inter-
vention of any other parties whatever. The Messrs.
Laird very properly looked first to the financial security.
I did not leaA'e them a moment in doubt on that point,
and being fully satisfied that the proposed transaction
was in every particular safe and regular, they took it in
hand as a part of their ordinary business.

At that time, wood had almost entirel}^ gone out of
use as a material for ship-building in Great Britain, and
it w^as suggested, and as readily admitted, that there
would be some difficulty in getting suitable timber for
the heavy scantling, such, to wit, as the stem, keelson,
and especially the sternpost, which would require to be
bored to receive the screw shaft. These facts were
mentioned and discussed with reference to the cost

COXFEDEKA TE ST A TES IN E UROPE. 6 1

and time necessary to build the ship, and it was perceived
that both would considerably exceed the estimate for an
iron vessel.

The general dimensions and other particulars of the
Alabama were: length 220 feet; breadth, 32 feet;
draft, with all weights on board, 15 feet ; tonnage, 1040 ;
engines, two horizontal, of 300 horse-power nominal, but
on trial trip indicated 1,000 horse-power. She was
barque -rigged, with very long lower masts, to get large
fore and aft sails. Her sails, carried at will, were as
follows : fore, fore-topmast staysail and jib ; two large
trysails, the usual square sails on fore and main masts,
with the exception of the main course, which was set
flying ; spanker and gaff-topsails ; all standing rigging
wire. IShe was admirably fitted in every respect :
engines equal to Admiralty standard ; brass screw,
GriflS.th's pattern, with lifting apparatus, and stowage
in iron bunkers for 350 tons of coal. She was provided
with a double suit of sails and the usual outfit for
an East India voyage. She had five boats, including
launch, cutter and whale-boat, and ample ground-
tackle. She was well supplied with hawsers, and had
spare blocks, running gear, etc., to meet all requirements
for at least a year. The engineer's stores and spare
engine-gear w^ere on the scale supplied to ships of
the Royal Navy intended for long and distant voyages,
and she was provided with condensing apparatus and
cooling tank to supply fresh water. She was built
of the very best materials, copper-fastened and coppered,
and w^as finished in every respect as a first-class ship.
I was satisfied in every particular with the manner in
which the builders fulfilled their contract, and I believe
she was as fine a vessel, and as well-found, as could
have been turned out of any dockyard in the kingdom,

62 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

equal to any of her Majesty's ships of corresponding
class in structure and finish, and superior to any vessel
of her date in fitness for the purposes of a sea rover,
with no home but the sea, and no reliable source
of supply but the prizes she might make.

The price paid to the Messrs. Laird, including the
outfit, was £47,500, payable by the terms of the
contract in five equal payments of £9,500 each ; and
the last instalment was made payable after satisfactory
trial and delivery to me on the ]\Iersey in the j^ort
of Liverpool. Everyone who has had experience in
the cost of ships Avill admit that the price named was
not in the least deofree excessive or unreasonable. I
had previously superintended the construction of vessels
of varying types, and I thought at the time, and am of
the opinion now, that the contract price for the Alabama
afforded only a fair commercial profit to the builders.

The foregoing statement will, I trust, be accej)ted as
a complete and final refutation of the charge often made,
that the ^Messrs. Laird were 2>aid a high j^rice for under-
taking the exceptional risk of building a vessel of war,
and delivering her to an agent of the Confederate
Government beyond British jurisdiction. In point of
fact, they delivered to me an unarmed ship in the port
of Liverpool. As another simple matter of fact, they
did not know for what purpose the ship was intended
when they agreed to build her. They were not informed
of anything which had reference to the armament, and
are to this day ignorant of the manner and place of
equipment, excepting in so far as the movements and
performances of the ship, after she passed out of their
hands, are known to the general public. (See p. 96.)

I feel that I owe to the memory of the late IMr. John
Laird, M.P., an explicit and unequivocal denial of the

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 63

charofe so often made that he was concerned in the
building and equipment of the ship afterwards called
the Alabama, a statement which many persons have
thought to be confirmed by some inadvertent expres-
sions in Admiral Semmes' narrative of her cruise under
his command. At the time when I was negotiating for
the Alabama, Mr. John Laird had retired from the firm
which bore his name, and he was shortly afterwards
elected to serve in Parliament as the first member for
Birkenhead. My business arrangements, and all the
discussions about the design and cost of the ship, were
carried on with Messrs. William and John Laird, junr.
Mr. John Laird, the subsequent member for Birkenhead,
had nothing whatever to do with the transaction, and I
am quite sure that he was never even present at any of
my interviews with the firm in reference to that subject.

After Mr. Laird took his seat in Parliament, I under-
stood and appreciated his position, and was rigidly
reticent about Confederate affairs. Our acquaintance
ripened into friendship, and I was his debtor for many
acts of kindly social courtesy, but never, in the freedom
of fi-iendly and familiar conversation, was the subject
of the Alabama discussed or even alluded to until she
was afloat as a Confederate cruiser, and her acts had
become matters of common knowledge, and topics of
general comment.

In May, 1874, I had occasion to go to the Brazils on
business, and I called to bid Mr. Laird good-bye, and to
get a number of letters of introduction which he had
kindly obtained for me. We were talking about the
Amazon, and a steamship company formed by the Baron
de Maua to navigate that mighty river. The conversa-
tion turned upon ships in general, and the Alabama was
incidentally mentioned. I told him how her battery

64 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

and ordnance stores were sbip])ed from London, and
<rave him an account of our adventures at tlie island of
Terceira, where she was armed and equipped. He was
much interested, and remarked that lie had always
thoug'ht it most fortunate that I had never mentioned
the circumstances to him durin^- the war, because his
ignorance of them enabled him to say, when attacked in
Parliament, without the least mental reservation, that
he was not only free from all complicity in the equip-
ment of the ship, but that he knew nothing about her,
except Avhat had been revealed to the general public.

Mr. Laird's statements in the House of Commons
that he had nothing to do with the building or equipment
of the Alabama were frequently s})oken of with distrust
by other members who were ardent partisans of the
United States, and the newspapers which adopted and
defended the same cause persisted in repeating the
original charge, in face of the most distinct and un-
equivocal denials ; but he had the satisftiction to know
that her Majesty's Government implicitly believed his
disavowal, and he came to feel at last that the repetition
of the charges was merely intended for party pui*poses,
and hence he ceased to give much heed to them.

At this late date, when time has softened the resentful
temper and the sharp antagonism which seem always to
warp the judgment and embitter criticism during periods
of great political excitement, I may indulge the hope that
my testimony in regard to the building and equipping
of Confederate ships abroad will be received without
distrust. I can conscientiously say that I have neither
the purpose nor the wish to conceal a single fact ;
indeed, my only fear is that anxiety to tell the whole
truth may lead me into the error of too great minute-
ness of detail, and that I may be seduced into the

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 65

expectation that incidents and adventures wliicli force of
circumstances strongly impressed upon my own mind
may be of corresponding interest to others.

The chief object of this narrative is to demonstrate, by
a plain statement of facts, that the Confederate Govern-
ment, through their agents, did nothing more than all
other belligerents have heretofore done in time of need —
namely, tried to obtain from every possible source the
means necessary to carry on the war in which they were
engaged, and that in doing so they took particular pains
to understand the municipal laws of those countries in
which they sought to supply their wants, and were
especially careful to keep within the statutes.

The Foreign Enlistment Act, and its bearing upon the
naval operations of the Confederate States in England,
will be fully explained and discussed in a subsequent
chapter ; but to preserve a due and relevant connection
<3f subjects, and to keep the record in appropriate rela-
tion to the order of events, it seems fitting to mention
that at a very early day after my arrival in England I
took legal advice.

The object of the Confederate Government was not
merely to buy or build a single ship, but it was to main-
tain a permanent representative of the Navy Department
abroad, and to get ships and naval supplies without
hindrance as long as the war lasted. To effect this pur-
pose it was manifestly necessary to act with prudence
and caution, and to do nothing in violation of the
municipal law, because a single conviction would both
expose the object and defeat its aim. A fortunate cir-
cumstance led me to consult the late Mr. F. S. Hull, a
member of a leading firm of solicitors in Liverpool, and
he continued to act as my solicitor durmg the whole
period of the war. Mr. Hull was a prudent, cautious,

VOL. I. 5

66 THE SEC BET SE 11 VICE OF THE

conscientious adviser, and throughout all those troublous
times I found him a Avatchful and safe mentor. I kept
him informed of all important transactions, and con-
sulted him with reference to all contracts.

There were many complications, and perplexing ques-
tions were constantly cropping up. These he faced with
coolness, judgment, and good temper, and never once
led me astray or encouraged me to undertake the im-
practicable. He piloted me safely through the mazes of
the Foreign Enlistment Act, in spite of the perplexing
ambiguity of its 7th Section, and the bewildering itera-
tions and reiterations of the j^recept not to ' equip,
furnish, fit out, or arm ' any ship with intent, etc., etc.

Generally Mr. Hull felt and proved himself competent
to deal with the legal questions as they arose, without
referring to any other authority; but at the time of
makino- the contracts for the Alabama and Florida, no
case involving the forfeiture of a ship had ever been
brought to trial under the Foreign Enlistment Act,*
and there had therefore been no judicial decision as to
its interpretation. If the Act prohibited the building
of a ship for a belligerent under all circumstances, and
imposed upon the builder the onus of proving that there
was no intent to arm her beyond British jurisdiction, it
was important to know it, because if that Avas the law,
merely concealing the ultimate purpose from the builder
would not protect the property from seizure and for-
feiture. Mr. Hull therefore drew up a case for counsel's
opinion, and submitted it to two eminent barristers,
both of whom have since filled the highest judicial
positions. The case submitted was a general and not a
specific proposition. It was not intimated for what

•' ^Alexandra Case,' speeches of the Attorney-General and Sir
Hugh Cairns.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 67

purpose or on whose behalf the opinion was asked, and
the reply was therefore wholly without bias, and em-
braced a full exposition of the Act in its bearing upon
the question of building and equipping ships in her
Majesty's dominions.

The inferences drawn from the investigation of the
Act by counsel were put into the following form by my
solicitor :

' 1. It is no offence (under the Act) for British sub-
jects to equip, etc., a ship at some country without her
Majesty's dominions, though the intent be to cruise
against a friendly State.

'2. It is no offence for any person (subject or no
subject) to equip a ship icithin her Majesty's dominions,
if it be not done with the intent to cruise against a
friendly State.

' 3. The mere building of a ship ivitlwi her Majesty's
dominions by any person (subject or no subject) is no
offence, whatever may be the intent of the parties^ because
the offence is not the building but the equippiny.

' Therefore any shipbuilder may build any ship in her
Majesty's dominions, provided he does not equip her
within her Majesty's dominions, and he has nothing to
do with the acts of the purchasers done within her
Majesty's dominions without his concurrence, nor with-
out her Majesty's dominions even with his concurrence.'

The foregoing deductions from the terms of the Act
were kept rigidly in view in all contracts for ships in
England, and every possible precaution was practised
both for the protection of the builders against criminal
prosecutions under the Act, and for that of the ships
against forfeiture. In no case was any builder or vendor
informed what was the purpose of the purchaser. No
ship was ever supplied with any portion of her equip-

5—2

68 rUE SECnKT SKUVICE OF THE

merit irithbi her Majesty's dominions, nor was the
huilder or vendor of any ship employed to assist in the
equipment icithoiit her Majesty's dominions.

On the 27th of July, 1861, the first remittance on
account of the Confederate Navy Department reached
England. The Oreto (Florida) was then partly in
frame, and the plans and specifications of the ship
afterwards called the Alabama being complete, the
contract with the Messrs. Laird was closed on the first
day of August.

It is very seldom that a particular name is given
to a ship until at or about the time of her launch, but
a dockyard number is assigned to her, for convenience of
reference, and for specification in the accounts of
expenditure. The number given to the ship contracted
for with ^lessrs. Laird was ' 290,' which, it will be
perceived, had none of the mysterious signification so
often ascribed to it, but meant simply that she was the
290th ship built by them.

It was often alleged, after the departure of the
Alabama from Liverpool, that a peculiar and mysterious
secrecy was practised in respect to her, and that no one
was permitted to examine her, or even to go into Messrs.
Laird's yard while she Avas building, without a special
permit. This is quite a mistake. My intercourse with
the builders was only so far secret that I kept my
own counsel, and did not communicate to them the
purpose for which the ship was intended. They,
on their part, asked no questions, and, so far as I know,'
they adopted no special restrictions with regard to
visitors to the works while she was in their hands.
Official documents, long since published, have proved
beyond doubt that the officers of Her Majesty's Customs
had free and unopposed access to her at all times, and

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUIIOFE. 69

the general public were not excluded in a greater
degree, nor under more stringent conditions than are
commonly enforced in all well-regulated manufacturing
establishments. *

When the United States Minister was clamouring at
the door of the Foreign Office, and pressing Her
Majesty's Government to seize, or at least to detain,
the Florida and Alabama, the Consul at Liverpool
supplied him with numerous ' affida\T.ts ' of persons who
subscribed the usual form of oath that they had seen me
on board giving instructions and describing the type,
arrangements, and ultimate destination of the ships.
Either those affidavits were ' made to order,' or else it
was not difficult to get a view of both the ships. By-
and-by it will be shown that many of the affidavits
were prepared with little regard to actual facts, and
that they were generally made either by hired ' private
detectives,' whose chief aim was to earn their pay,
or at least to give something in return for it, by self-
appointed spies, who found a ready market for their
tales, or by that class of persons who are possessed

* See report of Mr. Morgan, Surveyor of Her Majesty's Customs,
Liverpool, dated 28th June, 1862 :

' The officers have at all times free access to the building jards of
the Messrs. Laird at Birkenhead, where the said vessel is now lying ;
and there has been no attempt on the part of the builders to dis-
guise what is noAV apparent to all, that she is intended for a ship-of-
wsly:—' Alabcuaa Papers,' 24th March, 1863.

That the Alabama subsequently left Liverpool unarmed is proved
by the official report of the Surveyor of Customs, dated 30th July,
1862:

' I have only to add that your directions to keep a strict watch on
the said vessel have been carried out, and I write in the fullest con-
fidence that she left this port without any part of her armament on
board. She had not as much as a signal-gun or musket.' — 'Alabama
Papers,' 24th March, 1863.

VOL. I.*

70 THE SECnET SE 11 VICE OF THE

with a mania to spring at a lea]) to convictions which
may or may not prove to be rig'ht in the end, but
who, unwilling to await the natural and regular fulfil-
ment of events, are impelled by a restless impatience
to manufacture the intermediate facts or to mould
and distort them so as to confirm their preconceived
opinions.

None but an unsophisticated or very impertinent
person would think of walking into any business
premises and asking the owners Avhat they were doing,
and who for. Such inquirers get either evasive replies,
or rebuffs more or less courteously expressed. It is
probable that the Messrs. Laird had frequently to meet
such contingencies, and I have no doubt that they
invariabl}^ ' rose to the occasion,' and knew when to be
courteously equivocal, and when to maintain a frigid
reserve.

About the month of August, 1861, Messrs. Eraser,
Trenholm and Co. determined to send a steamer to one
of the Southern ports with a cargo, not wholly of arms,
but of general supplies suited to the wants of the
armies in the field, and their Charleston house, Messrs.
John Fraser and Co., had sent over an experienced coast
pilot to take her in. Mr. Prioleau told me of this
purpose, and informed me that while his firm expected
to realize a fair commercial profit from the undertaking,
their chief object was to demonstrate that the blockade
was ineflficient, and thus they hoped to encourage others
to embark in like enterprises, by which means the
pressing wants of the South could be supplied with more
or less certainty.

It was important to keep the destination of the ship
secret, but Mr. Prioleau told me of his purpose, as he
said, to ad\n[se me about the adventure, and also to

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUKOPE. 71

offer me the opportunity to sliip sucli arms and ordnance
stores as Major Huse and I might have ready to forward.
The steamer engaged for the purpose was the Bermuda.
She was fitted out and loaded at West Hartlepool, and
I went to that port with Mr. Prioleau to superintend the
shipment of the goods especially intended for the Con-
federate War and I^avy Departments, while Major Huse
looked after their despatch to the shipping port.

The Bermuda was commanded by Captain Eugene
Tessier, who had long been employed by the firm in the
Charleston trade ; and his pilot was Captain Peck, well
known on the coast from Charleston to St. Aus^ustine.
She sailed from West Hartlepool in August, 1861 ; got
safely into Savannah, September 18th ; and ran out again
with a laro-e caro;o of cotton, which she ])rouo;ht to
Liverpool.

Mr. Edwin Haigh, of Liverpool, the registered owner
of the ship, in an affidavit presented to the United States
District Court of Pennsylvania in October, 1862,* said
as follows : ' I am informed and believe that the said
steamship (^Bermuda), in the prosecution of her vo3^age,
was not warned off by any of the blockading cruisers ;
and that she entered the port of Savannah without
meeting with any of such cruisers, or having the oppor-
tunity of ascertaining whether the said blockade was
still in force, and there discharged her cargo.'

It will thus be seen that Messrs. Eraser, Trenholm
and Co. accomplished their purpose of demonstrating
that the blockade of the Southern coast, at the time of
the Bermudas voyage (August and September, 1861),
was inefficient ; and it is probable that their expectation
of realizing a commercial profit by the adventure was

* See 'Report of Proceedings in Admiralty, U.S. /•. SS. Bcrinmlib
and Cargo, Philadelphia, August, 1862,' p. 448.

72 TIIK St:CI!l-:T SEliriCE OF THE

also fiilfilU'd. Tlioir example undoubtedly stimulated
the trade, but the United States soon strengthened and
increased the blockadinof force, and durinof the last two
years of the war the difficulty of getting in and out of
the Southern ports was made greater and greater, until
only the swiftest vessels stood any chance of success,
and they only when favoured by dark nights and suitable
weather.

In February, 18()2, the Bermuda was despatched
again from England, but the greater efficiency of the
blockade at that time, together with the fear that she
was both too large and too slow to promise success,
caused the owner to abandon the purpose or attempt to
run her into a Southern port. The cargo, laden in
Eno-land, was intended to be discharo-ed at Bermuda
or Nassau, and a return cargo for Liverpool had actually
been provided by her consignees at Nassau.

This voyage of the Bermuda is interesting and im-
portant, because it affords a typical example of the
manner in which the United States dealt with neutral
vessels captured for real or alleged violation of the
blockade, and furnishes also a fittino* occasion for
some remarks ujDon the general conduct of the United
States towards neutrals during the war, and the
precedents that Government persistently laboured to
establish.

In pursuance of the owner's purpose, the Bermuda
sailed from Liverpool, touched at the island of Bermuda,
and in due course proceeded towards Xassau, her final
port of destination. On the morning of April 27th,
1862, being off the southern point of Great Abaco
Island, the Hole-in-the-Wall Light bearing south-west,
distant, according to the varying testimony of witnesses,
from less than three to over seven miles, the Bermuda

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 73

was stopped by a shot fired across her bows from the
United States steamer Mercedita, a prize crew was put
on board, and she was taken into Philadelphia.

There was some delay in bringing her case to trial ;
but finally she was arraigned before Judge Cadwalader,
of the United States District Court sitting in Admiralty
at Philadelphia. The proceedings began August 12th,
18G2, and the arguments ^;"0 and con were closed on the
16th of the same month. ' At the conclusion of the
argument, the judge remarked that he would consider
the case very carefidl}', and deliver his opinion at as
early a day as practicable.'* The outline of the case
cannot be better stated than in the -words of Mr. George
M. AVharton, counsel for the owners, or the ' claimants,'
as they are designated in the legal proceedings. Mr.
Wharton said : ' It is the case of a British vessel, owned
by a British subject, laden at Liverpool by British
merchants, and bound for Bermuda, a British colony.
After arriving at Bermuda, the ship has directions from
those who have the right to control, so far, her moA'e-
ments, to go from Bermuda to Xassau, another British
colonial port ; and while navigating in the direct Ime
fi'om Bermuda to Xassau, and at the distance of about
415 miles from that portion of the American coast the
blockade of which she is alleged to have violated, Avhile
sailino' amons' these British islands in a direct line
toward her place of destination, she is overhauled by a
cruiser of the United States Government, captured,
and brought here for trial and consequent condemna-
tion.'

The contention of the United States Attorney was to
this effect. The voyage to Bermuda and Nassau was
only a colourable pretext. The cargo was either
* See ' Eeport of Proceedings,' p. 397.

74 THE SECRET SEE VICE OF THE

enemy's property, or was shipped with the intent to be
forwarded to an enemy's port through the blockade, and
that even tliou<!:h the Bermuda mis-ht break bulk at
Nassau and land the whole of her cargo there, the
purpose was to reship it for Charleston, or some other
blockaded port. He furthermore urged the })lea that a
vessel bound in point of fact from London to Charleston,
could not plead in defence an original design to stop at
Nassau during the voyage, and that she was sailing at
the moment of capture for or in the direction of the
intermediate port. In their arguments the counsel for
the United States also contended that if the original
intention was to run the blockade, and merely to make
Nassau a place of call for any purpose whatever, the
vessel was liable to capture the moment she got beyond
the limit of British jurisdiction, which tliey specified to
be any distance beyond three miles outside of the port
of Liverpool.

International law is not an exact science. The
highest authorities differ in the construction of its rules,
and the most learned judges have variously interpreted
its provisions. It is a code Avhich has never received
the willing or unanimous consent of all nations, but
bears upon its face the impress of having been forced by
the stronger upon the weaker, and history furnishes
many instances in which during times of war belligerents
have set aside or acted in defiance of its apparent and
commonly received conditions, whenever their interests
required, and their power was sufficient to enforce
their purpose. Interference with trade between neutrals
and either of two belligerents has always been considered
oj^pressive, and in derogation of a natural right. By
the declaration of Paris of 185 G, the principle that the
neutral flag covered the goods and protected the ship

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 75

also from searcli, when on the high sea, was agreed to,
and the rules which prohibited a neutral from carrying
the goods of a belligerent, or compelled the neutral
to submit to ' the right of search,' were done away with,
as between the Great Powers who were parties to that
declaration. This did not, of course, abolish the right of
blockade.

It is not my purpose to argue or even to comment
upon the law points involved in the case of the
Bermuda. The whole of the proceedings have been
published, and have been no doubt carefully examined
by the interested parties. The present object is merely
to set out the circumstances of the capture, and the
facts appertaining to the disposal of the ship and cargo,
and thus to demonstrate the manner in which the
United States enforced their belli o:erent riofhts, and the
broad scope they claimed and practised in the exercise of
them. It is manifestly difficult to prove an intent, and
in the case of the Bcrnmda the only evidence on the
part of the United States was purely circumstantial ; on
the other hand, a number of persons in Liverpool were in-
terested in the shipments by her, and the particulars of
the voyage were known to many persons, and were much
discussed. It was well understood among the shippers
of goods that the vessel would go only to Bermuda and
Nassau, and among the documents laid before the Prize
Court,* there appears an affidavit by one of the Liver-
pool agents of the ship, in which there is set out, among
others, the following declaration : ' That the caro;-o laden
here' (Liverpool) 'was intended to be discharged at
Bermuda or Nassau, and that a return cargo for this port '
(Liverpool) * had been provided by her consignees at
Nassau.'

* See ' Eeport of Proceedings,' p. 424.

70 THE SKCUET S Eli VICE OF THE

The Bermuda was no doubt tainted by the alleged
previous violation of the blockade, but it has been shown
tliat she was not Avarned off, nor did she even see a
blockading vessel when she entered the port of Savannah
in September, 18G1, and it is therefore questionable
whether that voyage was in reality a Ijreach of blockade.
The ca})tain, too, seems to have lost his head, or to have
been over-confident in the protecting influence of his
flag and register. He should either have got his ship
clearly and indisputably Avithin the marine league, and
held on to all of his papers, or destro3'ed every docu-
ment except his manifest, letter of instruction, and
register, or he should have beached the ship and thus
have prevented her capture. He did neither, but stopped
at the first shot, and then destroyed only the papers in
his personal charge, containing those which demonstrated
that the ship \A'as to go no further than Nassau, and left
on board the private correspondence, for the nature of
which neither the owners nor the agents were respon-
sible.

However, the name and previous history of the sliip,
the nature of the cargo, and the particulars of the
voyage, could neither of them have been known without
forcible stop])age and search, and the fact remains that
the commander of the Mercedita enforced an extreme
and unusual belligerent pretension against a neutral
ship proceeding to a colonial port of her own country,
when steering towards that port, and on a course away
from, and 415 miles distant from the nearest part of the
coast the blockade of which she was alleged to have
violated.

Although the arguments in the Prize Court were con-
cluded on the l(jth of August, 1862, and the judge
announced his purpose to render judgment ' as soon as

CON FE DEE A TE ST A TES IN E UBOEE. 7 7

practicable,' * no decision was given up to December lOtb,
1862, and the further proceedings in the case may be
briefly stated as follows :

December 19th, 1862, the 'Attorney of the United
States ' petitioned the Court for an order directing the
Marshal to deliver to any authorized agent of the Kavy
Department of the United States the said steamer
{Bermuda), on the payment by the United States into
the Registry of the Court of the amount of her appraised
value. f The petition showed that the ship had been
appraised at the sum of $120,000, that the United
States wished to employ her in the naval ser\dce of the
United States, and had deposited the full amount of the
appraisement with the United States Marshal for that
district (Philadelphia) ; that the steamer had been
brought to the port of Philadelphia, May ^rd, 1862, and
had remained there from that time at heavy charges con-
sequent upon her detention ; that besides the official
compensation allowed the Marshal for the custody of
said steamer, special expenses had been incurred in the
employment of means necessary for the preservation of
the engines, boilers, and other parts of the ship, ' and
that the expenses incident to said detention which have
accrued, and are continually accruing, render the said
steamer in a relative sense perishable/ etc.

On the same date (December 19th, 1862) counsel for
the owners filed protest against the foregoing in due
form. J December 2Srd the Court ordered survey and
appraisement. Appraisers reported, December oOth:^
' The said steamship {Bermuda) has deteriorated in
value since the 12th day of September laM at the rate of
per month, exclusive of interest . . . caused

* 'Report of Proceedings,' p. 397. + Ibid. p. 458.

X Ibid. p. 459. § Ibid. p. 461.

78 THE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE

mainly by a want of the care and attention of proper
officers and crew ;' and tliey fix the vahie at $120,000.
March bfh, 18 Go, the Court decreed as follows :* ' It
appearing to the Court that the said steamer was, at the
time of capture, the property of enemies of the United
States, or otherwise confiscable as j^rize-of-war, it is
ordered, adjudged and decreed that the said steamer,
her tackle, apparel and appurtenances be, and the same
are, condemned as good and lawful prize.' In a sort of
preamble to tlie foregoing decree, the judge stated that
he was not prepared to give judgment in respect to the
carofo, and would therefore defer his ' reasons in detail
as to the vessel until a decision as to the cargo.' On
the same day counsel for the owners gave notice of
appeal, and the Attorney for the United States moved
for delivery of the ship to the United States jf and it
was ordered ' that, on the deposit of the said sum of
$120,000 in the registry of the Court, the said steamer
be delivered to the Navy Department of the United
States.' March 6th, 1863, counsel for the owners
prayed an appeal in due form, J which was allowed ; but,
nevertheless, the ship was delivered to the United
States Navy Department. She was quickly armed and
equipped as a vessel-of-war, and was cruising off the
Southern coast under the flag of her captors before the
appeal was heard.

It can hardly be the deliberate purpose of any Govern-
ment to exercise its belligerent rights with vexatious
stringency as regards neutrals ; and when vessels are
captured or detained on suspicion of an intent to violate
a blockade, or of carrying enemies' property, the least
forbearance that can be claimed is that the case should

* ' Eeport of Proceedings,' p. 462, t Ibid. p. 463.

+ Ibid. p. 463.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 79

be promptly dealt with, and that the property should be
carefull}' protected from injur}' pending the judicial
proceedings. But a very brief summary will demon-
strate that, if the United States were severe in the
practice of their rights on the high seas, they were none
the less rigorous and unyielding in the treatment of
those whose commercial interests were involved in the
captures made by their cruisers. The Bermuda was
caj^tured April 27th, 1862, and reached Philadelphia
May 3rd, 1862, where she was suffered to remain
until August 12th, deteriorating ' at the rate of $800
per month, exclusive of interest, for want of care and
attention.' Then, when the hearing of the case was
concluded, no judgment was rendered for seven months,
the deterioration going on at, or in excess of, the above
rate ; and finally she was handed over to her captors,
upon their application, in spite of the owners' protest,
and pending an appeal.

It will be perceived fi'om the statement of this case
— and many others of like particulars might be men-
tioned— that the United States asserted and practised
the right to stop any neutral vessel anywhere exceed-
ing three miles from her own coast, to take her to
a United States port, and there to determine whether
there was circumstantial evidence of a purpose or intent
to proceed herself, or to re- ship her cargo, to a blockaded
port. Manifestly this pretension was a virtual denial of
the doctrine that ' the flag covers the goods,' a principle
for which the United States had contended previously to
the Civil War, although they had not formally assented
to the agreement of the Great Powers at Paris. It was
also an assertion of the ' right of search,' a doctrine
which the United States had ever before resisted with
vehement earnestness, carrying the opposition so far, in

80 THE SECRET SEJIVICE OF THE

1812, as to face the cost and peril of a war with Great
Britain rather tlian submit to it.

The commonly admitted principle that there could be
no such thing as contraband goods in a neutral vessel
bound from one neutral ])ort to another was wholly
abolished by the United States during the Civil War,
although no country had so strongly contended for its
maintenance in regard to its own commerce in past
times.

These statements are not now made as matters of com-
plaint or reproach against the United States, but they
serve to confirm the truth of the old and somewhat
homely phrase, ' circumstances alter cases.' They
demonstrate the fact that when nations are at war
they act u})on the principle that the end justifies the
means, and although the laws of humanity in reference
to the treatment of persons are not often violated in
these latter days, yet the ' sacred rights of property ' are
seldom treated with reverence, and belligerents limit
their encroachments upon the privileges of neutrals, not
by abstract principles of law and justice, by respect for
treaty stipulations, or sentimental regard for inter-
national comity, but by considerations of policy and
self-interest. They press their rights and use their
privileges to the full measure of forbearance on the part
of neutral states, or their own power to enforce and
maintain them.

The bitter complaints of the United States Minister
against Her Majesty's Government for alleged neglect in
permitting the Confederate agents to get a few un-
armed ships in England, the querulous despatches of
Mr. Secretary Seward on the same subject, and the
harsh epithets which were freely showered upon the
persons concerned in those undertakings, appear almost

CONFEDEBATE STATES IN EUROPE. 81

ludicrous when the acts of those agents are contrasted
with what was done by the American commissioners to
France during the War of Independence, the equipment
of Paul Jones's ships witltin the French dominions, the
capture of the Florida by the United States ship
Wachmett in the neutral port of Bahia ; the seizure and
search of numerous vessels sailino- under neutral flaa's,
and passing on their course many miles away from the
blockaded coast during the Civil War of 1861-G5, and the
enlistment of thousands of men in Europe, and their
shipment from Liverpool and elsewhere for service
in the United States army, under the thin disguise
of labourers for American railways, or an ordinary
exodus of emigrants. If there was any blockade-running
under the French or Spanish flags, the attempts were
too few to attract public notice, and I liave no record of
any official remonstrances from either Paris or Madrid
against the interference of the United States with the
commerce of those countries.

It will scarcely be pretended that French or Spanish
subjects refrained from engaging in the prohibited trade
with the South because they thought the traffic wrong
in itself, or because of any high notions of duty or
favour to the United States as a friendly power. The
Confederate Government confined tlieir operations
chiefly to the better and cheaper markets in Great
Britain, and the purchases made in France were for the
most part sent first to England, or to the Havana,
Bermuda and Nassau, from whence they were transhipped
to a Confederate port. Moreover, maritime adventure
of that kind has always been peculiarly attractive to the
Anglo-Saxon race, and during the American Ci\il
War many British subjects embarked in the contraband
traffic, stimulated alike by the prospect of large profits

VOL. I. 6

82 THE SEC BET SEBVICE OF THE

and the exliilarating effects of the risk and uncertainty.
Besides this, all shipments on account of the Confederate
Government were made chief!}' in English vessels,
because it was soon perceived that no vessel under
the Confederate flag could load in a British port and
hope to escape interference, detention, and perhaps
seizure, on suspicion that she was intended for armament
as a cruiser.

The United States Government knew that England
w^as the source and fountain of supply for the Con-
federate States, and that English bottoms were the
means of conveyance. They looked with suspicion
upon every British ship which ventured to approach the
Western World. Their men-of-war policed the waters
adjacent to Mexico and the Spanish as Avell as the
English West Indies, and were not particular as to the
course a vessel was steering, or the port to which she
was bound. A British register, and a British flag,
w'ere assumed to be prima facie evidence of an ' intent '
to run the blockade, and many steamers, and even one
sailing vessel, the Springbok, were captured when bound
fi'om Europe, chiefly from England, to a British
Colonial port, or to Cuban and Mexican ports. Many of
the vessels employed by the United States in blockading
the Southern ports durmg the war were captured
blockade-runners, and it has always seemed strange
that no fast steamers were built at the North for that
special purpose.

A I'nited States naval officer, who was a long time on
blockade service, has told me that few of the original
blockaders could steam over eight to nine knots, and it
is a fact that ver}' few blockade-runners were caught m
an open chase with ample sea-room.

During the Anglo-French War with Kussia, com-

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUEOPE. 83

monly called the Crimean War, the Russian Go\'ern-
ment made a large contract with Colonel Samuel Colt
for repeating arms of his patent. The arms were chiefly
manufactured at Colonel Colt's works, near Hartford,
in the State of Connecticut, and they were shipped
together with other goods, contraband of war, in large
quantities from the United States in American and other
neutral vessels to the Prussian port of Memel, on the
Baltic, from which they were forwarded to Russia, pro-
bably in great part overland.* The British and French
Governments either admitted the legality of this traffic
between neutral ports in articles contraband of war, and
manifestly intended for their enemy, or else they did not
care to involve themselves in controversy with the
neutral Powers who were engaged in it.

In the same way the Confederate agents and private
commercial parties also shipped goods of all kinds fi'om
England to English colonial ports, to Havana and to
Matamoras during the Civil War. The general purpose
was no doubt to use those ports as entrepoU^ and to
tranship the goods not intended for hond fide delivery
by steamers especially designed to run the blockade.
The ships actually engaged in running the blockade
were liable to capture whenever the}^ approached the
blockaded coast or were in proximity to it, and were
legitimate prize-of-war when thus caught. But neutral
vessels on voyages, say from England to Nassau, Havana,
and Matamoras, and steering the direct course for those
ports, were surely within their rights, and were or should
have been as free from interference by either belligerent
as American ships trading to the Baltic at the time of

* Besides the taking of arms to Memel on behalf of Kussia, many
American ships were chartered by the French Government, and were
employed as transports during the Crimean War.

6—2

84 THE SKCllET SKUVICE OF THE

the Crimean War were exempt from interference by the
cruisers of France and England.

The United States would have complained most
bitterl}?-, and would probably have done something* more
than remonstrate, if those Powers had so stretched their
belHo-erent rio:lits as to nse the Swedish and Danish
bavs along the shores of the Cattegat as points of obser-
vation from which to watch and interrupt American
trade with the neutral ports in the Baltic.

It is on record, however, that United States ships kept
up a quasi blockade of Nassau during the years 1861-G5,
and that British vessels bound to that port were chased
and captured within the Bahama Channels. The British
steamer Margaret Jessie'* was chased off the island of
Eleuthera by the United States steamer Rliodc Island,
but escaped, though repeatedly fired at with shot and
shell when so close to the shore that some of the shell
fell upon the land, cut down trees, and did other damage.
In fact, the United States Government attempted to
establish coal-depAts at both Bermuda and Nassau, and
kept cruisers at or in the near neighbourhood of the
latter port, especially to intercept vessels, whether in-
w^ard bound from Europe or outward bound in the
direction of the southern coast. f

To prevent this use of the Bahama Islands, and to
prevent also the possible collision of United States and
Confederate ships within British waters, her ^lajestj^'s
Government were induced to issue ' regulations,' in
January, 1862, forbidding the vessels of both belligerents
alike to enter the port of Nassau except by permission of
the Governor or in stress of weather. The United
States paid but little heed to the spirit of those regula-
tions. ' There were no less than thirty-four visits of
* ^Margaret Jessie Debate.' t See 'British Counter-Case,' pp. 63 — 65.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 85

United States ships-of-war to the Bahama Islands during'
the time that the regulations were in force.* On four
occasions, at least, vessels of the United States exceeded
the twenty-four hours' limit, and took in coal by per-
mission ; one of them also received permission to repair.
Several were engaged in pursuit of vessels suspected of
being blockade-runners, and did not in every instance
relinquish the chase within British limits. Two prizes
appear, indeed, to have been captured by them, one
within a mile of the shore, the other almost in port.' j"

' The use made of the waters of the liahamas by
Federal cruisers, for the purpose of watching and inter-
cepting vessels supposed to be freighted with cargoes
for Confederate ports, was so persistent as to induce the
Governor on one occasion, when granting permission to
coal to the commander of the Dacotah, to accompany it
with the condition that the vessel should not, within the
next ten days, be cruising within five miles of an}' of
the Bahama Islands.'

It will be perceived tliat the United States adopted
the most rigorous means to repress the trade in neutral
ships between England and the British and Spanish
West Indian Islands ; and they did finally almost
entirely suppress it by a strict and severe extension of
the belligerent rights of visit, search, and capture — an
extension previously unknown to International Law.

Before the American Civil War, it had been commonly
assumed tliat a neutral vessel bound to a neutral port
was free from capture, and that a prize court would not
inquire into the destination of her cargo. The American
Courts introduced the principle that if sufficient evi-
dence could be discovered of an intent to tranship the

* See ' British Counter-Case,' Geneva Arbitration, pp. 109 — 110.
t 'Appendix to British Case,' vol. v., p. 224, for particulars.

86 THE .'^KCI.'ET SELTICE OF THE

cargo for delivery at a port of the belligerent, the cargo
itself, and in some cases the ship also, became, as Judge
Cadwalader expressed it in re Bermudd, ' confiscable.'
The United States Government acted upon the above
interpretation of international law. During the Civil
War many neutral vessels were captured ])y their cruisers
on the high seas, when bound from one neutral port to
another, and were condemned upon evidence of an
intended breach of blockade which was often very slight,
and, from the nature of the cases, purely inferential.

The course pursued by the United States cruisers among
the Bahama Islands, to which lier Britannic ^Majesty's
Government opposed no effectual prohibition, and the
decisions of the United States Prize Courts, to which
no formal objection seems to have been offered, destroyed
in a great degree the advantage which the proximity of
Nassau to the southern coast afforded to the Confederate
Government, because the risk of capture extended over
the whole voyage from England, and was not limited to
the comparatively short run from the Bahama banks to
the blockaded ports ; and the only iDcnefit left was that
of transferi'ing the caro;oes to lishter and swifter vessels
at Xassau.

The United States Secretary of State, Mr. Seward,
often complained of and denounced the use which tlie
Confederates made of Nassau, and the trade which
grew up at that port, in language not always suited
to the courtesy of diplomatic correspondence or the
dignity of State Papers, and the United States cruisers
continued to chase and often to capture the neutral ships
within the waters of the Bahamas and Spanish West
Indies, or when approaching them from Europe.
England, the Power chiefly concerned, submitted, or at
least made no effectual protest, and it is both interesting

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 87

and important to investigate the reasons for her seeming
indiiFerence.

No one who remembers the promptness and spirit
with which Lord Palmerston's Government resented the
taking of the Confederate Commissioners from the Royal
Mail steamsliip Trent by Captain Wilkes, and the
alacrity with which preparations were made to forward
troops to Canada, and to prepare a fleet for offensive
operations if the said Commissioners were not given up,
can suppose that her Majesty's Government were
deterred from protecting British ships engaged in trade
between England and the West Indian Colonies, or
between the several islands on that side of the
Atlantic, from lack of spirit to uphold the national
honour, or from a conviction that the trade was in
itself contrary to either Municipal or International Law.
In the ' counter- case ' presented on the part of her
Britannic Majesty's Government to the Tribunal of
Arbitration at Geneva, it is con-ectly stated that
Havana and Cardenas, in the Spanish island of Cuba,
were made use of for the same purpose as Xassau, and
that Confederate agents were maintained at those ports,
and it is then remarked (p. 58) : ' In this there was nothing
that the British Government was bound or legally em-
powered to prohibit, nor was any such obligation incum-
bent on the Government of Spain. Persons trading
either with the Southern States or with those which
adhered to the Union were free to use Nassau, as they
were free to use any other port in the British dominions
convenient for their purpose.' Clearly, then, according
to the views of her Majesty's Government, the Con-
federate transactions at Nassau, so far at least as
regarded its use for the purpose of an entrepot^ were
unobjectionable both in equity and law.

88 THE SECRET SEl'l'ICE OE THE

T would not venture to sav that tlie British ^linistry
of that (hay seriously discussed the conduct of the
United States Government in Cahinet Councih and
determined to submit to the interruption of Britisli
trade, and to the violation of the British flag, Avith the
intent to confirm a new interpretation of International
Law and to establish ])recedents against the I'nited
States ; but there can be no doubt that a broad con-
struction of l)elligerent maritime rights would be
especially and ])eculiarly favourable to Great Britain
and the other Great ^Maritime Powers of Europe when-
ever they may be again engaged in war, and the
course pursued by the United States toAvards neutral
ships during the years 1861-65 and tacitly acquiesced in
by the Euro])ean Powers, will at some future day
involve the former Government in a dilemma.

It is manifest to those who are acquainted with the
British steamship trade at this time, and the class of
vessels engaged in it, that at very short notice — say two
months after a declaration of war — England could have
at sea not less than one hundred steamers taken from
the merchant service capable of carrying heavy guns,
ample supplies of stores and fuel, and with an average
speed of thirteen knots, a good mam- with much
higher speed. So large a marine police, in addition to
the powerful fleet of the Royal Navy, would render the
transfer of contraband goods across the seas impossible,
and it can scarcel}' be doubted that, if England were
engaged in war, she would act upon the example of the
United States, and Avould stop the conveyance of such
goods to ports adjacent to those of her enemy, even
though covered by the American flag. AVhat would the
successor of Mr, Secretary Seward say to that ? He
could not deny or explain away the precedents. Sub-

CONFEDEllATE STATES IN EUROPE. 89

mission to such an interruption of their trade would not
be long borne by the people of the United States, The
alternative would be war, probably at a time when
the country would be unprepared with ships either for
active cruisiuQ- or for a vigorous defence of the coasting-
trade.

All the European Powers are steadily increasing their
naval forces. They are not only building armour-cased
ships and torpedo vessels, but others especially designed
to cruise into distant seas. France, Germany, and even
Austria and Italy, have dockyard accommodation and
store>s of material which would enable tliem to add
quickly to their present force of cruising ships.
Steamers taken from the l)ritish or Continental merchant
services would l)e more vulnerahle than vessels con-
structed especially for Avar, bat at the beginning of
hostilities they would be greatly superior in speed,
power, and in number to the opposing ships the United
States could quickly put afloat — strikingly superior
to those commissioned by the United States during
the Civil War. It is well known that many British
commercial steamers built of late years have been con-
structed with special reference to future conversion into
cruisers or torpedo vessels, under arrangements with
the Admiralty, and the great building-yards of the
Clyde, Merse}', Thames, Tyne, etc., could turn out any
description of vessels with great rapidity.

The ao-o'reo'ate of tonna^'e built in Great Britain
during the year 1881 was not less than a million tons,
the Clyde alone having completed 269 vessels, represent-
ing a tonnage of 340,823 tons. There was one firm on
the Tyne — Messrs. Palmer — who turned out no less an
output than 50,492 tons of iron shipping in that year.
In reference to the advance which has been made in

90 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

speed, it is only necessary to mention such ships as the
Britannic^ Germanic^ Serrid, City of Home, Arizona^
Alaska, all of whicli have crossed the Atlantic between
I^ew York and Queenstown at a speed of not less than
15 knots for every hour they were at sea; and the
steamship Sthiim/ Castle has actually jierformed, at sea,
with a dead weight of 3,000 tons, 18^ knots in an hour.
There would be no insurmountable obstacle in convert-
ing the majority of modern steam vessels of the British
mercantile marine to war purposes. The chief and
most important alterations would be to remove deck-
houses, increase pumping power, place additional water-
tight compartments, and perhaps protect exposed parts
of engines. Such alterations as the foregoing Avould
enable most modern British steamers not only to carry
batteries sufficient to defend their own cargoes, but
would fit them to cruise against commerce and to make
raids upon an enemy's coast. The Hecla, a private
steamship, was bought by the Admiralt}^ in 1878. She
has been armed with five ()4-pounders and one 40-pounder
gun, and without any structural strengthening has
proved a decided success.

The figures in respect to increase of tonnage, perform-
ance of steamship Stirling Castle, and success of Hecla
are taken from the address of the President of the ' In-
stitution of Xaval Architects,' and from the paper read
by Mr. John Dunn ' On Modern Merchant Ships,' at
the Session, March 29th, 1882. The loo;s of the Liver-
pool and New York packets have been published, and
their performances are well known to the travelling
public and to all who take an interest in steam shipping.

During the Crimean War, and on other occasions of
need, the ability of the i)rivate shipbuilders of Great
Britain to supplement the efforts of her Majesty's dock-

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 91

yards has been fally and satisflictorily demonstrated,
and some of the Continental Powers have in late years
largely increased their building capacity, American
naval officers, and probably the executive naval autho-
rities also, are conscious of the continuous increase of
maritime strength abroad, and contemplate with painful
misgivings the apathy that prevails at home. The
United States do not appear to have any fixed policy in
reference to the national armaments or the efficiency of
the naval service. Conofress doles out a few millions of
dollars from year to year, which barely suffices to keep
the public dockyards in repair and a few ships of a by-
gone type at sea, and allows nothing for steady con-
tinuous enlaro-ement of the cruisino* and fio-htins; fleet
proportionate to the increasing extent and growing
requirements of the country, or the progress and develop-
ment of naval efficiency abroad.

There is an admirable naval school at Annapolis ; the
course of study and the scientific training of young
officers for the United States Xavy is very thorough,
and embraces a large range of subjects. Some may and
do think that both the education and the training are
too strictly theoretical, and too purely military, and that
too little attention is now paid to practical seamanship.
Some critics also say that the cadet midshipmen are
kept so long and so exclusively employed at the pure
mathematics, in the study of laAv, and at artillery and
infantry drill, that they are too old when sent afloat for
regular cruising to acquire the constitutional aptitude
for the sea, and the smart active habit of handling ships,
which the officers bred, say, thirty years ago possessed.

This impression is strengthened by the appearance
and manoeuvring of the United States ships I have seen
abroad since the war. In the year 1841-42, I was serving

92 THE SKCL'ET ^ Ell VICE OF THE

on board the I nited States sailing sloop-of-"\var Decatur,
on the Brazil Station. She Avas a model man-of-war.
Some of her performances Avould almost seem incredible
to the officers brought up in these daj^s of steam. AVe
nsed to furl sails from a bowline in thirty- five seconds,
and sliift courses, when at sea witli all sail set, in nine
minutes from the time the first order was given to ' uj)
courses ' until the tacks were on board again. Once,
while cruising with a squadron of five other ships, off
Cape Frio (the late Commodore Cliarles ^lorris being in
command), the flagship made signal to 'shift main top-
masts.' The squadron, all sailing ships, was standing
by the wind in two columns with top-gallant sails set,
and the spare main-topmasts were lashed in cranes out-
side and abreast of the main-chains, and in tidy ships
like tlie Decatur Avere covered with canvas laced tightly
round the spar and painted black. The Decatur had
her spare spar aloft and on end, rigging all set up, and
the main top-gallant sail set again, in fifty -two minutes
from the time the signal was hauled down on board the
flagship. The times of performing all evolutions were
entered in the log-books, and I took notes of them in
my journal.

The foregoing may be considered fancy performances,
when everything was ready, or at least in expectation ;
but the smart, well-trained crew of the Decatur Avere
equal to any emergency. On one notable occasion the
ship was lying off Buenos Ayres. She Avas moored for
the AA'inter gales Avith seventy-fiA'e fathoms of chain on
the port bower, and one hundred and fiA-e on the star-
board, the latter backed by the stream-anchor. The top-
gallant masts, top-gallant and royal rigging Avere on
deck, the topmasts Avere housed, the topsail-yards AA'ere
down fi-om aloft, and the loAver yards Avere lasjhed

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUL'OFE. 93

across the rails. While in this condition, the captain
received orders very unexpectedly to proceed without
delay to Montevideo, and in two hours and forty- two
minutes the ship was standing down the river La Plata,
under top-gallant sails, jib, and spanker, Avith both
bower-anchors fished and the stream-anchor in the
fore-hatch. I ought to mention that at the time referred
to the Decatur was commanded by the late Commander
Henry W. Ogden, and her first-lieutenant was John H.
Marshall, who was unsurpassed in his day as an
executive officer. Before the end of the cruise, Com-
mander Ogden was invalided, and was relieved in
the command by the late Admiral David G. Farragut,
who did not permit the Decatur to fall ofi:' in smartness ;
indeed, while the latter officer was in command, he
once, as an experiment, put the ship through the
evolution of reefing topsails in stays, a manoeuvre
immortalized in nautical song and naval poetry, but
which I never saw performed except on that single
occasion.

Such performances w^ould not be possible with the
heavy ironclads of the present day, and as all men-of-
war appear now to enter and leave port under steam,
and use canvas only with leading winds, or when
they can make nearly the desired course, officers and
men have but little practice in maniBUvring under
sail, and it is not surprising that smart handy seaman-
ship should have declmed since the universal application
of steam-power to men-of-war. This lack of smartness
is apparent in the ships of all the Maritime Powers. I
stood at the George's Pierhead in Liverpool, and saw
her Majesty's ship Defence man yards on the occasion of
the visit of his lioyal Highness the Prince of Wales to
open the New North Docks in 1881, and such first-

94 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

lieutenants as used to handle the British frigates
and corvettes in ohlen times Avoukl liave near!}' gone out
of their minds to see the slow cautious way in which
the men laid out on the yards, and the prudent delibera-
tion with which they clung to the ratlins when laying
down from aloft.

Officers of the American navy are now probably, as
a class, more carefully and thoroughly educated than
those of any other national marine, at least in the
theory of their profession, but there is great scarcity
of native seamen, and it is not too much to say that
there is not now a single ship on the United States
Navy List which Avould be classed at all among the
effective naval forces of any European Power, and the
United States could not send a squadron to sea upon a
sudden emergency equal in the character of the ships to
the fleet which even the little Republic of Chili had in
commission during the late Avar with Peru.

In fact, the United States appear to have voluntarily
abandoned their claim to be included among the naval,
or even the maritime, Powers. The military marine has
been suffered to fall below that of almost every other
country ; and such is the lack of mercantile ships, that
the great staples produced in such prolific abundance in
the vast territory of the Union would never reach a
foreign market if dependent upon American vessels
alone for transportation. England has, in fact, appro-
priated almost the entire carrying trade of the ll^nited
States ; and the splendid steamships which issue from
English ports, and the wealth of British steamship com-
panies, furnish a measure of Britain's profit and America's
loss from the apathy of the United States Government
in respect to its maritime interests.

If this indifference to naval equality with other

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 95

countries was the result of a well-considered policy of
economy, or arose from confidence in the ability to
make good the deficiency by a great effort in case of
need, it would be intelligible, although of doubtful
wisdom ; but ships fit to meet the requirements of
modern warfare cannot be built hurriedly, and hasty
preparation always involves waste of material and ex-
travagant expenditure.

The United States Government, through a combative
but indiscreet Secretary of State, has quite lately re-
announced its purpose to insist upon the application
of the ' ]\Ionroe doctrine,' with special reference to the
Panama Canal and the Chileno- Peruvian embrooHo. To

o

make remonstrances effective, either at the Isthmus of
Darien or on the coast of Chili, would require the pre-
sence of a strong fleet of ships fully up to the modern
type ; and the United States have none of that kind.
Governments who persistently keep their naval and
military forces at a low point of strength and efficiency
should also practise a modest and inoffensive diplomacy,
because otherwise their declarations will either be treated
with indifference, or they are liable at any time to
receive a rebuff which would wound the national pride
and bring upon the responsible Ministry the indignant
reproaches of the people.

The ' Monroe doctrine ' as lately enunciated would
surprise its author, who probably never dreamed of so
broad an application of its meaning. But if the United
States seriously purpose to undertake the sole guarantee
of the highway between the two great oceans, and aspire
to be the only arbiters in matters affecting the interests
of the numerous American States, it is indispensable
that they be able to place a powerful fleet at the required
Bpot and at the critical moment.

96 THE SKCUET SK 11 VICE OF THE

England's right of way through the Suez Canal
would not he worth the value of her shares in the
capital stock of tlie company, if it was not thought
that she could hold the two ends of the canal against all
comers. A British Minister will jn'obably never issue
a circular manifesto to inform Europe that no one must
attempt to block the way, but the Admiralty continue to
lay down and to launch such vessels as the Northamj)ton,
Thunderer^ Polyphemus, Dreadnought, Edinburgh, Ajax,
Colossus, Majestic, etc., and everyone understands that
to interfere would involve the absolute consequence of a
hard struggle, to say the least.

In these times of great armaments, nations wlio wish
to advance their influence, maintain their prestige or
even to take part in international discussions with the
expectation of being listened to with respect, must
demonstrate that they are prepared for attack as well as
for defence, that they can strike as well as parry.
Those who are content to make peaceful progress in
wealth and domestic comfort, may possibly be left to
enjoy their freedom and their gams ; but then they
must not attempt the role of dictators, nor challenge
attack by a pretence of aggressive strength which tliey
take no pains to develop, and which all the world knows
they do not possess.

Note to Page 62,

After the departure of the Alabama from Liverpool and her
equipment as a Confederate vessel-of-war was publicly known, it
was often stated that the Messrs. Laird had been guilty of a violation
of law in building her. In consequence of such reports, those gentle-
men published a letter in the Times, dated 25th of May, 1869,
which contained copies of the following documents and opinions of
counsel :

" I am of opinion that Messrs. Laird had a right to build the ship
which has since been called the Alabama in the manner they did.

CONFEDERATE STATES LV EUROPE. 97

and that they committed no oftence against either the common law
or the Foreign Enlistment Act, with reference to that ship. I am
of opinion that the simple biiilding of a ship, even although the
.ship be of a kind apparently adapted for warlike purposes, and
delivering such ship to a purchaser in an English port, even although
the purchaser is suspected or known to be the agent of a foreign
belligerent Power, does not constitute an oftence against the Foreign
Enlistment Act (59 Geo. III., c. 60, s. 7) on the part of the builder,
unless the builder makes himself a party to the equipping of the
vessel for warlike purposes. The Alabama, indeed, appears to me to
have been equipped at the Azores, and not in England at all.

'George Mellish.

'3, Harcoiirt Buildings, 6th February, 1863.

' We entirely concur in the opinion given by Mr. Mellish on the
statements laid before him, and our opinion would not be altered if
the fact were that Messrs. Laird Brothers knew they were building
the Alabanut for an agent of the Confederate Government.

/ '(Signed) H. M. Cairns.

'James Kemplay.

' 17th April, 1863.'

Opinion of Lord Chief Baron Pollock on the trial of the Akxandray
June, 1863 :

' Many allusions in the course of this case had been made to the
Alabama; but he held that as that vessel left Liverpool unarmed,
and as a simple ship, she committed no unlawful act ; and we had
nothing to do with the fact that at a subsequent period she was
armed and converted into a vessel-of-war at Terceira.'

Letter from Lord Clarendon to Mr. Adams, 2nd December, 1865,
quoted by Earl Russell in his speech, 27th March, 1868 :

' It is nevertheless my duty, in closing this correspondence, to ob-
serve that no armed vessel departed during the war from a British
port to cruise against the commerce of the United States.'

Sir Roimdel Palmer, Solicitor General, speech in the House of
Commons, 27th March, 1863 :

' It was not till the Alabama reached the Azores that she received
her stores, her captain, or her papers, and that she hoisted the Con-
federate flag. It is not true that she departed from the shores of
this country as a ship-of-war.'

VOL. I. 7

98 THE SECRET SEBFICE OF THE

It vill be perceived from the foregoing that Messrs. Laird were
well supported in the vie>v that they were acting in strict conformity
■with law when thej' built the ship afterwards called the Alfl.hama,
but this whole subject is dealt with in another chapter.

Mr. George Mellish, Sir Hugh Cairns, and Mr. James Kemplaj',
are well known to have been leaders of great eminence at the English
Bar, and Sir Hugh Cairns (now Earl Cairns) has since been Lord
Chancellor of Endand.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 99

CHAPTER III.

Financial embarrassments of the Confederate Agents. — Incomplete
organization of the Confederate Executive at this period. — The
financial arrangements of the Confederate States in Europe. —
Incompleteness of the instructions of the Naval Representative,
and insufficiency of the arrangements to meet financial require-
ments.— Purchase and equipment of the Fivgal, afterwards the
Atlanta. — Shipment of war material. — Mr. Low, second officer of
the Fingal. — An unfortunate start. — The island of Terceira. — The
crew agree to run the blockade. — Arrival in the Savannah river.
The state of the Southern forces. — Correspondence concerning
the future operations of the Fingal. — Enlargement of powers as
Naval Representative in Europe. — Flag-officer Josiah Tattnall. —
Conversion of the Fingal into the armour-clad Atlanta. — Her
engagement with and capture by two United States 'Monitors.' —
Return to England.

The narrative of the Bermudas * second voyage, the
account of her capture and condemnation by the Prize
Court at Philadelphia, and the remarks upon the general
policy of tlie United States in the practice of their
maritime rights as a belligerent, which occupy much
of the last chapter, have somewhat anticipated the
precise order of events. But the naval operations of the
Confederate States in Europe were full of complications,

* Captain Tessier, who commanded the Bermuda on the occasion
of her successful voyage to Savannah in 1861, was not in her at the
time of her capture, or the result would probably have been less
disastrous,

7—2

100 THE SECL'ET SElinCE OF THE

and gave rise to many questions affecting international
duties, as well as international comity, and it will save
both time and space, and will, I think, l)e more impres-
sive, and also more systematic and instructive, to treat
such questions, as a general rule, subjectively, and to
explain and discuss them when they appear to have a
natural connection with a special event in the narrative,
than to postpone them for more formal and exclusive
treatment in separate chapters.

The Bermuda made her first and only voyage to
a Confederate port in August — September, 1861, and
she took to Savannah the first shipment of war material
from Europe on behalf of the Confederate Government.
I reported to the Secretary of the Navy by that vessel
the particulars of the Alalxima and Florida, advised
him of the contracts which had been made for general
naval supplies, called attention to the financial diffi-
culties, and informed him that it would probably be
necessary to buy a steamer and return to the Confederate
States in her myself, with military stores, as well as
for further consultation and reconsideration of my
instructions. There were at that early date numerous
agents of the United States in England, who seemed in
no way desirous to conceal their operations. They
went about their business with the air of men who
were sure of their position, and who neither anticipated
nor feared interference or opposition. They were well
provided with money, or satisfactory bank- credits, and
they rapidly swept the gun market of Avell-nigh every
weapon, Avhether good or bad. The Confederate agents
were forced from want of means to be content with
moderate purchases ; but they made large contracts for
forward delivery, at first on the credit of Messrs.
Eraser, Trenholm and Co., and then, when remittances

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE . 101

began to arrive, iTpon the confidence they had already
won by prompt payment, and the assurance they were
able to give that the Government had made suitable
arrangements to meet all liabilities, and to place their
bankers in funds. There was always, however, much
perplexity and embarrassment from lack of ready mone}'.
At one time, in September, 1863, I was forced to report
to the Kavy Department that the outstanding contracts
would require £700,000 in excess of the amount held
at that date by the financial agents, and the War
Department was rarely, if ever, able to keep pace
with its requirements. The compulsory sale of ships
that could not be got to sea because of the prohibition of
her Majesty's Government more than once supplied the
means of continuing purchases and shipments of war
material which otherwise could not have been bought.

The home authorities pressed us to hurry forward
supplies, and I was urged to place and to keep cruisers
at sea, but they appreciated the ditficulties, and in
looking over the correspondence now, I can find no
tmreasonable complaints, and no insinuations even, that
more could have been effected than was being done.

It has been said that the first remittance from the
Navy Department was received Jul}^ 27, 1861. The
funds were forwarded in the form of sterling bills and
bank-credits, but the ag-o-reo-ate amount was not sufficient
to cover the orders for naval stores already placed, and
the price of the two ships (^Alabama and Florida), and
no additional funds were received, nor any advices on
the subject, until October, hence no further contracts
could be made at that time. Meanwhile the work upon
the ships was progressing rapidly. It was estimated
that the Florida would be finished in February — March
and the Alabama in June, 1862, and such arrangements

102 THE SECRET SE 11 VICE OF THE

Lad been made ^vitll tlie builders tliat my personal super-
vision was not necessary, and, moreover, fre(|uent personal
attendance at the building yards was not prudent.

The Consular agents of the United States had already
begun to practise an inquisitive system of es])ionage,
and it was soon manifest that the movements of those
who were supposed to be agents of the Confederate
Government were closely and vigilantly watched. Men
known to be private detectives in the employ of the
United States Consul Avere often seen prowling about
the dockyards, and questioning the emploije-s of Messrs.
Laird and ^liller in reference to the two vessels, whose
somewhat peculiar type had attracted notice, and at a
very early date it became manifest that her Majesty's
Government "would take a riiiid view of the Foreio^n
Enlistment Act, and that there would be very great
difficulty and expense in getting ships to sea especially
adapted in their construction and general outfit for pur-
jioses of war. The financial question was, however, the
greatest cause of perplexity at that time. The rapidly
advancins; rate of exchange clearlv indicated that the
Confederate Government would soon be compelled to
resort to some other mode of placing funds in Europe
than by sterling bills. There "svas also much delay in
communicating by letter, and the danger of miscarriage
or capture made it hazardous to write fully and clearly
upon subjects it was vitally important to explain and
discuss without reserve.

Very soon after the beginning of hostilities the policy
of buying up the whole of the cotton at the South, on
account of the Government, and forwarding it as quickly
as possible to Europe, was suggested to the executive
authorities, and was no douljt earnestly considered by
them. If 200,000 bales of cotton could have been

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 103

shipped to Liverpool during the lirst year of the war,
the financial position of the Confederate States would
no doubt have been infinitely strengthened, and the first
levies might have been put into the field in such a state
of efiiciency, as regards clothing and equipment, as to
have greatly affected the results of the struggle. There
have been many persons in the South who have severely
criticized the Confederate Government for not adopting
the above policy at the beginning; but those wdio were
early employed in important offices connected with the
supply of the military and naval wants of the country,
and w^hose faculties were keenly aroused and directed to
the consideration of the ways and means, are conscious
that tliere were o-reat, if not insurmountable obstacles to
the fulfilment of that policy when it was first suggested.
During the greater part of the time wdiich intervened
fi'om the secession of South Carolina to the beginning of
hostilities, not quite five months, there w\as no general
Executive Government at all. The several States with-
drew from the Union at different periods. Each in turn
was fully occupied with lier own internal affairs, and
none were at all sure which, if an}-, of the neighbouring-
States would secede, or whetlier after seceding they
would be willing to unite in a joint Confederacy for a
common purpose. The Provisional Government was
not formed at Montgomery until February, 1861.

On the 13th of April, barely two months after, when
the Executive Departments were still in the very throes
of organization, with the Avhole machinery of Govern-
ment new and untried, without a single shipyard or
military arsenal in working order, and with no military
forces except the State volunteer corps, and tliose not
yet regularly enrolled into the general service, hostilities
were precipitated by the events at Charleston.

104 THE sfj'i;i:t skuvice of tile

AVbile affairs were thus (•()min<>' to a crisis, the ships
lyiiig ill the cotton })orts took in full cargoes and sailed ;
but they were of course loaded on private account, and
when the}' left, few, if any, came in their places. The
mercantile world, more astute than the politicians, fore-
saw the coming storm, and did not care to expose their
ships to its fury ; hence the vessels that came to Southern
ports immediately before the attack upon Fort Sumter
made haste to load and get away.

The authorities at Montgomery did not })revent their
departure, and the United States granted some respite
before closing the ports by a declaration of blockade.
There were several lines of steamers plying between
Boston, Xew York, Philadelphia, and Southern ports,
both on the Atlantic coast and the Gulf of ^lexico ; but
their movements were so arranged that at the critical
moment they were almost to a sliijo either at the Northern
jjorts or en route for them, and at the time when actual
hostilities began, there was scarcely an available ship of
any description in Southern waters. It has already
been mentioned that the steamship Bienville was per-
mitted to leave Xew Orleans on the day after the attack
upon Fort Sumter, and I know of only three regular
sea-going steamships which were still at Southern ports
a month after that event. One of the number was
bought by the Confederate Government, and was com-
missioned by the late Admiral Semmes as the Sumter ; a
second, the Nasliville. was also bought by the Govern-
ment, and made a short cruise to England via Bermuda,
and back to a Confederate port, under the command of
Captain R. B. Pegram, and the third w^as bought by
Messrs. John Fraser and Co., of Charleston, and sailed
from Wilmington, North Carolina, for Liverpool, with a
cargo of cotton, rosin, etc., on their account. There

CONFEDEllATE STATES IN EUROPE. 105

were two or three paddle -steamers at Eichinond, suited
to the coasting trade, but not for foreign voyages, and
they were taken up 1)}^ the Navy Department.

I do not state positively that the above were the only
steamers remaining in Southern ports at the time men-
tioned, but I think that if there had been any others
suitable for deep-sea voyages, the fact would not be
forgotten by me now, and I feel sure that they would
have been promptly and eagerly appropriated by the
Confederate Navy Department. Whether, therefore, the
Provisional Government at ^Montgomery approved of
the proposition to buy and ship the cotton still remain-
ing at the plantations and other interior points or not,
there can be no doubt that the means for shipping it in
large quantities were wholly wanting. Private persons
and several mercantile firms made many ventures to the
Bahamas and Havana during the first six months of the
war with no better craft than the ordinary river steamer,
but undertakings quite in keeping with mercantile usage,
and justified by the ordinary commercial considerations
of profit and loss, are inadmissible — indeed, they are
impracticable — as State enterprises, for the sufficient
reason that the public Departments are enveloped in
legal as well as traditional routine. National funds can
only be applied in accordance with legislative appropria-
tion, and therefore schemes which may be put in course
of effectual progress at the moment of suggestion by a
private firm or corporation, can only be executed by the
State after due consideration by two or more branches
of the Government, which necessarily involves delay,
and often such modifications of the original project as to
lessen the chances of success, or at least to increase the
difficulties to be overcome. Many persons will remem-
ber how quickly, and on what a stupendous scale, the

106 THE SEC RET SEL'FICE OE THE

Government cat AVashington hastened to prepare for tlie
invasion of the Confederate States when the suri-ender of
Fort Sumter ended the period of suspense and the state
of war betjan.

The so-called Democratic Party at the Xorth had
been generally favourable to the Southern view of
' State rights,' and was strongly opposed to that party
which, by a division among its opponents, had suc-
ceeded m electing Mr. Abraham Lincoln to the
Presidency. There had been also a strong minority of
the dominant or Republican Party, who, while repro-
bating the action of the South, and denouncing the
principle of secession as revolutionary and unauthorized,
were yet opposed to the exercise of any coercive measures
for the maintenance of the Union.

The Cabinet at Washington, the party leaders and
the party press, combined to arouse and direct public
sentiment, and to bring the people of the North to the
conviction that the right of secession, if once admitted,
would logically and inevitably tend to complete dis-
solution. They addressed themselves to the fears, the
2)rejudices, and the patriotism of the North, and with
such success that, when President Lincoln issued his
proclamation calling for troops to ' avenge the insult to
the national flag at Charleston,' and to ' restore the
Union ' (to use the phraseology of the period), there
was a prompt and ample response. Party distinctions
and i)arty principles ceased to restrain men from joining
together for the conunon purpose of restoring and main-
taining the Union, and large masses of troops were soon
gathermg around Washington, along the Potomac and the
northern frontier of Virginia. To prepare for the threat-
ened attack, and to provide the means for an adequate
resistance, must have sti-ained tlie resources and taxed

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 107

the administrative faculties of the Provisional Govern-
ment of the Confederate States to the fullest tension.

Those who wish to form just and impartial opinions
of public men, and who aspire to write the history of
great public events, must first look for the facts ; then
they must give a fair, judicial consideration to all the
circumstances. They must be careful not to infer that
a course of action which commends itself when viewed
in the light of accomplished events was practicable ; or,
if practicable Avhen first suggested, whether something-
else of more pressing and essential importance did not
necessarily demand precedence. The people of the
South will probably admit that it was of more vital
consequence to keep the Federal armies out of Ivich-
mond in 1861 than to effect even the important purpose
of transferring the cotton crop to Europe. An equitable
investigation of the facts, and due consideration of all
the circumstances, the insufficient means of transport by
land, and the still greater lack of means of transport by
sea — will demonstrate that both enterprises could not
have been accomplished at the same time, and the
project of perfecting the. financial arrangements abroad
was unavoidably delayed. At a later period of the war
the Government made great efforts to forward cotton
and other products of the south to Europe. The
Confederate Congress passed an Act authorizing the
Treasury Department to buy and ship whatever staples
were readily convertible into money in the European
markets, and agents were sent into the interior, and
were stationed at the seaports to carry out that purpose.
A special agent of the Treasury was sent to Europe,
with power to make contracts with banking or com-
mercial houses to supply the money necessary to build
steamers suitable for blockade running ; and he brought

108 THE SECllKT SEltVlCK OF THE

over orders from the Xavy Department directing me to
look after the designing and construction of tlie ships,
and to see tliat they were properly fitted for the pro-
posed work. The Treasury agent was Mr. Colin 'I.
McRae, and he made capital contracts with two or more
firms, who agreed to advance the money for a com-
mission of ten per cent., and to be recouj^ed from the
proceeds of the cotton or other })roducts brought out
by the ships themselves. The precise arrangement was
that the ships were to be emj^loyed in running the
blockade, the inward cargoes to be exclusively on
Government account, and the outward cargoes half for
the Government, and half to go towards payment of the
ships, until the whole amount advanced, together with
the stipulated commission, was cleared off. Until paid
for in full, each steamer Avas to be registered in the
name of a nominee of the firm who had advanced the
money, and then she was to become the pro])erty of the
Confederate Government. Time being of incalculable
importance, four paddle-steamers, the best that could be
found, were bought to begin with ; and ten were laid
down, carefully designed to get high speed on a light
draft of water. After\vards several larger and powerful
screw- steamers were designed, but these latter were not
finished in time to perform any service. One of the
smaller class of paddle-steamers brought out on her
first voyage 700 bales of unpressed cotton, on a draft of
six feet, which was a very satisfactory performance, witli
cotton at two shillings and sixpence ])er pound.

Those who have most sharply criticized the Executive
Departments of the Confederate Government, and have
especially charged them with want of foresight and
promptness in the management of the finances, are chiefly
Southerners, Avho must have been impelled by their

CONFEDEJIATK STATES IX EUROPE. 109

Impatience to expect striking results without taking"
due heed of the pressure upon the several Departments,
and the extreme efforts they were so suddenly called
upon to make. Although the Confederate Government
was never recognised by any foreign Power, yet when the
Treasury Department made a bid in Europe for a loan
of £3,000,000, five times that amount was subscribed.
There was for a short time what is called a ' spurt ' in
Confederate Bonds, and they actually rose to a premium
of five per cent, upon the price at which the loan
was placed, and they stood for several months at
a hio'her fio'ure than the bonds of the United States.
This is an interesting fact, although it is of no financial
importance now ; at any rate, it may be fairly taken as an
offset to the allegations of the grumblers. Reverting
now to the actual state of the finances at the beo^innino-
of the operations in Europe, it is proper to remark,
en passant^ that before I was sent ft'om Montgomery the
difficulties were foreseen in kind, but not in degree, and
it soon became e\ddent that the full purposes contem-
]3lated in my original instructions could not be
accomplished without a modification of plans and
a well -arranged system for providing funds with
certainty and regularity. After considering all the
circumstances as they were at the time wlien the first
remittance arrived (July, 1861), and^taking also into
account the fact that personal supervision of the ships
under construction was neither necessary nor ad^dsable,
it was thought that I should communicate personally
with the Government at Richmond, and in September,
1861, I submitted a proposal to the officers representing
the War Office, that Ave should contribute equally fi'om
the fmids of the two Departments, buy a fast steamer,
and that I should go into a Confederate port with her

no THE SEC RET sehj'ice oe the

myself, in order to report the precise condition of affairs.
as well as to take in the war supplies which were then
read}- for delivery, and Avhicli we knew were gi'eatl}'
needed. We had a consultation with the financial
agents, and the proposal was not only approved,
but I was urged to carry it out at once. Going upon
such an expedition was a deviation from my instruc-
tions, and it was also a diversion of a considerable sum
of money fi'om the original purpose to which it had
been apj)ropriated ; but the position of affairs was
critical, and I had been authorized to exercise a wide
discretion when it appeared necessar}* to effect an
important purpose. However, before taking any decisive
course, the proposition was referred to the Commissioners,
who expressed their full concurrence, and one of
them, the Hon. Dudley Mann, wrote me spontaneously
an official letter, virtuailv offerinor to assume the
responsibility, so far as he could. I immediately bought
the screw- steamship Fhu/al, built on the Clyde for
the Highland trade. She was a new shiji. had made
but one or two trips to the ISTorth of Scotland, was
in good order, well found, and her log gave her speed
as thirteen knots in good steaming weather. I had
to take her as she stood, with all outfit on board, and
was amused to find, in the inventory of cabin-stores,
six dozen toddy glasses, with ladles to match. Each
glass had the capacity of about a half- pint, and they
were hard and tliick and heavy enough to serve for
grape-shot, in case of need. The ship was placed on a
loading-berth at Greenock, and the goods were forwarded
to her as rapidly as possible, partly by rail, and partly
by a steamer from London. It was necessary to act mth
caution and secrecy, because the impression had already
got abroad that the Confederate Government was trying

CONFEDEBATE STATES IN EUROPE. Ill

to fit out ships in England to cruise against American
commerce, and during the whole period of the war all
vessels taking arms on board, or cases supposed to
contain arms or ammunition, were closely watched b}'
agents and spies of the United States Consuls, who fi-e-
quently sent affidavits to the Customs authorities, affirm-
ing the belief that the ships receiving such materials
were intended to be armed, and thus often effected their
detention, and on several occasions their seizure.

Colonel Edward C. Anderson, of the Confederate
army, had been sent to England in July, 1861, to com-
municate with ]\Iajor Huse, and to look generally into
the affairs of the AYar Department. Colonel Anderson
was directed to remain in Europe if his services seemed
to be necessary ; but he found that Major Huse had
everything in good working train, and was manifestly
capable of conducting the operations alone, so he deter-
mined to return to the Confederate States, and the
Fingal expedition afforded a favourable opportmiity.
Two Charleston gentlemen (Messrs. Charles Foster and
Moffat), detained in Euroj^e at the beginning of the war,
and unable to return through the United States, had
consulted me about the best means of getting to their
homes, and I arranged to take them in the Fingal ; and
Br. Holland, a spirited Texan, who had served in the
United States army during the ^Mexican War, and
wished to go to Richmond, was notified to be ready for
a move at short notice, and was requested to prepare a
big medicme- chest and a case of surgical instruments to
take ^\ith him. As the Fingal was the first ship that
ran the blockade solely on Government account, and
her subsequent fate as the Confederate ironclad Atlanta
gives her some historical importance, the particulars of
her cargo, and the incidents of her voyage, will probably

112 THE SKCIIET SE/n'Jc/: OF TIIK

be of some interest. In 18G1 the Eiiglisli iirmy weapon
was still the niuzzle-loadiiig Entiehl rifle. Prussia was
adopting the needle-gun, and France was preparing to
exchange her old arm for the i'liassepot^ but no breeeh-
loaders could be <>-ot either in Eni>-laiid or on the Conti-
nent, except as samples, and the jjurcliases for the
Confederate States were of the muzzle-loading type.

The shipment per Frmjal was :

On nccount of the War Department — 10,000 Enfield
rifles, 1,000,000 ball cartridges, and 2,000,000 percus-
sion caps ; 3,000 cavalry sabres, with suitable accoutre-
ments, a large quantity of material for clothing, and a
large supply of medical stores.

On account of the JVari/ Dejtai'tment — 1,000 short
rifles, with cutlass bayonets, and 1,000 rounds of ammu-
nition per rifle ; 500 revolvers, with suitable ammuni-
tion ; two 4-|-incli muzzle-loading rifled guns, ^\ith
traversing carriages, all necessary gear, and 200 made-
up cartridges, shot and shell, per gun ; two breech -load-
ing 2^-inch steel-rifled guns for boats or field service,
with 200 rounds of ammunition per gun ; 400 barrels of
coarse cannon-powder, and a large quantity of made.-up
clothing for seamen.

Foi' the State of Georgia — 3,000 Enfield rifles.

For the State of Lousiana — 1,000 Enfield rifles.

No single ship ever took into the Confederacy a cargo
so entirely composed of military and naval supplies, and
the pressing need of them made it necessary to get the
Fingal off with quick despatch, and to use every possible
effort to get her into a port having railway communica-
tion through to A'^irginia, because the Confederate army,
then covering Richmond, was very poorly armed, and
was distressingly deficient in all field necessaries.

Shortly before the Fingal was ready for sea, I was

CONFEDEEA TE ST J TES IN E UROPE. 1 1 3

joined by Mr. John Low, wlio was a Liverpool man by
birth, but he had lived several years in Savannah, and
was there at the beginning of the war. His purpose at
that time was to remain permanently in Savaimah ; he
was ardently attached to the South, and at the beginning
of hostilities he went to Virginia in a cavalry corps from
Georgia, but subsequently came over to England to
join me for special service. Mr. Low had been bred to
the sea in the British mercantile marine, and as he
arrived at a very opportune time, I sent him instanter to
Greenock to ship as second officer of the Fingal.

The Fingal was kept under the British flag for ob-
vious reasons, and it was therefore necessary to employ
a captain holding a Board of Trade certificate to clear
her outward, and to ship the crew in accordance with
the Merchant Shipping Act. Some pains were taken
to engage good engineers and a few leading men, but no
hint was given that the ship would go further than
Bermuda and Nassau. Mr. Low proved to be an able
seaman, a reliable and useful officer in every situation.
The character of his services, and his advancement in
the Confederate navy, will often have conspicuous and
commendatory mention in this narrative. The Fingal
was ready for sea about October 8th. Messrs, Foster and
Mofl'at joined her at Greenock, and the cajDtain was ordered
to sail as soon as possible, and to call off Holyhead to
take Colonel Anderson, Dr. Holland, and myself on
board, it not being thought prudent to show ourselves at
or about the ship until she was clear of the Custom House.

On the 11th we went to Holyhead, and learned by
telegram that the Fingal was off from Greenock.

During the night it came on to blow a hard gale,
which continued for two or three days, with thick
w^eather and much ram. We could get no tidings of the

VOL. I. 8

114 THE SECnET SEEFICE OF THE

ship, and althongli T felt reasonably satisfied that she
liad })ut into some harbour of slielter, yet the uncertainty
and delay were jierplexing. During tlie 14th the gale
broke. Towards evening the weather was fine, and we
had hopes of seeing or hearing from the missing ship on
the next day. At about 4 a.m. on the 15th, I was
aroused by a loud knock at my bedroom door, and a
house-porter came in with a dark lantern, followed by
^Ir. Low. It had been raining, and Low had on a
* sou- wester,' and a long j^ainted canvas coat, which
were dripping witli wet. I was only half awake. In
the dim lii»-ht of the lantern the fio-ure before me loomed
up like a huge octoj)us, or some other marine monster,
and I was startled by a sepulchral voice wliich seemed
to be mumbling under the breast of the ])eajacket like
the last tremulous quivering of a thunderclap. IJut my
ear caught the sound of a few articulate words, among
which ^ Fingal,'' 'brig,' * collision,' 'sunk,' were fear-
fully jumbled together. It is astounding with what
electric velocity the mind acts in the few seconds of
awaking when one is suddenl}^ aroused fi*om sleep.
1 )efore I could leap out of bed a painful scene of wreck
and disaster passed vividly through my brain, and I
fancied the Fingal at the bottom of Holyhead harbour,
with the fishes swimmins: amons; the shattered Enficlds,
sipping the mixture of sea-water and gunpowder through
their gills, and wondering what it all meant. Low was,
however, steady, cool, and unimpassioned, and put the
facts into my mind without waste of words, and they
may be briefly summarized thus : The Fingal was
creeping cautiously round the breakwater when she
suddenly came upon a brig at anchor, with no light up.
The steamer had barely steerage way, and the engines
were quickly re versed, but her sharp stem took the brig's
starboard quarter. There was just a slight sound, like

CONFEDERA TE ST A TES IN E UnOPE. 1 1 5

the quick snap of a gun-hammer upon the uncapped
nipple, then a shout from the deck of the unhappy craft,
and before a boat could be lowered she went down all
standing. This is Avhat usually happens when an iron
steamer comes in contact with a wooden ship.

We roused up Colonel Anderson and Dr. Holland
and got afloat as soon as possible.

Day was just breaking when we got alongside of the
Fingal, and in the dim twilight we could see the upper
spars of the brig standing straight up out of the water,
with the bunt of the main top-gallant sail just a-wash.
The vessel proved to be the Austrian brig Siccardi. She
was loaded with coal, Avhich accounts for her going
down so quickly and standing upright afterwards.

It was manifestly out of the question to remain where
we were. Customs officers would soon be on board; the
Fingal would be detained to settle, or give security for a
satisfactory settlement, with the consignees of the Siccardi;
Colonel Anderson and I could hardly hope to escape
notice ; affidavits would be prepared by the United States
Consul affirming the Fingal to be a suspicious vessel,
and then there would surely be inquir}", further deten-
tion, and perhaps a final break up of the voyage. I
thought of the rifles and sabres in the hold, and the ill-
armed pickets on the Potomac, waiting and longing for
them, and told the captain to weigh anchor at once.

There was no wish to defraud the owners of the
Siccardi of any compensation they were entitled to. I
wrote a hasty letter to Messrs. Fraser, Trenholm and Co.,
briefly reporting the circumstances and asking them to
find out the consignees of the brig and make the best
possible arrangement with them.* The letter was de-

* Messrs. Fraser, Trenholm and Co. communicated with the con-
signees very promptly. A friendly arbitration was agreed to, and
the affair was satisfactorily settled.

8—2

116 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

spatclicd on shore by a boat avc had eng'ag'ed to brmg
our luggage off, and the FuKjal was round the point of
the breakwater, and steaming down Channel, before the
accident at the mouth of the harbour was known to any-
one who would have had authority to stop her.

For several days after leaving Holyhead \\q had fine
weather, and were well satisfied in most respects with
the ship. She was staunch, comfortable, and well-fitted
in all particulars, but in the anxiety to get as much in
her as possible, she had been loaded too deep, and I
found that we could not get a higher speed than nine
knots, which was rather disappointing, in view of a
possible chase between Bermuda and the coast. About
the IDth of October we cauij-ht a i^'ale from the south-
west veerino; to north and north-east. The sea was so
heavy that we were compelled to ease the engines, and
in a measure lay-to under fore and aft sails. AVhile the
gale was still blowing, the steward informed me that the
fi'esh water seemed to be very low in the big iron tank
which held the main supply. Upon examination it was
found that we had only one or at most two days' supply
left. It seems that after filling up the water-tank at
Greenock, the ship continued to load for some da3''s, and
the crew, as well as a large number of stevedores em-
ployed in stowing the cargo, were permitted to use and
to waste the water at will. When readv for sea, it did
not occur to the captain to sound the tanks and fill them
up. I do not Avisli to injure the captain by mentioning
his name. He probably acted according to his lights,
which were dull. He was very inefficient, and was of
no use to us except as a medium of communication with
Customs and other officials. The Fingal had no separate
condensing a2)paratus, but fortunately the gale was
moderating, and the wind was hauling to the north and

CONFEDERA TE ST A TES IN E UROPE. 1 1 7

east, and so we bore up for Praya, a bay and village on
the north-east side of the island of Terceira, where we
found good water, fruit, vegetables, fresh meat, etc.

This necessary deviation from our direct voyage, and
the consequent delay, were not in the end mthout a
compensating advantage. The bay afforded good an-
chorage, and the whole neighbourhood was so quiet and
retired, so isolated from Europe, that I could not fail to
note its fitness for a place of rendezvous at which to
collect our cruisers with their tenders. Subsequently
the Alabama was brought to this very spot and armed
without hindrance. Perhaps if it had not been for the
captain's forgetfulness in the matter of the FingaVs
water supply, we might have gone to some less favourable
place with the Alabama and failed in our purpose. The
efforts of life in all undertakings are made up of alternate
failure and success, and all that can be hoped for is a
favourable balance-sheet at the end.

The Fimjal proceeded on her voyage from Terceira,
and arrived at Bermuda on the 2nd of November. Here
we had the pleasure to find the Confederate States ship
JVasJiville, Captain K. B. Pegram, from whom we learned
much about the state of affairs in the beleaguered Con-
federacy. The Nashville was a paddle- steamer, built for
the coasting' trade between New York and Charleston.
It has been already mentioned that she was bought b}^
the Navy Department, and her appearance abroad was
23robably intended as a mere demonstration to prove the
inefiiciency of the blockade, and to make an exhibit of
the Confederate flag upon the high seas and in Europe,
because she was weakly armed and de23endent upon her
engines alone for motion. Nevertheless, she captured
and burned the American ship HaiTci/ Birch in the
English Channel. There had been an original purpose

118 THE SECllET SEE VICE OF THE

to send the Confederate Commissioners, ]\Iessrs. ]Mason
and Slidell, to Europe in the Xashn'lle, but this inten-
tion Avas abandoned, and tliose gentlemen, Avith their
suites, ran the blockade in a small steamer from Charles-
ton, and proceeded to Havana. Captain Pegram
handed me a despatch from the Hon. S. K. Mallory,
Secretary of the Navy, acknowledgmg my reports sent
jier steamship Bermuda in August. He approved my
contracts for the Flonda and Alahania, and for naval
ordnance stores, and also the proposition I had sug-
gested of buying a steamer and returning m her to the
Confederate States with supplies and for consultation.
He furthermore informed me that he had sent out by the
Nashville several pilots, and that Captain Pegram would
let me have any one or more of them I might require.
Mr. John Makin, a pilot for Savannah and the inlets to
the southward, was transferi'ed to the Fimjal.

We were detained several days at Bermuda. The
United States Consul suspected the ultimate object of
the FiviiaVs voyage, and he did his best to put obstacles
in the way of our getting coal and other supplies, and
employed men to tamper with the crew and alarm them,
and persuade them to leave the ship. However, the
local merchants and the people generally were very
friendly, and we got at last all that was wanted, and
sailed for the coast on the afternoon of the 7th of
November.

Up to the time of our departure from Bermuda, not a
word had been said to a member of the crew, nor even
to the captain, about the purpose to run the blockade,
and the ship was cleared out from St. George's for Nassau.
AVe had, however, several very active intelligent men for-
ward, among them one named Freemantle, Avho followed
me back to Euroj^e and made the cruise in the Alabama as

CON FE DEB A TE ST A TES IN E UROPE. 1 1 9

captain's coxswain. During the j^assage from England
I had kept an eye to the men, and Low had been much
with them as an officer of the shij), and we felt pretty
sure that ' Jack ' had his suspicions. That they should
have resisted the persuasions and warnings of the United
States Consul at St. George's was therefore a gratifying
evidence of their willingness to take part in a little
excitino' adventure.

o

It was especially important to know whether the
' engineer department ' could be relied upon, and I had
often gone into the engine-room to have a talk with the
chief. His name w^as McNair, a silent, steady, reliable
Scot, immovable and impassive as the Grampian Hills
when it was proper to stand fast, prompt, quick, and
energetic when it was necessary to act. He was one of
that thoughtful class of men who seem to be always
thinking that something unexpected may happen, and
to be preparing for the difficulty. From the very first
I felt sure of McNair, and never parted fi-om him until
the Alabama was off on her cruise. In fittins; out that
ship he was of great service, and he had charge of her
engines until she was joined at Terceira by Captain
Semmes and his regular staff of officers.

The day after leaving Bermuda it was necessary to
put the ship's head in the direction of the actual port of
destination, and of course the men at the wheel, and in
fact all on board, would soon perceive that we were not
steerino- the course for l^assau. It would not have been
fair to conceal the object of the voyage fi'om the men
until a critical moment, and it would also have been
imprudent to go on to the coast without knowing their
minds, because they had not agreed to undertake any
such risk.

I determined, therefore, to settle the matter there and

120 THE SECnET SERVICE OF THE

then, and sent for all hands to come aft to the bridge.
I told them very briefly ' that they had ship]-)ed in a
]>ritish ]iort, to make a voyage in a British ship to one
or more British islands and back again to England; that
I had no right to take them an}-where else without their
consent, and I did not mean to use either force or undue
pressure to make them do anything not set out in the
shipping articles, but I thought they must have sus-
pected that there was some other purpose in the voyage
than a cruise to Bermuda and the Bahamas, and the
time had arrived when it was both safe and proper for
me to tell them the real port of destination, which was
Savannah, and of course this meant a breach of blockade,
with the risk of capture and some rough treatment as
prisoners-of-war.' I added, ' If you are not willing to
go on, say so now, and I will take the ship to Nassau
and get other men who will go ; but if you are ready
and mlling to risk the venture, remember that it is a
fresh engagement and a final one, from which there must
be no backing out.'

I had thought over what to say, and was pre})ared
with a few exhilarating and persuasive phrases ; but I
caught Freemantle's eye and saw that several of the men
were whispering together. It flashed across my mmd
at once that no further talk was necessary, and I put the
question plainly, ' Will you go ?' to which there was a
prompt and unanimous consent. I thanked them, but
said there was still something to explain, which I did to
the following effect :

' The United States have been compelled to buy up
steamers from the merchant service for blockaders.
Many of them are neither so strong nor so efficient in
any way as this ship, and they are not heavily armed.
If we should fall in with any blockaders ofi" Savannah

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 121

at all, they are likely to be of that class, and Colonel
Anderson and I, who represent the Confederate Govern-
ment, and the gentlemen passengers, who are Southern
men, do not feel disposed to give up this valuable and
important cargo to a ship not strong enough to render
resistance useless, or to open boats that may attempt to
board us. So long as the Fingal is under the British
flag, we have no right to fire a shot, but I have a bill of
sale in my pocket, and can take delivery from the
captain on behalf of the Confederate Navy Department
at any moment. This I propose to do, if there should
appear to be any likelihood of a collision with a blockader,
and I want to know if you are willing under such cir-
cumstances to help in defending the ship ?'

They answered ' Yes ' to a man. These preliminaries
being satisfactorily settled, all hands were set briskly to
work to arm the ship. We mounted the two 4^-inch
rifled guns in the for^vard gangway ports, and the two
steel boat-guns on the quarterdeck. We got up a suffi-
cient number of rifles and revolvers, with a good supply
of ammunition, and converted the ' ladies' saloon ' into
an armoury, shell-room, and magazine.

The cases containing the made-up cartridges for the
guns were stowed out of easy reach, so we hoisted out
of the hold a few barrels of poAvder and a bale of flannel,
and made ten or fifteen cartridges for each gun. Colonel
Anderson had passed a good many 3^ears of his early
life in the United States navy, and although he had
been long out of the service, his ' right hand had not
forgot its cunning.' He and I cut out the cylinders,
the other passengers helped at the sewing, and the
Fingal was on the next day ready to beat off" a boat
attack, or even to exchange shots with an impromptu
blockader on a dark night, and thus perhaps prevent her

122 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

closing. Freemantle and t^vo or three others of the
crew were old naval men, and took the leading positions
at the guns. We had two or three drills, and found that
we could handle the ' battery ' satisfactorily.

I had a talk with ]\IcXair after settling everything
with tlie men. Although he did not say so, I felt sure
fi'om his manner that lie had been expecting the in-
formation, because he received it quite as a matter of
course, and told me that he had been putting aside a few
tons of the nicest and cleanest coal, and if I could give
him time just before getting on the coast to haul fires
in one boiler at a time, and run the scrapers through the
flues, he thought he might drive the ship, deep as she
was, at the rate of eleven knots for a spurt of a few
hours. These preparations seemed to put all liands in
good spirits; mdeed, the men were quite jolly over the
prospect.

On the 11th ^IcNair got the chance to clean his flues.
It was my ])urpose to make the land at the entrance to
Warsaw Sound, throuofh which ^Makin said he could
take the sliip by inland creeks into the Savannah river,
and the course was shaped so that at noon on the 11th
we should be on the parallel of AVarsaw. From that
position we steered in on a due-west course, and timed
the speed to make the land about 3 a.m., or at any rate
before daylight.

The moon set early, but the night was clear, and there
was an unusually good horizon line. Several suitable
stars passed the meridian between dark and 1 a.m., and
Polaris was of course available, so we were able to get
the latitude ever}- half hour, and tlius to check the
course. At about 1 a.m. on the 12th we got along-
shore soundings inside the Gulf Stream. Up to this
time it had been uncomfortably clear, with a light south-

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 123

east breeze, but it now fell calm, and we could see a
dark line to the westward. Makin said it was the mist
over the marshes, and the land-breeze would soon bring
it off to us. In half an hour or so we felt a cool damp
air in our faces, then a few big drops of moisture, and
Ave ran straio-ht into as nice a fos: as any reasonable
blockade-runner could have wanted. There was not a
light anywhere about the ship except in the binnacle,
and that was carefully covered, so that the man at the
wheel could barely look at the compass mth one eye,
and the engine-room hatches were well-hooded. ISTot a
word was spoken, and there was not a sound but the
throb of the engines and the slight ' shir-r-r ' made by the
friction of the ship through the water, and these seemed
muffled by the dank vaporous air.

When we ffot into six fathoms the eno'ines were eased
to dead slow, and we ran cautiously in by the lead,
straight for the land, the object being to get in-shore of
any blockaders that might be off the inlet. We sup-
posed the sliip to be drawing fifteen or sixteen feet, and
we stood on into three and a quarter fathoms, when we
turned her head oif to the light easterly swell, and
stopped the engines. The fog was as thick as, and
about the colour of, mulligatawny soup, and the water
alongside looked of a darkish broAvn. From the bridge
it was just possible to make out the men standing on
the forecastle and poop. We could not have been in a
better position for a dash at daylight.

While Ave Avere thus lying-to and Avaiting, CA^ery faculty
alert to catch the slightest sound, and CA'ery eye search-
ing the fog for the first glimpse of land, or of an
approaching ship, there burst upon our ears a shrill
prolonged quaAxring shriek. The suddenness of the
sound, coming ujDon our eagerly exjDectant senses, and

124 THE SECTJ-JT SERVICE OF THE

jn'obubly much heiglitened in volume and force by con-
trast -with the stiUness, Avas startling. I am afraid to
venture upon a superlative, but I may safely say it was
unearthl}-. Xone of us could conceive what it was, but
all thought that it was as loud and as ]:)iercing as a
steam-whistle, and that it must have been heard by any
blockader within five miles of us. In a moment the
sound Avas repeated, but we were prepared, and it was
this time accompanied by a flapping and rustling noise
from a ' hencoop ' in tlie gangway. ' It is the cock that
came on board at Bermuda,' said some one. Several
men ran to the spot. Freemantle thrust his arm into
the coop, drew out an unhappy fowl, and wrung off its
head with a vicious swing. But it was the wrong one,
and chanticleer crowed ao^ain defiantly. ' Trv ao-ain,'
came up in an audible whisper from under the
bridge ; but Freemantle's second effort was more dis-
astrous than the first. He not only failed to seize the
obnoxious screamer, l^ut lie set the Avhole hennery in
commotion, and the ' ]Mujan ' cock, from a safe corner,
crowed and croaked, and fairly chuckled over the fuss
of feathers, the cackling, and the distracting strife he
had aroused. At last the offendins; bird Avas cauo'ht.
He died game, and made a fierce struggle for life ; but
Freemantle managed to catch him Avith a firm grip by
the neck, and fetching a full arm-SAving, as if lieaAdng
a tAA'elve-pound lead, the body fell Avith a heavy thud
upon the deck, and Ave AA^ere again faA^oured Avith a
j)rofound stillness.

By this time daylight began to break. Makin said
the fog would settle and gather over the Ioav marshes
towards sunrise, and gradually roll off" seaAA^ard before
the lio'ht land-Avind. I AA'ent aloft to look out for the
first sisrht of the ' inlet.' ^lakin was ric'ht. In less

CONFEDELATE STATES IX EUROPE. 125

than half an hour I could see the bushy tops of the tall
pine-trees, then their straight slender trunks, then the
brushwood, and finally the pale yellow streak of sand
which formed the foreshore.

I reported this to Makin, who could not see it all from
the deck, and he asked me to come down and consult.
I assured him Ave were right abreast of Warsaw Inlet,
and of this he was satisfied, but he said the buoys would
all be up, and the low-lying fog would probably cover
the distant leadino- marks, and we mio-ht q:o wrono- in
the intricate channels. He thought it would be some
time before the fog would clear off" to seaward, but as it
was settling over the land and we would soon have a
tolerably clear view in-shore, he proposed making a
dash for Savannah, about 17 miles to the north and
east, where he felt sure we could get in, buoys or no
buoys.

In a few moments the engines were doing their best,
and the ship's head was laid for the outer bar of the
Savannah river. McNair fulfilled his promise, for the
Fingal was making a good eleven knots. Meanwhile
the fog continued to settle and roll off* the land, and the
low sandy beach, with the tall pines in the background,
and a gentle surf just creaming its outer edge, was soon
in full view fi'om the deck. We skirted the shore in the
least water the ship's draft permitted, and were much
favoured. The land breeze dropped, and about half a
mile off shore the fog hung heavily, a great grey mass,
almost black at the water's edge. It served as a veil
between us and any blockaders that might be enveloj^ed
in it.

We bowled along at a steady pace, and before long
the beach and the line of pines trended abruptly away to
the westward ; we caught sight of the high brick walls

126 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

of Fort Pulaski, nnd were oif the estuary of the
Savannah. In anotlier quarter of an hour Makin had
his marks on : ' Starboard,' ' Steady at north-west by
north,' and the Fimjal was over the bar and ploughing
u]) channel, ' a big bone in her mouth,' the favouring fog-
still to the eastAvard, and the sheltering fort on the port
bow. Before irettinii' in ran2:e we fired a <m\\ and
hoisted the Confederate flag at the fore, which was an-
swered from the fort. The parapet of the main works
and the glacis of the outer were lined with men, and as
we drew near we saw the caps waving, although we
could not hear their cheers.

The entrance to the Savannah river is through a broad
estuary, but though the exi^anse of water is wide, the
ship channel is narrow and comparatively shoal. Xearly
opposite Fort Pulaski two large wooden sailing ships had
been sunk right in the fairway; but ]\Iakin thought with
our draft we could probably squeeze by on either side, and
he ported the helm to pass off shore of them, but just
abreast of the outer ship we brought up in an oyster
bank.

The tide was ebb, but the bottom was soft oozy mud,
and as the ship could take no harm, we determined
to let her lie as she was until we could find how it was
possible to get round the obstructions. Colonel Anderson .
was a Savannah man, and he went on shore immedi-
ately to learn the neAvs and to telegraph our. arrival up
to town.

Colonel Olmstead, the commandant of the fort, sent a
boat off to the ship as soon as he perceived that Ave Avere
aground, to inform us that a fcAV days previously a large
United States fleet, under Admiral Dupont, had attacked
and driA'^en the Confederate troops out of the batteries
protecting Port Ivoyal, and that place had been occupied

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 127

by a strong land force. We were furtlier informed tliat
the Federal fleet was still at Port Royal, and that
as there was interior water communication with the
Savannah river, the enemy might send over small
vessels or boats to cut us out ; but the boarding officer
Avas directed to say that a good look-out would be kept
on the ship, and a sufficient number of men to defend
her -would be sent off if any such attem23t should be
made.

The distance from Port Royal, however, was much
too far for us to be seen, and no danger was looked for
from that quarter. The blockading vessels had pro-
babh^ been drawn off to assist in the operations at Port
Royal. At any rate, we saw nothing of them, although
later in the day several appeared off the outer bar. "We
had thus been able to effect a ' breach of blockade ' with
no o-raver incident than the scrimmao:e with the Ber-
mud an cock, and the men appeared to be a little dis-
appointed at the pacific and commonplace termination
of the adventure.

At about 1 p.m. three river steamboats, being the
main portion of Flag-officer Tattnall's so-called fleet,
came down to look after us. Lieutenant-Commanding
Johnston sent us a hawser from his ship, the Savannah,
and dragged us out of the mud. After some pulling
and hauling they got the Finc/al above the obstructions,
and escorted her up to the city, abreast of which we
anchored at about -1 p.m., November 12th, 1861. The
same afternoon I telegraphed my arrival to the Secretary
of the ISTav}', and next day received orders by telegraph
to go on to Richmond as soon as arrangements for the
discharge of the arms, etc, could be made. On the
14th Flas^-officer Tattnall detailed an officer to attend to
the business of the ship, and I started in company mth

128 THE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE

Colonel Anderson, who was also goin£>- to Richmond to
report to the War De[)artnient.

I knew from statistics and from personal knowledge
of the country that the South was poor in military and
naval resources, and that there had been no preparation
for war, and no collection of material. But figures
never carry to the senses full and clear imjDressions.
When it is said that the drought in India has destroyed
so many million tons of rice, the mind is at once im-
j)ressed Avitli the conviction that there will be a great
deficit of food in Bengal ; l^ut it is only those who wit-
ness the sufterings of the famishing people who fully
comprehend the melancholy import of the statement.
On the route to Richmond I had ample and painful
evidence of the strain which the sudden outburst of war
had put upon the South, and the inadequate means to
meet it.

The railways having only one line of metals, and the
rolling stock barely able to satisfy the ordinary pas-
senger and goods traffic, were already yielding to the
increased wear and tear, and the heavy trains, filled with
troops moving towards Virginia, and loaded with stores
and supplies for the army, were dragged slowly along by
the over- worked engines. The troops in the train with me
were irregularly and indifferently armed, and were with-
out uniformity of dress or equipment ; but they were
full of spirit, and laughed and sang songs around the
impromptu fires which were quickly kindled wherever
the train stop])ed, for we fi*equently waited for some
purpose or other many miles from a station, often in the
woods.

At a place called Goldsborough, in ISTorth Carolina,
we remained for an hour or more, and while the passen-
gers were getting dimier I heard loud singing in the

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 129

street, mingled with the music of a band, and going out
of the hotel I saw a long line of uncovered railway
freight-trucks, with rough cross-benches uncomfortably
close too-ether, and each bench was filled with men.
There was an engine at the end of the line, and I learned
that tlie men were a reo-iment of North Carolinians from
the Buncombe district, on the way to join tlie forces at
Wilmington.

The troops were remarkably fine -looking men, mostly
young and well-proportioned, but they were dressed
in their ordinary clothing, and many had no great-
coats, although it was November, and the air was
keen and at night frosty. I walked along the whole
line of trucks and spoke to some of the men, and
asked about their arms. Some had old-fashioned flint-
lock muskets, some had only double-barrel sporting
guns, of course without bayonets, and a few had percus-
sion lock muskets. I believe twenty or thirty had the
old heavy small-bore weapon called the ' Mississippi
rifle,' but I did not see a smgie modern military rifle in
the whole battalion. In about half an hour the train
moved on, the men singing ' Dixie,' and the people in
the street cheering.

It would hardly be possible to exaggerate the discom-
forts and privations to which the Southern troops were
exjDOsed during the war. At first they were wholly
destitute of camp equipage, and were compelled to
bivouac in the open air without tent shelter or even the
comfort of covered field hospitals, and these deficiencies
were never more than partially supplied. The best
manhood of the South, young men of spirit and good
wiry constitutions, flocked into the army, and thousands
were carried ofl" by diseases always more or less preva-
lent in camps, but whose virulence and fatal effects are

VOL. I. 9

130 THE SEC LET SEliVICE OF THE

greatly lessened by good food and suitable protection
from wet and cold.

No one will suppose that I depreciate the efforts or
the services of those who held high commands, or occu-
pied responsible positions, whether in the field or in the
Cabinet, but I have always thought that the true heroes
of the ' lost cause ' were the rank and file — the men who,
while in no sense responsible for the political events
which produced the struggle, and the gTeat majority of
whom had not the least personal interest in that domestic
institution which many assert to have been the underlying
cause of the antagonism between the North and South,
yet answered quickly and loyally the appeal of their
States, and formed that splendid infantry wliich, though
ill-armed and equipped, poorly clad, and often insuffi-
ciently fed, marched and countermarched, toiled in
trenches, and fought in line of battle, with admirable
patience and courage for four years, and who, in the
depressing retreat to Appomatox Court House, when it
was manifest that there was no longer a hope of final
success, turned upon their pursuers mth all the elan of
Chancellorsville. No one can have witnessed what those
men endured, or can know what they performed, without
feeling im2)elled to speak a word of admiration ; but the
subject is one for the military historian of the war, and
I have no space for more than a passing tribute.

After frequent delays en route, the train reached Rich-
mond, and I lost no time in reporting at the Navy
Department.

It would be both uninteresting and useless to record
in detail the consultations with the Secretary of the
Nav}'. I reported fully upon the state of affairs abroad,
and the object of my return to the Confederate States
was explained. The Avants of the Department and the

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 131

naval policy of tlie Government — how to supply the one
and to carry out the other — were the chief considerations,
and they were amply discussed. Finally it was decided as
a first step that the Fingal should be filled up with cotton,
on account of the Navy Department, and that I should
return to Europe with her to carry out the further pur-
poses of the Government ; and while the ship was
loading, my original instructions and powers would be
revised, and the mode of furnishing funds would be
arranged with the Treasury Department.

Messrs. John Fraser and Co., of Charleston, were
instructed to buy in the interior and forward to Savan-
nah the quantity of cotton necessary to fill up the Fingal^
and the naval jDaymaster at that station was ordered to
supply the coals required for the outward voyage. I got
back to Savannah about November 23rd. The situation
of aflfairs was interesting, and I think it will afford a
better picture of passing events if I give the official cor-
respondence which was carried on from that place, than
if I continue the account in the narrative style.

'Savannah, November 25, 1861.
' SiK,—

' I have the honour to report that the steamship
Fingal has been discharged, and now lies in the Savan-
nah river ready to receive freight. Paymaster Kelly has
written to Columbus to have the necessary quantity of
coal sent down at once, and expects it to be here to-
morrow or next day. I cannot refrain fi'om urging the
necessity of getting the ship ofi^ without delay. Yester-
day five of the enemy's gunboats stood cautiously in,
and after throwing a number of shell upon and over
Tybee Island, a force was landed without opposition.
' This morning the Federal flag is flying from the

9—2

132 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

liulithoiise, and they Avill doubtless soon liave a battery
upon tlie point of the island. The only egress left for
the Fimjal is through AVarsaw Inlet, and it can scarcely
be supposed tliat the enemy will permit it to remain
open many days. . . . The small quantity of naval
stores and cotton required for the Fingal could be got
on board in a couple of days if they were brought here
on the spot.

' I am, etc.,
' (Signed) James D. Bulloch.

' Hon. S. K. Mallory,

* Secretary of the Navy.'

The railways were so fully occupied with the trans-
port of troops and material of war for Virginia, and
other frontier points, that the local traffic was almost
Avholly stopped, and the cotton and coals for the Fingal
were brought forward in the merest driblets. On the
4th of December I received the following letter of
instructions : —

* Confederate States of America, Navy Department,

* Richmond, Virginia, November 30, 1861.

' Sir, —

' You will take command of the Fingal, receive
on board so much cotton and rosin, to be delivered to
you under the orders of the Secretary of the Treasury, as
your judgment may approve, together with your coal,
and proceed to such port in Great Britain as you may
deem expedient, delivering your cargo as you may be re-
quested by the Secretary of the Treasury. You will
select two coast pilots to aid in bringing the Fingal
safely back. On your arrival in Great Britain you will

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 133

transfer the command oithoi Fingal to Lieutenant G. T.
Sinclair, whom you will receive on board at Savannah.'

Then follows information in regard to funds, and
instructions as to the articles most needed, which I was
to buy, if not already included in the outstanding con-
tracts, and ship back to a Confederate port in the Fingal.

' So soon as either of the vessels under contract in
England shall be completed and delivered, you will
adopt such measures as you may deem best to arm and
equip her as a vessel of war, without infringing the laws
of Great Britain, or giving to that Government just
cause of offence ; and having obtained a crew and all
things necessary' for an extended cruise, you will leave
England in command, and proceed against the enemy in
whatever quarter of the ocean circumstances may then
indicate as affording the best chances of success. Lieu-
tenant-Commanding Pegram (of the Nashville) is in-
structed to detail such officers from his vessel as you may
require, and you are authorized to confer acting appoint-
ments upon such others as you may deem necessary.
The Department, the speed and qualities of your vessel
being unknown, is unwilling, so far in advance, to
assign any particular locality for your operations, but
desires to impress upon you the importance of rendering
your vessel as formidable, and your cruise as destructive,
as practicable, leaving to you entire freedom of action.
Should your judgment at any time hesitate in seeking
the solution of any doubt on this point, it may be aided
by the reflection that you are to do the enemy's com-
merce the greatest injury in the shortest time. A speedy
recognition of our Government by the Great European
Powers is anticipated, and I have no reason to doubt
that if you shall seek their ports, you will receive the

134 THE fiECEET SEEVICE OE THE

consideration and treatment due from neutrals to an
officer of a belligerent Power with wliich they desire to
establish close commercial relations. The strictest re-
gard for the riglits of neutrals cannot be too sedulously
observed ; nor should an opportunity be lost of culti-
vatino' friendly relations with their naval and merchant
services, and of placing the true character of the contest
in which we are engaged in its proper light. You will
avail yourself of every opportunity of communicating
with your Government, using, when you may deem it
expedient, a cipher for this purpose. The Department
relies with confidence upon the patriotism, ability, and
conduct of yourself, officers, and men, and with my
earnest wishes for the prosperity of your cruise, and
your triumphant return to your country,

' I am, etc.,
' (Signed) S. R. Mallory,

' Secretary of the Xavy.
' Captain James D. Bulloch,
' Savannah, CTeorgia.'

In a subsequent letter the Secretary of the ^Sfavy
directed me to arm the Fiugal for the outward voyage,
and I replied to the main points as follows :

' Savannah,' i)efe??i5er 5, 1861.
' Sir, —

' I have the honour to acknowledge, etc. . . .

The greatest obstacle will be met at the very outset in
the difficulty of arming and equipping a cruiser in a
neutral port ; for even if Great Britain should have
acknoAvledged the independence of the Confederate
States, unless she has become a part}- to the war, her
oblio-ations under the International Code would force

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 135

her to prohibit the equipment of an armed ship under a
belUgerent flag in her ports. You are better informed
as to such contingencies than I can l^e, and I only
allude to the subject to show that I am fully prepared
to submit to the disappointment of not at once getting
upon that element which is free to any flag when
properly defended.

' Such jjortions of your instructions as are specific
shall be carried out as strictly to the letter as possible,
and in the exercise of the large discretion granted me,
I will endeavour to act with as much caution and
prudence as will be consistent with promptness and
vigour. I particularly note your remarks in reference
to neutrals, and will bear constantly in mind your
suggestions upon tliis and other points. There has
been much delay in getting the cotton forward, l)ut I
think the Fim/al will be ready for sea on Saturday
night. ... I have not deemed it necessary to arm the
Fingal for the return voyage, as it is important to
preserve her original character as an English ship.
This course will ensure her less trouble and annoyance
in getting another cargo on board. If, on our arrival
in England, the Confederate Grovernment has been
acknowledged, the flag can be changed. . . .

' I am, etc.,

'James D. Bulloch.

' Hon. S. R. Malloiy,

' Secretary of the Navy.'

Owing to the continued difiiculty of inland transpor-
tation and the delay in getting the cotton for the Fingal
to the shipping port, she was not loaded until December
20th, and the following copies of the correspondence

136 THE SECRET SEIU'ICE OF THE

will best explain the ntteinptR to get her to sea, as well
as the condition of aftairs at Savannah :

* Steamship Fingitl, off Thunderbolt Batteiy,

'Near Savannah, Deccmhrr 24, 1861.

' Sir, —

' On Saturday morning the barometer and the
general appearance of the sky indicating a favourable
state of weather, I made preparations for sea, and on
Sunday morning early dropped the ship down to a
bio'ht in AVilmini>'ton Island, where she can lie concealed
fi'om the enemy's ships at Warsaw as well as at Tybee.
This bight is about one mile above a seven-gun battery
on Skidaway Island, from which point there is a clear
"S'iew of the ojjening to Warsaw Sound. Immediately
after anchoring, the captain of this battery informed me
that three blockading vessels were off the bar, and that
one of them had chased his boat in on the afternoon
before. Still, as all appearances indicated a dark and
squally night, it was determined to get under weigh on
the first quarter of the flood, so as to get down to the
bar before the moon rose. At early dark a fog set in
over the marshes, concealing the leading marks, and the
pilots were unwilling to move the ship. This circum-
stance, sufficiently annoying at first, probably saved us
from capture, as it appears that the enemy were keeping
an especial look-out that night.

' No vessel could have seen to cross the bar before
half-past seven o'clock, yet at 8 a.m. one of their small
vessels ap])eared in full sight of the battery below us,
and actually steamed up to within half a mile of its guns,
turned, and .steamed down channel again without receiv-
ing a shot. I am informed that the approach of tliis
vessel was not rej^orted to the commander of the battery
until she was in the act of turning.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 137

' Ignorant of the incident abo^^e mentioned, I sent an
experienced pilot in an eight-oared boat with good sails,
kindly furnished by Lieutenant-Commanding Kennard,
of the Confederate States steamer Samson, to examine the
bar and the coast nortli and south of the point of Warsaw
Island, and to report as quickly as possible, so that if
all was clear we might go to sea on the afternoon tide.
In the meantime two additional gun- vessels had joined
the first, and the three coming rapidly up channel with
the young flood, cut ofl:' our boat, compelling her, as it
is now thought, to go into one of the creeks running
through the Romerly ]\Iarsh, from which I trust she has
been able by this time to reach Green Island. The
enemy's three vessels took up an anchorage just opposite
the main passage through Romerly Marsh, thus eff'ec-
tually closing all communication with Savannah from
the sea, through any inlet. As the enemy could easily
have discovered the position of this ship by landing
upon Wilmington Island, and could have cut her out
with boats at night, I took advantage of last night's
flood to bring her up to this place, where there is another
battery. For some time before last Saturday the enemy
had not entered Warsaw^ Sound, their vessels simply
cruising up and down the coast in very regular order.
This movement, therefore, would seem especially intended
to prevent the escape of this ship, and would indicate
treachery somewhere. It may, however, only be the
development of a general plan of attack upon Savannah,
which place I consider far from bemg safe. The batteries
are weak in guns and gunners, and whatever the
gallantry of the men may be, Avhich is undoubted, they
could not withstand a vigorous attack from the ships
which could be brought over Warsaw bar.

^ I will remain in a position to take advantage of any

138 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

change in the enemy's plans, and will lose no oppor-
tunity of getting to sea.

' I am, etc.,
'■ (Signed) James D. Bulloch.

' Hon. S. R Mallory,

'Secretary of the Navy.'

'Savannah, December 26, 1861.
' SiK,—

' On the 24tli inst. I addressed you from the
anchorage at Thunderbolt, re2:>orting my failure to get
the F'uKjal to sea, and informmg you that the enemy
had effectually sealed up all the approaches to Savannah
from Warsaw Inlet and the other channels leadino- from
the southward. The position of the Fiagal below the
battery at Thunderbolt was not safe, as the enemy might
at any time cut her out with boats. I therefore, by the
advice of Flag-officer Tattnall sent her back to the city
on the afternoon of the 24th, and went down to AVarsaw
Island myself in search of the boat I informed you had
been cut off by the sudden approach of the enemy's gun-
boats on the day before. I returned to Savannah last
night, and have the satisfaction to report that the men
(^\T.tli Mr. Low and two midshipmen who were of the
party) w^ere found and brought safely to Skidaway, and
are now here, with the exception of two of the crew of
the Samson^ who I regret to say deserted, and it is
feared got on board the blockading vessels. Yesterday
morning, while I was on Warsaw Island, a large paddle-
wheel steamer joined the three vessels already anchored
below Skidaway, and late in the afternoon a screw-
steamer, barque rigged and pierced for eight guns, came
in. There are thus five ships-of-war at the entrance to
the Romerly ]\Iarsh, a force too powerful for the simple

CONFEDERA TE ST A TES IN E UROPE. 1 39

blockade of the Fingal, and tliis assembling of the enemy's
fleet can only be regarded as preliminary to an attack in
force upon the city. It is impossible to conjecture Avhat
chance may occur to open a passage for the Fingal. . . .
If the Fingal is irretrievably locked up for the war, I
presume you would desire me to get to England by some
other means, etc.

' I am, etc.,
' (Signed) James D. Bulloch.

' Hon. S. R. Mallory.'

From the date of the fore^'oino- letter I continued to
report the condition of affairs at Savannah, and the
position of the enemy's ships at the main entrance to
the river, as well as in Warsaw Sound, and received
various letters from the Department, increasing the
orders for purchase of supplies in England, and en-
larging the general scope of my duties there, and espe-
cially instructing me to ' examine into the subject of
constructing- iron and steel clad vessels in Eno;land and
France.'

On the 3rd of January, 1862, 1 reported as follows : —

' Since my last letter there has been no change in the
position of the blockading vessels off Tybee, but the
enemy seems to have changed the design indicated by
tlie first appearance of his squadron near Skidaway
battery. On the 30th ultimo, three old sailing ships,
probalDly part of the much-talked-of " Stone Fleet," were
brought in and anchored at the entrance to the Romerly
]\Iarsh, and have since been stripped to their lower
masts. If these vessels are sunk in their present posi-
tion, the inland communication would of course be
closed between Savannah and the more southern ports

140 THE SECUET SEE VICE OE THE

of Georgia ; but should the enemy, content witli this
interruption of local trade, remove the men-of-war for
other operations, or for outside cruising, the Fimjal
might yet be got to sea through the regular ship channel
leading between AVarsaw Island and little Tybee. Up
to the present moment no o])portunity has offered to
pass the blockading shi})s. By way of Warsaw they
occupy the entire channel with five ships, sometimes
seven ; and at the anchorage near Tybee there have
never been less than four ships, frequently as many as
eleven.'

January loth I again reported : —

' I reo'ret to sav that this letter must be of the same
tenor as tlie last. The enemy are fully informed of the
FingaVs position and the intention to get her out if
possible,' etc. ' Unless there be some changes in the
political relations of the United States with the courts
of Europe, I consider the port of Savannah as com-
pletely closed to commerce for an indefinite time ; con-
sequently my detention here with any hope of getting
the FiiKjdl to sea is not only unnecessary, but will
occasion much delay and confusion in the settlement of
the business for which I was originally sent to Europe.
I therefore respectfully suggest that you order me to
proceed at once to England for the purpose of com-
pleting that business, and of still further carrying out
your instructions of Xovember 30, 18G1.'

In continuation I pointed out the effect of the delay,
and the probable impossibility of completing or even
fairly setting on foot the \-arious duties with which I
was charged, in time to go to sea in the first ship,
which would probabl}- be ready by the date of my

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 141

arrival in Eno[land, and suo-o-ested that I should be
transferred to the second ship, whicli would be finished
three to four months later. In repl}^, my orders were
modified in the above particular, and the Secretary of
the Navy directed me to turn over the Fimjal to
Lieutenant G. T, Sinclair, and to proceed to England by
any feasible route.

Mr. John Low, upon my recommendation, was ap-
pointed a master in the Confederate Navy, and was
ordered to accompany me to Europe. Two midshipmen,
E. C. Anderson, junior, and Eugene Maffitt, were ordered
to join me, and also Mr. Clarence R. Yonge, an assistant
in the paymaster's office at Savannah, the last named to
act as clerk, and then to be appointed acting paymaster
in one of the cruising ships.

Mr. Yonge afterwards left the Alabama when at
Jamaica, somewhat unexpectedly, and as he took
service on his return to England under the United
States Consul at Liverpool, and afterwards took the
prominent part of chief witness in the ''Alexandra Case*
(which will be dwelt upon in a subsequent chapter),
his conduct was much criticised at the time.

The official correspondence quoted above has not been
included in the body of this narrative merely to illus-
trate the movements of the Fingal, but chiefly to de-
monstrate the views of the Government in respect to the
proposed naval operations abroad, and to make a fair
representation of the enemy's operations and the condi-
tion of affairs at Savannah in December — January,
1861-62. My duties at that time compelled me to be
much and often at both entrances to the Savannah
river, and to examine carefully and critically the move-
ments and force of the blockading fleet, and the strength
and number of the Confederate defensive works.

142 THE SECRET SEEFICE OF THE

Tlie main approach to Savannah, via Tybee, was
defended by two old brick forts, \ery inefficiently
armed, chiefly with smooth-bore 32-pomiders. The
approach from Warsaw Sound, through Wilmington
Creek, was protected by a battery of seven guns on
Skidaway Island, and another battery of six or seven
guns at Thunderbolt, further up the creek, and quite
out of range of the first. Jjoth of these fortifications
were newly made earthworks, entirely open in rear, and
the guns were mounted in barbette.

The United States ships at anchor off the entrance to
Romerly ]\Iarsh were just out of gunshot from the
SkidaAvay battery. They lay there for days, and so far
as I could discover, never made a reconnaissance.
There Avas no sleeping accommodation for the garrison
inside the works at Skidaway, and the men lived in
tents and huts some distance in the rear, a guard only
being actually in the battery night and day. Among
the blockading vessels was one fine steamship of the
Iroquois class, and I often wondered why they did not
come inside some dark night mth boats, get round the
flank of the battery, and spike the guns. The garrison
were sturdy fellows, and would have been formidable in
a stand-up fight, but the attacking party always have
the advantage in a night surprise, and the ships could
not only have chosen their time, but could have greatly
outnumbered the guard.

The blockading squadron at Tybee was also very
apathetic, and never, while I was there, came within
range of Fort Pulaski. Among the vessels ofl^" Tybee, I
recognised my old ship the Bienville, or it might have
been the De Soto — they were sister ships. The gun-
boats could have run past the batteries on Wilmington
Creek at any time, and so have got into the rear of Fort

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 143

Jackson, driven the men out of it, and then gone on
into the Savannah river, completely isolating Fort
Pulaski. The men, working the guns in barbette, could
not have stood a rapid fire from the ships ; grape and
canister would have swept them off the parapet.

I do not know who commanded the United States
blockading squadron at that time. Either Farragut or
David Porter would have tried to get inside, if they had
been there ; at least, they would have made some effort
to discover the means of resistance. The Confederate
naval forces at Savannah were commanded by Flag-
officer Josiah Tattnall, as gallant a seaman as ever trod
a plank. I suppose no officer of his rank and quality
was ever doomed to the indignity of such an inefficient
command. His flag-ship, the Savannah, was a paddle
river-boat, mth engines and boilers on deck, and her
battery consisted of one smooth-bore 32-pounder gun,
on a traversing carriage. A rocket exploding among
the flimsy joiner-work of her deck cabins would have
set her on fire, and a single shell fi'om one of the gun-
boats outside would have blown her up. When Tattnall
would come down the river, as he often did, ynth his
so-called * Musquito fleet,' and flaunt his flag as a seem-
ing challenge to the formidable ships of the enemy at
Tybee, nothing saved the display from the appearance
of bravado, or the manoeuvre from ridicule, but the
natural grace and dignity with which the fine old
gentleman performed every act of his life.

Josiah Tattnall was a man out of the common, the
beau ideal of a naval officer of what must now be
called the old school, 'the sublime of Jack-tar.' He
was punctilious on a point of honour, and rigid in
the practice of official propriety ; but he was genial,
modest and unassuming in his private intercourse with

144 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

friends, and liis manners were courtly, yet easy and unre-
strained. He was cliarniinii-lv fluent and entertaining- in
conversation, and had a very special gift for telling a
story with liveliness and spirit, always illustrating the
sense and point of his narrative Avith ajipropriate action
and gesture. In positions of command fully testing his
tact, judgment, courage, and professional skill, he almost
invariably exhibited higher faculties than the occasions
required, and no one can therefore fix the limit of his
ability. He possessed all the traits which are found in
heroic characters, and, with suitable opportunities, would
have set his name among the great naval worthies who
are historic. He was a high type of human nature —
a ' perfect ' man in the Scriptural sense — that is to say,
complete in all his parts. He died in Savannah, his
native place, and was buried near there in a grove of old
live-oak trees planted to commemorate the w^edding of
the first of his ancestors who settled in the Colony of
Georgia. A couplet from the touching requiem to
' Tom Bowling ' would be a fitting epitaph to one who
has been called the ' Bayard of the sea ' : —

' Though Lis body's under hatches
His soul has gone aloft.'

The prediction that Savannah would be sealed up for
the remainder of the war was fulfilled, and the FingaVs
proposed voyage to Europe was definitely abandoned.
She was not, howxver, lost to the Confederate States.
The Navy Department took her into the service, and she
was converted into an armour-clad, and christened
Atlanta. To effect this conversion she was first cut
down to her deck, which throughout about 150 or
160 feet amidships was widened (6 feet on each side,
widest part, but tapermg towards the ends) by a 'heavy

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 145

solid overway of wood and armour,' sloping from a point
several feet below the water-line to the edge of the deck.
Upon this widened portion of the deck a casemate Avas
built, the sides and ends inclining at an angle of about 30°.
The top of the casemate was flat, and the house to cover
the steersman and officer directing the fire rose above the
roof about three feet. The sloping sides and ends of the
casemate were covered with two layers of iron plates,
each being two inches thick, screwed to a backing com-
posed of three inches of oak upon fifteen inches of pine.
The bolts were one and a quarter inch, countersunk on
the outside of the j)lates, and drawn up by nuts and
w^ashers on the inside. She was provided with a beak
or ram at the bow ; and a pole and lever, which could
be lowered at will, was also fitted at the bow, long-
enough to project beyond the ram. The pole was in-
tended to carry a percussion torpedo. Her armament
consisted of two 7 -inch rifled guns on bow and stern
pivots, and two 6 -inch rifled guns in broadside. The
7-inch guns were so arranged that they could be worked
in broadside, as well as for fore and aft fire, and the
Fingal could therefore fight three guns (two 7 -inch
and one 6-inch) on either side. The guns were cast-iron
with wrought iron bands, and were of the ' Brooke '
pattern.

As soon as the Atlanta was finished, the Navy De-
partment was desirous that she should be tried against
the enemy's ironclads, eight or nine of which were
known to be in the neighbourhood, off" Charleston and
the entrances to Savannah, or at Port Eoyal. The senior
officers of the Confederate navy at Savannah did not
think that she would be a match for the United
States Monitor class at close quarters, and they did not
think it prudent to take her out into Warsaw Sound,

VOL. I. 10

U6 THE SECnET SERVICE OF THE

where two ' Monitors ' were lylno-, except under fovour-
able circumstances of spring-tide, because lier draft had
been increased by the weight of armour, ordnance, and
necessary stores, and the channels were not only in-
tricate, but the depth of water very scant at best, and
besides this, the ship steered badly in consequence of
the increased draft and the alteration of form caused by
the projecting overway, which extended several feet
below the water-line.

Flag-officer Tattnall's advice was to wait until the
enemy collected his ironclads for a second attack upon
Charleston, and then to send the Atlanta out on the first
spring-tide, when she could be got to sea without the
risk of being taken at a disadvantage in the narrow and
shoal waters of the Romerly Marshes and Warsaw
Sound. Once fairl}- afloat, and with ample sea-room, he
tliought she could strike a telling blow, either at Port
Royal, where the enemy had a large collection of trans-
ports, or at some other point. This wise counsel was
unhappily overborne by the w^eight of public clamour,
and the Xavy Department yielded to the outside pressure.

Commander Wm. A. Webb, a clever and spirited
officer, was ordered to the Atlanta, and the condition of
his appointment appeared to be that he should at once
* do somethmg.' Before daylight on the morning of
June 17, 1863, Webb got under weigh, and steaming
past the old batteries on Skidaway Island, which had
ere this been abandoned, entered Warsaw Sound. The
United States ' Monitors ' Weehawken and Nahant were
at anchor in the sound. They made out the Atlanta at
about 4 a.m., and the Weehawken immediately slipped
her cable and steamed towards her, followed closely by
the Nahant. At about GOO yards from the Weehaicken
the Atlanta grounded, but was backed off with some

CONFEDEBATE STATES IN EUROPE. 147

difficulty. Shortly after, the Atlanta took the bottom
agam, and stuck fast. The Wcehaicbm approached to
withm about 300 yards, and choosmg a position so that
' the Atlanta could bring her guns to bear with difficulty,'
opened fire. The engagement, if it can be called one,
lasted about fifteen minutes. The Nahant did not fire
a shot, but the Weehawken hit the Atlanta four times,
twice with 15-inch ' cored shot,' and twice with 11 -inch
solid shot. The Atlanta's pilot-house was knocked off,
and one of the port-stoppers, or shutters, was driven in ;
the armour was crushed in at several points, although
not pierced, and the backing was much damaged. One
15-mch shot struck fairly on the inclined side of the
Atlanta, breaking the armour plate and driving a shower
of splinters from the backing into the ship. Captain
Webb has told me that the concussion knocked down
about forty men, and sixteen were more or less wounded
by the splinters.

Webb was in a sad plight. It can hardly be said that
he was fighting his ship — he was simply enduring the
fire of his adversary.

It was manifest that a few more concussions, and a
15 -inch shot, perhaps a shell, would find its way into
the casemate, and there would be great and useless
slauo;hter amono- his men. When further resistance
ceases to hold out any hope of final success, the dictates
of humanity extort an acknowledgment of defeat, and
the Atlanta\s flao; was hauled down.

The foregoing brief statement has been made up
a,lmost exclusively fi:'om the Confederate accounts. I
have before me, while writmg, a copy of the report of
the commander of the Weehawken, and if it contained
anything in conflict with the above, I would either
mention the fact or give the report in full. Captain

10—2

148 THEISECRET SEllVICE OF THE

Johii Rodo'crs, of the Wcchaiclni (I hope I may still
speak of him in tlie present tense), is an able officer.
He accepted with promptness the Atlanta^ s invitation to
battle, and handled his ship with skill and judgment.
He took up a good position, awkward for his adversary
and advantageous to himself, which he was bound to
do, for it is clearly the duty of a commander so to dis-
pose his force as to defeat the enemy witli as little loss
to himself as possible, and finally he reported the result
of the engagement in a plain, manly, straightfoi-ward
document, without the least brag or unbecoming elation.
As a pleasing but somewhat unique feature in the report
of Captain Rodgers, I may mention that he called the
Atlanta the 'enemy,' and not the 'rebel,' an epithet
chosen hj the politicians at Washington for a purpose,
and used b}' them as a reproach. It crept into the mili-
tar}' and naval phraseology of the war, and was thrown
broadcast over the correspondence of civil functionaries
and United States Consuls ; but the old officers of the
army and navy, for the most part, either avoided it, or
at any rate seemed to use it as a technical phrase, with-
out opprobrious meaning.

The encounter between the Federal ' Monitors ' and
the Atlanta illustrates no general princi^^le applicable
to engagements between iron -cased shijDS. The 15 -inch
guns of the Weehawhen were superior in battering power
at close quarters to the 6 -inch and 7 -inch guns of the
Atlanta, and the only chance of success for the latter
would have been to get into deep and broad waters,
where she could manoeuvre, and thus use her guns effi-
ciently, and choose her distance as well as position.
Lj'ing helplessly aground, she was at the mercy of her
oi)ponent, who was able to come within the most effec-
tive range for her own guns, and to avoid almost

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. U9

entirely the return fire of her adversary. Captain
Eodgers does not mention that his ship was hit, or that
she received an}^ injur}^ whatever, except by colKsion
with his own consort, the Nahant, after the surrender of
the Atlanta.

When the Secretary of the Navy directed me to turn
over the Fingal to Lieutenant Gr. T. Sinclair, and to pro-
ceed to England by any practicable route, I commu-
nicated at once with Messrs. John Fraser and Co., of
Charleston, and they kindly offered me and my party
passage in either of two steamers they were about to
despatch, one fi'om Charleston and one from Wilmington.
The Charleston steamer would try the blockade first,
but she was small, and would only go as far as
Nassau, from which place I would have to find my way
to Havana, and thence round by St. Thomas to South-
ampton, a circuitous route, and very uncertain as re-
gards connection with packets, etc. The Wilmmgton
steamer was larger, having been built for the coasting-
trade to Boston, and the purpose was to send her direct
to Liverpool, only stopping at Fayal in the Azores to
replenish her coals. I chose the latter ship and route,
and went on to Wilmington, arriving there January 24,
1862. The steamer's name originally was North Caro-
lina, but it had been changed to Annie Childs. She was
coaling and taking in cotton, rosin, tobacco, and other
cargo, until February 1st, when her commander. Captain
Hammer, took her down to Orton Point, about twelve
miles above the mouth of the river, fi'om which position
the ship was concealed from the blockaders.

General J. R. Anderson, commander of the Con-
federate forces at Wilmington, kindly put a small screw
tug-boat at my disposal, and Captain Hammer and I
went down to Fort Caswell, at the mouth of the river,

150 THE SECIIET SEL'VICE OF THE

every da}' to reconnoitre. The New Inlet bar was too
shoal for the A?}?iie C/iilfh, and tlie only possible egress
was by the main sliip channel. Two gunboats were
generally l}'ing at anchor during the day about one mile
west-south-west fi-om the bar, and were sometimes joined
by another from Xew Inlet. We learned fi-om the coast-
guard pickets that they did not get under weigli at night.
The nights continued to be clear until February 5th,
and there was no chance for a run. I find the following
entry in my diary under February 5th, 1862 :

' Early part of the day clear, but wind nortli-east,
with passing clouds towards noon. In the afternoon
got ready for a start. At 10 p.m. under weigh, moon
shining, but light haze. Full tide at 12.7; moon set at
same time. Timed the ship's speed so as to reach the
bar just after the setting of the moon. Crossed 12.15 ;
low fog, stars over head, smooth sea, calm, might have
heard the dip of an oar or the swash of the screw a long
way. lilockaders must have been fast asleep. Scarcely
clear of the bar when the heatini!: of a bearino; made it
necessary to stop the engine for at least half an hour.
Fortunateh' it be^fan to rain. The bearino- bemo; all
right, we started again, and were soon safe in a thick
drizzle, which lasted until we got to the eastward of the
Gulf Stream.'

The Annie Childs had a single engine, one inverted
cylinder, and was badly found for a vo}age across the
jN^orth Atlantic in the month of Februarj', but she was
a capital sea-boat and behaved admirably in a heavy
north-west gale which Ave caught in the ' roaring forties.'
At Fayal the American Consul gave a great deal of
trouble, and if it had not been for Llo^'ds' agent we
should not have got any coal at all. As it was, we had
to be content with a scant supply. At 2.30 p.m. on the

CONFEDEIIATE STATES IN EUROPE. 151

afternoon of March 8th, 1862, we made the Old Head of
Kinsale, took a Cork pilot on board, and went into
Queenstown that night, burning the sweepings of the
bunkers mixed with rosin, and the spare spars cut into
short lengths. The next day I took train for Liverpool
via. Dublin and Holyhead, and arrived there at 4 p.m.
on the 10th.

152 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

CHAPTER IV.

The Florida. — Captain Dugiiid. — Correspondence concerning the
Florida. — Her arrival at Nassau. — Commander Maffitt. — The
United States blockade of the British Bahama Channel. — The
equipping of the Florida. — Yellow fever. — The Florida runs
the blockade at Mobile. — An unparalleled chase. — The Florida's
cruise in the "West Indies. — Vessels captured by the Florida. — Her
stay at Brest. — Her second cruise. — Her assassination by the
JFacMisetf. — Justification of the use of the term ' assassination,'
— The Brazilian Government and the capture of the Florida. —
United States treatment of prisoners-of-war.

Before leaving England witli the Fingal in October,
1861, I drew up very particular and specific instructions
A\ith reference to the outfit of the Oreto (^Florida), Avith
the purpose of preventing an}' possible violation of the
Foreign Enlistment Act, as it had been explained to me
by counsel, and to ensure that the ship when delivered
to me should be prepared to fulfil the conditions essen-
tial to a sea-going steamer of her class and notliing
more.

On my arrival in Liverpool fi'om the Confederate
States (March lOth, 1862), the Oreto {Florida) was
ready to take the sea. She had made a satisfactory trial
trip, and was already provisioned for her outward voyage.
I made a thorough investigation, and satisfied myself
that not a single article contraband of war was on board
the ship — not a weapon, not an appliance for momiting

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 153

a gun. In this condition I was advised that according
to the Municipal Law of Great Britain, she was a per-
fectly lawful article of traffic, that the builder could
deliver her, and I could pay for and receive her, without
infringing any statute, or transgressing any requirement
of commercial propriety.

Captain James Alexander Duguid, a duly certificated
master mariner, was appointed to command the ship,
and the crew and engineer's staff Avere engaged in strict
conformity with the conditions of the Merchant Shipping-
Act, signing articles for a voyage from Liverpool to
Palermo, and thence, if required, to a port or ports in
the Mediterranean Sea, or the West Indies, and back to
a j)ort of discharge in the United Kingdom, the voyage
not to exceed six months. Not a single officer or man
was enlisted for the service of the Confederate States,
nor was a hint thrown out to the crew that the voyage
would be other than the route specified in the shipping
articles. Captain Duguid and the chief engineer were
informed that the ship would go first of all to Nassau,
but they knew perfectly well that a shipowner has the
right to var^T- the order of visit to the ports specified in
the shipping articles, and that it is not unusual to exer-
cise that privilege when his interests or the special cir-
cumstances of the vo3'age suggest or require a variation
within the general limits of the original engagement.
Neither the captain nor the engineer were, however, em-
ployed, nor in any way pledged to depart from the
general conditions set out in the articles, and they did
not at any future time enter the service of the Con-
federate States, so far as I know.

In ' The Case of the United States,' laid before the
Tribunal of Arbitration at Geneva, it is affirmed, on the
authority of a despatch from the United States Consul

154 THE SEC BET SERVICE OF THE

at Liverpool, to Mr. Seward, that the Oreto ' took her
gun-carriages on board at Liverpool,' and it is further-
more stated that she sailed witli ' a crew of fifty-two men
and some guns.'* In refutation of the foregoing, the evi-
dence of the Customs officers at J Liverpool was that they
kept ' watch on the 2)roceedings of the vessel Oreto from
the time she left the Toxteth Dock, on the 4th of ]\Iarch
last (18(j2), till the day she sailed, the 22nd of the
same month. . . . we did not see at any time any arms,
or warlike ammunition of any kind, taken on board, and
Ave are perfectly satisfied that none such was taken on
board during her stay in the river.'

One of the statements was very specific.

' I am one of the Surveyors of Customs at this port
(Liverpool). Pursuant to instructions I received fi'om
the Collector on the 21st February in the present year
(1862), and at subsequent dates, I visited the steamer
Oreto at various times, when she was being fitted out in
the dock, close to the yard of Messrs. Miller and Sons,
the builders of the vessel. I continued this inspection
from time to time until she left the dock, and I am cer-
tain that when she left the river she had no warlike
stores of any kind whatever on board. After she went
into the river she was constantly watched hy the board-
ing officers, who were directed to report to me whenever
any goods were taken on board ; but, in reply to my
frequent inquiries, they stated nothing was put in the
ship but coals.

' (Signed) Edward Morgan,

' Surveyor.'

The foregoing and other statements of like import will
be found in the evidence laid before the Tribunal of

* ' United States Case,' p. 65.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 155

Arbitration at Geneva.* They are confirmatory of my
own declarations to the same effect, and the fact is
therefore established beyond dispute that the Oreto left
the Mersey wholly unarmed, and without any portion of
her outfit which could render her liable to seizure or
detention for violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act.
As she lay in the river off the Egremont Ferry, she
looked a comely craft, as much within her legal rights
as a hundred cases of Birmingham rifles, or as many
tons of gunpowder, about to start for New York in any
other ship. This is not the rash assertion of an in-
terested party, pronounced in a spirit of bravado, or by
way of a retort ; it is founded upon the decision of one
of the highest Courts in the realm, as will be shown in
due course.

It will be remembered that the orders of the Navy
Department, dated November 30th, 1861, directed me to
take personal command of the first ship completed in
England, and to proceed to cruise against the enemy's
commerce. But other duties assigned to me in Europe
were largely increased before my departure from the
Confederate States, and I was also instructed to examine
into the subject of ironclads, and report whether vessels
of that class could be built in England or France. When
I called the attention of the Navy Department to the fact
that the first ship would probably be ready for sea by
the time I could reach England (I have already men-
tioned that the original orders were modified to suit the
new conditions), I was directed to set in train the
general business of the Navy Department in Europe,
and to take command of the second ship (the Alabama).

It was not anticipated that this change would occa-
sion any perplexity, because the Nashville (Captain R.

* See ' British Case,' p. 58, etc.
VOL. I.'" 10

156 THE SECIIET SERVICE OF THE

B. Pegram) was supposed to l)e in England at that
time, and tlius a commander, with a complete staff of
officers, could be provided for the Oreto with little or no
trouble. The two vessels could be cleared for an
appointed rendezvous, and the transfer easily and safely
effected. The Secretary of the Navy informed me that
he had written Captain Pegram to order such officers
to the Oreto as I might require, and that officer would
have been only too happy to find that under the changed
circumstances he would have the opportunity to com-
mand the Oreto himself. Unhappily, the instructions
did not reach Captain Pegram, and when I arrived in
Liverpool I learned with regret that he had sailed for
a Confederate port, and was far beyond reach. The
situation was perplexing. The ship was an object of
suspicion and disquietude to the United States Minister,
who was pressing her Majesty's Government to detain
her, and his importunities might prevail. No inquiries
could discover that she was thus far in default — of this
I felt assured ; but still, the Confederate Government
had no acknowledged advocate, and the Government
might ' strain the law,' as the Attorney-General ad-
mitted they did at a later period.

It was imperative to send the ship away. Lieutenant
(afterwards Commander) J. N. Maffitt, had been sent to
Nassau on special duty, and I had reason to believe he
was there at that time. I knew Maffitt well. He
was a man of great natural resources — self-reliant,
and fearless of responsibility. I determined to de-
spatch the ship to him at once, and I ordered Low
to go in her. The Oreto sailed from Liverpool on
the 22nd of March, and Mr. Low's instructions were as
follows : —

CONFEDEBATE STATES IN EUROPE. 157

'Liverpool, list March, 1862.

' You will take passage in the steam vessel*
Florida, now about to sail for the Bahamas. This
vessel, for reasons already explained to you, is sent out
under the British flag, and in command of an English
captain, and it is of the utmost importance that nothing
shall be done to com23romise her character as a neutral
vessel until she is safely delivered to an officer of the
Confederate navy, or some agent especially appointed
by the Confederate Navy Department. You are hereby
charged with the care of all public property on board, a
duplicate list of which is herewith furnished you, and
the captain has been instructed after arrival at the first
port of destination to be governed by your orders as to the
movements and disposal of the ship. As soon as you
arrive at the Bahamas, you will communicate with Cap-
tain J. N. Maffitt, Confederate States navy, whom you
will hear of through Messrs. Adderley and Co., of
Nassau, and you will forward the accompanying des-
patch to the Hon. Secretary of the Navy, reporting also
your arrival to him in writing. If Captain Maffitt or
any other commissioned officer of the Confederate States
navy is at Nassau, give him all the information you
have in reference to the ship, hand him the invoice of
stores, with the enclosed letter addressed to Captain
Maffitt, and make the best of your way back to this
country as quickly as possible, as I have duties of great
importance for you here. Should you not find Captain

* The Florida^ s dockyard name was Oreto ; the name first assigned
to her hy the Navy Department was Manasas, by which she is men-
tioned in some of the correspondence, but to avoid confusion, or fre-
quent explanation, she will hereafter be mentioned in this narrative
as the Florida.

158 THE SECUET SEEFICE OF THE

!Maffitt in Nassau, put yourself in communication tlirougli
Mr. Adderley with Major Charles J. Helm or ^Ir. Louis
Heyleger, one of whom will doubtless be in Nassau.
Consult witli those g'entlemen as to the propriety of
keeping the shij:) in Nassau, and remam ^\'ith her until
you hear from the Navy Dei)artment. You must be
careful to ap])ear always as a private gentleman travelling
on his own affairs, and let your intercourse Avith all
persons known to be connected with the Confederate
Government be very guarded and cautious. With the
gentlemen mentioned above, you can of course speak
freely, bat let your interviews be private, so as to escape
notice as much as possible.

' It is impossible to give you instructions to cover
every emergency. I have had experience of your discretion
and judgment, and must rely upon them now. You
will be furnished mth money to pay your personal
expenses, and to meet any small demands against the
ship. As the Florida has an extra quantity of coal on
board, and the captain has been ordered to make the
passage mostly under canvas, it is presumed no material
outlay will be required for some time. Should there be
absolute need of additional funds, you will apply to
Messrs. Adderley and Co., or to either of the afore-
mentioned gentlemen, pledging the Nav}^ Department,
through me, for the amount. You will, however, under
all circumstances, practise the most rigid economy.
You will keep a careful memorandum of the ship's per-
formances, under steam and sail, noting her steering,
working, stability, and all particulars of the speed under
different circumstances, and the degree of pitching and
roUino; under various conditions of sea and weather.
Furnish information on these points to the officer who
may relieve you, and keep a copy for me.

CONFEDEUATE STATES IN EUIIOPE. 159

'Among tlie papers are drawings to show how the
sweeps and traverses for the pivot guns are to be put
down. These, with the guns and all necessary equip-
ments, are on board the steamship Bahama^ now about
to sail for Nassau. If the officer who will take charofe
on the part of the Navy Department needs your services
for a short time, you are at liberty to remain with him,
but unless otherwise directed by the Hon. Secretary of
the Navy himself, after he has received the enclosed
letter, you will return to England at latest by the first
day of June, as 3'our services will then be indispensable
to me.

' Wishing you a safe and speedy passage, and a satis-
factory consummation of the purposes of your voyage,

' I am, etc.,
' (Signed) James D. Bulloch.

* Master John Low,

' Confederate States Navy.'

The follo^\nng letters were given to Mr. Low, along
with his instructions, to be delivered to Captain Maffitt,
and to be forwarded to the Secretary of the Navy from
Nassau : —

'Liverpool, ^st March, 1862.

' Sir, —

' Day after to-morrow I despatch for Nassau a
o-un-vessel, built in Enoiand under contract with me for
the Confederate navy. In all sailing and steaming
equipment she is very complete, but I have been forced to
dispense with all outfit suited to her true character. It
has been with much difficulty, and only by the most
cautious management, that she has escaped seizure or

160 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

indefinite detention here, and I send her as she is, the
first regularly ])uilt war-vessel for our navy, to your
care. Mr. Low, Master, Confederate States navy, goes
in her to take charge of the public property on l)oard,
and to place her in the hands of any Confederate officer
who may be in the West Indies on her arrival. I hope
it may fall to your lot to command her, for I know
of no officer whose tact and manao'ement could so
w^ell overcome the difficulties of equipping her, or
who could make better use of her when in cruising
order.

' It has been impossible to get the regular battery in-
tended for her on board, but I have sent out four 7-inch
rifled guns, with all necessary equipments in the steamship
Bahama, bound to Nassau, and ^Ir, Low will give you
all particulars as to her probable time of arrival, and will
also hand you a list of everything on board the gun-
vessel, as Avell as an invoice of the shipment by the
Bahama. Another ship Avill be ready in about two
months, and I will take the sea in her myself by some
means or other, although I perceive many difficulties
looming in the future.

' The country seems to be hard pressed, but I hope no
one at home despairs of the final result. Two small
ships can do but little in the way of materially turning
the tide of war, but we can do something to illustrate
the spirit and energy of our people, and if we can
arrange to meet, may yet repay upon the enemy some of
the injuries his vastly superior force alone has enabled
him to inflict upon the States of the Confederacy. AYrite
me as soon as you receive this, and give me full infor-
mation of the state of aff'airs on the other side of the
Atlantic, and if you get to sea in the little cruiser I send
out, appoint a rendezvous. I am too much pressed for

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 161

time, and have too lately arrived, to write more fullv
now, but will communicate with you again soon.

' I am, etc.,
' (Signed) James D. Bulloch.

' Captain J. X. Maffitt,

' Confederate States Xavy. '

'Liverpool, 3Iarch 21, 1862.

' Sir, —

' On the 14th inst., in a necessarily short letter,
I informed you of the safe arrival of myself and party
in England, and will now report more in detail upon the

matters which relate to my especial duties here

Although arrangements have been made by Avhicli cor-
respondence with the Confederate States can be carried
on with more freedom than formerly, yet as there is
always a probability of letters going astray, such as treat
of public affairs must obviously be worded with caution,
and names of persons and places be suppressed

' The 31. {Florida) is ready for sea, with crew, pro-
visions, and all boatswains', carpenters', and sailmakers'
stores necessary for several months on board, and I
will despatch her on the day after to-morrow to a West
Indian port, the exact locality of which will be reported
to you in a subsequent letter, as well as from the ship as
soon after her arrival as possible. It is hoped that she
will be able to communicate immediately upon arrival
with the officer you have already detailed for duty be-
tAveen the southern coast and the Bahamas, and for this
purpose I will send in her the very trusty and prudent
officer you appointed especially to assist me in such
affairs as require me to keep in the background.

' It has been found impossible to place any munitions of
war on board the M. She has been twice inspected by

VOL. I. 11

162 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

the Custom House authorities, in compliance with
specific orders from the Foreign Office, to see that
nothing contraband of war has been phiced m her, and
notice has been given tliat any attempt to smuggle such
articles on board Avould at once be followed by her
seizure. The hammock-nettings, ports, and general
appearance of the ship sufficiently indicate the ultimate
object of her construction, but there is nothing to com-
promise the pacific character she must necessarily assume
for this voyage. Registered as an English ship, in the
name of an Englishman, commanded by an Englishman,
with a regular official number, and her tonnage marked
upon the combings of the main-hatch, under the direction
of the Board of Trade, she seems to be perfect^ secure
against capture, or even interference, until an attempt is
made to arm her, or to change the flag, and this, it
appears to me now, can only be effected at sea. The
late unseemly conduct of the caj^tain of the Federal slii})
Tn.^ra7'ora has caused the British Admiralty to issue
very stringent orders in reference to the treatment of
United States and Confederate vessels in English ports,
whether home or colonial.'

Here follow sjiecifications of the Admiralt}' Orders,
which, have been already mentioned in a previous
chapter, and some details in reference to the shipment
per steamship Bahama, sending out officers, ])ay of
crews for the cruising ships, etc.

' I am, etc.,
' (Signed) James D. Bulloch.

' Hon. S. E. Malloiy,

' Secretary of the Xavy.'

The Florida arrived at Xassau on the 2Sth of April,
and the subjoined letter is ^Ir. Low's re^Dort :

Sir

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 1 63

'Nassau, \st May, 1862.

' I have the honour to report to you the safe
arrival at this port of the Confederate States steamer
Florida^ on the morning of the 28th of April, after a
passage of thirty- seven clays, which, in compliance with
your instructions, has been made principally under
canvas. We wished to he as economical as possible in
regard to the consumption of fuel, but were rather un-
fortunate in having light winds and frequent calms, more
especially in the Trades. During the latter we thought
it prudent to steam, thinkmg that if we made too long
a passage the steamship Bdliama would be here some
time before us. The amount of coal, as you are aware,
Avas one hundred and seventy -five tons, including Welsh
and English. Our consumption of the former was
eighteen tons ]jer day, and of the latter twenty-four.
We have now on board good two days' coal, so I trust
you will find, after taking into consideration the weather,
and our reasons for not making a long passage, that we
have been as economical as possible, not only as regards
fuel, but with everything on board,

' I took particular notice of the vessel as regards her
speed under steam and canvas, and am happy to report
most favourably of her in all respects. Our average
steaming is nine knots and a half ; her sailing averages,
with the wind abeam or quarterly, so that the fore and
aft canvas will draw, twelve knots. The above is the
averao-e : I now o'ive vou what I have seen her do durins;
the passage. Under steam, with smooth water, ten and
a half knots, and under canvas alone, with quartering
wind, so that we could carry main top -gallant studding-
sail, thirteen and a half good.

As regards stability, I do not think there is a

11— 1>

■^5

164 THE SEC BET SEEVICE OF THE

stroiifi'er vessel of lier class afloat ; when pitcliing, you
could not see her work in the least, not so much as to
crack tlie pitch in the A\'aterwa}- planks, where I believe
a vessel i^itching is as likel}' to show weakness as any-
where else.

' I am, etc.,

' (Signed) Joiix Low.
' Commander J. D. Bulloch.'

In the concluding portion of the above letter, Mr.
Low reported that Captain ^Maffitt was not at Nassau
when he arrived, but was expected shortly, and b}' the
advice of Mr. Heyleger he determined to keep the ship
there, but moved her to ' Cochrane's ' or the ' New
Anchorage,' about six miles from the town, where there
was deeper water, and where the ship would be less con-
spicuous. I received several reports from ]\Ir. Low
Avhile he was detained at Xassau, and the subjomed
extract fi'om one of them will be interesting as evidence
of the rifjforous ' blockade ' Avhich the United States
cruisers had established over the l>ritish liahama
channels, even at that earlv date : —

' The steamer Stettin arrived here on the 30th of April
from Falmouth. A short distance off the island she
was chased and fired at several times by a United States
gunboat, but the Stetthi being a faster vessel, she ran
away from her. The gunboat fired twelve shot and
shell at the Stettin — several, as the passengers inform me,
came very near. Diu'ing the firing the Stettin had the
English ensign flyuig, but it appears they have no
respect for that.'

On the 13th of May Low had the happiness to advise
me of Mafiitt's arrival, and that he had taken charge of
the Florida ; he reported that although everything had

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 165

been kept as quiet as possible, yet there had been many
surmises in reference to the movements of the ship, and
he feared there would be trouble if she was detained
much longer at Nassau. Fearing this myself, I had
advised that she should be run into a Confederate port
at once, if there seemed likely to be any difficulty, and
there equipped, and this was eventually done ; but
Maffitt, on the spot, was encouraged to hope that he
might get her guns shipped to some neighbouring Cay
or some point on the banks, and there complete the
equipment without the delay and risk of running the
blockade.

I never permit myself to criticize the action of an
intelligent energetic officer when he is present on the
scene and I am not. Throughout all the trying diffi-
culties ]\Iaffitt showed great patience, astonishing en-
durance, and unflinching jjluck. He wrote me a number
of letters about the troubles and delays, but the details
of the seizure of the ship and the proceedings against her
in the Vice- Admiralty Court at Nassau are fully reported
in the proceedings before the Tribunal of Arbitration
at Geneva, and need not be repeated here. A short
summary will suffice.

The United States Consul at Nassau had his sus-
picions aroused very shortly after the arrival of the
Floruluj and began at once to press the authorities to
examine and then to detain her. She was several times
inspected by officers of the Royal Navy, who reported,
what was quite manifest, that she was in all respects
suited for the purposes of a vessel-of-war, but that she
was not armed, and had no warlike stores on board.
On the loth of June some of the crew of the Florida
(she Avas still called Oreto) went on board of her
Majesty's ship Greyliowid^ and stated to Commander

IGG THE SEC UFA' S Ell J 'ICE OF THE

Hinckley that they had left the Oreto because they were
not able to ascertain her destination, and that slie was
endeavourinij;' to sliip another crew. Tliereupon Com-
mander Hinckley seized tlie vessel, 1)nt on the morning
of the iTtli she was released, tlie Attorney -General being
of thv opinion that tliere was not evidence sufficient to
justify a seizure. Notwithstanding this oj)inion, how-
ever, she Avas again seized on the same day (June ITtli)
by orders of the Governor, and proceedings were forth-
with instituted against her in the A'ice-Admiralty Court
of tlie colony for violation of the Foreign Enlistment
Act. ]\[any witnesses were examined, and the trial was
continued until August 2nd, when the judge pronounced
judgment. After reviewing the evidence, he declared it
to be insufficient, and made a decree for the restoration
of the vessel ' to the master clairain<»' on belialf of her
alleged owner.'

Under date of August 1st, 18()2, Maffitt wrote me
from Xassau : ' The arguments (/// re Oreto) were
l)rought to a close last evening, and the judge reads in
court to-morrow his decree. We have a clear case, but
if the decision is favourable to us, I fear the Governor
will order an apj)eal. Notwithstanding all I say, tlie
O. ma}' be released j in that event, six liours will not
find her here.'

Having been released l)y the decree of the Vice-
Admiralty Court, Maffitt, acting always through tlie
consignees of the ship, cleared the Florida outward as a
vessel in ballast for 8t. John's, Xew Brunswick, and
went out of the harbour to a position near Plog Island,
to trv tlie machinery and to refit. Tlie shiji had been
much neglected while under seizure, and many articles
had been taken out of her which could not be recovered.
At this time vessels Avere loading daily at Xassau for

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 167

the purpose of running the blockade. The schooner
Prince Alfred was engaged by the consignees of the
steamship Bahama, and was loaded with the armament
and other stores intended for the Florida, but unfortu-
nately Maffitt was not able to personally supervise the
transhipment, and many essential articles were over-
looked.

This was one of the ffreat difficulties the Confederates

o

had to encounter during the whole war. Agents of the
United States Government could ship war material of
every description without disguise or the fear of inter-
ference. There were no Confederate Consuls to make
up and forward affidavits affirming that the vessels thus
loading were intended to be armed as cruisers, and the
statement that many vessels were loaded in British ports
with rifles, cannon, ammunition, and military equip-
ments for the United States, expressly for use in the
war against the Confederate States, requires no proof at
this late date.

Maffitt' s open personal interference with the Florida
would have resulted in further detention, probably in
another seizure. Every detail was necessarily left to
agents, who in this case acted certainly with absolute
good faith, Init who did not comprehend the full extent
of his necessities. About August 9th the Prince Alfred
cleared out for St. John's, and proceeded to sea as if
with the purpose to run the blockade. The Oreto
{Florida) being already outside near Hog Island, soon
followed her, and both vessels proceeded in company to
Green Cay, a small desert island on the edge of the great
Bahama Bank, about sixty miles from Nassau. The
United States ships Adirondack and Ciiyler were in the
neighbourhood, and they Avere informed of the Prince
Alfred's movements and her probable connection with

168 THE SECnET SERVICE OF THE

the Floridly as appears from a despatch from the United
States Consul at Xassau to Mr. Seward, dated Aui^-ast
12th,* but they either kept an indifferent look-out or
]\[affitt gave them the slip. At Green Cay the armament
and other stores were transferred from the Prince Alfred
to the Oreto, the Confederate flag was hoisted for the
first time, but not until she was quite clear of the Bank.
The ship was then regularly commissioned, and the
name was finally chano-ed to Florida.

Althouich ]\Iaffitt was now afloat in a Confederate
ship-of-war, he was in no condition to begin a cruise.
The necessarily qiiick departure fi-om Xassau after es-
caping fi'om the clutches of the Vice- Admiralty Court had
made it impossible to engage a sufficient number of men
to Avork the ship, fiir less to fight a battery. He had,
moreover, only one officer of experience, Lieutenant J-
M. Stribbling.

The Avork of transferrmg the armament Avas very
laborious. The hot August sun. combined with night
exposure and general Avant of physical comforts, told
upon them all, and the much-dreaded yelloAV fe\'er, that
scourge of the West Indies, broke out among the
men. There Avas no surgeon on board, and the care
of the sick Avas added to Maffitt's other resjwnsibilities.
United States cruisers AA^ere folloAving him ; he himself
Avas ill ; it Avould have been folly to keep the sea —
indeed, it AA\as impossible. He succeeded in evading the
United States ships Avhich AA^ere blockading the Bahama
channels, and finally found his Avay to the port of
Cardenas, in the island of Cuba, Avhere he Avas kindly
recei\^ed by tlie citizens, and the authorities made no
objection to his obtaining such supplies as Avere needed.

* The letter is among the documents laid before the Tribunal of
Aibitration at Geneva.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 169

From Cardenas Maffitt wrote me the subjoined hasty
note : —

' Cardenas, ^w^«5^ 20, 1862.

' My dear Bulloch,

' I took on board at sea all my battery, but man}^
things in the haste and confusion were forgotten, such
as rammers, sponges, etc. Had but two firemen and
eleven men ; have run the gauntlet splendidl}^ my Coast
Survey experience being of great service. AVhere I went
the Federal sliips dared not follow, and here I am, with
prospects of filling up my crcAv and obtaining what is
necessary. The '■'•prize-crew'" committed many acts of
robbery, and left the vessel in a terrible plight. ... I
hope to give a good account of myself soon, if I get the
men. I write in o-reat haste. Have Lieutenant Strib-
bling — good officer ; acting-master Bradford, acting-
midshipmen Bryan, Floyd, Sinclair — young men of no
nautical experience. No doctor, no paymaster. I have
now three cases of ^^ellow fever ; have had seven. Am
doing well in that line. You remember my fondness
for doctoring the crew. I was fortunate enough to avoid
any connection with the Oreto until the day before we
gave the Yankees the slip. Semmes was looked upon as
the person ordered to command her, and after he left,
that Stribbling was to take her to him at a rendezvous.
. . . This is written in extreme haste, to catch a chance
to send it to Helm at Havana. Good luck, and a God's

blessing.

' Yours aff'ectionately,

' (Signed) J. N. Maffitt.'

In the foregoing letter Maffitt complained bitterly of
the heedless conduct of a Confederate officer to whose
indiscreet and uncontrollable looseness in conversation

170 THE SECRET SERVICE OE THE

he attrihuted the seizure of tlie Oreio and her subsequent
troubles. It wouUl l)e as jiainful to my own feelings as
to those of Mattitt to mention any name in such a con-
nection, because the loyalt}- and good intentions of the
person to wliom he alluded were beyond suspicion ;
indeed, it may be fairly said that he was probably un-
conscious of his failing's, and a secret leaked throuoii his
mind and found expression from his lips just as the
breath permeating through the lungs passes by its
natural channels to the open air. There are some men
Avho are wholly A\'ithout the faculty of concealment, Avho
cannot disguise or suppress their knowledge of important
events which are in course of secret preparation, who
have not the patience to aAvait results and then to take
their share in the credit of having contributed to success,
but who are irresistibly impelled to manifest by their
manner and speech that weighty concerns have been
confided to them, and that the issues thereof are likely
to be momentous. Many carefully laid schemes were
frustrated during the late war by lack of prudence and
for want of self-control on the part of men who were
devoted to the South, and from whom nothing to its
injury could have been wrung by violence.

From Cardenas IMaffitt sent Lieutenant Stribbling to
Havana, to communicate with Major Charles J. Helm,
who was the Confederate agent at that place, and to see
what could be done there in the way of enii'airino* men.
In three or four days Stribbling returned with twelve
men, and on the 28th of August Major Helm telegraphed
that the Captain-General desired that the Florida would
come round to Havana. On the 30th ]\Iaffitt got under
Aveigli and proceeded to Havana, where he arrived on the
31st, but finding the restrictions so severe that it was
impossible for him either to increase his crew or to make

CONFEDEBATE STATES IN EUROPE. 171

g'ood liis other deficiencies, he resolved to run the ship
into ^lobile.

While t\\Q Florida was at Cardenas Maffitt himself was
forced to succumb to the fever, which had already more
than decimated his small crew. His strong constitution,
and the hourly demand upon all his faculties, had kept
him up until the ship was safe, but with the rest and
relief from incessant care there came a reaction, and the
fever took advantage of his relaxed energies and made a
well-nigh fatal attack. Dr. Gilliard, a surgeon in the
Spanish navy, kindly volunteered his services, and
Maffitt prol)ably owes his life, partly at least, to the
skill and benevolent efforts of that philanthropic gentle-
man.

Dr. Bennett, of Georgia (I wish I knew his Christian
name), was at that time in Cuba. He heard of the
Florida s helpless condition, volunteered his services as
surgeon of the ship, and joined her, thus facing all the
perils of her hapless condition, with no visible motive,
except the wish to be helpful to those in distress, and
no expectation of reward except the ' answer of a good
conscience.'

The ol^ject of the Captain-General in requesting
Major Helm to get the Florida away from Cardenas, and
to induce ^laffitt to bring her to Havana, is not fully
apparent. He may have thought that she could be
better protected from violence on the part of the United
States ships at the latter than at the former port ; or he
may have wished to have her more completely inider
his own e^'C, and where he could with more certainty
prevent her obtaining an}' supplies or reinforcement of
her crew whicli would constitute a violation of Spanish
neutralit}'.

The strino'ent orders ]\Iaffitt found in force on his

172 THE SEC RET SERVICE OF THE

aiTival at Havana sni-'u-est that the latter object was the
reason ; and findinii" that he couhl neither refit nor
obtain men at Ha\ana, he promptly determined to rmi
into ^Mobile. On the afternoon of September 1st, the
Fliuidd Avas clear of the Moro Castle, and was steering
boldly across the Gulf, which was then the highway for
United States transports she had not the power to
attack, and whicli was swarming with United States
cruisers she was helpless to resist.

At 2 p.m. on the 4tli the lighthouse on Sand
Island, and then Fort Morgan, at tlie entrance to Mobile
Bay, were made ; but between the sheltering port and
the devoted little craft lay three of the enemy's war
ships. ^laffitt had no purpose to retire and draw off
the blockaders, and then endeavour to double and get in-
shore of them. His determination from the first was
to dash straio'ht in whene\'er he made the land. Wwi he
hoped to get fairly among tliem, or even a little bej'ond,
before the}' suspected his true character or purpose.
AVitli this object in view, he hoisted the British ensign
and pennant, and stood on directly for the blockading
squadron.

Commander Preble was the senior officer of the
blockading force, and he placed his ship, the Oneida^
directly in the Florida'' s course, the other ships taking
up good supporting positions. AVhen the Florida got
close to the Oneida, Preble hailed and ordered her to
stop. ^laffitt perceived that he must either obey or
draw u])on the British flag an indignity, and he hauled
it down and steered so direct for the Oneida that Preble
was forced to reverse his engines to avoid a collision.
There Avas no lono-er ^nx dissruise : the Fhnida Avas
recognised, and Maffitt pushed on past the 0/ieida, taking
her broadside at little more than j^istol-shot. There is,

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE . 173

so fur as I know, no record of such a scramble as
folloAved. The Florida stood steadily on for the bar,
recehdng broadside after broadside from the three United
States ships.'"' She did not even cast loose a gun, because
there were no men to fight them, and as there was
nothing to distract the enemy's fire, it is marvellous
they did not literally blow her to pieces. For nearly
two hours the Florida stood this pelting feu d^eiifer,
drawing away little by little from her relentless pursuers,
and at last the poor little crippled craft limped like a
wounded stag into the friendly port, and anchored under
the protection of Fort ]\ I organ.

'No shot or shell had "'ot amons; the Florida^ s
machinery, but she was much cut up. The fore-top-
mast and fore-gaff were shot away, all the boats were
cut to j^ieces, the hammock -nettings were nearly all
swept off on one side, the main rigging was cut adrift,
and she was hulled in many places. One 11 -inch
shell had passed clean through her just above the water-
line, and another had entered the caj)tam's cabin, for-
tunately without exploding.

During this unparalleled chase and escape, Maffitt sat
most of the time on the quarter-rail, and steered straight
for the bar; Stribbling was cool and self-possessed, and not
one of the young officers or men flinched. Every man
of true courage will say that this was a gallant deed, and
will feel a generous regret that men of so much fortitude
should have had no opportunity to show their metal
except in the test of passive endurance.

It is not the purpose of this history to narrate in
detail the cruises of the several vessels which were built

* Two of the blockaders, the Winona and the llacJiel, Seaman did
not get to very close quarters, but still they had a good chance for
gun practice at the Florida.

174 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

or bought in Europe for tlie Confederate States. The
late Admiral Semmes published before his death a full
account of his adventures in the Sumter and Alalxtma,
the journals of the Florida have been also ])ublished,
and there have been accounts more or less complete of
the performances of the other ships. I shall therefore
o'ive mere summaries of their movements, limiting' mv
remarks upon their cruising careers to such incidents as
suggest general reflections in respect to maritime Avar-
fare, or which have some special bearing upon the
question of belligerent rights and practices.

The Florida needed extensive repairs and almost a
new outfit, to make good her losses and injury at
]S!assau, and the terrible punishment she had received
from the Oneida and her consorts; but at Mobile there
was no dock, not even a slip upon which she could be
placed, and almost everything required for outfit and
armament had to be brou2:ht from a distance, the
ordnance stores from far-away Richmond.

It was not until December that all necessar}' work
was finished, and the Florida did not get to sea until
some time in Januarv, 1803. The blockadino; force had
meanwhile been largely increased, with the special pur-
pose to prevent the Florida's escape, and she had to wait
some weeks before there was a favourable opportunity.
The bold run into ^lobile was justifial)le only on the
ground of its seeming necessity. An attempt to pass
outward throuo'h the blockaders in the same darino'
manner would have been reckless and unworthy of
Maffitt's reputation for jn-udence as well as courage.
The o])portunity came at last. One day, January 15th,
18 Go, there were sio-ns of a 'norther' and evervthino-
was ffot readv for a run. At niii'litfall the o'ale beii'an.
There was no slielterinir rain, but the wind was almost

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 175

dead ofF-shore, the dark-blue surface of the Gulf was
lashed into foam, and the spume of the sea was flying
half-mast high. These northers in the Gulf of Mexico
are spiteful, but no good well-found ship need fear
leaving the weather- shore in one of them. The blockaders
were no doubt doing their best to hold on to the land,
for they must have thought the Florida would make the
attempt to escape. She did, and got clear, although she
was seen, and chased nearly across to Havana.

Mafiitt did not remain long in the confined waters of
the Gulf, but reappeared at Nassau, the scene of his first
troubles, on the 25th of January, 1863,* where he
remained only one day. From Nassau he cruised down
to the southward through the West Indian Islands,
touching at Barbadoes, February 24th, and Pernambuco,
in Brazil, May (Sth. At the last named place he
stopped four days to get fresh provisions and make some
repairs to his engines. Getting away from Pernambuco,
May 12tli, he cruised for a short time ofi?" the coast of
Brazil, and worked his way u]i to St. George's, Bermuda,
where he arrived July 16th, 1863.

Durinof the Florida s run throuo'h the West Indies,
Eear-Admiral Wilkes, of Trent notoriety, was com-
mandino- the United States naval forces in those lati-
tudes, and he seems to have been looking especially after
Mafiitt, and to have had some inkling of his necessities,
although not particularly well informed in regard to his
whereabouts. On the 26th of February Admiral Wilkes
wrote to his Government thus : ' The fact of the Florida s
having but a few days' coal makes me anxious to have
our vessels off" the ^Martinique, which is the only island
at whicli they can hope to get any coal or sup])lies, the
Eno-lish islands beino- cut oft' under the rules of her
* ' British Case,' p. 68.

176 THE SECL'ET SERVICE OF TEE

Majesty's Government for some sixty days yet, which
precludes the possibility, unless by chicanery or fraud,
of the hope of any coal or comfort there.'* Two
da\s before the date of Admiral Wilkes's letter, i.e.,
February 2-l:th, 18()3, the Florida went into Barbadoes,
and got what coal she required without practising either
' chicanery ' or ' fraud,' but ui)on Captain ^laffitt's simple
statement that his fuel had been exhausted from stress
of weather. In the ' liritish Case, Geneva Arbitration,'
p. ()8, it is stated on the authority of the Governor that
both the United States ship Sa?i Jacinto and the Con-
federate ship Florida had been permitted to obtain coal
at Barbadoes within a less period than three months
after they had respectively coaled at another British
colonial port, the commander of each vessel having
alleged that his supph' of fuel liad been exhausted by
stress of weather.

In the ' Case of the United States ' it is demonstrated
bv official documents that the Governor of Barbadoes
was mistaken in the supposition that the San Jacinto
had received a supply of coal at a British port within
three months ; but it is not pretended that he had
reason to doubt the fact at tlie time of the occurrence,
because he mentioned it in a subsequent conversation
with Admiral Wilkes, as the precedent which he had
followed in extending a like privilege to the Florida.
The Governor did not construe the regulations as
applicable to cases of distress, and in his report he
states that both vessels were 'dealt with as being
in distress.'! The Florida was, however, onl}' per-
mitted to take on board about ninety tons of coal, which
act of grace nevertheless oifended Admiral Wilkes, and

* See 'United States Case, Tribunal of Arbitration,' p. 96.
t ' British Apijendix,' vol. i., p. 92.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 177

afforded the occasion for an indiscreet and intemperate
protest. It is surprising to perceive how quickly a
certain class of the United States naval officers adopted
the phraseology of the politicians at Washington, and
soiled their reports and marred the dignity of their
official correspondence by the use of inelegant and
opprobrious epithets in describing the conduct of their
opponents, whose only offence was that they had
conscientiously, and manifestly to their own injury, taken
a different view of a great political question.

The Florida s short cruise in the West Indies and on
the coast of Brazil caused much uneasiness in the
commercial ports of the United States. The war
premium advanced, and merchants hastened to register
their ships in the names of British subjects, and to put
them under the British flag. The Alabama was also by
this time at sea and actively at work, as will afterwards
appear, and her operations added to the panic.

The principal ships captured and destroyed by the
Florida duriuo: the cruise above mentioned were the
Aldebaran^ Commonwealth, Gene7'al Berry, Crown Point,
Lapwing, M. J. Colcord, Southern Cross, Oneida, Star of
Peace, Rienzi, William B. Nash, Red Gauntlet and
Henrietta. I have before me, at the moment of writing,
the ransom bonds of four other vessels which were
taken by Maffitt from their respective captains, it
appearing upon investigation that they were loaded on
account of neutrals. Ship Sunrise, $60,000,* ship Kate
Dyer, $40,000, ship F. B. Cutting, $40,000, schooner
V. H. Hill, $10,000. The Floiida left Bermuda July
25th, 1863, and arrived at Brest August 23rd. On the
passage she captured the American ships F. B. Cutting
and the Avon^ but released the former.

* See p. 199 for copy of bond.

VOL. I. 12

178 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

Besides the vessels above mentioned wliicli Maiiitt
captured mth the Flor'uhi, he captured the Clarence off
the coast of Pirazil, and fitted her out as a tender, and
mth her destroyed tlie Kate Stuart^ the Mary Alvi?ia,
the Mary Schindler, and the WJiistlimj Wind. On May
10th, 1863, he captured the Taeony^ and finding her
better suited to his purpose tlian the Clarence, he burnt
the latter, and transferred her crew and armament to the
Tacony. In conjunction with this vessel he captured
the Ada, Byzantian, Elizabeth Ann, Goodspeed, L. A.
Macomher, Marengo, Ripple^ Rufus Choate, and Umpire.

On June 25th, 1863, he captured the Archer, trans-
ferred guns and crew fi'om Tacony to Archer, and burned
the former, and a few days after the boats of the Archer
went into the harbour of Portland, Maine, and destroyed
the United States revenue cutter Ccdeh Cushiny.*

The Florida s arrival at a European port at that time
w^as wholly unexpected by me, for I had received
no communication from Captain Mafiitt since his escape
from Mobile, and had no advice of his intended move-
ments. ]\Iaffitt, on his part, was ignorant where I was,
although he knew that Liverpool w^as the most likely
place to find me. Immediately upon the Florida^s
arrival at Brest, Mafiitt reported to the Prefet ]\Iaritime,
Yice-Admiral Count de Gueyton, the necessity which
had compelled him to seek the shelter of a French port;
and the first reply of the Admiral was that the shi])
might receive coals and other supplies, and effect
necessary repairs on the same conditions as any ' merchant
ship.' But the Florida needed a thorough refitting.
On the 3rd of September ]\Iafiitt sent an officer to

* The officer who commanded the Florida's tenders and who
executed the dashing aftair at Portland was Lieutenant C. AV. Read.
The whole number of prizes taken during Maffitt's cruise was fifty -five.

CONFEDEBJTE STATES IN EUROPE. 179

Liverpool to see me personally, and to report defects
and requirements, wliicli were many and important.
The officer brous-ht me a letter from Maffitt, from which
the following is an extract :

' AYe must dock, relieve our shaft, ^\dlic]l has got
out of line, and replace some of our copper. We Avant
also a blower to get steam with the bad coal we
are often obliged to put up Avith. While in ^Mobile Ave
did all that could be done, and that Avas but precious
little, for Ave lay in the middle of the bay, and the
povert}^ of the city was painful in the extreme. Since
leaAdng Mobile Ave have been under a constant pressure,
Avithout a friendly port in AAdiich to overhaul or give
ordinary attention to the engines.'

I immediately sent a competent representativ^e of the
builders of the ship and engines to Brest to examine
the Florida, and to report her condition. There was no
commercial dock at Brest, but after some demur per-
mission Avas given to use a Government dock. The
Florida remained in dock live or six Aveeks, and the
French authorities, Avhen they became satisfied of her
real Avants, permitted them to be supplied in full. Tlie
rough handling to Avhich the Florida had been sub-
jected had told upon her armament as Avell as upon her
general equipment. Permission Avas given to land the
small arms to be overhauled by a local gunsmith, upon
a i>'uarantee throuo;!! the Customs authorities that thev
Avould be re-shipped Avithout any addition in quantity.
Application was made to land some of the gun-carriages
for the same j^urpose, but this was refused. However,
two carriages and the necessary gear Avere made at
Nantes for the pi\"ot guns, and Avere deliA^ered to the
ship off the island of Belle Isle, together Avith some

12—2

180 THE SECliET SEE VICE OF THE

fusees and other articles contraband of war, without in
any way viohatini;" the neutrality of France.

Tlie repairs at Brest occupied several months, because
applications had to be frequently made to the authorities
for leave to do what was necessary as tlie need was dis-
covered ; and the requests had not only to be considered
by the local authorities, but often referred to Paris. But
there was difficulty, embarrassment, and delay from
circumstances relating to the j^ersonnel of the Florida, as
well as from the wear and tear of her hull, machinery,
and armament. On the 3rd of September Captain
Maffitt informed me officially by letter that he had been
compelled to discharge a large number of his men at
lirest, and had supplied each of them with money suffi-
cient to carry him to Liverpool. He said tliat he had
informed the men that they would not be entitled to be
paid their wages in full unless they returned to the Con-
federate States, but they would be directed on the subject
by me.

In AATiting an historical narrative it is necessary to
record events which are often not of especial moment in
themselves, but which in their consequences cause diffi-
culties and create obstacles to the achievement of pur-
poses with which they seem at first to have no connection,
and they cannot therefore be omitted.

It will appear in a subsequent chapter that the
Floridiis arrival and dela}' in Brest, but especially the
discharge of a portion of her crew there, caused infinite
embarrassment, and contributed to the failure of an
enterprise Avhich Avould have been of incalculable ad-
vantage to the Confederate cause. Maffitt, of course,
knew only of his own necessities, and his dut}- was
therefore to do his best under the circumstances in
which he was placed. His ship required overhauling.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 181

and he brought her to a port at which the defects could
he made good, and from which he couhl communicate
with the agent of the Confederate Xavy Department, and
he did not anticipate, neither could he liave foreseen,
that he would thus cause any trouble elsewhere.

The discharo'e of the men referred to above left the
Florida so weak-handed that she would not have been
fit to resume her cruise, and it was necessary to replace
them. Application was made to the French authorities
for leave to fill up the vacancies. There was at first
some hesitation, and the application was referred to
Paris. It appears from the proceedings before the
Tribunal of Arbitration at Geneva that there Avas a good
deal of correspondence on the subject between Mr.
Dayton, the United States ^Minister, and M. Drouyn
de I'Huys, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, of
which at the time we could know nothing. Mr. Slidell
(the Confederate Commissioner), however, knew that
the matter had been discussed by the Imperial Cabinet,
and after due process of gestation the application was
granted. M. Drouyn de I'Huys stated to Mr. Dayton
that the Government had caused inquiries to be made,
and had ascertained that seventy or seventy-five men
liad been discharged from the Florida at Brest, because
the period for which they had been shipped had expired,
and that the Government had concluded not to 2)rohibit
' an accession to the crew, inasmuch as such accession
was necessary to her navigation.'*

This, it must be admitted, was a strange and some-
what unusual proceeding, but we Confederates had no
concern with the matter as a diplomatic controversy, or
as a question of international law. The Florida wanted

* See 'British Case,' North America, No. 1 (1872), pp. 71, 72.
Correspondence of Mr. Dayton.

182 THE SECnET SERVICE OF THE

a number of seamen, and the only question with Maffitt
"was, how to get them witliout violating the munici})al
laws of France, or im})()sing upon the credulity and
friendly consideration which he liad received from the
local authorities at r)rest. It would seem to be an easy
matter to engage and get on board seventy seamen in a
maritime port, but there A\as very great difficulty, and
much time was consumed in accomplishing that ap-
parently simple purpose. The permission to replace the
discliarged men did not carry mtli it the right to enlist
them for the Confederate service even in France, and of
course it gave not the semblance of a right to do so in
England. The Florida wanted English-speaking sea-
men, and these had to be sought for chiefly across the
channel. The men were engaged in small groups Avher-
ever they could be found, and were forwarded to Calais
and other French channel ports, and then taken by rail
to Brest. This was the only possible arrangement, and
it required the employment of several agents, whose dis-
cretion was not always relial)le. ^Manifestly the men
could not be told wliat they were wanted for until they
got on board the Florida. The mystery of the proceed-
ings attracted notice, the suspicion of several of the
United States Consuls was aroused, and they did their
best to discover the true purpose of the unusual but
sj^stematic movement of nautical-looking men, with con-
ductors in charge, and to defeat it.

With so much to accomplish, and by such indirect
and tedious means, it is not surprising that the Florida
was detained a long time in Brest ; in foct, she was not
ready for sea until February, 18G4. All that the Florida
required could have been completed satisfactorily in a
few weeks, if she could have gone to any of the large
English building-yards — say on the Clyde or ^Mersey —

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 183

and there have done the work openly and in the ordinary
commercial way, and the expense would have been
moderate. But the constant peril of being stopped for
an alleged violation of neutrality, the necessary appli-
cations to official personages on every small matter of
detail, the hesitations, references to Paris, and general
circumlocution, caused great loss of time, and a large
increase in the expenditure. The local authorities were
most considerate and courteous, and for that very reason it
was imperative to scrupulously respect their instructions
and limitations, so as not to involve them in any trouble.

I have given the simplest possible synopsis of the cost
and labour of refitting a Confederate ship. Full details
would, I really think, astonish the reader, but the fore-
going will suffice to suggest, if it does not abundantly
demonstrate, the immense disadvantages under which
the Confederate Government laboured in the effort to
keep a small naval force at sea.

Very shortly after the arrival of the Florida at Brest,
]\Iaffitt's health completely gave way. The attack of
yellow fever at Cardenas had left him in a weak state.
Subsequent exposure brought on rheumatism of the
heart. When at Bermuda in July, 1863, he had in-
formed the Secretary of the Navy that he would feel
bound to obtain a relief on the arrival of the ship in
Europe, if he did not get much better, and as soon as
the arrangements for the repairs were fairly in train, he
resigned the command. Several Confederate naval
officers were then in Paris, for purposes which will be
subsequently explained. One of these. Commander J.
N. Barney, relieved Maffitt, and he had much of the
worry and labour of refitting the ship, but his health
was not strong, and in January it became so feeble that
he was compelled to retire, and he was relieved in the

ISi THE SECHET SEE VICE OF THE

command by Lieutenant C. J\Ianiganlt Morris, about
January 4tli.

The FlortJa "was still short-handed, but there "were
men enough to handle the ship and work her pivot guns,
and the Confederate cruisers were always able to recruit
from prizes.

Morris got to sea from Brest on the 1:2th of February,
18G4, took his new gun-carriages on board off Belle Isle,
February 19th, and then proceeded to cruise through
the West Indies, and up to the northward in the direc-
tion of the American coast. He touched at Martinique,
April 2Q^ for coal and supplies, called at Bermuda, ]\Iay
12th, merely to communicate and land a sick officer, and
went to that island again on June 18tli, where he was
permitted to make some necessary repairs and take in a
small supply of fuel. July 27th he was off again, and
made a bold dash straight in for the enemj^'s coast, which
took him across the track of outward-bound ships. On
the lOtli of July, thirt}^ miles off the Capes of the Dela-
ware, he captured the United States mail steamer Electric
Spark, bound from Xew York to New Orleans, with the
mails and a number of passengers on board. Morris
transferred the crew and passengers to a passing English
schooner, which he chartered for the purpose, and then
cut the steamer's pipes, opened her valves and ports, and
thus permitted her to sink. During the run in shore
from Bermuda the Florida captured and burned the
following ships : — Harriet Stevens, Golconda, Manjaret
Y, Davis, and Mondamin. ]\Ianifestly the little Con-
federate cruiser could not remain in that neighbourhood
long. The purpose was to alarm the enemy by a ' raid '
on the line of his coasting trade, and having struck the
blow, Morris ran across to Teneriffe, and then cruised
leisurely across the line towards the north-eastern coast

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 185

of Brazil, burning whatever prizes he made (in all about
thirteen), including those captured during the run in
and off the American coast.

On the 4th of October, at 9 p.m. the Florida
anchored at Bahia, the purpose being to get suj^plies,
make some sliglit re23airs, and refresh the crew after a
long and active cruise ; for, in point of fact, there had
been no chance to give the men a run on shore since the
departure from Brest on the 12th of February. By
this time the Florida was in good condition to fulfil the
objects of those for whose service she was built. Officers
and crew were in fine spirits, and hoped to accomplish a
good deal of work still, although American ships were
fast disappearing from the high seas, or at least they
were rapidly sheltering from capture under the British
mercantile flag. But there was another fate in waiting
for the gallant little ship. She had braved and survived
the lawful, though murdering, attack of the United
States ships off Mobile ; she surrendered to the
treacherous and illeo'al assault of another United States
ship at Bahia. The first encounter was a fair oj^en
' stand and deliver,' the second was an assassination.
This is a harsh word. It has been forced from me. The
English language does not offer a milder phrase to fitl}^
distinguish the occurrence, or I would gladly adoj)t it,
but I feel, nevertheless, bound to justify the epithet.

It was dark when the Florida anchored, on the
evening of October 4th. At an early hour on the
morning of the 5th the customary visit of ceremony
and inquiry was paid to her by the Brazilian naval
authorities, and it was perceived that a United States
ship-of-war was at anchor not far off, which proved to
be the United States steam corvette Wachusett, Com-
mander N. Collins. At about noon of the same day

186 THE SECUET SEE VICE OF TEE

Morris liad an interview Avith the President of the
Province, by special appointment, to explain his wants,
and to get a reply to the request he had made to the
Brazilian Admiral for permission to remain the neces-
sary time to make some repairs to the engine, which
request the Admiral had referred to his Excellency.
The Admiral was present at the interview, and the
result was very satisfactory to ]\Iorris. The President
promptly consented to his remaining the customary
fortv-eio-ht hours, to which time all bellio-erent vessels
were limited, but added that if upon the report of a
marine engineer, who would be sent on board to inspect,
it should appear that the repairs could not be com-
pleted in that time, he would grant an extension suffi-
cient to meet the requirements of the case.

The President, in the course of further conversation,
remarked upon the j^resence of a United States ship-of-
war in the bay, and impressed upon Morris that he
■would expect and rely upon him to do nothing that
might occasion a hostile collision with her. He added
that the United States Consul had given him a solemn
assurance on behalf of Captain Collins that the
Wachusett would do nothing while in the port which
Avas contrary to the laws of nations, or in violation of
the neutrality and sovereignty of Brazil, and exj^'essed
the desire that Morris would give him a corres23onding
promise, which he did. At this point the Admiral
remarked that the Florida and Waclmsett were lying in
close proximity, and he suggested that Morris should
move the Florida to a position between his (the
Admiral's) ship and the shore. After the interview
Avith the President, ]\Iorris went immediately on board
and shifted his berth to the anchorage suggested b}' the
Admiral. The marine engineer spoken of by the

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 187

President had preceded liim, and soon reported that
the repairs would require four days.

Morris now being quite easy in mind with regard to
the privilege of remaining in port, and feeling no appre-
hension of an unpleasant, and certainly believing that
there could be no hostile, collision with the Wachusetf,
or any of her belongings, determined to give his crew
' liberty.' The ship was put in usual harbour trim,
the guns were unloaded, the running gear was flemished
down, the awnings spread, and the port watch (one
half the crew) were permitted to go on shore. The
next day, October 6th, the ' liberty men ' began to
return on board at an early hour, and when most of
them had returned, the starboard watch was sent on
shore. Captain Morris and a party of the officers going
at the same time.

When night set in on that 6tli of October, 1864, the
state of affairs was this: The Florida was lying in-
shore of the Ikazilian Admiral's ship (a small wooden
sailing sloojJ-of-war), and the Waclmsett was some
distance off, and on the other or off-shore side of the
Admiral. The first-lieutenant, J. K. Porter, with ten
officers of all grades, and about seventy men, most of
whom had just returned from 'liberty,' were on board
the Florida, and Captain Morris, four officers, and the
remainder of the crew were on siiore. At about 3 a.m.
on the morning of the 7th, Lieutenant Porter was
aroused by the officer of the deck, Acting- master
T. T. Hunter, who reported to him that the Waclmsett
was under weigh, and was standing towards the Florida.
Lieutenant Porter had not turned in, but was asleep on
a sofa in the commander's cabin, and being dressed, he
got very quickly on deck, when he saw the Waclmsett
close aboard, and steermg directly for them. Before he

188 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

could give an order, or even bail the apjiroacliing ship,
she ran violently into the Florida, striking her on the
starboard quarter. The force of the collision crushed in
the bulwarks, started several beams, broke the main-
yard, and carried away the mizen-mast, which came
down in three pieces. The Wachusctt at or about the
same time fired two shots from her battery, and opened
a musketry fire upon the startled crew of the Florida^
who, thus unexpectedly aroused, could have made no
eftective resistance, even if they had been armed, being
embarrassed, and indeed prevented from even seeing the
attacking ship, by reason of the awning, which, borne
down b}^ the wreck of the mizen-mast and its gear,
covered and confined them as if in a net.

In the confusion of the collision, Lieutenant Stone
managed to get clear of the awning, and standing upon
a gnn, he fired one shot fi-oni his revolver. About
fifteen of the crew jumped overboard, but only six
reached the shore. Those who succeeded in swimming
safely to the shore reported to Captain [Morris that they
had been fired at while in the water by the men on the
forecastle and in the boats of the Wdchusett, and that
the missing men had prol:)ably been killed or drowned.
Immediately after the collision the Wndmsett backed off
a short distance and hailed the Florida, demanding an
immediate surrender, on })ain of l:)eing sunk there and
then. After a moment's hesitation, and a hasty consul-
tation with Lieutenant Stone, Lieutenant Porter replied
that he would surrender. The Florida was then boarded,
a hawser was made fast to her, and the Wachusett towed
her to sea.

I have condensed the fore^'oins; statement into the
smallest possible space and into the briefest possible
phrases, because I have thought it would be best and

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 189

fairest to all parties to let them give their own version,
and the official reports and statements with reference to
the whole occurrence, together with the correspondence
between the Brazilian Le^'ation at Washino-ton and the
United States Secretary of State, will be found in full at
the end of the chapter.

That portion of Captain Morris' report which refers
to what took place on board the Florida during the
attack was, as he himself says, gathered from the six
men who succeeded in swimming ashore, and I am
satisfied they were mistaken in saying that there was
repeated firing on either side. From personal inquiry I
feel assured that not more than two pistol-shots were
fired from the Florida. I am inclined to think there
was only one, b}' Lieutenant Stone, in the manner related
above ; on the other hand, I cannot learn that the
Wachusett fired into the Florida after backing clear,
although the men who escaped asserted that they were
fired at in the water.

My object in giving a brief summary of the circum-
stances attending the capture of the Florida is to supply
the text for the general remarks I feel called upon
to make upon the whole occurrence, in order to justify
the use of the word ' assassination ' which I have applied
to it, without being forced to refer frequently to the
official documents, which the reader can consult at his
convenience. There could hardly be a more flagrant and
off'ensive violation of national sovereignty than that which
Captain Collins committed upon the Empire of Brazil ;
but it is no part of my purpose to discuss the incident
with reference to its diplomatic or legal bearings.
I have no sentimental notions in regard to the precepts
of public law, or the demands of international comity.
I know full well that strong Powers have treated such

190 THE SECBET SERVICE OF THE

considerations witli indifference and contempt, -whenever
it suited their purpose to do so. Xelson sailed into
Copenhagen and destroyed a great part of the Danish
fleet Avithout orders, even if not in violation of tliem,
Avhen England and Denmark were not at war, and
he set up no pretence in justification, but simply affirmed
that the safety and interests of his own country required
him to act in that energetic wa}'.* Captain Hillyar,
Avith the British ships Plioehe and Cherub, foUoAved the
United States ship Essex into the harbour of A'alparaiso,
attacked, and after a desperate resistance captured her
under the A^ery guns of a Chilian batter}^, but both
of those acts were done openly in the light of day, and
in bold defiance of all consequences. AVhen Buenos
Ayres Avas fighting her Avar of independence Avith
Spain, a ship-of-Avar of the ' so-called ' insurgents, the
Fedeml, boarded an American A'^essel on the high seas,
and took out of her some goods alleged to be Spanish
propertA'. The Federal put into the Danish island of
St. BartholomcAv soon after, and found there, or
Avas followed in by, the United States ship Erie^
Captain Daniel Turner. Captain Turner made a
demand upon the GoA'ernor for the surrender of the
Federal to him, she having done A'iolence to the
American flag. The GoA^ernor refused, on the gi'ound
that the ship in question was a commissioned A'essel-
of-Avar, belonging to a recognised belligerent PoAver, and
Captain Turner sent in the Erie's boats, under command
of his first-lieutenant, Josiah Tattnall, and cut her
out from under the guns of the fort. The acts of

* ' Pictorial History of England,' vol. vi., book x., p. 1G2. AVhen
asked by the Crown Prince of Denmark why the British fleet had
forced its way up the Baltic, Nelson replied, ' To crush and annihilate
a confederacy formed against the dearest interests of England.'

CONFEDERA TE ST A TES IX E UROPE. 1 9 1

the two Captains Hillyar and Turner were indefensible
upon the principles of international law and comity as
generally understood, but in neither case was the
commander under a personal engagement, implied
or otherwise, to respect the neutrality of the countries in
Avhose waters the offences were committed. They
simply acted in defiance of law, and w^ere prepared
to take the consequences.

There is no evidence that Captain Collins gave any
personal assurance to the President of Bahia in
reference to his conduct while in that port. He makes
no allusion to the subject in his official report ; but
that is not conclusive either one way or the other. I
think those who read the various reports will not doubt
that the Consul, Mr. Thomas F. Wilson, did give the
assurance required by the President on behalf of the
Wachusett, and it was his business, his imperative dut}',
to inform Captain Collins what he had done.

But apart from all technicalities and quibbles, it is
perfectly well known that the regulations under which
the Neutral Powers permitted the ships of the two
belligerents in the American Civil War to enter and
remain in their ports, were founded upon the assumption
that in return for the hospitalities and shelter granted,
there was an honourable and unqualified undertaking to
respect the neutrality of the ports. Whenever a United
States or a Confederate ship let go her anchor in a
neutral port and asked leave to remain, her commander
could only accept the privileges he asked under the
above conditions, and when the alternative of compliance
or departure was not directly and specifically proposed,
it was from a feeling of delicacy on the part of the local
authority, and of confidence in the good faith of the
individual commander.

192 THE SECRET SEBFICE OF THE

AVe come, then, to this final })roposition. In statini^
it I hope to avoid the ai)])earance of exaggeration. The
United States ship Waclm^sett lay in the harbour of
l>aliia, in company with the Confederate ship Florida
two days, both ships being under an obligation to keep
the peace as the condition of their lea^'e to remain. But
Avhen the Wachusett, by her quiet demeanour, had
dispelled all doubt and apprehension, not only in the
nimd of Captain Morris, but in the minds of the Brazilian
authorities as Avell, she crept stealthily, under cover of
night, and struck her adversary a foul blow when there
was no power to ward it off, and no possible ground for
suspecting it. If Captain Collins had dashed into the
harbour in the full light of day, and had made his attack
upon the Florida without fear of the consequences, the
jDroceeding would not have been more ofi'ensive to
Brazil, nor would it have been a greater violation of her
sovereign rights than the course he adopted, and he
would have been equally sure of capturing, or at least
destroying his enemy, because she would have been
quite unprepared to make effective resistance, and the
whole transaction demonstrates that the Brazilian
Admiral's ship was too weak and inefficient to exercise
any j^reventive force.* If the Wachusetfs assault upon
the Florida had been in the above manner, it could have
been classed mth that of the Plia'he and Chemb upon the
Essex, or the boats of the Erie upon the Federal, and I
should have been sj^ared the pain of denouncing it as an
assassination.

Captain ColUns offers in justification, or at least in
palliation of liis offence against the sovereign rights of
I^razil, the allegation that the Alabama had been per-
mitted to burn some Amex'ican ships near the island of
* See ' AdmiraFs Report,' p. 210.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 193

Fernando cle Xoronlia, within the jurisdiction of the
Empire without remonstrance, and he therefore thought
it ' probable ' that his attack upon the Florida would be
treated with the same leniency. Captain Collins could
have had no personal knowledge of the occurrence he
mentions, and probably got the alleged fact from the
United States Consul, Avho also put it in his letter to
the President, requesting, or rather ' claiming,' that the
Florida should in effect be treated as a pirate.* Admiral
Semmes, in his history of the Alabama s cruise, writing
from his diary, and without any knowledge of Captain
CoUins's counter allegation, gives the true version,
wdiich is that he burned the Louisa Hatch and the Kate
Cory, ' taking the pains to send them both beyond the
marine league, that I might pay due respect to the
jurisdiction of Brazil.' j"

The letter of Mr. Thomas F. Wilson to the President
of Bahia is a fair example of the diplomatic literature
with which the consular agents of the United States tried
the patience and vexed the polite sensibilities of the
local authorities to wdiom they were accredited during
the Civil War. Brazil, in common wdth all the other
Powers, great and small, had acknowledged the Con-
federate States as a belligerent, with a r/6\/}zr^fo Govern-
ment, wdiich conceded to them the same right to com
mission ships-of-war as the United States had ; and yet
Mr. Thomas F. Wilson was apparently unconscious of
the incivility and impolicy of asserting in an official
communication to a high civil officer of the empire that
the Florida was ' not commissioned by any recognised
Government w^hatever,' that her officers and crew were

* See ' British Case,' p. 74.

t ' M}^ Adventures Afloat,' by Admiral Eaphael Semmes. London :
Bentley, 1869.

VOL. I. 13

194 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

'not sul)ject to an}- international or civilized law,' anrl
were consequently ' not entitled to the privileges and
immunities conceded to vessels navio'atino; under the
flag of a civilized nation,' and then in conclusion setting
up a ' claim' that the ' piratical cruiser ' should he ' de-
tained to answer,' etc.,* by which the writer probably
meant that the officers and crew should be looked upon
as ]\lalay pirates, and treated accordingly.

The Brazilians are a very polite race. They are
punctilious in the practice of official propriety and de-
corum. Their officials are easily conciliated by defe-
rential treatment and outward forms of respect, Thej''
are very affable and obliging when approached with
complaisance and frankness, but are reticent, suspicious,
and unyielding at the slightest approach to rudeness or
duplicity. I can well imagine the mingled feelings of
surprise and repulsion with which his Excellency
Antonio Joaquim cla Silva Gomes, President of the Pro-
vince of Bahia, read the letter of Thomas F. Wilson,
Consul of the United States, and the effort it must have
cost him to suppress his feelings within the limits of the
mild and gentlemanly rebuke contained in the last p>ara-
gi'aph of his reply.

When the Wacliusett steamed out of the ba}^ of Bahia
with the Florida in tow, the Brazilian Admiral pursued
her with the force at his disposal ; but his three vessels
were so small and so inefficiently armed, that he could
have had no expectation of compelling the release of the
Florida, and his demonstration was therefore only a
spirited protest against the act of violence which had
been committed under his eye. The Wachiisctf, towing the
Florida, and with sail on both vessels, had no difficulty
in getting away from her pursuers, and she finally
* Letter, p. 200.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 195

arrived at Hampton Roads with her prize on the 12th
of jSTovember.

On the arrival of the two sliips at Hampton Roads
the Secretary of State, Mr. William H. Seward, must
have been promptly informed of the occurrence, and he
must have known that the act of Captain Collins was
wholly indefensible. His duty as a statesman, careful
and jealous for the honour of his country as well as for
its safety, would seem to have been quite clear. He
admits, in his reply to the complaint of the Brazilian
]\Hnister at Washington, that ' the capture of tlie Florida
was an unauthorized, unla^vful, and indefensible exercise
of the naval force of the United States within a foreign
country, in defiance of its established and duly recognised
government.' It is hardly possible to conceive that he
should have hesitated one moment in deciding to release
the Florida, and in offering an aj)ology to Brazil, which
would have been so much more gratifying to the re-
cipient, and honourable to the giver, if promptly and
spontaneously tendered. But Mr. Seward waited to see
what the Brazilian Government would do. He knew
that it would be some time, probably two or three
months, before that Government could instruct their
Minister at Washington, and he seems to have preferred
yielding to a demand rather than to proffer a fran
explanation.

At last the demand came, on the 12th December j^^
through the Brazilian Legation at Washington, and ^Ir.
Seward made the amende, in a despatch hardly ever
paralleled in its tone of arrogant and offensive recri-
mination.

Brazil was too weak to protect the Florida. She Was
equally powerless to resent the injury this ungracious
apology must have inflicted upon her pride. Diplo-

13—2

196 THE SECHET SEEVICE OF THE

matically, her demands were complied ■svith, but tlie
status quo was never restored. Pending the arrival of
the anticipated complaint from Kio de Janeiro, the
Florida was permitted to founder in Hampton lioads,
by a judiciously managed oversiglit in examining her
valves, so Mr. SeAvard could not restore the ship.
There were twelve or thirteen thousand dollars in gold
in the pa}'master's safe when the Floi'ida was captured,
a part of which belonged to the officers' mess. Mr.
Seward did not mention that fact to the Brazilian
]\Iinister, nor was a single penny of it supplied to the
officers when they were discharged from Fort Warren,
after a riirorous confinement of about three months.*

The treatment of those officers is one of the most
painful and discreditable incidents in this unhappy affair.
When the Wachusett arrived in Plampton Roads tlie
prisoners were sent oi masse to the militar}' prison at
Point Look-out, where the officers and men were separated,
and the officers were in a few days transferred to the
' Old Capitol Prison ' at Washington. After three or
four days' confinement in that gaol, they were sent back
to the Wachusett at Hampton Roads, and were all con-
veyed by her to Fort Warren, a fortress on an island in
the harbour of Boston, which had been converted into a
' lock-up ' for prisoners -of- state as well as of war. In
this cheerless place, and under the trying conditions
specified in Lieutenant T. K. Porter's official report,f
they were imprisoned until February 1st, 1865, which
Avas nearly seven weeks after ]\Ir. Seward had stated, in
an official despatch to the Brazilian ^Minister at Wash-
ington,]; that 'the capture of the Florida was an wi-

* See Lieutenant Porter's official letter to Mr. Secretary Gideon
Welles, p. 223.

t See Eeport, p. 219. J Letter, p. 216.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 197

authorized^ unlairful, and indefensible exercise of the
naval force of the United States,' and that the crew of
the Florida were 'unlawfully brought into the custody
of this Government,' namely, the Government of the
United States.

But this is not all. When the officers were set at
liberty, they were forced to sign an undertaking that
they would leave the United States within ten days
from the date of their release. They were without any
means to pay their expenses, and Lieutenant Porter
wrote an ai^plication to ^Ir. Gideon Welles, the Secretary
of the United States ^avy, for a return to him of the
money which had been captured in the Florida, and
which, to the extent of the amount of pay due them, was
as much the private property of the captured officers as
Mr. Gideon Welles' watch was his, to sav nothino- of the
obligation, under the conditions of the amende to Brazil,
to restore the whole of it to Lieutenant Porter as the
senior officer of the Florida.

To that application ]Mr. Gideon Welles did not see fit
to reply; he did not even practise the commonplace
courtesy of acknowledging its receipt, and the officers
were turned into the streets of Boston, and among a
population which was then hostile, with no means to pay
their way out of the country, and yet under a forced
engagement to depart within ten days. Lieutenant
Porter was able to arrange for a ])assage for himself and
party to England in the Cunard steamship Canada, by
giving a draft on the Confederate financial agent, and
they reached Liverpool about the middle of that month,
and came to me very much in the condition of distressed
seamen sent home under consular certificate.

I submit the foregoing without comment, as a plain
unvarnished statement of the manner in which Mr.

108 THE SEC RET SERVICE OF THE

Secretary Seward made tlie nrncndc to Brazil for Avhat
he himself denounced as an ' unauthtyrized^ unlawful^
and indefensible defiance ' of her neutral rights, and of
the spirit in which he affected to restore the status
quo.

An historical narrative cannot be limited to a mere
record of events in the form of a diary. The occur-
rences must be illustrated sometimes by explanatory
comments, and by comparing or contrasting them with
events or with actions upon which public judgment has
already been pronounced. A military or naval officer in
command of a national force loses, to a certain extent,
his personal identit}'. He is merged in his office, and
may thus be criticized without reference to his indi-
viduality or the personal qualities which make up liis
])rivate character. Captain Collins was always looked
upon as an honourable and truthful man in his intercourse
with friends and acquaintances. If a proposition of
doubtful propriety Avere suggested to him, I should feel
sure that, if left to himself, he would come to a fair and
just resolution, and that lie would not leave it in the
])Ower of friend or foe to charge him w4tli bad faith.
With reference to his conduct in the adventure with the
Florida, upon which it has been my painful office to
comment, it seems to me that he made the mistake of
placing himself in the hands of ]\Ir. Consul Thomas F.
\Yilson, who appears to have imbibed the acrimonious
temper of his departmental chief, and to have adopted
the harsh epithets and the opj^robrious phrases which
that high officer of State did not think it unbecoming to
introduce into his diplomatic correspondence when it
was necessary to mention those who Avere opposed to
him in the S!:reat Civil AVar.

Since Mr. Seward has thought it i)roper and dignified

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 199

to maintain in an official desj)atcli* that ' that vessel (the
Florida) , like the Alabama, was a pirate,' and to further
state in the same document that ' the crew,' among whom
he contemptuously includes the officers, ' were enemies
of the human race,' it seemed imperative upon me, as
tlie historian of the little craft's origin and adventures,
not only to relate the closing events of her brief career,
but to comment upon the manner of bringing them
about. I have no feeling of enmity against anyone. It
would orieve me to know that I had wounded the
feelings of one who was, in former 3'ears, a brother
officer, or that I had cast an aspersion upon the service
in which I once held a commission, by heedless state-
ments or ill-digested comments. I confidently believe
that in what I have felt it my duty to write there has been
no warping of the facts, but that I have kept faithfully
to the record. But the reader himself can judge, because
I have annexed the official rejDorts of all the persons in-
volved in the affiiir.

DOCUMENTS ABOVE REFERRED TO.

FOEM OF RANSOM BOND TAKEN FROM PRIZES WHEN
RELEASED (See p. 177).

This bond, made and entered into this seventh of July, one
thousand eight hundred and sixty-three (A.D, 1863), by and between
Richard Luce, master and commander of the American ship Sunrise
of the first part, and John N. MafRtt, lieutenant-commanding in the
navy of the Confederate States of America of the second part,
witnesseth :

That the said party of the first part is held and firmly bound (for
himself, the ship and her owners) unto Jefferson Davis, President of
the Confederate States of America, or his successors in office, in the
full and penal sum of sixty thousand dollars (860,000), to be well
and truly paid, in gold or its equivalent, within six calendar months

* See p. 216.

200 THE SECUET SEE VICE OF THE

after the ratification of a treaty of peace 1)etwcen the Confederate
States ami the United States.

The condition of this bond is such that the aforesaid party of the
first part has this day been captured on the high seas, while in
command of the ship aforesaid, by the Confederate States sloop-of-
war Flwida, whereof the party of the second part is commander,
and has been allowed to proceed on his voyage without injury or
detriment to the ship or cargo, and has been guaranteed against
molestation during the present voyage from any and all armed
vessels in the service of the Confederate States of America.

Done in duplicate on board the Confederate States sloop-of-war
Florida, the day and date above written.

Witness : Thomas Barry, Richard Lucp: {seal),
First Officer. Master-Comdg.

Witness : G. D. Bryan, J. X. Maffitt {seal),

Mdn. C.S.N. Lieut.-Comd- C.S.N.

[Copy.-]

THE UNITED STATES CONSUL TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE PROVINCE OF BAHIA.

To his Excellency Antonio Joaquim da Silva Gomes, President, of
the Province of Bahia.

Consulate of the United States of America,

Bahia, Odohrr bth, 1864, 9 a.m.

Sir, —

This morning a steamer anchored in this port, bearing the
flag adopted by those who are involved in the rebellion against the
Government of the United States of America, and I am infoimed
that the said vessel is the Florida, which is engaged in capturing
vessels navigating under the flag of the United States of America,
and in destroying them by making bonfires of them and their cargoes.

The vessel in question is not commissioned by any recognised
Government whatever, and her officers and crew are composed of
persons of various nationalities, who are not subject to any inter-
national or civilized law, and are consequently not entitled to the
privileges and immunities conceded to vessels navigating under the
flag of a civilized nation. I therefore protest, in the name of the
United States of America, against the admission of this vessel to free
practice, by which she might be enabled to supply herself with coal,

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 201

provisions, tackle, or utensils of any kind whatever, or receive on
board any persons Avhatever ; finally, against any assistance, aid or
protection which might be conceded to her in this port, or in any
other belonging to this province,

I likewise claim that t^^' piratical cruiser, which in combination
with the i>irate Alabama violated the sovereignty of the Imperial
Government of Brazil, by capturing and destroying vessels belonging
to citizens of the United States of America within the territorial
waters of Brazil, near the island of Fernando de Noronha, in April,
1863, be detained, with all her officers and crew, in order to answer
for so flagrant a violation of the sovereignty of the Government of
Brazil, and of the rights of citizens of the United States within the
jurisdiction of the Brazilian Government.

I avail, etc.,
(Signed) Thomas F. "Wilson,

Consul of the United States.

THE PEESIDENT OF THE PROVINCE TO MR. WILSON.

Palace of the Government of the Province of Bahia,

October 5t/i, 1864.

In a note dated this day, Mr. Thomas F. Wilson, Consul of the
United States, claims that the steamer Florida, now anchored in
this port, shall not be admitted to free pratique, nor obtain per-
mission to provide herself with coal, provisions, suj)plies, and utensils
of any kind whatever, nor receive on l)oard any person Avhatever ; he
likewise requests that, as the cruiser, in combination with the
Alabama, violated the sovereignty of the Imperial Government of
Brazil by capturing and destroying vessels belonging to citizens
of the United States of America within the territorial waters of the
Empire, near the island of Fernando de Noronha, in April, 1863, she
may be detained, with all her officers and crew, in order to answer
for this flagrant violation of the sovereignty of the Government of
Brazil, and of the rights of citizens of the United States, within the
jurisdiction of the Brazilian Government.

In reply to the Consul, I have to inform him that, as the said
vessel belongs to the Confederate States, in whom the Imperial
Government recognised the character of belligerents, all the assist-
ance required by humanity may be furnished her, which does in no
wise constitute assistance for warlike purposes, as laid clown by inter-
national law, and does not conflict with that neutrality which this

202 THE SKCIiET SEllVICE OF THE

Government stiuliousl}' seeks to preserve, and has always preserved,
in the contest between the States of North America, The under-
signed cannot, therefore, admit the first portion of the claim of the
Consul, in the general manner in which it was presented, and particu-
larly in relation to those articles cousidersJ as contraband of war, in
conformity A\-ith instructions issued on that subject by the Imperial
Government, and according to which the said vessel will only be
permitted to remain in this port for the length of time al)Solutely
indispensable.

In regard to the second part of his note, it is my duty to observe
to the Consul that, even if it were fully established that the Florida
had previously violated neutrality, such a proceeding Avould scarcely
authorize us to refuse her permission to enter the ports of the Empire,
and would never warrant us to com.mit the acts required by the
Consul, which would be equivalent to a hostile rupture, without the
intervention of the sui)renie Government of the State, which is alone
competent to authorize such a rupture.

I renew, etc.,
(Signed) Antonio Joaquim da Silya Gomes.

To Mr. Thomas F. AVilson, Consul of the United States.*

[Copy. Xo. 38.]
To the Honourable Gideon AVelles, Secretary of the Navy.

United States steamer Wachusett,

St. Thomas, W. I., Odohn- 31.sY, 1864.

Sir, —

The following is a detailed report of the capture of the
rel)el steamer Florida in the bay of San Salvador, Brazil, by the
officers and crew of this vessel, Avithout loss of life : —

At three o'clock on the morning of the seventh day of October
instant, we slipped our cable and steered for the Florida, about five-
eighths of a mile distant. An unforeseen circumstance prevented us
from striking her as intended ; we, however, struck her on the star-
board quarter, cutting down her bulwarks, and carrying away her
mizcn-mast and mainyard. This ship was not injured.

* For the letter from the United States Consul to the President
of Bahia and the reply of the President, see 'British Case,' pp.
74, 75.

CONFEDEBATE STATES IN EUROPE. 203

Immediately upon striking we backed off, believing she would
sink from the effects of the blow.

In backing clear Ave received a few pistol-shots from the Floridch
which were returned with a volley, and contrary to my orders two of
our broadside guns Avere fired, Avhen she surrendered.

In the absence of Captain Morris, who was on shore, Lieutenant
Thomas K. Porter, formerly of the United States Navy, came on
l:)oard and surrendered the Florida, with fifty-eight men and tAvelve
officers, making at the same time an oral protest against the capture.

FiA^e of the Florida's officers, including her commander, and the
remainder of her crew, Avere on shore.

We took a haAvser to the Florida and toAved her to sea.

In contemplating the attack on the Florida in the bay, I thought
it probable the Brazilian authorities Avould forbear to interfere, as
they had done at Fernando de Noronha, Avhen the rel)el steamer
Alabama Avas permitted to take into the anchorage three American
ships, and to take coal from the Louisa Hatch Avithin musket-shot of
the fort, and afterAvard, Avithin easy range of their guns, to set on fire
those unarmed vessels.

I regret, hoAvever, to state that they fired three shotted guns at us
while we Avere toAving the Florida out.

Fortunately Ave received no damage. After daylight a Brazilian
sloop-of-Avar, in tOAv of a paddle gun-boat, Avas discovered folloAving
us. With the aid of sail on both vessels Ave gradually increased our
distance from them.

We had three men slightly Avounded ; one only of the three is noAV
on the sick report.

I enclose a list of the prisoners. Those Avho have a star oiDjDosite
their names Avere formerly in the United States navy.

This vessel is ready for service. The Florida Avill require repairs
of machinery, a new mizen-mast, etc.

The officers and crew manifested the best spirit. They haA'e my
thanks for their hearty co-operation, in Avhich I beg to include
Thomas F. Wilson, Esq., United States Consul at Bahia, Avho volun-
teered for any duty.

I am, sir, very respectfully

Your obedient servant,

N. Collins, Commander.

204 THE SECBET SEEVICE OF THE

[L'upy. Xo. 39.]

To the Honourable Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, "Washington

City.

United States Steamer, Wach uxett,

Hampton Roads, Va., ^^orcmher lith, 1864,

Sir, —

The following is a supplement to my report. No. 38, dated
October 31st, 1864 :—

1. On the morning of the 7th of October last, I directed to be
cast adrift one of our whale-boats, just returned from reconnoitring
the rebel steamer Florida, rather than attract attention of outside
persons by the noise of hoisting her.

2. At the time of starting to run into the rebel steamer Florida
on the 7th day of October last, I ordered thirty fathoms of our
cal)le to be slipped without a Imoy, as I feared the rope of the latter
might possibly foul the propeller.

3, Our second cutter swamped alongside the prize steamer Florida
while we Avere towing the ship to sea, and Avas cut adrift to avoid
detention in range of the Brazilian guns. As the tide Avas flood,
both the whale-boat and cutter Avill probably be recovered by the
United States upon the payment of salvage.

Their probajjle value Avas, for the cutter, one hundred and fifty,
and for the AA^hale-boat, fifty dollars,

4, Thomas F. "Wilson, United States Consul at Bahia, desired to
remain on this ship during the nights of the 5th and 6th October
last, in anticipation of a probable conflict at sea Avith the rebel
steamer Florida, and Avas on board at the time of the capture of the
latter vessel. As it Avas not convenient to land him, I brought him
to this place.

5. At the island of St, BartholomcAV, AVest Indies, Avhere Ave
called for supplies, every facility was granted us, although Ave had
one case of A'arioloid on board. I trust the Department may make
some official acknoAvledgment to the GoA^ernor of that island for his
civility to us,

6, "Walter Dulany, a citizen of Baltimore, a passenger on the
American ship JMondamin, and captured by the rebel steamer Florida
Avith the former vessel, Avas found on the Florida Avhen Ave captured
her, occup3'ing such a position among the Florida's officers, some of
Avhom Avere former friends and acquaintances, that I Avould suggest
the policy of either holding him as a prisoner or of compelling him
to take the oath of allegiance to the United States,

CONFEDEUATE STATES IN EUROPE. 205

7. The authority to discharge such of our crew as have served out
their period of enhstment is respectfully requested. Some have
Ijeen on increased pay since June last, consequent upon having been
detained beyond the time for which they shipped.

8. "We touched at St. Bartholomew, ^Yest Indies, on the 29th
October ult., and at St. Thomas on the 30th, where we remained till
the 2nd inst., sailing on that day, and arrived here on the 12th.

I have the honour to be, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

N. Collins, Commander.

THE SEIZURE OF THE FLOIUDA.

LIEUTENANT-COMMANDING MORRIS'S OFFICIAL STATEMENT.

Bahia, October 13th, 1864.

Sir, —

It is with great pain that I have to report the seizure of
the Confederate States steamer Florida, lately under my command.

I arrived at this port on the 4th inst., at 9 p.m., to procure coal
and provisions, and also to get some slight repairs after a cruise
of sixty-one days. Just after anchoring, a boat passing around us
asked the name of our vessel, and, upon receiving our reply, stated
that the boat was from her Britannic Majesty's steamer Ciirleu:
Next morning I found that the United States steamer Wachusett
was at anchor near us, but no English steamer, so I at once concluded
that the boat which had hailed us the evening before was from the
Wachusett.

We were visited on the morning of the 5th by a Brazilian officer,
to whom I stated my wants, and was informed by him that he would
report the same to the President, and that until his answer was
received we could hold no communication Avith the shore. At noon
I received a communication— which was left on board the Flwida —
from the President, stating that he was read}^ to receive me. At our
interview he informed me that forty-eight hours would be allowed
me to fit and repair, but that, should his chief engineer, whom
he would send on board to examine the machinery, deem the time
too short, he would grant the necessary extension. He was most
urgent in his request that I should strictly observe the laws of
neutrality, at the same time stating to me that he had received the
most solemn assurance from the United States Consul that the

206 THE SECUET SERVICE OE THE

United States steamer would do nothing in port contrar}' to the laws
of nations and of Brazil ; and that he desired the same from me,
"vvhich I unhesitatingly gave.

The Brazilian admiral, who Avas present at the interview, suggested
that I had better move my vessel in between his ship and the shore,
as our proximity to the JFachuseU might cause some difficulty. My
assurance to the President seemed to set his mind at rest on the score
of any collision between the two vessels, and upon leaving him
I immediately repaired on board and moved the Flurida close inshore
to the position suggested by the Admiral. I found the Brazilian
engineer on board and was informed by him that it would require
four days to repair the pipe of the condenser. Feeling now no
apprehension of any difficulty occurring while in port, and wishing
to gratify the crew with a short liberty, not only on the score
of good conduct, but also of health, I determined to permit one watch
at a time to go ashore for twelve hours, and sent the port Avatch off
that afternoon. About 7.30 p.m. a boat came alongside, stating that
she was fr"om the United States steamer JFacJmseff, with the United
States Consul, who had an official communication for the commander
of the Florida. The letter, with the card of the Consul, was handed
to First-Lieutenant Porter, who, after examining it, and finding it
directed to Captain Morris, " sloop Florida," returned it unopened
to the Consul, stating that it was improperly addressed ; that
the vessel was the Confederate States steamer Florida, and that Avhen
the letter was so directed it would be received. The next day (6th)
a Mr. de Vidiky came on board, having received a letter from the
United States Consul, enclosing one for me. He requested me, before
receiving my letter, to permit him to read to me the one sent
to him.

It was a request of Mr. de Vidiky to carry a challenge to the com-
mander of the Florida, and in case of its acceptance, to offer his (the
Consul's) influence in having the repairs of the Florida speedily
finished. I informed Mr. de Vidiky that I had heard quite enough,
and, finding the letter to me improperly addressed, declined receiving
it ; but at the same time said to him that I had come to Bahia for a
special purpose, Avhich being accomplished, I should leave ; but I
would neither seek nor avoid a contest with the Wachusett, but
should I encounter her outside the Brazilian waters, would use my
utmost endeavours to destroy her. That afternoon, the port watch
having returned, I sent the starboard watch, the other half of the
crew, ashore on liberty, going also myself, in companj^ with several

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 207

of the officers. From our nearness to the JFachuseff, persons on
board that vessel could well see these men leave the ship. At 3.30
a.m. I was awakened by the proprietor of the hotel at which I was
staying, and told that there was some trouble on l)oard the
Florida, as he had heard firing and cheering in the direction of the
vessel, but on account of the darkness was unable to discern any-
thing. I immediately hastened to the landing, and was informed by
a Brazilian officer that the United States steamer Wachusett had run
into and seized the Florida, and was then towing her out of the
harbour. I hurried off to the Admiral's vessel, and was told by him
that he was at once going in pursuit, which he did as soon as steam
was raised on board a small steamer belonging to the fleet.

The Admiral's ship, being a sailing sloop-of-war, was taken in
tow by the steamer and went out of the harbour. He returned
in the afternoon Avith all his vessels, having been unable to overtake
the IFachiisett Upon mustering the officers and crew left on shore,
I found there four officers, viz., Lieutenant Barron, Paymaster Taylor,
Midshipman Duke, and Master's-Mate King, and 71 men, of Avhom
six escaped by swimming from the Florida after her seizure. Of the
actual occurrences and loss of life on board the Florida, I have been
able to find out very little. The substance of Avhat I have gathered
from the six men Avho escaped is as follows : That at 3. 15 a.m. on Oc-
tober 7th, Master T. T. Hunter, Jr., being in charge of the deck, the
Wachusett left her anchorage, and taking advantage of the darkness,
steamed for the Florida, from which she was not seen until close aboard,
when she was hailed by Mr. Hunter, who, receiving no answer, called
* all hands ' to quarters. Before the officers and crew were all on
deck the JFachusett struck the Florida on her starboard quarter,
cutting her rail down to the deck and carrying away her mizen-mast,
at the same time pouring a volley of musketry and a charge of canister
from her forecastle pivot gun upon our decks. The JFachusett then
backed off and demanded our surrender, to which demand Lieutenant
Porter declined to accede. The enemy then fired again and again
into us, which Avas returned by the officers and creAv of the Florida.

Another demand Avas then made for our surrender, and Lieutenant
Porter answered, ' I Avill surrender conditionally.' The enemy then
stopped firing, and the commander called for Captain Morris to come
on board ; Lieutenant Porter ansAvered that Captain Morris Avas on
shore, and that he, as commanding officer, Avould come on board as
soon as he could get a boat ready. The enemy then sent a number
of armed boats to take possession of the Florida. As soon as

208 THE SECltET SERVICE OE THE

Lieutenant Porter was heard to surrender, fifteen of our crew jumped
overljoard to escaj^e capture, of Avhom only six succeeded, the re-
maining nine having been shot in the water by the men on the fore-
castle and in the boats of the WacliuscU. Mr. Hunter was wounded
and a number of men killed. The enemy made fast a hawser to the
foremast of the Florida, and, after slipping her cable, towed her out
to sea.

I called in person on the President as soon as possible, but could
get no further information from him. On the 8th I sent a protest
to the President, of which I send you a copy, marked 2. On the
10th our agent was informed by the interpreter that the President
did not intend to answer my protest, as the Confederate Government
had not been recognised by Brazil, and that I could find all the official
correspondence in the newspapers.

I then wrote a letter marked 3, in which reference is made to a
letter marked 4. Just before leaving Bahia, having received no
answer, 1 sent our agent, Mr. James Dwyer, to the President. The
result of his visit is contained in his letter, marked 5. The Bahia
papers contain a number of reports as to the killed and wounded on
board the Flw'ida, all of Avhich I have thoroughly sifted, and find no
foundation for the same.

At the time of her seizure there was about twenty-five tons of
coal on board, most of which was dust. The list of officers captured
is contained in the report of Paymaster Taylor, marked 6.

The enclosed newspaper is an official extract containing all the
Brazilian cori'espondence in reference to the Florida.

I am, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

(Signed) C. Manigault Morris,

Lieutenant-Commanding, Confederate States Navy.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 209

[Copy.]

LETTER OF THE PRESIDENT OF BAHIA TO THE
AMERICAN CONSUL.

To Mr. Thomas Wilson.

Bahia, October 1th, 1864.

Palace.

Sir, —

Having reached this Presidency the grave attempt committed
by the steamer Wachusett, of the United States of North America,
and which, violating the neutrality of the Empire, treasonably and
disrespectfully during the night set at defiance the respect due to
the Empire, and in the harbour took prisoner the steamer Florida^
setting aside the most sacred rights of people and civilized nations,
that guards between nations belligerent any such acts, having this
Presidency received the word of honour of the Consul, Mr. Wilson,
to preserve the neutrality, that in explicit terms promised that the
Commander of the steamer IFadmsett should confine himself to his
duties, and respect the neutrality due to the Empire, and not
practise any hostile act in these territorial waters. The President
cannot refrain from solemnly protesting against the act referred to,
the more so that the Consul is therein implicated, seeing that, spite
of his formal promise, he has not taken any measure to withdraw
from the responsibility of this action. And as this fact and the
silence preserved up to this date evidently prove that the President
cannot confide in his endeavours to preserve the neutrality and
sovereignty of the Empire, it is resolved to at once interrupt all
official relations Avith him until further orders from the Govern-
ment, where this unexpected and deplorable act will be related, and
where, in its higher knowledge, final decision will be given. The
Consul is in the meantime duly informed that orders are given to
the respective authorities that in no * harbour ' of the Province the
steamer JFacJmsett will be allowed entrance, resorting, if necessary,
to force for this end. According to the terms of the instructions
promulgated on the 23rd of June past by the Minister for Foreign
Aff'airs, this, if the steamer obstinately and criminally persists in
continuing in this manner, to infringe the rights imposed by the
dignity of its own flag.

(Signed) Antonio Joachim da Silva Gomes.

VOL. I. 14

210 THE SECnET SEIIFICE OF THE

LETTER FRO.M THE COMMANDER OF THE 2nd NAVAL
DIVISION TO THE PRESIDENT OF BAHIA.

To the President.

Steamer Paraense, Bahia, October 7th, 1864.

Illus. e Ex. Senhor, —

It is my duty to state to }our Excellency that to-day at
daybreak the United States of America steamer IFachusett, without
having previously given anj^ symptom of moving, suddenly left the
anchorage where she was, and approached the Confederate States
steamer Florida. When she passed by the poop of the corvette
D. Januaria, where I was, I intimated that she should anchor, and not
doing so, sent an oflficer on board to give notice that all the ships of
the division, as well as the forts, would fire if she attacked the
Florida. To this intimation the commander replied that he
should comply, and do nothing further, and that he would return to
his anchorage, as your Excellency Avill see by the paper annexed
signed by the officer Avho gave this notice.

Notwithstanding, the corvette, to ratify the intimation, fired a gun
loaded -with ball. Follo^nng, notwithstanding, her Avay outside, as
it appeared to me to return to her anchorage, I observed as she
passed by the bow that she was tugging the Florida. Immediately
this steamer fired in the direction of the steamer JFachusett cannon
loaded with baU ; but escaping this attack, sailing in the direction of
the bow, thus rendering iiseless the fire from the corvette, and I
therefore ordered to cease firing. Having previously ordered that
the Paraense should be made ready to move, I immediately that this
was possible sailed, and went after her, seeing that the breeze was
light, and made signal to the yacht Fdo de Confes to follow us to the
waters, which she did TNnth all possible speed, sailing in our wake.

We chased the JFachusett outside the harbour as she tugged the
Florida, both of which were little more than three miles off. I trust
your Excellency will believe that when I left this port it was with
the decided determination of sacrificing every consideration present
and future to fight her, not^vithstanding the small amount of force
on which I could reckon, in order to vindicate the insult offered to
the sovereignty of the country, thus taking by main force the
steamer Floiida ; and this thought I expressed to the officers on
leaving the harbour as they were united in the cabin, showing them
the requirement in which we found oiu'selves to sacrifice every con-

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 211

sideration without a thought to consequences, seeing that the pro-
ceeding of the commander of the Wachusett was of a nature to arouse
the indignation of every Brazilian. A general and enthusiastic
manifestation of complete adhesion to my opinion was the reply
given by all the officers ; and I am convinced that the other ships
that accompanied me felt the same noble sentiments.

At seven o'clock in the morning the Fame use, tugging the yacht,
gained considerably on the two American steamers, and I began to
nourish the hope that we should satisfy our desires, when the wind
calming, which the Wacknsett soon perceived, always tugging the
Flwkla, began steaming, increasing gi-adually the distance between
our sliips and their steamers flying before our bow, and being of
considerably superior swiftness. Nevertheless, Ave chased them
until eleven o'clock and forty-five minutes, when disappearing, I
determined on returning to the port, returning to the Faraense,
leaving outside the corvette and the yacht, with orders also to
return to this harbour, where I dropped anchor at a quarter past
three.

Before finishing this communication, I ought to give notice that a
few moments before leaving this harbour I received offers from the
Inspector of the Arsenal and Captain of the Port of assistance, or
anything in their power, which I accepted, begging them to send me
as many armed sailors as was possible. But it being necessary to
use the greatest possible urgency in order to catch the flying
steamers, I believed I ought not to w\ait, and immediately quitted
without waiting for the offered help, also failing to wait on your
Excellency for the same motive, according to the message I re-
ceived.

God preserve your Excellency.

(Signed) Gervasio Macebo,

Commander of the Division.

Note. — The two foregoing letters are printed verhatim from the
translations made by the public interpreter at Bahia, at the time of
the occurrence. They were given in the above form to Captain
Morris, and handed by him to me on his arrival in England. It has
been thought best to reproduce them without putting the phraseology
into better idiomatic English, for fear that the precise meaning of
the writers might be inadvertently altered in the effort to express
the sense in an easier and more graceful flow of language.

14—2

212 THE SECllET SERVICE OE THE

[Copy.]

LETTER FROM THE BRAZILIAN MINISTER AT AVASHING-
TOX TO THE UNITED STATES' SECRETARY OF STATE.

(Translatio7i.)

To his Excellency the Hon. William H. Seward.

Imperial Legation of Brazil,

Washington, December 1'2th, 1864.

The undersigned, Charge d'Aflfaires ad interim of his Majesty the
Emperor of Brazil, has just received orders from his Government to
address himself without delay to that of the United States of North
America about an act of the most transcendent gravity done on the
morning of the 7th day of October last, in the port of the capital of
the Province of Bahia, by the war steamer TVackuseff, belonging to
the navy of the LTnion, an act which involves a manifest violation
of the territorial jurisdiction of the Empire, and an offence to
its honour and sovereignty.

On the 4th day of the month referred to, there entered that port,
where already had been lying for some days the Wachmett, the
Confederate steamer Florida, for the purpose declared by her
commander to the President of the province, to supply herself with
alimentary provisions and coal, and to repair some tubes of her
machinery.

The President, proceeding in accordance with the policy of
neutrality which the Empire resolved to adopt on the question in
which unfortunatel}' these States are involved, and in conformity with
the instructions in this respect issued by the Imperial Government on
the 2.3rd of June of the year last past, assented to the application of
the Florida^ and fixed the term of forty-eight hours for taking in
supplies, and fixing, in dependence on the final examination by the
engineer of the Arsenal, the determination of the residue of the
time which, jieradventure, should be deemed indispensable for the
completion of the repairs.

The same authority at once took, with the greatest impartiality,
all the measures necessary to avoid any conflict between the two
hostile steamers.

The Florida was placed under cover of the batteries of the
Brazilian corvette D. Januaria, on the inshore side, at the request of
her commander, who, reposing on the faith with which, without
<loubt, the chief authority of the province could not fail to inspire

CON FE DEE A TE ST A TES IN E UROPE. 2 1 3

him, considered himself sheltered from any attack of his adversary,
and in this confidence not only stayed a night on shore, but
gave liberty to a great part of the crew of his vessel.

It behoves me to say that, as soon as the Confederate steamer
entered the port of Bahia, the American Consul, Wilson, addressed
to the President a despatch claiming that the Florida should not be
admitted to free pratique, and that on the contrary she shoidd be
detained, alleging for this, that that vessel had, in concert with the
Alabama, violated the neutrality of the Empire by making captures
in 1863, near the island of Fernando de Noronha.

Such exaggerated pretensions, founded on facts not proven, which
had already been the subject of discussion between the Imperial
Government and the legation of the United States, could not be even
listened to.

If the President should have refused the hospitality solicited
by the commander of the Florida, he would have infringed not only
the duties of neutrality of the Empire, but also those of humanity,
considering that steamer, coming from TenerifFe, had been sixty-one
days at sea, was unprovided with food, and with machinery in the
worst condition.

Afterwards, the President having stated to the same Consul that
he hoped, from his honour and loyalty toward a friendly nation, that
he would settle with the commander of the Wachusett that he should
respect the neutrality and sovereignty of the Empire, he was
answered affirmatively, the Consul pledging his word of honour.
Things were in this condition, the term of forty-eight hours being to
exjMre at one o'clock of the afternoon of the 7th, when, about dawn
of that day, the commander of the steamer Wachusett, suddenly
leaving his anchorage, passed through the Brazilian vessels-of-war
and approached the Florida.

On passing across the bows of the Brazilian corvette D. Jamiaria.,
he was hailed from on board that he must anchor ; but, as he did
not attend to this intimation, and continued to approach the Florida^
at the same time firing a gun and some musketry, the Commander of
the Naval Division of the Empire stationed in those waters sent an
officer to board the Wachusett and inform her commander that the
ships of the division and the forts would open fire upon her if she
should attack the Florida. The Brazilian officer was not allowed to
make fast to the Wachusett, but the officer of the deck hailed him,
saying in reply that he accepted the intimation given, that he would
do nothing more, and that he Avas going to return to his anchorage.

214 rilE SECllET SEITICE OF THE

Tlie commander of the Brazilian division then thought proper to
ratify his intimation by firing a gun, upon which a complete silence
followed between the two ships JFarhusett and Florida. At the time
this was passing the corvette D. Januaria, on board which the com-
mander of the division had hoisted his flag, lay head to flood, the
steamer Florida anchored B. B., side by side of her, and quite close to
the shore, and between her and the corvette the IVachusett stopped
her wheels.

The Commander of Division then observing— notwithstanding
the darkness of the night— that the JVachusett, from the position in
which she was, kept moving onward, and Avas passing ahead of the
corvette, in a course E.B., became convinced that, in fact, she
was steering for her anchorage, thus complying with the promise
made.

But a few moments afterwards, perceiving that the Florida was in
motion, the commander discovered that the IVachusett was taking
her off in tow by means of a long cable.

Surprised at such an extraordinary attempt, the commander
immediately set about stopping this, and redressing, at the same
time, as behoved him, the oflence thus done to the dignity and
sovereignty of the Empire.

But availing himself of the darkness of the night and other circum-
stances, the commander of the JVachusett succeeded in carrying
his prize over the bar, and escaping the just punishment he
deserved.

The Consul, Wilson, preferred to abandon his post, withdrawing
on board the IVachusett.

The Government of his Majesty, as soon as it had official informa-
tion of the event, addressed to the legation of the United States at
Rio Janeiro a note, in which, giving a succinct exposition of the fact,
it declared that it had no hesitation in believing it Avould hasten to
give to it all proper assurances that the Government of the Union
would attend to the just reclamation of the Empire as promptly and
fully as the gravity of the case demanded.

In correspondence with this expectative note, the worthy represen-
tative of the United States Avas prompt in sending his reply, in
which he declares he is convinced that his Government will give to
that of the Empire the reparation which is due to it.

Such are the facts to which the undersigned has received order to
call the attention of the Honourable William H. Seward, Secretary
of State of the United States.

GONFEDEBATE STATES- IN EUBOPE. 215

The principles of international law which regulate this matter,
and in respect of which there is not the least divergence among the
most distinguished pubhcists, are common, and known to all. The
undersigned would fail to recognise the high intelligence of the
Honourable Mr. Seward, if, perchance, he should enter in this
respect into fuller developments.

He limits himself then only to recall a memorable example, in
which these principles, invariably sustained by the United States,
had entire application. In 1793, the great Washington then being
President of the United States, and the illustrious Jefferson Secretary
of State, the French frigate L'Embuscade captured the English ship
Grange in Delaware Bay, thus violating the neutrality and the
territorial sovereignty of the United States. The American Govern-
ment remonstrated energetically against this violation, and required
from the Government of the French Eepublic, not only the immediate
delivery of the captured vessel, but also the complete liberation of
all the persons found on board. This reclamation was promptly
satisfied. Much more grave, certainly, is the occurrence in the port
of the province of Bahia which makes the subject of the present
note. By the special circumstances which preceded and attended it,
this act has no parallel in the annals of modern maritime war.

The commander of the IFacImsett not only gravely offended the
territorial immunities of the Empire, passing beyond the laws of
war hy attacking treacherously, during the night, a defenceless ship,
whose crew, much reduced, because more than sixty men were on
shore with the commander and several officers, reposed unsvary
beneath the shadow of the protection which the neutrality of the
Empire guaranteed to them ; and so open was the violation, so
manifest the offence, that the enlightened American press was almost
unanimous in condemnation of the inexcusable proceeding of Com-
mander Collins.

On this occasion, remembering the United States, whose antece-
dents are well known and noted in history by the energetic defence
and respect for neutral rights, of these unshaken principles, the
undersigned cannot consider the event which occurred at Bahia
otherwise than as the individual act of the commander of the
Waclmsett not authorized or approved by his Government, and that
it will consequently give to the Government of his Majesty the
Emperor the explanations and reparation which in conformity with
international laws are due to a power which maintains friendly and
pacific relations Avith the United States.

216 THE SECL'ET SEBFICE OF THE

The just leclainatiou of the Imperial Government being thus pre-
sented, the undersigned awaits the reply of the Honourable Mr.
Seward, and fully confiding in his exalted wisdom, and in the justice
of the Government of the United States, he has not even for a
moment doubted but that it will be as satisfactory as the incontest-
al)le right which aids the Empire, and the vast gravity of the offence
■which was done to it, may require.

The undersigned, etc.,
(Signed) Igxacio de Avellar Barboza da Silva.

MR. SEWAED TO MR. BARBOZA DA SILVA.

To Senhor Ignacio de Avellar Barboza da Silva, etc.

Department of State,

Washington, December 20t/i, 1864.

Sir, —

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note,
"which sets forth the sentiments of the Imperial Government of
Brazil concerning the capture of the Florida by the United States
"war-steamer JFacMiseft in the port of Bahia.

You will, of course, explain to your Government that owing to an
understanding between you and myself, your note, although it bears
the date of the 12th December, was not submitted to me until the
21st inst.

Jealousy of foreign intervention in every form, and absolute non-
intervention in the domestic aflfairs of foreign nations, are cardinal
principles in the jjolicy of the United States. You have, therefore,
justly expected that the President would disavow and regret the
proceedings at Bahia. He will suspend Captain Collins, and direct
him to appear before a court-martial. The Consul at Bahia admits
that he advised and incited the captain, and was active in the pro-
ceedings. He will therefore be dismissed. The flag of Brazil will
receive from the United States navy the honour customary in the
intercourse of friendly maritime powers.

It is, however, not to be understood that this Government admits
or gives credit to the charges of falsehood, treachery, and deception
■which you have brought against the captain and the Consul. These
charges are denied on the authority of the officers accused.

Y^ou will also be pleased to understand that the answer now given
to your representation rests exclusively upon the ground that the

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 217

capture of the Flwida was an unauthorized, unlawful, and indefen-
sible exercise of the naval force of the United States within a foreign
country in defiance of its established and duly recognised Govern.
ment.

This Government disallows your assumption that the insurgents of
this country are a lawful naval belligerent ; and, on the contrary, it
maintains that the ascription of that character by the Government of
Brazil to insurgent citizens of the United States, who have hitherto
been, and who still are, destitute of naval forces, ports, and courts,
is an act of intervention in derogation of the law of nations, and un-
friendly and wrongfid, as it is manifestly injurious, to the United
States.

So, also, this Government disallows your assumption that the
Florida belonged to the afore-mentioned insurgents, and maintains,
on the contrary, that that vessel, like the Alabama, was a pirate,
belonging to no nation or lawful belligerent, and therefore that the
harbouring and supplying of these piratical ships and their crews in
Brazilian ports were wrongs and injuries for which Brazil justly owes
reparation to the United States, as ample as the reparation which she
now receives from them. They hope, and confidently expect, this
reciprocity in good time to restore the harmony and friendship
which are so essential to the welfare and safety of the two countries.

In the position which I have assumed, the Imperial Government
will recognise an adherence to rights which have been constantly
asserted, and an enduring sense of injui'ies which have been the
subject of earnest remonstrance by the United States during the last
three years. The Government of Brazil is again informed that these
positions of this Government are no longer deemed open to argu-
ment.

It does not, however, belong to the captains of ships-of-Avar of the
United States, or to the commanders of their armies, or to their
consuls residing in foreign ports, acting without the authority of
Congress, and without even Executive direction, and choosing their
own time, manner, and occasion, to assert the rights and redress the
wrongs of the country. This power can be lawfully exercised only
by the Government of the United States. As a member of the
family of nations, the United States practise order, not anarchy, as
they always prefer lawful proceedings to aggressive violence or
retaliation. The United States are happy in being able to believe
that Brazil entertains the same sentiments. The authorities at
Bahia are understood to have unsuccessfully employed force to

218 THE SECRET SEE VICE OF THE

overcome the IVacltnudt and rescue the Florida, and to have con-
tinued the chase of the offender beyond the waters of Brazil, out
upon the high seas. Thus, in the affair at Bahia, subordinate agents,
without the knowledge of their respective Governments, mutually
inaugurated an unauthorized, irregular, and unlawful war. In de-
sisting from that war on her part, and in appealing to the Govern-
ment for redress, Brazil rightly appreciated the character of the
United States, and set an example worthy of emulation.

The disposition of the captured crew of the Florida is determined
upon the principles which I have laid down. Although the crew are
enemies of the United States, and, as they contend, enemies of the
human race, yet the offenders were, nevertheless, unlawfully brought
into the custody of this Government, and therefoi-e they could not
laAvfully be subjected here to the punishment which they have
deserved. Nor could they, being enemies, be allowed to enjoy the
protection of the United States. They will, therefore, be set at
liberty, to seek a refuge wheresoever they may find it, with the
hazard of recapture when beyond the jurisdiction of this Govern-
ment.

The Florida was brought into American waters, and was anchored
under naval surveillance and protection at Hampton Roads. While
awaiting the representation of the Brazilian Government, on the
28th November, she sank, owing to a leak which could not be
seasonably stopped. The leak was at first represented to have been
caused, or at least increased, by a collision Avith a war transport.
Orders were immediately given to ascertain the manner and cir-
cumstances of the occurrence. It seemed to affect the army and the
navy. A Naval Court of Inquiry and also a Military Court of In-
quiry were charged Avith the investigation. The Naval Court has
submitted its report, and a copy thereof is heremth communicated.
The Military Court is yet engaged. So soon as its labours shall
have ended, the result will be made known to your Government. In
the meantime it is assumed that the loss of the Florida was a conse-
quence of some unforeseen accident, which cast no responsibility upon
the United States.

I avail, etc.,

(Signed) William H. Seward.

Note. — The two foregoing letters, Senhor Barboza da Silva to Mr.
Seward, and the reply of Mr. Seward, will be found in the ' British
Case,' pp. 75-78.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 219

COPY OF EEPORT OF LIEUTENANT T. K. PORTER ON
THE CAPTURE OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES
STEAMER FLORIDA BY THE UNITED STATES
STEAMER WACHUSETT

To Lieutenaut-Commander C. M, Morris, Confederate States Navy.

Liverpool, February 'lOth, 1865.

Sir, —

In obedience to orders I submit the folloAving report of
the capture of the Confederate States steamer Florida at Bahia,
Brazil, on the 7th of October, 1864, by the United States steamer
JFachiisett, the treatment of the officers and crew while prisoners ;
and the manner of our release. But before commencing I beg to
call your attention to the fact that before entering the harbour our
shot were withdrawn from the guns ; that after our being requested
by the Brazilian naval commander to anchor in-shore of his squadron
we let our steam go down and hauled fires.

At about 3 a.m. on the morning of the 7th October, the officer of
the deck, Acting-Master T. T. Hunter, sent the quarter-master down
to call me, and tell me that the Wacliusett was underweigh and standing
towards us. I immediately jumped on deck, Avhen I saw the JJ^achusett
about twenty yards off, standing for our starboard quarter. A moment
after she struck us abreast the mizen-mast, broke it into three pieces,
crushed in the bulwarks, knocked the quarter-boat in on deck,
jammed the wheel, carried away the mainyard, and started the
beams for about thirty feet forward. At the same time she fired
about two hundred shots from her small arms, and two from her great
guns. She then backed off about one hundred yards, and demanded
our surrender. I replied to the demand that I would let them know
in a few moments. The reply from the Wacliusett was to surrender
immediately, or they would blow us out of the water. As more than
half our crew were ashore, and as those on board had just retui'ued
from liberty, I believed that she could run us down before we could
get our guns loaded. But as I did not like to surrender the vessel
without knowing what some of the other officers thought of it, I
consulted Lieutenant Stone, the second officer in rank ; and finding
that he agreed with me that we could not contend against her with
any hopes of success, I informed the commander of the JFachttsett
that under the circumstances I would sm-render the vessel. I then
went on board, and delivered to Commander Collins the ship's ensign

220 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

and my sword. He immediately sent a prize-crew on board the
Floriifa, and towed her out of the harbour. During the day he
transferred al)out two-thirds of those captured to the JFodiusett. He
then paroled the otticers, and put the men in double irons. As there
were so few men compared to the JFachusett's crew, and those divided
l)etween the two ships, I tried to get Captain Collins to allow the
irons to be taken off of all, or a part of them, during the day, but he
refused to do so. Beyond keeping the men in double irons for nearly
two months, there were but two cases of severity towards them that
were reported to me. Henry Norman (cox.) was ironed to a stanchion
with his hands behind him for having the key of a pair of the Flcri'ida's
irons in his pocket. He, as well as all the other men on the
Wachusett, was ironed with the irons belonging to her (the JFachuseft).
John Brogan (fireman) was kept in the sweat-box. Dr. Emory
reported to me that he was sick and could not stand such treatment.
I asked Captain Collins to tell me why he was so treated. His reply
was that Brogan Avas seen talking, and that when his master-at-arms
came up he stopped. He also said that Brogan had, the day the
FlwkJii was captured, cursed one of his engineers, who tried to get
him to show him something about our engines. He said, though,
that he had ordered his release two days before, and thought he had
been taken out. This was about three weeks after our capture.
Brogan informed me afterwards that he had been confined there for
several days, and eighteen nights. A few days before going into
St. Thomas, I went to Captain Collins, and told him that on a
previous occasion he had informed me that he was going to put our
men ashore at Pernambuco, and that as we would be in port a few
days, I would like to know if he still intended to put them ashore,
at the same time telling him that I thought the Florida would be
given up by his Government, and that I thought any honourable
man would try to return the ship and crew as nearly in the condition
in which he found her as he could. His reply was, 'I have not
thought of it — I have not thought of it to-day.' After further
conversation I left him, believing that he would not try to break up
the crew. But before leaving St. Thomas our men were informed
that all of them who wished to go ashore could do so, and that
Master George D. Bryan and one other officer would meet them to
look out for them. They asked what was to become of their money,
which had been taken for them, and were told that Mr. Bryan would
take it ashore for them. A number of them thought this was a trick
to get rid of them, and would not go, but eighteen were foolish

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 221

enough to believe it, and had. their irons taken off on the berth-deck,
and were put in a boat from the bow port, and allowed to go ashore.
The first Mr. Bryan heard of his part of the affair was when we left
the Wachusett and had an opportunity of talking to the other men.
After the men had time to get ashore, the commander of the
TVachusett called away his boats, and sent an armed force after the
boat in which our men had left. So anxious was he to get them
ashore, that he sent them Avhen the quarantine flag was flying at his
fore in consequence of having the small-pox on board. The United
States steamer Keasarge left St. Thomas while we were there, and
Dr. Charlton and the eighteen men on the Florida were transferred
to her. When Ave arrived at Fortress Monroe, we were sent up to
Point Look-out Prison, and there the officers were separated from
the men, and sent to the Old Capitol Prison in Washington. But in
three or four days we were sent back to the JVachusett at Fortress
Monroe to go to Fort Warren, Boston. On our return to Fortress
Monroe, I heard that the Florida's money-chest had been opened, and
I went to Captain Collins and reminded him that soon after we were
captured, I informed him that there were three hundred and twenty
dollars in it which belonged to the wardroom mess, which I had
given to the paymaster the evening before we were captured, to keep
till the caterer. Lieutenant Stone, should return from shore. He
told me that he had mentioned it to Rear- Admiral Porter, but that
the Admiral refused to give it to us. We saw the Florida before we
left. She had lost her jibboom by a steam-tug running into her. A
lieutenant-commander told me that if the L^nited States Govern-
ment determined to give her up, the officers of the navy would
destroy her. Several other of our officers were told the same.
AVhilst in Fort Warren we heard these threats were carried out.

From Hampton Roads we were carried in the Wachuseit to Boston,
but before we were sent to Fort Warren, Lieutenant-Commander
Beardsly went to the men and informed them that he was sent by
Captain Collins to tell them that if they would take the oath of
allegiance to the United States Government they would be released.
He, meeting with no success, was succeeded by the master-at-arms of
the vessel, and a sergeant from the fort, who told them that all the
men but five of those who had come from St. Thomas on the Keasarge
had taken the oath. I do not know by whose orders this was told
them ; but we found on arriving at the fort that it had no more truth
in it than the report they gave the men at St. Thomas, that Mr.
Bryan was to meet them on shore. I am happy to say that but one

222 TH?: SECBET SERVICE OE THE

of the crew deserted his flag, and he did it the day we were captured.
Wlaen we airived at Fort Warren, the men were all pvxt in one room,
and the eleven officers were put into one with thirty-two other
prisoners. These rooms were casemates, and Avere fifty feet long
and about eighteen feet wide. At sunset we were locked \\\) in these
casemates, and released after sunrise, and allowed to promenade the
extent of five such rooms. At 8 a.m. we Avere marched arouml to
the cookhouse, and were all given one loaf of bread each, weighing
fourteen ounces. After 1 2 we were marched around again, and were
given our dinner, which consisted of about eight ounces of cooked
meat, Avith half a pint of thin soup, three days, and two potatoes,
some beans or hominy the other days. This was all we received each
day. Many of the jirisoners by economizing found this enough to
ai^pease their hunger, Ijut a great many others were hungry all the
time. If we had been allowed to buy sugar and coffee, and bread
and cheese, a great many Avould have been able to do so, and divide
with some of their friends Avho had no means, but Ave Avere alloAved
to buy nothing to eat AA'ithout a certificate from the Post surgeon that
we Avere sick. There is an arrangement betAveen our Government
and that of the United States, that prisoners-of-Avar may be alloAA'-ed
to receive boxes of provisions and clothing from their friends at
home, but the United States Government noAv interprets this to
mean that all boxes must come by a flag of truce. As half of the
Confederate prisoners have their homes Avithin what is noAV the
United States military lines, this agreement Avorks almost entirely
for the Federals and against us. Half of the Florida s officers Avere
in this situation, and they were compelled to decline the offers of
their friends. On the 24:th December all the Florida's officers except
Dr. Charlton and fourteen other prisoners Avere locked up in a case-
mate, and kept in close confinement both day and night. AVe were
not allowed to go out under any circumstances, except that for the
first four days Ave were marched under a heaAy guard to the cook-
house twice a day. After that our dinner Avas 1)rought to us, and
two of us were marched around to get the bread for all of those con-
fined. This AA'as for discussing a plan to capture the fort, Avhich one
of the prison spies, AA'ho pretends to be a lieutenant-colonel in our
army, and a lieutenant in the English army, revealed to the
authorities. We Avere kept in close confinement until the 19th of
January, when Lieutenant Woodman, of the United States army, sent
for me, and told me that he had an order from the Secretary of the
Kavy to release the officers and crew of the Florida from Fort

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 223

Warren, and that as such was the case he would release all of us from
close confinement. He showed me the order from the Secretary of the
Navy, which was that we would be released on condition that we
signed a parole to leave the United States within ten days. I asked
him if we would be given the money and our swords, and other
articles captured on the Florida, which had not been sunk with her.
He said that he knew nothing about them, but that if I wished to
write to Mr. Welles, he would send the communication. I then gave
him a copy of the following note, which he assured me was sent the
same day :

' To the Hon. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy.

' Fort Warren, January 19tJi, 1863.

' Sir, —

' I have just been informed by the commanding officer of this
fort that the officers and crew of the Confederate States steamer
Florida will be released on condition of leaving the United States
within ten days. We will accept a parole to leave at any time when
we are put on board any steamer going to Europe, but we would
prefer to go to Eichmond. We would call your attention to the fact
that there were somewhere about thirteen thousand dollars in gold
on the Florida when she was captured, which was taken out of her by
order of Eear- Admiral Porter. And to leave the United States it
will be necessary to have that to take us out, unless the United
States Govei-nment send us away as they brought us in. If you will
give us our money we would prefer remaining here till a steamer leaves
here for Europe, or we would ask for a guard till we are piit on one
in New York, as so many of us being together might be the cause
of an unnecessary disturbance, of which we would be the sufferers.
'Very respectfully,

'Your obedient servant,

'Thomas K. Porter,
* Firsc-Lieutenant, Confederate States Navy.'

Mr. Welles made no reply to this. After waiting a week and
finding that the United States Government neither intended to pa)^
our passage away, nor to give us the money belonging to our Govern-
ment, and not even our private money, I sent Lieutenant Stone to
Boston with directions to procure a passage in the British and North
American steamer Canada, or if he failed in that, to get us out of the

224 THE SECUET SERVICE OE THE

United States in any manner possible. He sncceeded in getting
passage for all of us on the Canada, by my giving a draft to be paid
at Liverpool. And on the 1st of February we signed the follomng
parole : ' "We, the undersigned officers and creAv of the steamer Elorida,
in consideration of being released from confinement in Fort Warren,
do jointly and severally pledge our sacred woi-d of honour that we
"wall leave the United States within ten days from date of release,
and that while in the United States we will commit no hostile act,'
and I left the fort for the steamer Canada. It may be of importance
to state that we were officially informed by Major Gibson, command-
ing the Post part of the time we were there, that we could hold no
communication with the Brazilian authorities.
Very respectfully.

Your obedient servant,

Thomas K. Porter,
First-Lieutenant, Confederate States Navy.

CON FED Ell ATE STATES IN EUROPE.

CHAPTER Y.

The building of the Alabama. — Suspicions of the United States Consul
at Liverpool. — Captain Butcher. — The equipping of the Alabama.
— Quitting Liverpool. — Bond, the Pilot. — Official Correspondence.
— Captain Semmes. — The Alabama handed over to his charge. —
Sonae matters connected Avith the clearance of the Alabama from
Liverpool. — Mr. Price Edwards, the Collector of Customs at that
Port. — The Alabama's ^vst engagement. — The Alabama a legitimate
vessel-of-war. — Action of the United States in regard to commission-
ing vessels at sea. — Influence of the cruisers on the United States
carrying trade. — The Alabama's action with the Keasarge. — Mr.
Seward and Earl Russell.

Wkiting subjectively, and following the career of the
Florida from her bii'th on the busy but peaceful shores
of the Mersey to her violent seizure in Bahia, and thence
to her final resting-place among the oyster-beds in the
estuary of the River James, the narrative has been
carried far beyond the regular course of events, and we
must now return to March, 1862, and pick up that
thread of the history which was woven into the general
occurrences of the period by the Alabama.

At the time of the Florickts departure from Liverpool,
her still more famous consort had not yet been dignified
by an}^ other name or title than the dockyard number
' 290.' Her comely frame had been covered in by the
binding grip of the outside planking, which had
developed the graceful curves of her counter and the

VOL. I. 15

226 THE SECnET SERVICE OF THE

delicate wave-lines of her bow ; but, nevertheless, I was
disappointed to find that she was hardly up to specified
time.

The builders were determined to turn out a first-class
ship, and feeling perhaps that their obligation to do so
was, if possible, increased by my absence, and the fact
that there was no one to look after the interests of the
owner, they were especially critical and hard to please
in the selection of tlie timber for the most important
parts, and had discarded two or three stern-posts* after
they had been partly fitted and bored to take the screw
shaft, because of some slight defect. This creditable,
satisfactory, and punctilious care had caused some delay
in completing the hull, but all the other work was in an
advanced state, and the engines were ready to go into
the ship as soon as she was off" the ways.

The Birkenhead Ironworks lie some distance above
the chief commercial parts of Liverpool, and being on
the opposite side of the ^lerse}^, they do not attract
especial notice from persons engaged in business, or
passing to and fi-o by the AVoodside Ferry, and the boats
plying to the lower landings on the river. But the
large number of people passing up river to Tranmere,
Kock Ferry, and Eastham, would often pass along the
dock -walls of ]\Iessrs. Laird's establishment, and they
could not fail to observe the gradual develojoment of the
ffracefiil craft that stood out in bold relief at the extreme
south end of the yard, and to contrast her with the
large iron structures they were accustomed to see upon
the adjoining building slips and wa3^s.

The departure of the Florida without being called
u2)on to give a particular account of herself and lier

* The single piece of timber finally used for the stern-post cost
£100. .

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 227

intentions had grieved and vexed the United States
Consul, and his suspicions having been once aroused,
liis mind was kept in a wakeful and agitated condition
durino" the remainder of the war. The voluminous
correspondence submitted to the Geneva Arbitrators,
and which appeared from time to time in the Parlia-
mentary Blue-books, gives proof of his nervous activity
and the irritable and sometimes irritating persistency
with which he pressed the local authorities to seize, or
at least to detain, ships which he affirmed ' it was quite
notorious Avere intended to be armed and equipped as
privateers ' for the ' so-called ' — which latter appellation
came to be a common designation of the Confederate
States amono; those United States officials who were
sometimes willing to dro]) the still more common
epithets of ' rebel ' and ' insurgent,' to which, however,
the Liverpool Consul generally adhered.

The people who saw the '290' on the building- slip,
and Avere attracted by her appearance, naturally talked
about her, and no doubt remarks were often made in
respect to her fitness for a cruiser, and it is not therefore
surprising that she should have aroused the suspicions
of those whose business it Avas to keep Avatch over the
interests of the United States. I soon learned that spies
Avere lurking about, and tampering with the Avorkmen at
Messrs. Laird's, and that a private detective named
Maguire Avas taking a deep and abiding interest in my
personal moA^ements ; but my solicitor assured me that
there AA^as nothing' ille^'al in Avhat I Avas doino- and
there Avas nothino- therefore to be done but to maintain
a quiet reserA^e, to hasten the completion of the ship, and
to get her aAA^ay as soon as possible.

On the 15th of May ' 290 ' AA^as launched, and as a
matter of foct left that numerical title on the signboard

15—2

228 TU?: SECUET SERVICE OF THE

at the top of the slip wlien she slid off into the ^lersey,
although it stuck to her some time, and continued to he
the term used when mentioning her in the Consular
affidavits, and in the diplomatic correspondence, until
the frequent reports of her performances afloat gave
greater notoriety and distinction to her now historical
name of Ahibania.

But this ship, like the Florida^ bore more than one
name in passing through the various phases of her life,
from a mere entity in a dockyard to the position of a
commissioned ship-of-war. It is one of the peculiar
anomalies of our nautical Enoiisli m-ammar that a man-
of- war is feminine, and we should say of a frigate whose
name was Ajax, or which bore the still more harsh and
masculine appellation of Polyphemus, ' She is a fine sea-
boat.' The office of christening a ship is almost invari-
ably performed by a lady, which is an aggravation of
the anomaly about the sex, because if custom justifies a
sailor in calling his ship ' she,' and if there is any
propriety in his passionate affirmation, ' my barque is
my bride,' the function of handing her into her natural
element would be more fittingly, though not so grace-
fully done, by one of the 'opposite sex.' I could not
take the liberty of introducing the name of the lady
who christened ' 290,' into this narrative. She graciously
consented to perform the office, and fulfilled it in a
comely manner, little knowing that she was construc-
tively taking part in a great Civil War, and wholly
unconscious that she was helping to make work for five
eminent statesmen at Geneva ten years after. I hope
her conscience has never upbraided her since, and that
she has not felt in any way responsible for the bill of
£3,000,000, which her Most Gracious Majesty had to
pay on account of the * Alabama Claims.'

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 229

AYlien ' 290 ' was to be launched, it was necessary to
provide an appellation for her. The Spanish language
furnished a flexible and mellifluous equivalent for the
Christian name of the lady who served the oflice, and
when the ship got free of the blocks and glided down
the ways, she had been christened Enrica. The Spanish
name gave rise to another alleged mystery, and it was
often asserted that there was a purpose to afi*ect that the
ship was intended for the Spanish Government, or at
least for a Spanish firm in Spain ; but I now state that
there was no attempt to deceive anyone by any pretence
whatever in the business of building and despatching
the Alabama from Liverpool. I have already described
the negotiations with Messrs. Laird for the building of
the shijj. There was no m3'stery or disguise about
them, and it will be seen that all the further manage-
ment of the transaction was conducted in the same
ordinary commonplace way. A great effbrt was made
by the United States Minister to induce her Majesty's
Government to seize the ship, but no satisfactory
evidence was produced that any violation of the Foreign
Enlistment Act had been committed, and it appears
from what is now known that the Government were
not willing to ' strain the law ' at that early date, or
^ to seize a vessel which it would have been the duty of
a court of law to restore.'

I have always attributed the success of getting the
Alabama finished as a sea-going ship, and then
despatched, to the fact that no mystery or disguise was
attemjDted. I was well advised as to the law, and had
the means of knowing with well nigh absolute certainty
Avhat was the state of the negotiations between the
United States Minister and her Majesty's Government.
For the rest, I merely practised such ordinary business

230 THE SECL'ET SEIiVICE OF THE

prudence and reserve as a man would be likely to follow
in the management of his private affairs. I never told
any emj^Ioye more than Avas necessary for luni to know,
and never gave any reason for an order having reference
to the outfit or movements of the shij). Everything
was done quietly, without any excitement or appearance
of haste. At the last moment she was hurried off Avitli
some precipitancy, but this will be explained in due
course.

The jMessrs. Laird, conscious of being somewhat
behind time with the hull, appeared desirous to make
up the loss by quick work in setting up the engines and
completing the outfit. The ship Avas no sooner in the
water than two tugs took her to the entrance of the
graving-dock, and she was warped into it, and placed
over the blocks at once. The engineer dej^artment at
the Messrs. Laird's is especially efiicient. Before the
Emica was fully secured in her berth the great derrick
was swinging over her decks, and the first heavy pieces
of the machinery were going on board. The Avork was
now ra})idl}- pushed forward, and the progress was
satisfactory. On about June I5tli the ship was taken
out for a trial trip, and Avas run OA^er the usual course
until all parties Avere satisfied.

As the ship approached comj^letion, it Avas necessary
to appoint a captain Avho held a lioard of Trade
certificate, to superintend the preparations for sea,
to engage the crcAv, and transact all such business as by
law and custom falls Avithin the office of the commander
of a vessel. The selection of the right man Avas a
matter of graA'e consideration. The requirements Avere
professional competency, j)rudence, control over the
tongue, and absolute integrity. I consulted a friend,
and he soon brought to me Captain MathcAv J. Butcher,

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 231

a o'entleman who was then servino: as first-officer in a
Cunard steamship ; but he held a master's certificate,
and w^as therefore eligible.

It turned out that I had met Captain Butcher two or
three years before in Havana, he being then chief-officer
of the Cunard steamship Kaniak, and thus he was not
wholly unknown to me. A conversation of a half
to three-quarters of an hour brought us to a satisfactory
understanding, and we went across to Messrs. Laird's
yard, and I introduced Captain Butcher as the com-
mander of the Enrica, through whom I desired them to
receive all further instructions with reference to the
outfit of the ship. To prevent repetition hereafter, I
will take this occasion to say that Captain Butcher
fulfilled all the requirements of the offices he engaged to
perform, not only with tact, judgment and discretion,
but with that nice and discriminating fidelity which
marks the man of true honesty. He was engaged
merely to take the ship to an appointed place without
the United Kingdom ; and he was especially warned
that no men must be engaged under any pretence what-
ever, except to navigate the ship to a port or ports in
the West Indies, with the privilege of stopping at
any intermediate port.

It may be stated here, once for all, that no men
were hired or engaged for any other purpose than that
of navigating an unarmed ship, and no man w^as enlisted
to enter the Confederate service, nor was a word said to
an}^ man to induce him to enter that service, by anyone
having the slightest authority to make any such propo-
sition, until after the ship had passed far beyond
British jurisdiction. It would have been quite easy
to prove that the affidavits obtained by the United
States Consul at the time were either the fictitious

232 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

conceits of the men who made them, or else tliat tlie
men liad been themselves deceived. V>\xt while Captain
Butcher was only en2:ao'ed to take out an unarmed
ship, and lie never did enter the Confederate Service,
vet it was manifestly necessary to confide to him more
than what a])peared on the surface. He therefore knew
enough before the arrival of the ship at Terceira to
place the success of the whole enterprise in his power.
An indiscreet remark, or a hint from him to a careless
gossiping acquaintance, would have spoiled all of
our well-laid plans. I shrink from seeming to suggest
that there might have been a possibility of such a
catastrophe ; but there can be no doubt that the
United States would have given a considerable sum
to frustrate the departure of the ship, and a much
larger sum still to have got possession of her. There
was a time when the commander might have handed
her over to an agent of the United States, or for
that matter he might have taken her to Xew York,
instead of to Terceira. I mention this to demonstrate
the prodigious trust it was necessary to repose in
Captain Butcher. But I never had the least uneasiness ;
men who have had much to do with their fellows,
if observant, learn to understand them, and after our
first interview I never hesitated to tell Captain Butcher
all that was necessary for him to fully comprehend the
actual state of affairs, although I never ceased to abide
by the rule of burdening no one with more of a secret
than it seemed good for him to know.

I was fortunate in having held on to my old Mend
McNair, the engineer of the Fingal, and he took charge
of that department on board the Enrica, so that I was
quite sure nothing would be neglected in the way
of proper outfit.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 233

About the 1st of July the Enrica was so nearly
ready for sea, that I began to make preparations for my
own departure in her. Lieutenant J. R. Hamilton had
arrived in England from the Confederate States at the
end of April, and reported to me for duty as first-
lieutenant of the Alabama (still Enrica). When I was in
Savannah With. t\\Q Fingal in February, 18G2, Lieutenant
Hamilton had expressed an earnest desire to get afloat,
and asked if I could bring it about that he should
be detailed to serve with me. There appeared to be
some difficulty at the time, but the Secretary of the
Navy bore it in mind, and I was much gratified by
Hamilton's unexpected arrival. He entered with much
spirit into the arrangements for our cruise.

In the original instructions the Navy Department had
left me a large discretion, and I had fully arranged and
planned what, and in what direction, my operations
should be. ]\Laffitt and I had both served together on
the United States Coast Survey. r)oth of us could find
our way into about every harljour from Boston to the
Mississip2)i. I had proposed a rendezvous with him,
and a joint dash at a given point ; but, failing the ren-
dezvous, I had sketched out my own course separately.
Just about this time, when in another week I should
have been off, I received two despatches from the Navy
Department of great length, the contents of which
greatly disappointed my hopes and expectations in re-
ference to getting afloat, but at the same time added
largely to the sphere of my general duties.

The first despatch notified me that it had been thought
advisable to order Captain Semmes to return to England
from Nassau, and directing me to put him in command
of the Alabama. That this change may be fully under-
stood, 1 will just briefly mention that Captain Semmes,

234 THE SECBET SERVICE OF THE

ill the progress of his cruise in the SumttT, had found
Lis way to Gibraltar, and finding it impossible to make
at tliat })lace tlie repairs necessary to fit her for further
cruising, and being also unable to obtain a sufficient
supply of fuel to fetch the ship to a French or English
])ort, he had laid her up and was e)i route witli his staff
of officers for the Confederate States Avheii the fresh
orders of the Secretary- of the Navy met him at Xassau.*

The Sumter was for some time a bete noire to me.
She Avas much in the way at Gibraltar, but having been
turned over to me as Confederate property, there was
both the necessity and the obligation to look after lier.
The United States kept two vessels in the neighbour-
hood to watch her, which was some offset to the incon-
venience and expense, but when it became apparent that
she could not be got away, and we began to have better
and more efficient vessels for cruising, I sold her, and
she was put under the British flag by her new owners,
and was brought round to Liverpool and converted into
a blockade-runner. She was never caught, but ended
lier days in the natural and ship-shape way by foundering
somewhere in the Xorth Sea.

The views of the Navy Department at this time will
be best explained by quoting from the second of the
afore-mentioned despatches : ' Captain Semmes returns
to England to assume the command of the Alabama,
and you will jDlcase afford him all possible assistance
in getting her to sea and maintaining her as a cruiser.'

The Secretary then goes earnestly into the question
of ironclads ; directs me to build, if possible, two more
vessels of the type of the Alabama^ advises in what way

* A full account of all this will be found in ' My Adventures
Afloat,' in -which Admiral Semmes gives a history of his cruises in
the Sumter and Alalama. ;

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 235

he hojies to provide funds, adds orders for various sup-
plies, and notifies me of some large contracts he has
made with private parties , and instructs me to supervise
them on behalf of the Government.

It may be interesting to the reader to know the
opinion of a member of the Confederate Cabinet in June
— Jidi/, 1862, in resj^ect to the possible intervention of
Great Britain and France, and I give it in the following-
extract : —

' AYe are all astonished here at the evident apprehen-
sion of the Government of Great Britain of a war with
the United States. ]\Ir. Seward's gasconades upon this
subject excite but the contempt of his own people. . . .
Should Great Britain and France acknowledge our inde-
pendence, and send their products in their own ships to
our ports, the war would not only cease, but their course
would meet the approval of a vast majority of the people
of the United States, for the war is carried on by a party
in power, and not by the people.

' Enclosed you have a copy of my instructions to
Commander Semmes. Your services in England are so
important at this time, that I trust you will cheerfully
support any disappointment you may experience in not
getting to sea. The experience you have acquired
renders your agency absolutely necessary. . . .

' I am, etc.,
' (Signed) S. E. Mallory,

' Secretary of the Navy.'

Simultaneously with the notification of Captain
Semmes's appointment to the Alabama, I received a
letter from that ofiicer himself, in which he advised me
that he would join me in Liverpool by the first vessel

230 THE SECRET SERVICE OE THE

leaving Xassaii, and requesting me to make such
arrangements to get the enterprise complete as I might
deem best. This change, coming so late, when the
ship was, in flict, read}' for sea, and liad been delivered
to me by the builders, was very embarrassing. We
kncAv that tlie American Minister was ])ressing the
Government to seize the ship ; and the frequent inquiries
addressed to the builders by the Customs authorities at
London, and the active watchfulness of the local officers
of that department at Liverpool, warned me that the
situation was critical.

Meanwhile the Enrica (^Alabama) Avas taken into the
Birkenhead Dock, where she was coaled and all her
stores were put on board. Everything was kept in
readiness for a start at short notice, but a full crew was
not shipped, for fear that the men would be restive at the
dela}', and attract notice by their numbers and indiscreet
talkinii".

In order to preserve due consistenc}'^ in the order of
events, it is now necessary to give an account of the
arrangements for ' equipping ' the Alabama — that is to
say, the means adopted to supply that portion of her
furniture which would complete her outfit as a vessel-of-
war. It is not necessary to dwell long upon these
arrangements. The battery was ordered very shortly
after the contract for the ship was made, and all the
ordnance supplies were put in train in good time ; but
such instructions were jriven as would ensure their beino;

O CD

ready not much before the ship, although the j^arties
contracted with were not informed for what purpose
they were wanted, or even how they were to be shipped,
until the time arrived for forwarding them. The
necessar}^ number of revolvers, short rifles with cutlass
bayonets, ammunition, made-up clothing for 150 men,

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 237

extra stores of all kinds, hammocks, and, in fact, every-
thing required for the complete equipment of a man of-
war, were ordered, and instructions Avere given that the
goods when ready should be packed, marked, and held
for shipping orders.

About the end of May a suitable agent was instructed
to look up a moderate- sized sailing-vessel in London,
fit for a West Indian voyage, to carry heavy Aveights,
She Avas to be staunch and in good condition ; but high
finish not Avanted, and a clipper not requu'ed. We got
just the craft — a barque of about 400 to 450 tons. Her
recommendation was that she had lately brought home
ordnance stores — old guns, shot, etc. — from Gibraltar
on Government account. She Avas bought, and in due
time Avas entered out fi'om London to Demerara. The
agent Avas ordered to put 350 tons of coal in her, and
the necessary shipping orders were given to the parties
holding the Alabama s goods. Our barque Avas named
Agiippijia, and she attracted no especial notice and no
suspicion wdiile loading in the London Docks. It Avas
easy to regulate the forAvarding of the cargo and the
lading, so as to fit in with the movements of the Enrica
at Liverpool, Avithout creating the suspicion that there
was any connection betAveen the two vessels.

I Avished to know something definite as to the time of
Captain Semmes's arrival, or at least that he had
started from Nassau, before desj^atching the tAvo ships,
because it might be more dangerous to ha\'e them Avait-
ing at the rendezvous, Avhere a passing United States
cruiser might by chance fall upon them, than for the
Enrica to remain in Liverpool, where no foreign enemy
could touch her. But there Avas a domestic enemy — the
Foreign Enlistment Act — upon Avhom it Avas necessary
to keep a Avatchful eye.

238 THE SECnET SEEFICE OF THE

On Saturday, July 26th, 1862,1 received information
from a private but most reliable source, that it would
not be safe to leave the ship in Liverpool another forty-
eight liours. I went immediately to ^Messrs. Laird's
office, and told them that I wished to have a thoroui>-li
all day trial of the ship outside. Although the testing
trial trip had already been made, and the delivery of
the ship to me in accordance with the terms of the
contract was complete, yet it had been verbally agi*eed
that there should be another trial, when coals and stores
were all on board, if I desired it. Captain Butcher was
ordered to ship a few more hands, and to have every-
thing ready to come out of dock on 3Ionday's tide.
Xone of the crew were given an inkling of the con-
templated movement ; but I informed Captain l^utcher
confidentially that the ship would not return, and
directed him to get on board some extra tons of coal,
and to complete his stores.

It was important to have as many trusty and intelli-
gent men on board as possible, and I had already detailed
Mr. John Loav (now a master in the Confederate States
N^avy), who had rejoined me after going out to Xassau
in the Florida, to be ready to accompany Captain
Butcher.

On ^Monday the 28th the Enrica came out of dock and
anchored off Seacombe, and every preparation was made
for going out of harbour the next day, A small part}^ of
guests were invited to go out for the trial trip, and the
next morning — Tuesday, the 2J)th — the ship was partially
dressed with flags, and at about 9 a.m. we got under weigh
and steamed down the river with a number of guests on
board, and a party of riggers and additional engineers'
men to assist if any heljD was needed. We had also in
company the steam-tug Ilercule^s as a tender.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 239

The day was fine and the trials were very satisfactory.
We ran several times between the Bell Buoy and the
north-west lightship. The average speed was 12-8, the
sea being quite smooth, and the wind light from north-
west. About 3 p.m. I explained to the guests that it
Avas my wish to keep the ship out all night to complete
her trials, and that the sea being c[uite smooth we would
run close to the bar, and every one could go up to town
in the tug. Shortly after I asked Mr. George Bond, the
Liverpool pilot, if he knew Moelfra Bay. He said 'yes.'
I then directed Captain Butcher to take the ship down
to that anchorage as soon as the rest of us left, and wait
there until I came to him, which, if possible, would be
the next afternoon. At -i p.m. the guests, the extra
men, and I, got on board the tug, and parting company
from the Enrica, she proceeded to her place of anchorage
on the Welsh coast, while we went up to town. On the
way up the river I engaged the tug to be at the Wood-
side landin2:-staQ;e at () a.m. on the next mornino;, tellino;
the master that I wished him to take a few articles to
the ship, which would probably remain outside at least
for a day. A shipping-master had been previously
engaged to have thirty or forty men on the landing-
stage at the same time to join a ship at an outport, for a
voyage to the Bahamas, and possibly to Havana.

I was on the Woodside landing-stage by 7 a.m. on the
30th. The Hercules was already there, and the articles
wanted for the Enrica were on board. They were a
spare anchor-stock, a large piece of scantling, intended
for the frame to support the spare spars, and a few brass
pieces belonging to the engines. There is reason for
some particularity in these small details, as one of the
Consular affidavits affirmed that gun-carriages were
taken, which is quite untrue. The shipping-master

240 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

wa.^ also on the stag'e. He liad Avitli liim about
thirty-five or forty men, and nearly as many Avomen, of
that class who generally affect a tender solicitude for
Jack when he is outAvard-bound, and is likely to be pro-
vided with an advance-note. I told him to get the men
on board, but of course the women could not go. He
replied that he feared it was a case of all or none. The
women, he said, stood in various degrees of tender
relationship to the men, and would not part with them
unless they could first get a month's pay in advance or
its equivalent. There was no time for parley ; the
mixed group were hurried on board, and we proceeded
down the river. As Ave a})proached Ncav Brighton I
told the master of the tug to take the Rock Channel,
which Avould save distance, and go down to Moelfra Bay.
At about 3 p.m. we sighted the Enrica^ and at four got
alongside of her. It had been raining, and the afternoon
was dull and cloudy.

There had been nothino; to eat on board the t\\^. Jack
and his foir friends Avere therefore hungry, and not in suit-
able frame of mind for business. The stcAvard Avas
ordered to prepare a substantial supper as quickly as
possible, and Avhen it Avas ready all hands Avere refreshed
Avith a fair but safe allowance of grog, to add zest and
cheerfulness to the meal. AVhen the men had Avell eateii,
and had finished their pipes, they AA^ere called aft, and it
Avas explained to them in fcAV Avords that the slii2) had
been ' cruising in the Channel to get her engines in good
Avorking order, and as cA-erything Avas satisfactorA' it Avas
proposed to proceed on the A^oyage AA'ithout going back
to Liverpool, wliich Avould be an unnecessary delay and
expense. Would they ship for the run, say to HaA'ana,
touching at any intermediate port ? If the ship did not
return to England they Avould be sent back free of

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 241

expense, or some other satisfactory settlement would be
made with them. They should have one month's pay
in advance, paid down on the capstan-head. The ship
was a nice comfortal:)le craft, and was well found, and
well provisioned.' After a short consultation among
themselves, all but two or three of the men agreed to go.
Articles expressing the terms of the agreement had been
prepared, and each man came down to the cabin in turn
with his 'lady,' and signed, the latter receiving the
stipulated advance in money, or a note for the equivalent
from Captain Butcher.

It was near midnight before ever^^thing was arranged,
and the tug was lying uneasily alongside ; for the wind
had shifted to south-west, and was blowing in spiteful
squalls, with heavy rain. It seemed inhospitable to
turn the ladies out on such a night, but there was
no accommodation for them on board, and there were
reasons why the Enrica should not be found in Moelfra
Roads on the next morninsr. ^Yhile the Enrica was
still in Liverpool, it came to my knowledge that the
laiited States ship Tuscarora., Captain T. A. Craven,
had come up from Gibraltar to Southampton, some time
in the early days of July, and that she continued to
remain there, or in the near neighbourhood.

The nervous apprehension of the United States
Consul in respect to the Enrica was well known, and it
did not require much acumen to connect the presence
of the Tiiscarora in British waters with the supposed
character and probable destination of the former vessel.
Arrangements Avere made with a judicious friend at
Southampton to keep me informed of the Tuscarora\s
movements, and I had received almost daily advices.
Just before leaving the Woodside landing-stage in the
tug with the men and women, a telegram was handed

VOL. I. 10

242 THE ^KCHET SERVICE OF THE

me, Avhicli contained the announcement that tlie
TuKcarora had left Southampton, and it was believed
that she had gone to Queenstown. Manifestly we were
watched, and some one had put Captain Craven on our
supposed track. It seemed so clear that he would
touch at (^ueenstown for news, and then lie off Tuskar,
or somewhere in the channel to intercept the Enrica on
her way to sea, or follow her out by the usual route,
that T determined to go ' north about.' I had already
consulted with Captain Butcher and our excellent pilot,
3Ir. George Bond, on that point: both had agreed that it
Avas the best course, and Bond knew that route as
well as the other.

After the tug left us the Aveather grew worse. By
1 a.m. it was blowing hard from south-west, and
raining heavily. It was not an opportunity such as a
prudent seaman would choose to leave a safe roadstead
and venture into the Irish Sea, but the circumstances
appeared to j ustify the move; indeed, I thought them
imperative. At 2.30 a.m. (31st), we got under weigh,
and stood out of the bay under steam alone. At 8 a.m.
the ship was off the Calf of ]\Ian, the sky clearing and
wind dropping. We set all sail to a middling fresh
breeze, and bowled along 13^ knots, good. By 1 p.m.
the wind fell light, and we lost the effect of the sails ;
at noon passed South Rock, and steered along the coast
of Ireland. At 8 p.m. entered between Rathlin Island
and Fair Head. At 6 p.m. stopped the engines off the
Giant's Causeway, hailed a fishing-boat, and Bond and I
went ashore in a pelting rain, leaving Captain Butcher
to proceed with the Enrica in accordance with his
instructions.

During the evening it rained incessantly, and the
wind skirled and sniffed about the ji'ables of the hotel in

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE . 243

fitful squalls. Bond and I sat comfortably enough in
the snug dining-room after dinner, and sij)ped our
toddy, of the best Coleraine malt ; but my heart was with
the little ship buffeting her way around that rugged
north coast of Ireland. I felt sure that Butcher would
keep his Aveather-eye open, and once clear of Innistrahull,
there would be plenty of sea-room ; but I could not
wholly shake off an occasional sense of uneasiness.
Bond gave me the exact distances from point to point,
from lio;ht to lio'ht, and havino- been tau£>'ht at school to
work up all sums to very close results, I made the
average speed of the Enrica to have been 12*89 from
]\Ioelfra to the Giants' Causeway, and felt well satisfied
with the performance. The next morning, x4.ugust 1st,
Bond and I took a boat and pulled along the coast to
Port Hush. The weather was beautifully fine, and the
effect of the bright sun and the gentle west wind was so
exhilaratino; that I felt no further solicitude about the
Enrica. From Port Rush we took rail to Belfast, and
then steamer and rail via Fleetwood to Liverpool, where
I learned that the Ttiscarora had come off Point Lynas
on the 1st, and then looked into Moelfra Bay, but
found nothing there to engage her special attention.

I cannot dismiss Bond without a passing tribute ; I
came to know him well durmg the war, and for
years afterwards. He was one of those men who
perform every office of life with earnestness and
zeal ; who never complain of too much labour, or
too little reward ; whose conversation is without
covetousness, and who always seem content with the
things that are present. His j)Osition was not elevated.
He began as a river and channel pilot, and ended
his career as m'aster of the Clarence Dock in Liverpool ;
but there was something in the heart and eye and

16—2

244 THE SECBET SERVICE OF THE

manner of the man "wliich gave an importance and
dignity to his em})lojment above its seeming con-
sequence. We meet such men occasional!}' in what are
called the humble walks of life, and they make labour
honourable. After his short cruise in the Enrica,
it would have been useless for me to attempt any
special mystery' in dealing with him ; but he never
asked an inquisitive question, and if it w^as necessary to
give him any information, I never doubted that his lips
would hold it as a sealed envelope.

AVhen it became manifest that the Enricd must be
sent awa}' from Liverpool, I telegTaphed the agents
who were loading the Agrippina to despatch her forth-
with, and sent up orders wdiich the captain was not to
open until all hands were on board and the ship was
practically off. On my return to LiverjDool, I learned
Avith satisfaction that she was clear of the Channel, and
that her cargo was complete. The two vessels were
thus safely on their Avay to the rendezvous — that quiet
little bay on the east side of Terceira, whose inviting
shelter I would not have known but for the necessity of
putting in there with the Fingal for water, which has
been mentioned in a previous chapter.

I have thought that it will be best, in the further
progress of this narrative, to give the actual official
reports, explaining each important event, which were
written at the time of the occurrence. This course mil
perhaps interfere with and interrupt the symmetry of
the narrative, but I cannot doubt that it will add to its
weight as a truthful imcoloured account of the various
enterprises, and it will only be necessar}- to fill in the
time between the dates of the reports with brief explana-
tory remarks. The instructions to the commanders of
the two vessels should come first in order.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 245

'London, July 28th, 1862.

' Captain, —

' You will proceed at once to sea with the
barque Agrippina, now under your command, and make
the best of your way to the bay of Praya, in the island
of Terceira, one of the Azores. . . .

' Your experience as a seaman renders it unnecessary
to give you special advice as to the care of your ship,
and you will of course use all proper precautions in
approaching the land ; but it is advisable to give you
some hints in respect to the anchorage at Praya and its
approach. The bay of Praya is open to the east, and
is easy and safe of access, there being no sunken rocks
or danger of any kind not visible to the eye. With a
leading wind, stand boldly in for the middle of the
bight until a small islet off the north point is in range
with the point of the mainland of the island itself ; then
haul up for the town, which lies in the northern cur\-e
of the bay, and anchor by the lead in eight to ten
fathoms water. With the wind from the westward you
can beat in by the lead, standing not quite so far on the
southern as on the northern tack, and bring up in, say,
eight to ten fathoms. You will be visited soon after
anchoring by a health officer, to whom you will simply
report that you are from London for Demerara, and have
put in for supplies. It is hoped that the steamer will not
be long behind you ; indeed, you may find her there. The
name of the commander of the steamer is Butcher. He
Avill have a letter to you with authority to take what-
ever cj[uantity of coal and other articles of your cargo he
may require, and we particularly desire you to give him
your best assistance, and afibrd him every aid in your
power to transfer what he needs from the Agrippina to
his own ship, and you will then proceed to any port he

246 THE SECHKT SEE J 'ICE OF THE

may direct, and land or deliver tlie remainder of 3-our
cargo. In foct, you are to consider all orders from the
commander of the steamer as being authorized by us,
with or without any other letter of advice.

' If any vessel is at anchor at Praya A\hen you arrive,
hoist 3'our number, and should she be your consort she
will show a white En<''lish ensio-n from the after shroud

O O

of the main rigging. If the steamer arrives after you,
she will, after anchoring, make this same signal of the
white ensiirn in the main rii>'2:inof, which you will
answer with your number, after which you can com-
municate freely, llelying with confidence upon your
integrity and willingness to carry out our wishes in the
prosecution of the voyage }'0u have undertaken, we do
not think it necessarv to i>ive you more minute direc-
tions in writing, but may find means to communicate
with you again before your departure fi-om Praya. Our
interests are so deeply involved in the adventure
entrusted to your management, tliat we Avill fully
appreciate your exertions to bring it to a successful
termination, and uj)on your safe return to England, we
will be happy to make you a substantial acknowledgment
for any extra exertions }-ou may make for the satisfactory
accomplishment of the voyage.

' We are, etc.
* Captain Alexander McQueen,
* Barque Agripphia.^

The above letter was ' signed by the registered o^mers.'

'Liverpool, July 30fh, 1862.

' Sir, —

' You will proceed to sea in the steamship Enrica,
now under your command, and taking the channel by
the Xorth of Ireland, will sliape a course for the bay of

CONFEDEBATE STATES IN EUROPE. 247

Praya, in the island of Terceira, one of the Azores. At
that place you Avill be joined by the barque Ac/ripj^intt,
Captain McQueen, to whom you have a letter, and who
will thenceforth be under your orders. As the Agrip-
pina is a sailing vessel, and may not be at the place of
rendezvous for a fortnight, it will not be necessary for
you to arrive ahead of her, and you will therefore econo-
mise your fuel as much as possible, making the passage
mostly under canvas. You have been informed of the
manner of signalling the Agrippina^ and when she joins
you, if the weatber permits, you will at once begin to
transfer her cargo to your own ship. The paymaster
has an invoice of her cargo, showing the contents of every
case and bale, so that there can be no confusion or delay.
All slops, clothing, and other articles in the purser's de-
partment you will please take on board first, and have
them placed in the store-rooms, directing the paymaster
to issue such of them as may l)e required by the men.

' Get the gun-carriages out of their cases and place
them in their proper places, the carriage for 8-inch gun
on the quarter-deck, and the one for the 7 -inch rifled-
gun immediately forward of the bridge. The carriages
for the broadside-guns place opposite the side-ports. The
cases containing the guns, being filled with small fixtures
and equipments, had better be left as you find them until
the Confederate States ofiicer who is to command the ship
arrives. The cases containing the shot can be opened, and
the shot put in the racks, each rack being so fitted as to
receive its proper shot. The shells you will place in the
shell-rooms, each in its proper box, the spherical shells in
the starboard, and the elongated shells in the port -room.
The pistols are in four small cases, made so that two of
them will fit into each of the arm-chests intended for
the quarter-deck. Put them in the chests as soon as

248 THE SECRET SERFICE OF THE

you get them on board. Fill the bunkers from the
coals on board the A<iripp}n(t^ and keep both vessels
ready for a start at short notice. Captain W. Semmes,
of the Confederate States Navy, is the officer who \\ ill,
I hope, A'ery soon relieve you. He will bring you a
letter fi-oni uie, and thereafter you will consider that all
my control or authority over the ship is transferred to
him. My private and official intercourse with you has
been such as to give me a high estimate of your personal
and professional ability, and as we have freely conversed
as to the management of the adventure 3'ou have un-
dertaken, I do not think it necessary to give you written
instructions as to the simple care of the ship.

^ You are to consider yourself my confidential agent,
and I shall rely upon 3'ou as one gentleman may upon
another. If you have an opportunity at any time, send
me a line, and get out of the reach of the telegraphic
stations as soon as possible. I do not anticipate that
you will meet with any interruption in making the
transfer of cargo, but an easterly gale may force you to
get the Acp-ippina out of Praya Ba}^, in which case you
can tow her under the lee of the island and lie by her
until the weather permits you to return. In such a
contingenc}' leave a letter Avith her ^lajesty's Consul,
directed to Captain J. W. Clendenin, saying where you
have gone, and that you will soon be back.

' It is important that your movements should not be
reported, and you will please avoid speaking or signalling
any passing ship.

' Wishing you a successful cruise, and hojjing to see
you soon in good health,

' I am, etc.,

' (Signed) James D. Bulloch.

' Captain M. J. Butcher.'

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 249

'Liverpool, Jithj -ISth, 1862.

' Sir, —

' Yoii will join the Confederate States steamship
Alabama (^Enrica) temporarily under the orders of
Captain M. J. Butcher, and proceed in her to sea. The
Alabama may have to cruise several da3^s in the British
Channel, and to touch at one or two ports. During this
time you are strictly enjoined not to mention that you
are in any way connected with the Confederate States
JSTavy, but you will simply act as the purser of a private
ship.

* In this capacity you will keep account of all
money paid out, and you will assist Captain Butcher in
any manner he may desire. You have been provided
with an invoice of everything now on board the Alabama,
as well as the cargo shipped on board the barque Agrip-
pinay which vessel you will meet at the port to which
the Alabama is bound. The invoice of the Agripjnnas
cargo gives the mark and number of every case and
bale, the contents of each, and the ])^tI of the vessel in
which it is stowed. You will endeavour to make your-
self fully acquainted with the invoices, and examine the
store-rooms, so that you w^ill be able to give efficient
aid in getting everything in its proper place when the
transfer of stores is made.

' When the Alabama is fairly at sea you will mix
freely with the " warrant and petty officers," show in-
terest in their comfort and welfare, and endeavour to
excite their interest in the approaching cruise of the
ship. Talk to them of the Southern States, and how
they are fighting against great odds for only what every
Englishman enjoys — liberty! Tell them at the port of des-
tination a distinguished officer of the Confederate States
Navy will take command of the ship for a cruise, in

250 THE SECUET SEEFICE OF THE

Avliicli they will liave tlie most active service, and be
Avell taken care of. I do not mean that you are to make
the men set speeches, or be constantly talking to them,
but in your i)osition you may frequently throw out to
leading men hints of the above tenor, which will be
commented upon on the berth -deck. Seamen are very
impressionable, and can be easily influenced by a little
tact and manao'ement.

' When Captain Semmes joins, you will at once report
to him, and act thereafter under his instructions. He
will be a stranger to the ship and crew, and will be in a
])osition of great responsibility and embarrassment.
You have it in your power to smooth away some of his
difficulties in advance, especially in having all the stores
and cargo of the ship in an orderly state, and the men
settled and well-disposed, and I confidently rely upon
your exertions to brino^ about such a state of thing's.
You will consider yourself as temporarily under the
orders of Captain Butcher, in whom I place great con-
fidence, and by strict attention to your duties and the
displaj' of zeal and judgment in their execution, you
Avill evince a just appreciation of the trust reposed in
you, and will prove that your appointment to so im-
portant a post has been deserved.

' I am, etc.,

' (Signed) James D. Bulloch.
' Acting Assistant-Paymaster C. R. Tonge.'

The foregoing letters, together with the statement
which immediately precedes, sufficiently describe the
despatch of the Alaharivi and her tender. It will be
perceived that the Alahanui left the Mersey without any
portion of her armament, and without any stores ' con-
traband of war.' The official report of the Surveyor of

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 251

the Customs to the Collector at Liverpool, dated July
30th, 1862, contams the followmg paragraph:

' I have only to add that your directions to keep a
strict watch on the said vessel have heen carried out,
and I ^\Tite in the fullest confidence that she left this
port without any part of her armament on board. She
had not as much as a sio^nal-o-un or musket.

' (Signed) E. Morgan,

' Surveyor.'

I got back to Liverpool from the Giants' Causeway
on August 3rd, and immediately posted the following
hasty despatch to the Secretary of the Confederate Navy
by the Nassau closed mail :

'Liverpool, September 3rd, 1862.

' Sir,—

' For the last fortnight the United States officials
in this country have used every possible means of in-
ducing the British authorities to seize, or at least to
forbid the sailing of the Alabama. Spies were em-
ployed to watch the ship while lying in a private
dockyard, and affidavits were made that men had ac-
tually been enlisted by me to serve in the Confederate
States Navy.

' This charge, although perfectly unfounded, for I had
been very cautious not to violate any English law, gave
me much uneasiness, and learning on Tuesday last from
a very reliable source that the Government might not be
able to resist much longer the importunities of the
American Minister, I determined to get the ship out of
British waters, and therefore went to sea in her myself,
very unexpectedly, on Wednesday night. The United

VOL. I.*

252 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

States ship Tuscarora was known to be on the look-out,
but favoured by thick weather, Avhich enabled me to get
quickly clear of stations from which our movements
could be telegraphed, she was dodged, and I have just
returned to this place, having left the Alabama well clear
of the Irish coast, while the Tuscarora still remains on
the look-out off Queenstown, as the telegraph reports.
I have but a moment to mention this fact, as the Nassau
closed mail leaves, or rather closes, in an hour. ... I
am in receipt of a letter from Captain Semmes, and from
its contents hope to see him here in a day or two. The
Nassau mail is safe, even though it passes through New
York, and letters can be forwarded from Nassau by
private hands through the agents of Messrs. John Fraser

and Co.

' I am, etc.,

' (Signed) James D. Bulloch.

' Hon. S. R. Malloiy,

' Secretary of the Xavy.'

Not lono- after the above date the Confederate ag-encies
at Nassau, Bermuda, and Havana were so well organized
that there was no difficulty in sending reports by the
British mails via Halifax and New York to either of
those places, and the agents forwarded them to the Con-
federate ports by the best class of blockade-runners. It
is quite astonishing how few letters from the regular
official agents of the Confederate Government in Europe
fell into the hands of the enemy. The agents at the
islands practised great caution, and put their official
mails in the hands of safe messengers, who destroj^ed
them when capture seemed inevitable. There was often,
of course, much dela}", Avhich caused embarrassment, but
I never learned that any letter addressed by me to the

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 253

Secretary of the Confederate Navy at Richmond ever
found its way to Washington instead, although lists of
captured correspondence were frequently published in
the New York papers.

I began now to look anxiously for the arrival of
Captain Semmes, and knowing that he had left Nassau
in the steamship Bahama, I arranged with the owners
of that vessel to charter her for a voyage back to Nassau,
and the purpose was that she should take Captain
Semmes and his officers to the Alabama at Terceira.
Some extra stores and two additional 32-pounder guns
w^ere got read}- to be shipped by the Bahama, and Free-
mantle, who was with me in the Fingal, and a few good
men were picked up to go also, ostensibly for Nassau.
At the last moment about thirty men were induced to
take passage in the Bahama, the plea being that they
were to join a vessel at an outport.

The following extracts from my two next reports to
the Secretary of the Navy will suffice to close the ac-
count of the outfit of the Alabama, and the beginning
of her career as a Confederate cruiser.

'Liverpool, August \Wi, 1862.

' Sir, —

' I have already informed you by letter, as well
as by private messenger, that the Alabama is safely clear
of British waters, and that another vessel, with her
battery and ordnance stores, had previously sailed for a
concerted rendezvous. I have now the satisfaction to
report that Commander Semmes, wdth his officers, has
arrived here, and wall sail to-morrow in a steamer
chartered for the purpose, to join the Alabama. It has
been deemed advisable that I should o-o with Commander
Semmes as far as the rendezvous, to smooth away as

2oi THE SECRET SEUVICE OF THE

much as possible his embarrassments and difficulties in
assumini^- the command of an entirely new ship with a
strange and untried crew. My absence Avill not be
prolonged beyond one month, and I have arranged all
otlier business so that there Avill be no delay or inter-
ruption in the progress of other work. As soon as it
would be safe to allude to the movements of the
Alabama in detail, you shall have full accounts. . . .
Suffice it for the present to say that the United
States Consul .... has not been able to prove any
violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, or of her
Majesty's Neutrality Proclamation. . . .

' It will give me the greatest satisfaction to know that
Commander Semmes is fairly afloat in the Alabama,
and confident of his ability to do good service in her, I
will watch with pride her coming success, although I
cannot overcome the feeling of disappointment I expe-
rienced when first informed that I was not to command
her myself. The papers necessary to show all the plans,
equipment, etc., of the ship are too bulky to send by the
means now offering, but you shall have all these points
as soon as possible. . . .

' I am, etc.,
' (Signed) James D. Bulloch.

' Hon. S. R. Malloiy,

'Secretary of the Navy.'

'Liverpool, September 10th, 1862.
' Slli, —

' I have the honour to report my return to
England after a short cruise to the Western Islands,
Avhere I had gone with Commander Semmes to see him
fairly afloat in the Alabama. You have been already

CONFEDERA TE ST A TES IN E UROPE. 255

informed that I had taken the Alabama out of British
waters, and leaving her off the north-west coast of
Ireland, had returned to Liverpool to prepare a ship for
the conveyance of Commander Semnies and his officers
as soon as they arrived. The battery and ordnance
stores, with a quantity of men's clothing and general
supplies for a cruising ship, with 850 tons of coal, were
despatched from another port of the kingdom in a sailing
vessel bought for the purpose, and the two vessels
were ordered to rendezvous at Praya, in the island of
Terceira.

' Captain Semmes arrived from J^assau on the 8th of
August, and on the 13th I sailed in the steamship
Bahama with him and all his officers for the previously
selected rendezvous.

' In seven days the Bahama reached Praya, and we
had the satisfaction to find the Alabama and her consort
at anchor in the bay. It was now Wednesday, August
20th, and no time was lost in commencing the transfer
of stores from the tender to the Alabama. Favoured
by Providence with mild calm weather, we met with no
interruption, and the work progressed so briskl}" that at
10 a.m. on Friday, the 22nd, the last gun of the battery
was mounted, the powder and shell all stowed, sliot in
their racks, and, in fine, the tender was discharged.
The remainder of the day until 10 p.m. was occupied in
coaling, at which time the " main-brace was spliced," and
the hammocks piped down, the Alabama — so far, at least,
as related to her equipment — being ready for action. On
Sunday morning (the 24th), the Alabama and Bahama
steamed slowly off the land, and when beyond the
marine league which was covered by the jurisdiction of
Portug-al, our own national colours were hoisted for the
first time at the Alabama s peak, welcomed by three

256 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

cheers from the united crews of both vessels, lso^y
came the business of shipping the men formally for the
Confederate States service, making out their allotment
tickets, arranging their accounts, etc. This could be
done leisurely, for we were on the high seas, beyond the
reach of Foreign Enlistment Acts and Neutrality
Proclamations, the most annoying foes we have to
contend with on this side of the Atlantic.

' By twelve o'clock at night all these matters were
arranged ; the two steamers stopped their engines, and
bidding Captain Semmes a cordial adieu, with heartfelt
2)rayers for his success, I stepped over the jilahama.s
side. . . . Commander Semmes has written you enclosing
crew-list, etc., and for further information I beg to refer

you to his report. . . .

' I am, etc.,

'(Signed) James D Bulloch.

' Hon. S. E. Mallory,

' Secretary of the Navy.'

There were some minor adventures attending the
equipment of the Alabama at Terceira which Captain
Semmes has narrated in his very full and interesting
history of his cruise. To repeat them here would be
superfluous. ]\Iy official reports were usually brief and
concise, often written in great haste, and there Avas
neither time to describe incidents of ordinary interest,
nor would they have been suited to appear in official
documents.

Captain Butcher returned with me in the Bahama to
Liverpool. We parted company shortly afterwards and
did not meet again for many years. I have already
given my estimate of Ca])tain Butcher's qualities, and as
his name will now disappear from this narrative, I take

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 257

pleasure in sa3diig that his conduct up to the last
moment was confirmatory of my first impressions.
He carried out his instructions with zeal and intelli-
gence, and when the Bahama arrived at the rendezvous,
we had the satisfaction to find that he had already
broken bulk on l^oard the Ar/rijipma, and had transferred
a portion of the stores and some of the heavy weights
to the Alabama, and had thus lessened the subsequent
labour, and shortened the time of our detention at
Terceira.

The whole story of the building and equipment of the
Alabama has now been told, perhaps with unnecessary
detail, but that ofli'ence may be pardoned, in considera-
tion of the misapprehensions which have heretofore
prevailed, the many misstatements which have been
made with reference to her orioin, and the obligfation
resting upon me to tell the whole truth, if I ventured
to come forward as a witness at all.* Some of the
statements respecting the departure of the Alabama
from Liverpool require to be especially controverted and
explained. It has been said that she ' escaped by a
ruse,' and that an offence was committed by taking her
away without registration, and Avithout a clearance at
the Custom House. The effect of registry in England
is to entitle the ship to wear the British flag, and
to assume the privileges of British nationality ; but the
law does not positively require an owner to register his
ship.'l' Disabilities and disadvantages are, however,
incurred by the failure to register, and thus the law may

* That the Alahanuo left Liverpool wholly unarmed is proved by
the Report of the Surveyor of Customs, See note, Chapter II., p. 69.

t The law in respect to clearance and registration was altered in
1867, and the above remarks have reference to the law as it stood
in 1861—1865.

VOL. I. 17

258 THE SECnET SERVICE OF THE

be said to j^ractically enforce registration in all cases of
Britisli ships employed in trade to and from the United
ICingdom. When, however, a vessel is built in England,
and is sent abroad for sale or for delivery to a previous
purchaser, there is no violation of law, and no penalty is
incurred, if she is sent away without a register.

The requirement to take out a clearance at a British
port is purely for Customs purposes : (1) to obtain
statistics of the quantity and description of merchandise
entering and leaving the United Kingdom; and (2) to
})rotect the revenue in the following particular. Ships
taking on board, out of bond, such goods as are liable
to import duty if consumed in the countr}', are allowed
an exemption if the goods are intended for use during
the outward voyage, or for final export, and before
a clearance can be effected the Customs authorities
require satisfactory proof that the goods of that class
stated to be thus shipped are really kept on board
and carried away. In the year 1862, and I believe
until 1867, when the law was changed, no legal penalty
Avas incurred by a vessel if she left a Britisli for a
foreign port without a clearance, provided she was in
ballast, and had no stores on board except such as were
exempt from duty, or had paid dut}'. I took legal
advice on both the above points, and was fully instructed,
besides wliich, I Avas furnished with specific examples
of ships that had previously gone away direct from the
hands of the builders, without registration or clearance.
The Alabama Avas in ballast, and had no goods or
stores on board that Avere not either free of import
duty or had paid duty. She lay in a public dock for at
least a fortnio-lit. She Avas broug'ht out of that dock
in open daylight, and lay a night and part of two
days in the river. She then got under AA'eigh in a busy

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 259

part of the day, when the whole neighbourhood was
awake and active, and went to sea with colours flymg.

There could hardly be a movement less like a
clandestine ' escape,' and it has been shown that there
was no violation of law. But it may be and has been
said, that the party of guests, and the dressing with
flags, were intended to convey the impression that
the departure was not final, and that the ship would
return. If the charge of ' escaping by a ruse ' is
founded upon those lawful and innocent proceedings,
there is no occasion for much concern about it. I
have never learned that the ethics of war forbid the
practice of a ruse to deceive an enemy.

Not a single false statement was made with the
purpose to mislead those having authority to make
inquiries. N^o trust was betrayed, no confidence
violated. The Foreign Enlistment Act, the Merchant
Shipping Act, the Customs Regulations, were carefully
examined, and in the opinion of experts none of them
were transgressed, and no one has ever been indicted or
made to answer in a court of law for his conduct in any
matter concerning the building or despatch of the
Alabama, although the parties implicated were at the
time, and continued to be, resident in Great Britain.

Officers of her Majesty's Customs had been closely
w^atching the ship. They were on board the very morn-
ing of her departure, and were satisfied that there were
no arms or ammunition in the ship, and no goods except
such as were free or had paid duty. The ' so-called '
ruse was not intended to deceive them, but to mislead
the United States consular spies, who I knew were
ready to make any affidavit that might be considered
necessary to eff'ect a seizure of the sliip for violation of
the Foreign Enlistment Act.

17—2

260 THE SECRET SEllVICE OF THE

It was furthermore said tliat the departure of the
Ahihama from the Mersey was ' hastened b}' the illicit
receipt of intelligence of the decision of the British
Government to stop her.' In the ' Comiter Case ' pre-
sented on the part of the Government of her Britannic
Majesty to the Tribunal of Arbitration at Geneva, this
statement is disposed of by pointing out that the report
of the law officers w^as not made mitil the 29th of July,
and therefore no decision had been come to when the
Alabama left, early on the morning of that day ; but the
defence is set up that even if ' it had been so. the British
Government could never be held responsible for the
treacher}' of some unknown subordinate, who may have
become informed of their decision or may have anticipated
that it would be made.'

The statement referred to above is rather in the
character of an insinuation than a charge, because it
could not have been proved b}^ any direct evidence,
unless the alleged informer had been driven by a re-
proving conscience to confess his treachery. On the
other hand, it cannot be proved to be false by any other
evidence than a direct and cate^'orical denial. It is not
my office to defend, or explain, or to palliate the conduct
of the British Government in any particular, but per-
manent officials, and especially the subordinates in the
various departments, are in no way responsible for a
policy, but only for the manner in which their specific
duties are performed, and I feel it incumbent upon me
to declare that no officer, high or low, in any department
of the Government, did ever convey to me, or to anyone
w^ho afterwards repeated to me, a word or a hint which
led me to anticipate what the action of the Government
would be, or w\as likely to be, in any pending case.
Althouo'h the Confederate Commissioners were not

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 261

officially recognised, and therefore could have no diplo-
matic intercourse with the Government, it is well known
that outside official circles they were received with very
marked and gratifying cordiality, and it is probable
that through private friends Mr, Mason could and did
have very favourable opportunities of learning the
general, and in some instances the specific, purposes of
the Government. Whatever he learned that had any
bearing upon our naval operations was always repeated
to me without delay, and the information thus received
often proved to be correct, although it was gathered
merely from conversation with those who were accus-
tomed to observe the conduct of Ministers and to draw
their own conclusions, and not from the statements of
any persons who were in a position to know the actual
purposes of the Government.

But in the j)articular case of the Alabama the signs
that something serious was about to happen were too
visible to escape notice. The numerous statements and
affidavits sent to the American Minister by the Consul
at Liverpool were necessarily drawn up in legal form,
and required the employment of solicitors. I cannot
say whether there is, or is not, a species of magnetic
sympathy between attorneys, or whether they have any
special devices for finding out each other's ways, but I
do know that my own solicitor managed to find out the
particulars of some of the affidavits, and although they
Avere inaccurate in the affirmations which were at all
specific, yet some of them contained allegations which
he thought would at least induce the Government to
detain the ship for investigation.

Besides this, the Foreign Secretary, pressed by the
United States Minister to take some action, referred
the affidavits to the Commissioners of Customs, and

VOL. I.*

262 THE SECllET SERVICE OF THE

directed them to inquire and report. For a fortnight
before the departure of the Ahibama inquiries came in
showers from the collector, sometimes delivered in
person by the surveyor or his subordinates, sometimes
in the form of written memoranda. The inquiries were
mostly addressed to the builders of the ship, and often
referred to matters of which they knew nothing, and so
could give no reply. My solicitor got possession of one
of the lists of questions, and it lies before me now while
I am writing. Almost every inquiry could have been
answered by a direct and positive denial of the truth of
the allegation ; but at the same time it was possible,
perhaps probable, that the Government would not be
satisfied with denials, however categorical and exj)licit.

It must be manifest from the foregoing resume that
there was good reason for hastening the de])arture of the
Alabama, and I trust it will be now admitted that the
information which caused the somewhat precipitate
movement came to those concerned in it, not by any
treachery or breach of trust, but in a very simple,
regular, and ordinary w\ay.

The collector of the Port of Liverpool at that time
was a Mr. S. Price Edwards. The official documents
2)nblished in the proceedings before the Tribunal of
Arbitration prove, it seems to me, that Mr. Edwards did
his duty faithfully — in fact, zealously. On the 21st of
July, 1862, eight days before the sailing of the Alabama,
he appears to have written to his superiors in London
informing them that the ship was quite ready for sea,
and might sail at any moment, and he asked to be
instructed by telegraph if the intention was to detain
her.*

* Extract from a letter addressed by the Collector of Customs,
Liverpool (Mr. Price Edwards), to the Commissioner of Customs,

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 263

Wlien it was known that the Alabama was off, and
all chance of seizing her had vanished, great annoyance
and chagrin was felt at the United States Consulate and
among the resident Americans Avho were in sympathy
with the Federal Government. This feeling of disap-
pointment was shown in many ways — among others, in
harsh and ungenerous insinuations against the integrity
of the local authorities, especially against Mr. Price
Edwards himself, who was even accused of having been
paid for shutting his eyes.

]\Iany months afterwards I met a gentleman at the
house of a friend, and we engaged in conversation for
some time, neither knowing who the other was. Later
in the evening we were joined by our host, who intro-
duced us. There was a mutual expression of surprise,
for the parties were Mr. Price Edwards and the writer.
Mr. Edwards asked me if I was aware that he had been
accused of takino; a bribe from me for lettin"; the Alabama
go. I replied that I had heard some indefinite insinua-
tions of the kind, but had not given them much heed.
He affected to be equally indifferent, but I learned from
other sources that he had been deeply pained, and that
he never wholly recovered from the feeling of mortifica-
tion produced by such an unfounded and gratuitous
aspersion upon his official integrity.

Subsequently Mr. Edwards fell into some difficulties
with the authorities at London in no way connected
with Confederate affairs, and was removed from his
office. I never knew the cause of his removal, but I
met him some time afterwards. He appeared much
broken in health and greatly depressed in spirits, and

London, dated July 21, 1862 : * I shall feel obliged by the Board being
pleased to instruct me by telegraph how I am to act, as the ship
appears to be ready for sea, and may leave at any hour she pleases.'

264 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

not long after I learned that he had j^assed beyond the
reach of such ' ills as flesh is heir to.' I am glad to
have it in my j^ower to free his memory from the stain
which may have clmig to it in respect to the ' escape ' of
tlie Alabama, although it is hardly probable that any
survivino- relative will know that it has been done.

There is just one more disclaimer that I feel in some
sort impelled to pronounce in this connection. I have
said that no public of&cial, either principal or subordinate,
ever gave the faintest hint of the purposes of his superiors
in respect to the seizure of Confederate ships. I can
also affirm, without the least mental reservation, that no
2)roposition, or suggestion, or promise of reward, was
ever made to an employo of the Government Avhich
could have tempted him to swerve in his loyalty, or to
turn one hair's -breadth from the straight line of his
dut}', and I never saw or heard of anj^one who appeared
likely to be accessible to such temptations, had they
been put in his Avay.

When I parted fi*om Captain Semmes off the island of
Terceira, it was arranu'ed that I should send out the
Affrippina to him with a cargo of coals and certain other
supplies, and the barque was ordered to Cardiff' to load.
This arrano'ement was carried out successful Iv. Semmes
met his tender at St. Pierre, in the French island of
^lartinique, from which place he despatched her to Blan-
quilla, a small island off the coast of A^enezuela, where
he took from her a supply of coal, and then sent her to
the uninhabited Areas Cays, oft' Yucatan. Here he
took the remamder of the coal and stores, and sent the
barque to Liverpool, proceeding himself to look after
General Banks's expedition against Galveston.

Semmes' hope was to catch the troop- ships and
transports en route, and to make a dash in among

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUBOPE. 265

tliem. He wrote me from Areas Islands, January 4,
1863 :—

' I have filled up with coal a second time from the
barque, caulked the spar deck, overhauled and set up
rigging, and shall sail again to-night on another foray
against the enemy. My ship is getting in good order,
and I have nearly a full crew, having added twenty-five
men to the eighty-five that I brought with me from
Terceira, and they are pretty well drilled at the guns.
It is not unlikely that before I get out of the Gulf of
Mexico I shall " put up " something, as this is a sort of
"close sea" of the enemy, swarming with his cruisers.
After leaving the Gulf I shall carry out the Secretary of
the Navy's suggestion as to my cruising ground, and
about which we (you and I) have consulted.'

In the same letter Semmes asked me to send the
Agri]?pina to him again, first to the island of Fernando
de Noronha, with instructions to wait there three days,
and if he did not arrive to go on to Bahia. The expec-
tation that he would ' put up something ' before he got
out of the Gulf was realized. He did not get among
General Banks's transports, but he went oft' Galveston to
look after them, and found there a powerful squadron
under Acting Rear- Admiral H. H. Bell, who sent two
or three of his ships to meet the approaching stranger
and brino; her to an account of herself.

Semmes ran slowly off" shore, and drew one of his
pursuers after him. When he found that the others did
not follow, he waited until just at nightfall, when the
enemy closed. There was a hail and a reply, then two
quickly succeeding broadsides, and a sharp engagement
of thirteen minutes, a cessation of the firing on one side,
and a hail to report the vessel sinking. The hail was
not from the Alabama, but it suspended her fire, and

266 THE SEC BET SERVICE OF THE

her boats were soon busy picking u}) the crew of the
United States ship IFattcrds.

It was a creditable performance for the lirst effort of
a hastily improvised cruiser with a green crew, to sink
an opposing ship in thirteen minutes in a night engage-
ment, and then to pick up every man who had not been
killed or mortally wounded in the action. On the other
side, I take pleasure in saying that Lieutenant-Com-
manding H. H. Blake showed commendable spirit and
courage in boldly running down upon a ship which he
suspected to be the Alabama, and therefore knew was
his superior in armament and general efficiency, when
he had distanced his consorts and could expect no sup-
port from them.

The Hatteras was an iron paddle- steamer, bought out
of the mercantile marine. Her engines were much
exposed, and were of the ' top-lever,' or ' walking-beam '
type. The armament of the Hatteras was four 32-
pounders, two Parrot 30-pounder rifles, one 20-pounder
rifle, and one 12-pounder howitzer — total, eight guns.
The armament of the Alabama was six 32-pounders,
one 8-inch smooth-bore gun (112 cwt.), and one
100-pounder Blakely rifled gun. The crew of the
Hatteras was 108 men, that of the Alabama 110.

I do not describe the eno:a2:ement in detail, because
the reports of both commanders are on public record,
and every incident has been minutely related in ' My
Adventures Afloat,' by Admiral Semmes. There is no
doubt that the Alabama was the superior ship, and
barring an accident, or one of those unexpected chances
which sometimes occur in contests between single
vessels, and upset all calculations, she ought to have
won, and the loss of his shiji was no disgrace to the
conmiander of the Hatteras.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 267

The Agripjjina "was not a clipper. She made a long
passage from the Areas Islands to England, and sprang
her foremast in a gale before getting into the ChanneL
She was refitted and despatched as quickly as possible,
but this time the arransfements failed. Semmes touched
at Fernando de Xoronha, and then went on to l>ahia,
but not finding the tender at either place, he coaled
from the shore, and proceeded on his cruise to the
Cape of Good Hope, en route for the China Sea. The
Alabama left Bahia on the 22nd of May, 1863, and the
Afp-ippina- arrived there on June 1st. Semmes was
a little impatient to get away. He had done much
damage to the enemy's commerce on the great ocean
highway off the north-east coast of Brazil, and began to
think that the neio-hbourhood could not remain safe
much longer. He wrote me from Bahia, May 21st,
1862:

' I have coaled from the shore, and as the authorities
are hurrying me off, I have appointed another ren-
dezvous for the A(/npprna. If you hear anythmg of
my violating the neutrality of Fernando de Noronha,
contradict it i?i limine, as being an invention of the
enemy. We are having capital success. That " little
bill " which the Yankees threaten to present to
our Uncle John Bull, for the depredations of
the Alabama, is growing apace, and already reaches
$3,100,000.'

When the Agrippina arrived at Bahia, Captain
McQueen found there two United States ships, the
Mohican and the Onirard. The United States Consul
had suspected another British ship then in port of
having stores on board for the Alabama, and had
advised the commanders of the United States ships
to capture her if she should leave the port. Captain

268 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

^IcQueen soon learned that his vessel had also attracted
the notice and suspicions of the United States Consul,
and he learned that the Onicanl was especially on the
watcli for him. In this dilemma he consulted her
]\Iajesty's Consul, who told him that he ha<l not a
shadow of doubt that if he went outside the Onward
Avould capture him, and he would be sent before a
United States prize-court.

Captain ]\Ic(^ueen waited for some time in great
perplexity, being most anxious to comply with Captain
Semmes' instructions, but the Onward remained also on
the look-out for him, and escape from her was im-
possible. Finally he applied again to her ^Majesty's
Consul, M'ho advised him to sell his cargo and take
a fi'eight for England, a proceeding which would protect
him from capture, and would be the best possible
arrangement for his owners. The Consul did not, of
course, know of the Arjrippina s connection with the
Alabama, whatever the general belief at Bahiamay have
been, and his advice was given in the ordinary course of
his duty as the guardian of British interests, the
Agrippina being a duly registered British ship. Captain
]\Ic( iuecn acted upon it, and to satisfy the owner that all
was right, he brought home a consular certificate,
which alleged that ' Bahia had been for some time
virtually blockaded by the United States ships Mohican
and Onward!

The Agrippinas homeward freight amounted to £437
15s. 3d. She was too well known to be used for
the Confederate service again, and was sold, after some
delay, for a purchaser did not readily offer. Her original
cost was £1,400, and she fetched at auction £860. The
service she had rendered was more than comj^ensation
for the loss, but it was evident that the expense of

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 269

providing a permanent tender for each cruising sliiji
was more than the Confederate Treasur}^ could bear, and
besides this, I perceived that the probabilities of bringing
the two together at distant and varying points, where
they could communicate and make the transfer of stores
safely, did not justify the labour and expenditure. The
Alabama was therefore left to look out for herself,
and I felt no great concern, because I was confident
of her qualities and fitness for the work she had
in hand. I knew that she could supply herself Avith
provisions and various other wants fi'om prizes, and the
' cruising fund ' was sufiicient to meet the requirements
of fuel. Her commander writes of her thus :

' I was much gratified to find that my new ship proved
to be a fine sailer under canvas. This quality was of
inestimable advantage to me, as it enabled me to do
most of my work under sail. She carried but an
eighteen days' supply of food, and if I had been obliged,
because of her dull sailing qualities, to chase everything
under steam, the reader can see how I should have been
hampered in my movements. I should have been half
my time running into port for fuel. This would have
disclosed my whereabouts so fi'equently to the enemy,
that I should have been constantly in danger of capture,
whereas I could now stretch into far-distant seas, and
chase, capture, and destroy, perfectly independent of
steam. I adopted the plan, therefore, of working under
sail in the very beginning of the cruise, and practised it
unto the end. With the exception of half-a-dozen prizes,
all my captures were made with my screw hoisted and
my ship under sail.*

The foregoing extract from ' My Adventures Afloat,'
by Admiral Semmes, is confirmatory of what I have
said in an early chapter respecting the suitable tyj)e for

270 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

a Confederate cruiser ; and the opinion I lield at tlie
beo'inninii; of the war was maintained to the end, and
deterred me from Luring any of the ordinary war-ships
with non-lifting screws, or any of the wooden ships
with insnfficient sail power, which private parties de-
sirous to make commissions were constantly pressing
npon me.

The Alabama, it will be perceived, Avas commissioned
on the high seas, and she never entered a Confederate
port. This was always a sore point with Mr. Seward,
the United States Secretary of State. He never ceased
to call her a pirate, nor to press the British Government
to seize her, even after she had been commissioned as a
man-of-war under the Confederate fla"'. The tone of
his despatches on the subject was not couched in such
language as is commonly used by statesmen accustomed
to diplomatic usage. His petulant complaints often
gave offence, and brought upon him rebukes and retorts
which must have been wounding to the national feeling
in the United States if they were ever printed in the
Congressional documents.

The European Powers having acknowledged the
existence of a de facto Government at Eichmond, that
acknowledgment carried with it the concession of all
belligerent rights. Wy the determination to acknowledge
the Confederate States as belligerents, England, among
other PoAvers, bound herself to extend the same privi-
lesres to Confederate cruisers as to those of the United
States ; and it was not only discourteous, but it was
highly impolitic in ]\Ir. Seward to taunt foreign Govern-
ments with precipitancy in the recognition, and then of
harbouring ' piratical cruisers.'

I suppose there can be no princij^le of international
law plainer than this, namely, when a ship is once com-

CONFEBEBATE STATES IN EUEOFE. 271

missioned by a ^cognised de facto Government, no other
Power can inquire into her origin or antecedents.

The process of commissioning a ship is for the duly
appointed captain, with his staff of officers, to take charge
of her, read his commission, and hoist his pennant and
the national colours. When these formalities have been
complied w^ith, no foreign Power can question the
character of the ship, or enter upon any inquiry as to the
place where she was commissioned. The British autho-
rities could ask the commander of a Confederate cruiser
for a sight of his commission, and if that was in order,
no further inquiry was admissible.

I^o European or other neutral Power questioned the
foregoing premises during the late Civil War, and it is
not therefore necessary to mention any precedents from
their history of vessels commissioned abroad or on the
high seas.

Cooper, in his ' N^aval History of the United States,'
supplies many examples of vessels which were bought,
armed, equipped, manned, and almost exclusively
officered abroad and by foreigners, and which were then
commissioned by the American Government and sent to
cruise against English commerce, and to foray upon the
British coasts, without previously entering an American
port. As one case is sufficient to establish the prece-
dent, I will just mention that of a fine fast English
cutter bought at Dover by an agent of the American
Commissioners in France. She was taken across the
channel to Dunkirk, where her name was chano-ed to the
Surprise. She was fully equipped, officered, and manned.
The Commissioners filled up a blank commission signed
by John Hancock, President of Congress, and handed it
to one Captain Gustavus Conyngham, who went to sea
from Dunkirk on the 1st of May, 1777, and on the 4th

272 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

captured the English packet Prince of OrniKjc. Captain
Conyngham took his prize into Dunkirk, the neutral
port from which lie liad sailed only a few days before.
The English ]\Iinister remonstrated, and the French
Government seized the Surprise, imprisoned Captain
Conyngham, and took away his commission ; but the
American Commissioners at Paris found means to obtain
his release. They bought and fitted out another cutter
at Dunkirk, which was called the Bevenge, and Captain
Conyngham was recommissioned to her. The ReveiKje
sailed from Dunkirk on July 18, 1777, and captured
many British vessels. Some she destroyed ; the most
valuable she sent into Spanish ports. Fenimore Cooper
says that the Surprise and Revenge were spoken of in
the accounts of the day as privateers, but that they were,
as a matter of fict, bought and equipped by agents of
the Diplomatic Commissioners of the United States.

Commodore Paul Jones fitted out his ship, the Bon-
Jiomme Richard, in a French port. His crew, picked up
chiefly at Xantes, are thus described by Cooper : ' A
few Americans were found to fill the stations of sea-
officers on the quarter-deck and forward, but the
remainder of the people were a mixture of Irish, Scotch,
Portuguese, Norwegians, Germans, Spaniards, Swedes,
Italians, and Malays,' etc. The Commissioners stationed
in France at that time, and who conducted the naval
operations of the American Congress abroad, were
Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, and John Adams,
eminent men, who Avould have indignantly repurhated
the charge of piracy against their improvised cruisers,
and 3^et no agent of the Confederate Government ever
took such liberties with neutral rights, or with the laws
of nations, as they did.

In regard to the right to commission a ship on the

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 273

high seas, I will refer to but one case, recorded also in
Cooper's ' Naval History of the United States.' Com-
modore David Porter made a famous crnise among" the
English whaling- fleet in the Pacific during the war of
1812-15, in command of the United States ship Essex.
One of his prizes being armed and well suited for cruising,
he manned her, partly from his own ship, put his first-
lieutenant, John Downes, in command, and com-
missioned her as a United States ship-of-war, naming
her the Essex Junior.

In view of these and other well-known examples
recorded in the naval histories of England as well as the
United States, Mr. Seward's continued harping upon the
' foreign origm ' of the Alabama seemed puerile to the
representatives of the various Powers to whom he
addressed remonstrances on the subject. However, the
Florida, although she went into a Confederate port, and
was officered, manned, and recommissioned there, was
also called by the generic name of ' pirate ' in all the
official correspondence of the United States during the
war ; and so it appears that, in Mr. Seward's opinion,
deeds done by the de facto Government of the revolted
colonies in 1777, or by the more formally recognised
Government at Washington in 1812-15, were just and
lawful acts of war, but that similar acts done by authority
of the de facto Government of the Confederate States in
1862 were ' criminal ' and ' nefarious.' The Surprise,
fitted out, armed, and manned at Dunkirk, might with
propriety capture a British vessel four days after she
had left the neutral port ; the Essex Junior, a captured
prize, might be lawfully commissioned by a United
States officer, at some savage island in the Pacific, and
then sent to prey upon British whalers ; but the
Alabama, carrying the commission of a de facto Govern-

VOL. I. 18

274 THE SECnET SERVICE OF THE

ment, recognised as a belligerent Power by ever}''
civilized nation, was a ' piratical rover ' unworthy of
shelter or assistance, but fit only to be pursued and
destroyed as a common enemy and a common pest.

Let us hoj^e, if we can, that there will be no more
wars, foreign or domestic ; but Mr. Seward has done
much by the pretensions he set up during the great
contest of 18G1-65 to embarrass the United States
whenever they may be again placed in the position of a
neutral or belligerent.

The Alabama left Liverpool on the 29tli of July,
1862. She was commissioned off the island of Terceira
on the 24th of August, and she kept the sea almost
incessantly for two years. During that period she was
rarely in harbour, and never long enough to effect a
thorough and satisfactory overhaul of rigging, hull, or
eno-ines. She was kept wdiile cruising chiefly under sail,
with screw up ; but she Avas purposely taken to the
crreat thorou2:hfares of American marine traflic, to those
well-known points towards which the trade of the
world converges, and where it was reasonable to expect
United States ships would be sent to keep guard.
Hence she was in constant expectation of having to ran
or to fight. Any morning's light might find her close
to an enemy's ship, and prudence required both a sharp
look-out and constant readiness. Her engines got rest,
but her boilers none. The fires were never allowed to
go wholly out, but were banked ; and the water was kept
in such condition that steam might be quickly got.
The chief engineer has told me that he rarely had an
opportunity to cool the boilers and clean flues and
pipes.

A great portion of her cruising was in the tropics,
although she faced every vicissitude of climate. The

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE.

'Sio

icy fogs of the Newfoundland Bank, the steaming
moisture of the equatorial belt, the burning sun of
Malacca and the China Sea — all these in turn, and in
quick succession, served to test her endurance. The
wear and tear of such a cruise, such a lengthened period
of restless activity, with no means to supply deficiencies
or to repair injuries, except what might be found in
captured vessels, told upon the little craft at last, and
early in 1864 Semmes began to think of her require-
ments, and coming back round the Cape of Good Hope
into the Atlantic, he worked leisurely up through the
* paths of commerce,' capturing a prize now and then,
but finding few, for by that time the American
mercantile flag had well nigh disappeared.

The eff"ect produced upon the commerce and the
shipping interests of the United States by two or three
Confederate cruisers was a very striking peculiarity of
the late war. While the Alabama was in the China Sea
many American ships took shelter in the harbour of
Singapore and other ports, and were partly dismantled
and laid up at a time when trade was good, and there
was an active demand for tonnage to all j)arts of the
world. Semmes found on board a prize captured in the
Straits of ^Malacca a copy of the Singapore Times, dated
9th December, 1863, containing a list of seventeen
American ships, with an aggregate tonnage of about
12,000 tons, which were laid up at that port alone.

The Eight Hon. Milner Gibson, President of the
Board of Trade, made a speech at Ashton-under-Lyne,
January 20th, 186-1, in which he commented upon the
transference of the carrying trade fi'om American to
British ships. He stated that during the year (1863-4)
the number of British ships clearing had increased to
something like 14,000,000 tons, as against 7,000,000

18—2

276 THE SEC BET SERVICE OF THE

tons of all foreign tonnage inclusive, and he gave the
actual decrease in the emplo}'ment of American shipping
m the trade between Eno-laiid and the United States as
something like forty-six or forty-seven per cent.

^[r. ]\Iilner Gibson called particular attention to the
foregoing results as an example of what could be done
by two or three swift steamers, and commented upon
the injury inflicted upon the commerce of the United
States by the Confederate cruisers, as a warning to other
Maritime Powers of what might happen to them. But
I have always thought that the United States N^avy
Department showed either great apathy or was singularly
blind to the real danger to the commerce of the United
States, and strangely negligent in using the means to
protect it. The points of attack were so apparent that
it seems hardly credible that they were never oc-
cupied.

The whole traffic between the northern ports of the
United States and the Pacific, as well as with Brazil and
the states of the La Plata, passes through a belt of no
great width, which intersects the equator at about the
30th meridian of west lons^itude. American outward-
bound ships shape their course so as to leave the north-
east Trades near the above-named meridian, then work
their way through the equatorial ' doldrums,' and meet-
ing the south-east Trade-winds, they are forced, after
crossing the line, generally somewhat further west,
thus passing in sight, or very nearly in sight, of the
island of Fernando de Noronha. Homeward-bound
American ships from the East Indies leave the south-
east Trades at very nearly the same point, and those from
round the Horn and the La Plata or Brazil pass some-
times rather more to the westward, between Fernando
de Noronha and that portion of the South American

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 277

const which has its extreme eastern projection between
Pernambuco and Cape St. Roque.

If the United States had stationed a few ships to
cruise in couplets in the neighbourhood of the above-
named ' forks of the road,' as they have been called by
Maury, and a few^ more, say, in the Straits of Malacca, and
on the principal and well-known cruising ground of their
whaling-fleet, two or three Confederate cruisers could
not have remained for weeks in the track of passing
ships, capturing and destroying them without hindrance.

jSTeither the Alabama., Florida, nor Sumter was driven
from her work in any particidar latitude ; they shifted
their cruising grounds only when it seemed advisable
to seek fresh victims elsewhere ; and the Shenandoah
went round the world, sought out the great American
whaling-fleet in the North Pacific, and destroyed thirty-
eio'ht vessels without so much as seeino; a United States
ship-of-war.

It is not probable that any other Maritime Power
will leave its commerce at the mercy of light cruisers
of the Alabama type in a future war. In fact, a
fair amount of I^ritish trade could be carried on in
steamers capable of protecting themselves or of escaping
by their great speed, because the majority of the modern
steamers of the British mercantile marine could carry as
heavy guns as the cruisers that would be sent after
them, and they have very high speed.

On the 11th of June, 1861, the Alabama arrived at
Cherbourg. The purpose was to give her a thorough
refit, at least so far as the French authorities would
permit. Captain Semmes soon learned that the United
States ship Kearsarge., Captain John A. Winslow, was at
Flushing. On the 14th she came round to Cherbourg,
and Captain Winslow made a request of the local

278 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

autliorities that a number of prisoners landed from the
Alabama shouhl be permitted to join his ship. This re-
quest Mas refused, and the Kearsarge, Avithout anchormg,
went outside and took up a position off the breakwater.
It was not probable that she would leave the near
neia'hbourhood until the Alahama came out, and it was
necessary therefore for Captain Semmes to consider
whether he Avould complete his repairs, and then attempt
to avoid an encounter by going out on a dark night, or
whether he should go out openly and engage her.

The Kearsanie had some advantage in tonnage, and in
Aveight and size of scantling, and she was probably in
better condition generally. The effect of the Alabama's
long and actiA-e cruise has been mentioned aboA^e. Captain
Semmes, Avriting about two months before his arri\al
at Cherbourg, likens her to ' the Aveary foxhound, limp-
ing back after a long chase, footsore, and longing for
quiet and repose.' The Kearsarye, on the contrary, Avas
out in ]:)ursuit, and there is no reason to doubt that she
Avas fit for any Avork suited to her class.

The Alabama carried six 32 -pounder guns in broad-
side, one 8-inch smooth bore of 112 CAvt., and one 7-inch
100-pounder rifled gun (Blakely pattern) on piA'ots.
The Kearsarye mounted four o2-pounders in broadside,
tAvo 11 -inch Dahlgren guns piA'oted on deck, and one
28-pounder rifled gun, pivoted on the top-gallant fore-
castle. She had also a 12 -pounder hoAvitzer, A\diich Avas
used near the close of the action. The Alabama was
j^ierced for eight 32 -pounders, but Avas two short. How-
ever, by shifting one to the fighting side she could, and
in fact did, use six guns in the engagement against the
five Avhich the Kcarsarge fought.

In spite of the Alabama !< extra 32 -pounder in broad-
side, I think CA'ery professional man Avould say Avithout

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 279

liesitation that the battery of the Kearsarge was the
most efFective. She not only threw more metal in
broadside, but the larger calibre of her two chief pivot-
guns gave her a great advantage against a wooden ship.
I have not hesitated to point out, fairly as I think, the
particulars in which I consider the Kearsarge to have
been superior in condition and armament to the
Alabama. The conditions under which the engagement
was fought did not admit of any advantage being
gained on either side by skilful handling, neither ship
having sufficient superiority in speed to enable her
to take a raking position. The result of the action Avas
determined by the superior accuracy of the firing from
the Kearsarge. The damage she inflicted upon the
Alabama was more than sufficient to have destroyed
her, and inasmuch as the Kearsarge received no mortal
wound, and came out of the engagement with no
material injury, it is only a fair admission to say that
the result would probably not have been different under
the existing circumstances, even if the Alabama had
been a larger ship, and more powerfully armed.

The crew of the Alabama were in good discipline, and
were well drilled in the manual of the guns, but the
impossibility of replenishing the ordnance stores pre-
vented target practice, and the battery had never been
used with shot except in the short engagement with the
Hatter as, which was fought at very close quarters, and
a few rounds on one occasion fired at a prize, after
the crew were removed. The men, therefore, had not
been trained to judge of distances, and were wholly
without the skill, precision and coolness which come
only with practice and the habit of firing at a visible
object and noting the effect.

Captain Semmes took a comprehensive view of the

280 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

relative force and. condition of the two ships, and did
not think the disparity so great as to render success
hopeless. He thought of the cases in Avliicli a cliance
shot reaching a vital spot had disabled ships in previous
engagements, or had at least balanced the initial
disparity, and felt therefore justified in trying con-
clusions Avith his enemy, Avho it was quite apparent did
not intend to grant him a free passage out to sea.

Captain Semmes notified Captain Winslow, through
the United States Consul, that he would go out and
fight him as soon as he had finished coaling, and it
will not be doubted, that both ships made the best
possible preparations for the engagement. On the
morning of the 19th of June, 1864, at about 9.30, the
Alabama got under weigh, and steamed out of Cher-
bourg, passing to the westward of the breakwater. The
Kearsarge took note of her movement, and knowing that
there was no purpose to avoid an engagement, and
desirous to prevent any encroachment upon the neutral
rights of France, Captain Winslow turned his ship's head
off shore, and steamed to a distance of about seven
miles, followed by the Alabama. When it was quite
certain that both vessels were Avell bej^ond the ' line of
jurisdiction,' the Kearsarge turned her head in shore
and steered towards the Alabama. The two ships
approached rapidly, both Avere cleared for action, each
with her battery pivoted to starboard.

AVhen they were about one mile apart, the Alabama
sheered to port, showed her starboard Ijattery, and
almost immediately opened fire, the shot mostly going
high. The Kearsarge stood on until she had received
three ' broadsides ' from the Alabama,* the shot still
going high, and doing no damage except to the rigging.

* Captain "Winslow's ofl&cial report

CONFEDEBATE STATES IN EUROPE. 281

At about a thousand yards' distance, Winslow began to
be apprehensive of getting a raking shot, and he then
sheered to port, bringing his own starboard broadside to
bear, and opened fire.

The action now became active on both sides. Semmes,
conscious of the inferiority of his crew in gunnery, had
carefully considered the advantage he would gain by
fighting at close quarters, and his purpose was to get
within short range as soon as possible. Winslow,
ignorant of this intention on the part of his adversary,
pushed on at full speed to get in- shore of the Alabama,
hoping thus to prevent any attempt to return into
Cherbourg if he should succeed in disabling her. As
soon as the two ships passed each other, the Kearsarge
put her helm to port, with the object to pass under the
stern of the Alabama and rake her. To counteract this
movement and to keep her own broadside bearing, the
Alabama s helm was ported also, and the two ships,
keeping their helms to port, and steaming at full speed,
fell into a circular coiu'se, and continued the action
heading in opposite directions, in positions generally
parallel to each other, while steaming round a common
centre.

In about one hour and ten minutes after the Alabama
fired her first gun, she was found to be in a sinking con-
dition. The 11 -inch shells of the Kearsarge had made
several openings in her sides which it was impossible to
stop, and at every roll in the very moderate swell large
quantities of water rushed into her.

Semmes made an effort to reach the French coast by
assisting the engines with the fore-and-aft sails, but the
ship filled so rapidly that the fires were soon put out.
Meanwhile the Kearsarge steamed ahead, and keeping her
helm to port, she passed under the Alabama's stern, and

282 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

running calong her port-beam, finally got into a raking
position across her bow ; but by this time the Alahama
was so manifestly sinking that the fire of both ships had
ceased.

When Semmes discovered that his ship had got her
death wound, and that she was hopelessly settling under
him, he ordered the colours to be struck. There is
some discrepancy' in the reports of the two commanders
as to the cessation of the firing. Captain Semmes says
that the Kearsarge fired into him after his flag was down.
On the other hand, Captain AVinslow states that having
ceased firing, he received two shots from the Alahama s
port battery, which drew a return fi-om him. Xeither
captain, however, charges the other with a wilful default.
Semmes states the fact in his report, but in the comments
upon the action in his narrative of the cruise, he acquits
Captain AVinslow of any intentional violation of the
rules of humane warfare, and there can be no doubt that
the alleged exchange of shots after the surrender arose
from a mistake which is not without precedent in pre-
vious sea fights.

There was barel}' time to get the Alahama's wounded
men into the boats and despatch them to the Kearsarge.,
when the ship Avent down, and the officers and crew
were swimming for their lives. The Kearsarge did not
immediately send assistance. It appears from Captain
AVinslow's report that the boats were disabled, but he
managed, after some delay, to get two afloat, and they
picked up a few men.

Captain Semmes and the greater portion of his officers
and crew were rescued by two French fishing vessels
and the English steam-yacht Deerliound, owned by Mr.
John Lancaster. The French fishermen proceeded into
Cherbourg, and the Deerhound to Southampton, and the

CONFEDEBATE STATES IN EUROPE. 283

rescued officers and men were landed at those two ports
respectively.

The Alabama was so badly cut up m her hull that it
is doubtful if she could have been ao-ain refitted for
cruisino-, even if she could have been kept afloat long-
enough to reach Cherbourg. An officer told me the day
after the eno;ao;"ement that he thouo'ht a barrel mio-ht
have been passed through the hole made by an 11 -inch
shell at the gangway, and near the water-line. He said
one of the men, while sponging his gun, saw the hole,
and called his attention to it. He looked out of the
port, and when he saw the aperture and the rush of
water at every roll, he felt that the Alabamans last
moments were close at hand. It is not possible to tell
how many times the Alabama was hit, but it is quite
certain that she received many shot in her hull, more
than one of which contributed to her sinking.

The Kearmrge fired 173 shot and shell, apportioned
as follows : From 11 -inch guns, 55 shell ; from 32-
pounders, 18 shell and -42 solid shot ; from 2 8 -pounder
rifled gun, 48 shell ; from 12 -pound howitzer, S) shrap-
nel and 1 canister. She was struck twenty-eight times
by shot and shell in various places. One shell exploded
in her funnel, but except damage to some of her boats,
she was but little injured, and strange to say, she had
only three men wounded, none killed. The Alabama
had twenty-one Avounded and nine killed, and it is
believed that ten were drowned.

I have read with care the reports of the two com-
manders. They are creditable to the writers, and give
a fair, unpretentious account of the action, varying in
no essential particular. I have not described the action
with minute detail, because the official reports are on
record, and Captain Semmes has published a full ac-

284 THE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE

count of all the incidents a]i]iertaininii' to the enu'agement,
and the events which preceded and followed it. I feel
confident that I have given an impartial summary, and
I think it may fairly be stated that the Kearsarge was in
better condition and was more efficiently armed than the
Alabama ; but that she used her superior strength with
commensurate skill and effectiveness, and gained the
action bv the excellence of her o^unnery.

In mentioning the points it was proper for Semmes to
consider loefore determining whether he would be
justified in engaging the Kearsanje, I have said that he
took into account the possible occurrence of one of those
fortuitous chances which often produce very unexpected
results. It appears fi'om the details annexed to Captain
AVinslow's report that a shell from the Alabama's 7 -inch
rifled gun lodged in the stern-post of the Kearsarge, but
did not explode. A shijj's stern-post receives the 'wood-
ends ' of the planks which form the counter, and a vessel
could scarcely receive a shell in a more vital point, if the
shell exploded. I have been informed b}^ an officer,
who told me that he got the fact fi'om the first-lieutenant
of the Kearsarge, that this shell struck the stern-post
about fifteen minutes after the beoinnini*' of the enii-a^'e-
ment. If, therefore, it had not failed to explode, the
stern of the Kearsarge would have been shattered, the
wood-ends opened, and she would have foundered instead
of the Alaham,a. But without reference to time, if the
shell had done its work, the result would have been to
entirely change the issue of the action.

In all the remarks I have heretofore made with re-
ference to the relative strength and condition of the two
ships, I have compared them exclusively as two wooden
screAV-steamers, but it aj^pears from Captain Winslow's
report that, his ship being rather light, he had protected

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 285

her midship section by stowing the sheet chain-cables
outside. The chains were, it appears, arranged perpen-
dicularl}" from the water's edge, so as to cover the eno-ine
space, and they were concealed by a thin plank covering.
In fact, the Kearsarge over her most vital parts was
armour-plated, and this is an important consideration in
discussing the princij^les of naval warfare suggested by
this spirited engagement between two single ships pro-
pelled by steam.

Captain Semmes, in his rejDort, says that the officers
whom he sent to the Kearsanie with the wounded, in-
formed him that the covering boards had been ripped off
in many directions, and in some places the chains had
been broken and forced parrly into the ship's side by the
Alabama s shot and shells. It is manifest that if those
projectiles had found their Avay into that protected section
of the Kearsarge, the engagement might have had a
different result.

Captain Semmes also states, in the history of his
cruise, that the Alahaiims powder was defective, which
he attributed to the long time it had been on board, and
the exposure to so many varying climates. It seems to
me that there is some reason to accept the oj^inion that
the powder was defective, because the details accompany-
ing Captain Winslow's report mention that the Kearsarge
was struck twenty-eight times in various places about
the hull, but no damage is stated except the shatterino-
of two boats. When the firing became active, the ships
were about a thousand yards apart, and the distance was
gradually reduced to four hundred yards. At this
latter distance I think that the 100-pound elongated
shot and shells from the Alabama s Blakely rifled gun
would have carried the chain through the side of the
Kearsarge if they had struck uath the velocity due to the

286 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

power of the Aveajion. The powder on board the
Ahibama was manufactured and put up mto cartridges
especially for her by Messrs Curtiss and Harvey. I
do not mind mentioning their names, because they took
the order as an ordinary business transaction, and without
the slightest knowledge of the purpose for which the
ammunition Avas wanted. The quality at the beginning
of tlie cruise was perfect. Ca])tain Semmes has told me
that in the nio-ht eno-ao'ement with the Hatteras her sides
were all ablaze with the vivid light of the Alabama's ex-
ploding shells, and the sharp, quick, vigorous reports
gave proof of the purity and strength of the charges.

In reference to the action with the Kearsarge^ Captain
Semmes says : ' Perceiving that our shells, though
apparently exploding against the enemy's sides, were
doinof him but little damai^e, I returned to solid-shot
firing ;' and several naval experts who witnessed the
eno-asrement from the hills near Cherbouri^ have told me
that they were struck with the difference in the appear-
ance of the flame and smoke produced by the explosions
of the shells from the two ships. Those from the Kear-
sartje emitted a quick bright flash, and the smoke went
quickly away in a fine blue vapour, while those from the
Alabama exhaled a dull flame and a mass of sluggish
grey smoke. It is not unlikely that the effect of climate
and the long stowage on board had helped to deteriorate
the Alabama's powder, but I think the deterioration was
hastened and increased by a local cause, and by a
practice the ill effects of which were not suspected at
the time.

The internal arrano;ements of the Alabama were
designed to secure the largest possible space for essential
stores ; and as she had means of condensing, it was not
thought necessary to provide tanks for more than two to

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 287

three weeks' supply of water. The magazine was jjlaced
so that the top would be two feet and a half beloAv the
water-line, and the water-tanks, which were of iron,
were fitted on each side and in front of it, and were
carried up to the berth deck-beams, thus formino- an
additional protection. After the loss of the Alabama^ I
learned from the chief engineer that it was often the
habit to condense in excess of the quantity which the
coolin2;-tank held ; and that the boilins; water, almost in
the condition of steam, was often passed directly into
the two iron tanks on each side of the maixazine, and
in contact with it. I think this practice contributed
largely to the deterioration of the powder, and I have
thought it worth mentioning as an element in the case.

Taking a comprehensive and impartial view of all
the circumstances, I think it will be admitted that the
probabilities of success were in favour of the Kearsarge.
Captain Winslow was quite right in doing whatever he
could to increase the defensive power of his ship, and he
was not bound to inform his adversary that he had
encased her most vulnerable parts with chain- cables.
It has never been considered an unworthy ruse for a
commander, whether afloat or ashore, to disguise his
strength and to entice a weaker opponent within his
reach. The Kearsarge was well fought. Captam Winslow
reported the result in a clear, plain statement, neither
concealing nor exaggerating any circumstance that
would tend to enhance his own merit, or to depreciate
his adversary, if it were difi*erently told. Anyone
who reads his report and the accompanying documents,
and who is aware of the effect of her fire upon the
Alabama, will admit that the Kearsarge was in a state of
discipline and efficienc}^ creditable to all on board, and
to the United States naval service.

288 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

On the other hand, it seems to me that tlie Alabama
coukl not have won, except by the occurrence of a
fortuitous chance, such as the explosion of the shell
wliicli lodged in her enemy's stern-post. Captain
Semmes says that every man and officer behaved well,
and at the trying moment there was neither panic nor
confusion. Captain Winslow says in his report that
' the firing of the Alabama was at the first rapid and
wild ; towards the close it became better,' which proves
that her crew were steady and cool, and that the}'"
only lacked practice to make them effective gunners.

The fact that the Kearsarge was in some degree ' a
protected ship,' and that the Alabama was somewhat
inferior in force and general condition, besides having
defective powder, are circumstances which sufficiently
account for the result of the engagement. Nevertheless,
the principle, admitted in theory, that good guns, well
handled, are essential to success in naval warfare, found
a confirmation in the damage inflicted by the Kearsarge
upon her adversary, and the precision of her fire might
have given her the victory even over a much larger
ship, less efficient than herself in the above respects.

I hope there is nothing in the foregoing remarks
which will appear like a purpose to lessen the credit
due to Cajitam Winslow for the excellent performance
of his ship, or to press into undue prominence the
defects and inferiority of the Alabama.

I have not felt at all impelled to dwell upon Semmes'
especial merits, or to take the occasion of this particular
incident of his naval career to eulogise him. His defeat
did not change the estimate I had formed of his capacity.
If he had gained the victory it would not have added
to my appreciation of his abilities. As a mere sea-
officer under the ordinary requirements of the naval

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 289

profession, he was not especially distinguished. He
had neither the pliysique nor the dashing manner which
combine to make a showy brilliant deck officer, and
in the gift of handling a ship in fancy evolutions he had
no special excellence. But in broad comprehensive
knowledge of all the subjects embraced in a thorough
naval education, in tact, judgment, acquaintance with
diplomatic usage, and the requirements of international
law and comity — in the capacity to generalize and
to form plans, and in the latent nerve and mental
^'igour necessary to impress his views upon those under
him, and thus to carry them out effectively, he had
few if any equals in that service in which he passed the
greater portion of his life, and which he left in obedience
to a principle which was paramount with him, as it was
in the minds of many others of unblemished character
and unsullied honour, and who yet were classed together
with him under the generic appellations of ' pirate,'
' rebel ' and traitor,' in the political phraseology which
grew up and was disseminated from the State Depart-
ment at Washington.

Semmes managed the cruises of the Sumter and
Alabama with admirable skill and judgment. He
not only inflicted great injury upon the enemy, but
he did much to enlighten the authorities at the neutral
23orts necessity forced him to visit upon the true nature
of the war, and to remove the impression that Con-
federate cruisers were buccaneers, seeking only plunder,
and willing to grasp it regardless of the rights of
neutrals or the restraints of international courtesy. He
was often compelled to correspond with officials of high
position in civil service, as well as in military and
naval rank. He had often to act, not only as the
commander of a national ship, but as the diplomatic

VOL, I. 19

290 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

and consular agent of liis country as avcII. In all of
these trvino' positions he acquitted himself admirably.
Tlie local authorities perceived that he understood his
bellio-erent riirhts. l)ut also knew how to advance his
claims with "firmness and precision, without de]iartini2; a
hair's-breadth from the line of official courtes}- and
respect. He soon won the confidence of those with
Avhom he came in contact, and his shi])s were generally
received and treated in neutral ports with a kindly
consideration which was gratifying to liimself and
beneficial to the cause he represented. In fact, he
was capable of much more than sailing or fighting
a single ship. He had the faculties and the acquu'e-
ments which fit a man for high command, and if
circumstances had ever placed him at the head of
a fleet, I feel sure that he would have achieved im-
portant and notable results.

When the Alabama settled down to her final resting-
place at the bottom of the English Channel, and the
Kearsarge steamed away with flying colours to announce
her victory, it would seem that the pride of the victors
might have been satisfied, and their anger appeased,
after a little pardonable jubilation. But as the origin
of the famous Confederate cruiser gave rise to much
controversy, so likewise did the circumstances of her
death furnish a topic for discussion, carried on with
harsh and bitter petulance by Mr. Seward, and answered
with singular forbearance, but with a touch of sarcasm
and reproof, by Earl llussell. Captain Semmes and his
officers, having landed from the Deerhound at South-
ampton, were free to go where they liked ; but Mr.
Adams, the United States ^linister, soon sent in a
complaint to lier Majesty's Government and claimed
them as prisoners -of- war.

CONFEDEBATE STATES IN EUROPE. 291

Lord Russell was evidently more surprised than
vexed by this preposterous demand. In the official
reply he says : —

' It appears to me that the owner of the .Deerhoiind,
of the Ro^'al Yacht Squadron, performed only a common
duty of humanity in saving from the waves the captain
and several of the crew of the Alabama. They would
otherwise, in all 2^i'obal3ility, have been drowned, and
thus would never have been in the situation of prisoner s-
of-war. It does not appear to me to be any part
of the duty of a neutral to assist in making prisoners-
of~war for one of the belligerents,'

The answer to the above was written by Mr, Seward
himself, in a despatch addressed to Mr. Adams —
probably he thought Mr, Adams would be too mild, I
shall only quote one paragraph, wliich sufficiently
exhibits its general tone.'"'

' The Earl argues that if those persons had not been
so taken from the sea, they would in all probability
have been drowned, and they would never have been in
the situation of prisoners -of- war. ... I have to
observe uj3on these remarks of Earl Russell that it was
the right of the Kearsarfje that the pirates should drown,
unless saved by humane exertions of the officers and
crew of that vessel, or by their own efforts, without the
aid of the Deerliound.^

From ]\Ir. Seward's point of view they were pirates —
Jioste-^ Itumani generis. If, therefore, the}^ had been saved
by the ' humane exertions of the Kearsarge,^ it would
have been to meet the fate of hanging instead of drown-
ing— an alternative that would not have tempted them
to make much effort to get out of the water.

* See 'United States Appendix,' vol. iii., pp. 263, 273, and
'British Case,' p. 116.

19—2

292 THE SECL'JJT SEHVICE OF THE

The answer of the British Goveniiiient to Mr. Seward's
demand Avas ' that there is no obligation by international
law which can Ijind the Government of a neutral State
to deliver up to a belligerent prisoners-of-war who may
have escaped from such belligerent, and may have taken
refusre within the territorv of such neutral.' He adds
that they had been guilty of no offence against the laws
of England, and had committed no act which Avould
bring them within the provisions of a treaty between
Great Britain and the United States for the mutual
surrender of offenders, and states the following conclu-
sion : — ' Her Majest^^'s Government are, therefore, en-
tirely without any legal means by which, even if they
wished to do so, they could comply with your above-
mentioned demand.'

The grounds of Lord Russell's refusal were unques-
tionable, and his reasoning was unanswerable. Mr.
Seward must or should have known that the reply to
his demand could not have been different from what it
proved to be, and his motive in seeking the humiliation
of a refusal is inexplicable. But ]\Ir. Seward had fully
impressed his views and his spirit upon many of his
subordinates who represented the United States abroad
at that time, and especially upon Mr. Thomas H. Dudley,
the Consul at Liverpool, who manifested a bitterness of
temper, and practised a sharpness and asperity in lan-
guage and correspondence, and a recklessness in his
statements, which would have been aj^palling, but for the
conviction that public sentiment in Eurojie would revolt
against such jiretentious extravagance.

After the departure of the Alabama from Liverpool,
many communications were addressed by Mr. Adams to
the British Government dwelling upon her so-called
esca^^e, and the despatch of her armament from England.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 293

In one communication he enclosed a letter from ]\[r.
Thomas H. Dudley, dated January 11, 1864, in Avhich
that gentleman with the bitter temper and indiscreet
pen enumerated the circumstances affecting the Alabama,
which, he affirmed, proved her to be a ' British ship,'
nnd her acts ' piratical.' The above letter was referred
to the law officers of the Crown, who were asked to
advise whether any proceedings could be taken with
reference to the supposed breaches of neutralit}' alleged
by Mr. Adams and Mr. Dudley. The law officers
reported that ' no proceedings can at present be taken,'
but they could not let Mr. Dudley's uncivil assertions
pass without comment, and they closed their report Avith
the following remarks : — ' So far as relates to Mr.
Dudley's argument (not now for the first time advanced)
that the Alabama is an English piratical craft, it might
have been enough to say that Mr. Dudley, while he
enumerates everything which is immaterial, omits
everything that is material, to constitute that character.'
The law officers then demonstrate that the Alabama
is a public ship-of-war of the Confederate States,*
'and has been ever since she hoisted the Confederate
flag and received her armament at Terceira,' and they
close their report, or rather their ' opinion,' in these
words : — ' It is to be regretted that, in any of the discus-
sions on this subject, so manifest an abuse of language
as the application of the term " English piratical craft"
to the Alabama should still be permitted to continue.'

The law officers who gave the above ' opinion ' were
Sir Koundell Palmer, now Lord Selborne, who was
generally supposed to be partial to the Federal cause,
and Sir liobert Collier, who had been consulted b}^ the

•'■ Fdr opinion of the law officers quoted above see ' British Case,
p. 117.

294 THE SECUET SEL'FICE OF THE

solicitors of the United States Consul in reference to the
seizure of the Ahihanta before he received the apjioint-
nient of Solicitor- General.

Northern men often complained of the sympatliy ex-
hibited in some parts of Europe, and especially in
Eniiiand, for the Confederate cause. I have reason to
believe that at least five out of every seven in the middle
and up})er classes in England were favourable to the
South, and I confidently believe that the majority Avere
moved to favour that side by the haughty and offensive
tone assumed by many of the representatives of the
United States.

At the time of the rescue of tlie Alabama s drowning
men bv the Deerhound, manv harsh thinii's Avere said of
her owner, jMr. John Lancaster, in the diplomatic cor-
respondence of the United States, and high officials of
that GoA'ernment recklessly afiirmed that the Deerhound
Avas in collusion Avitli the Alabama, and that Mr. Lan-
caster had taken his yacht out to watch the engagement
under a covert understanding Avith Captain Semmes.

It is not probable that any American historian AA'ill
giA'e further currency to those statements. Mr. Lan-
caster proved to the satisfaction of her ^lajesty's Govern-
ment, and to all Avho read his published letter, that there
Avas not the slightest foundation in fact for the assertions
of the United States officials in respect to his conduct,
and he publich' offered to submit the Avhole of his j^ro-
ceedings to the yachtsmen of England for their opinion.
I Avould have made no mention of the foregoing incident
at all, except for the fact that it remains on record in tlie
printed papers in reference to the Confederate naval
operations, and it appeared necessary, therefore, to men-
tion the satisfactory and conclusive j^roof that tlie accu-
sations Avere not true.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 295

CHAPTER VI.

The Confederate cruisers and the Foreign Enlistment Act. — The
protest of the United States against the ' laxity ' of the British
Clovernment. — The answer of the British Government. — The Con-
federate States admitted to he belligerents by the Supreme Court
of the United States, and acknowledged as such by the European
Powers. — Debate in the House of Commons. — European recruits
for the United States Army in England. — Keview of the situation
of the belligerents in regard to neutral States. — The American
and the English Foreign Enlistment Acts. — The Alexandra Case. —
The Crown witnesses. — Conclusions to be drawn from this case. —
After-history of the Alexandra.— Other vessels searched at the
instigation of the United States Consul. — United States purchases
in England. — The Board of Trade Returns. — Messrs. Baring
Brothers and Co. and the United States. — Condition of the Con-
federates during the War.

A HISTORY of tlie efforts made, by the Confederate
Government to organize a naval force abroad would be
very incomplete if the narrative was limited to a mere
statement of the number and names of the vessels which
were bought or built in Europe and a description of the
arrangements which were made to effect their departure
from the neutral ports and to equip them as figliting
ships. It is well known that the few Confederate cruisers
which mav be said to have been of ' forei^'n orio-in '
created much greater disturbance, and excited far more
public interest, than their operations would have aroused

296 77//; SECnET SEE VICE OF THE

if they liad simply come out of the ports of one belli-
irerent, in the ordinary Avav, and liad inflicted a o-iven
amount of damag'e upon tlie otlier. They were the source
of very serious complaints and nuich diplomatic cor-
respondence between Great Britain and the United
States, and pages of ' Hansard ' are filled with the
reports of del)ates in reference to them in both Houses
of the British Parliament. They were the means of first
drawing serious attention to the Foreign Enlistment
Act, and caused the law ofiicers of her Majesty's
Government much trouble in ex[)ounding the meaning
of that somewhat ambiii'uous statute. Thev o-ave
occasion for a suit Avhich resulted in a judicial exposi-
tion of the Act, and a judgment which has never been
reversed, but which was so unsatisflictory to the United
States, who were the real plaintiffs, and also to her
Majesty's Government, who seemed desirous to satisfy
them, that a Royal Commission, composed of learned
judges and jurists and distinguished statesmen to the
number of thirteen, was ap])ointed to inquire into the
character, working, and effect of the laws of Great
Britain available for the enforcement of neutralit}^ ; and
finally, as everyone knows, they gave rise to so much
controversy betAveen her Britannic Majesty's Govern-
ment and that of the United States, in refei*ence to
international ris^hts and duties, that an ao-reement could
only be effected by means of a special treaty and a great
international arbitration. The diplomatic correspondence
has been long since published, and is accessible to all
who are interested in the subject.

The United States affirmed that the Confederate
Government had established a biu-eau of their Navy
l)e[)artment in England. They charged the Confederate
agents with wilfully and persistently violating the

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 297

municipal laws of Great Britain, and denounced their
acts as beino; ' criminal ' and ' nefarious.' Thev com-
jilained that her Majesty's Government was both lax
and slow in putting the la^\^ in operation, and that the
subordinate officers of the Cro'wn Avere wilfully passive
in executing the orders of their superiors. The answers
of the British Government to the complaints of the
United States are fully set out in the correspondence
and in the proceedings before the Tribunal of Arbi-
tration at Geneva. The merest synopsis of them would
require more space than w^ould be admissible in this
narrative.

The </ravame)/, of tlie charges was that the British
Government did not put the municipal law in operation
with sufficient promptness and energy to prevent the
acts complained of, and did not enforce the punitive
clauses with the rigour which the nature of the alleged
offences and friendly consideration for the United States
justified the latter Government in expecting. The sub-
stance of the answer was that the Government of Great
Britain was one of limited and legally defined powers,
and that its authority could, therefore, be exercised only
in subordination to law ; that when there was interfer-
ence liy the Government with the rights of persons or
property, redress might be immediately sought and
recovered, provided the Government could not maintain
its action, in a court of law. The Government could not,
therefore, seize vessels alleged to belong to the Con-
federate States, or arrest persons accused of violating
the law, unless there was sufficient iwimd fade evidence
to render a conviction probable ; and neither the
evidence obtained by the Government through their
own officers, or tendered by the United States Minister
and Consuls, was considered sufficient by the law officers
of the Crown to justify either seizure or prosecution.

298 THE SECUET SERVICE OF THE

One ship was seized, and the United States ofticials
exerted themselves to the utmost to provide evidence,
hut the prosecution failed, and her ^lajesty's Govern-
ment had to pay damages. It was furthermore contended
that acts prohibited by municipal law or by the orders
and proclamations of the Executive Government were
not necessarily prohibited by the law of nations, and
there was no obligation to use executive power harshly,
or in a manner at variance with the s})irit of the national
institutions, Avith no other purpose than to protect one
bellioerent a<>'ainst the other. In one of Earl Kussell's
despatches to Lord Lyons, the liritish Minister at AYasli-
ington, he says that a phrase used by ^h\ Seward in
describing the conduct of Great Britain ' was rather a
figure of rhetoric than a true description of facts ;' 'that
the Cabinet were of opinion that the law was sufficient,
but that legal evidence could not always be procured.'*
. . . ' That the British Government had done evervthinji'
in its power to execute the law ;' and that, in his belief,
' if all the assistance given to the Federals by British
subjects and British munitions of war were weighed
against similar aid given to the Confederates, the balance
would be greatly in favour of the Federals.' f Lord
Bussell added, however, that Mr. Adams, the American
^Minister, totally denied the foregoing proposition. In
this denial of Mr. Adams, we have the clue to the feelmg
wliicli aroused the temper of the United States, and
which caused Mr. Seward to put forward so many un-
reasonable complaints, and to use such strong and often
abusive language in referring to the acts of the Con-
federate Government and their agents.

One of the most important lessons to be learned in

* Earl Kussell to Lord Lyons, March 27, 1863.

t Parliamentary Docnment, 'North America,' No. 1, ISGi, p. 2.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. ■ 299

ordinary life in the management of everj-day affairs, is
that which teaches men to acknowledge and to submit
Avith dignity and patience to the consequences of an
' accomplished fact,' even though the result may have
disappointed their hopes and baulked their expectations.
The statesman whose temper will not suffer him to admit
that which is incontrovertible, whose faculties cannot
discern the difference between his own will and the in-
evitable fulfilment of events, who persistently and with
ever increasing warmth urges his own opinions and
])olicy against the adverse convictions of those who have
already scrutinized the question and pronoimced their
judgment, can hardly expect to control or direct public
sentiment successfully, or to make the cause in which
he is engaged acceptable to those not immediately con-
nected with him bv some common interest. The Cabinet
of Mr. Abraham Lincoln during the period of the Civil
War contained a number of able, energetic men, but
they never could bring their minds to acknowledge that
they were engaged in war with a de facto Government,
and they never could treat with complaisance the repre-
sentatives of those foreign Powers wdio ventured to act
upon the principle that the contest between the States
was a revolution and not an insurrection.

But the logic of facts proved too strong for them.
One of the first acts of the Government at Washington
for the suppression of the so-called rebellion was to
proclaim a blockade of all the Southern ports. In the
Proclamation, dated April 19, 1861, President Lincoln
stated that the blockade Avould be ' set on foot' ' in pur-
suance of the laws of the United States, and of the law
of nations in such cases provided.' The foreign Ministers
resident at AVashington innnediately requested infor-
mation as to the manner in which the blockade was to

300 THE SECnET SEBVICE OE THE

Ije enforced. To tlie liritish Envoy Mr. Seward gave
the assurance tliat it "would l)e conducted strictly accord-
m\X to the rules of public law, and with as much
liberality towards neutrals as any belligerent could
j^ractise. In reply to the ^Minister of Spain he wrote
thus : ' The blockade will be strictly enforced upon the
principles recognised by the law of nations.'*

The proclamation of blockade was limited at first
to seven specified States, but by the end of May it
Avas extended to all the principal ports of the Gulf and
Atlantic States, including; Yiro'inia. The Federal
cruisers soon began to make prizes of neutral ships
for alleged breach of blockade, and they were condemned
with very short shrift by the United States prize-courts.
Appeals were taken to the Supreme Court, and ]\Ir.
Justice Grier, giving the judgment of the court in
a test case, said :

' To legitimatize the cajiture of a neutral vessel or
property on the high seas, a war must exist de facto,
and the neutral must have a knowledge or notice of the
intention of one of the parties belligerent to use this
mode of coercion against a port, city, or territory' in
j^ossession of the other. . . . The proclamation of the
blockade is itself ofiicial and conclusive evidence to the
court that a state of war existed which demanded and
authorized a recourse to such a measure under the
circumstances peculiar to the case. The correspondence
of Lord Lyons with the Secretary of State admits the
fact and concludes the question.'

The Great Maritime Powers acted upon the foregoing

statements of Mr. Seward and the judgment of the

Supreme Court of the United States. They admitted

the legality of the blockade, and as a necessary and

* See ' British Case,' part ii., j). 5.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 301

legitimate consequence tliey acknowledged the Con-
iederate States as belligerents, and threw open their
ports to both parties on the same conditions and
under precisely similar restrictions.

Here, then, was an accomplished fact — ude facto war,
Europe refused to look upon the efforts of eleven great
commonwealths, whose entire population, to the number
of at least six millions of people, had united in asserting
their right to retire from a voluntary union, as a mere
insurrectionary opposition to an obnoxious Government.
The common-sense, as well as the philanthropy of
all nations, rejected the proposition to treat President
Davis, Lee, and Stonewall Jackson as common brawlers
or rebels, and the people of England especially could
not be persuaded to denounce Josiali Tattnall, who
towed the British boats into the Peiho, as a pirate, nor
could they cast that stigma upon the naval service
to which he belonged.

The acknowledgment of the Confederate Govern-
ment as a belligerent met with such unanimous con-
currence among foreign States, that it would have
been only an act of common courtesy, and of judicious
policy, to accept the judgment. But Mr. Seward could
not bring himself to a dignified acquiescence in the
common verdict. He indulged in repeated and petulant
complaints, and urged with vehement earnestness that
all the world should be subservient to his will, and
should re-fashion the code of public law to suit his
polic}-. It was a case of one sagacious juror against
eleven stubborn men who took a different view of
the criminal. What Mr. Seward wanted was that
Europe should permit the United States to remain
in the enjoyment of every privilege guaranteed by
treaties of peace, free and unrestricted access to the

302 THE SECUET SERVICE OF THE

ports, tlie right to buy arms and transport tlicm unmo-
lested across tlie sea, to eno-au'e men and forAvard tliem
to the battlefields in Virginia witliout question, and,
at the same time, that the Avhole Avorld sliould tolerate
a total suppression of trade with eleven great provinces,
and sutler the United States to seize ships on the
high seas and hale them before prize-courts, unless
they were protected by the certificate of an American
Consuh* He wislied to practise all the rights which a
state of war confers upon a belligerent, but begged to be
excused from performing the duties which attacli in
equal degree to that condition.

Tlie answer of the Great Maritime Powers was plain
and to the point. Substantially it was this : ' You may
be whatever you like — in a state of peace or in a
state of war. If the political agitation wliich disturbs
your country is a mere insurrection which you will
suppress in " ninet}^ f^'^^js," the result will be quite
aa'reeable to us: but meanwhile we must claim the riii'ht
to go into the Southern ports, and get the staples our
people want, and give in exchange the products of
our industry, which their people want. If, on the other
hand, j'ou cannot maintain us in our privileges of trade
with the South — if you cannot exercise jurisdiction
there, and can only enter tlie country with great armies,
which we perceive are often defeated ; if to restore your
authority it is necessary to resort to measures which are
only admissible when exercised as a belligerent right,
then by your own showing there is a state of war,
to which there are of necessity two parties, each of
whom must, by the common law of nations, have equal
rights and duties, and we must protect our status as
neutrals by seeing that neither party takes more than
* See Debate: Hansard, vol. clxx., 1863 (2), pp. 581, 582.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUBOPE. 303

he is entitled to receive, or exacts more than lie is
justified in demanding.'

; It will thus be seen that the outside world did not
originate the event or create the fact. Eighteen or more
great States, acknowledging a central Government at
Washington, were engaged in war Mith eleven other
great States adhering to a common authority at Eich-
mond. This was the actual condition of affairs. All
the special pleading of the politicians at Washington, all
the jines.^e of diplomatic reasoning, could not alter the
facts. Foreign Powers perceived the actual state of
affairs, and the Proclamations of Neutrality, and the
regulations specifying the conditions upon which their
])orts might be used, were framed in accordance with the
fact that there was a state of war between two separate
Powders, and although one could glory in the full-fledged
title of ' a Government de jure,'' and the other was
shackled with the more restrictive appellation of ' a
Government de facto, ^ yet in regard to belligerent rights
and duties they were placed on precisely the same footing
by the common consent and common action of the whole
civilized world.

In discussing the acts of the Confederate Government,
and the efforts made by them to obtain military sup-
plies and a few cruising ships in Europe, it is only fair
to call attention to the real position of the two belli-
o'erents in reference to the neutral Powers.

It has been often asserted in the diplomatic corre-
spondence of the United States that the agents of the
Confederate Government abused the hospitality and in-
fringed the municipal laws of the neutral States, espe-
cially of Great liritain. ' Criminal evasion,' ' nefarious
transactions,' and other cognate expressions, ^vere among
the milder forms in which their conduct was denounced

304 TEE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

by the United States Secretary of State and his consular
representatives. Those charges and those epithets liave
been preserved in the ])ages of ' Blue Books,' and remain
on record among the proceedings of the Tribunal of
Arl)itration at Geneva ; and there are many people in
En2'land even now "vvho think that there must have been
some clever evasion of the law, some illicit ' tip ' from a
sub-official, which made the so-called ' escape ' of the
Alabama and her consorts ])ossible.

If the charges and the epithets had merel}' been cast at
an individual agent they would be of little importance,
and it would hardly be worth while to intrude an ex-
planation or a defence into a narrative of this kind,
because an agent must be prepared to bear the conse-
quences of the policy he undertakes to carry out, and if
his principals have exacted from him the performance of
any acts which may, when stripped of rhetorical flourish,
be justly branded as ' criminal ' or ' nefarious,' he must
be content, if he has consented to retain his office, to
assume the responsibility and to endure the ignominy.
But I have shown in a previous chapter that it was the
jjrinciple as well as the policy of the Confederate Govern-
ment to practise a scrupulous and rigid deference to the
rights of neutrals and the municipal laws of those coun-
tries from which the}' hojied to draw supplies. ]\Iy o^vn
instructions were clear and explicit on this point, and I
am in the position to know that all orders issued b}- the
Confederate Government to agents and commanders of
cruising ships were of the same tenor. If, therefore,
the law of England was violated, or evaded in a criminal
desri'ee, the fault must be laid to the inadvertence or the
negligence or the wilfulness of the agent, and not to
the ])olicv of those in whose behalf he Avas acting.

Seldom is a man competent to take up a comjjlicated

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 305

Act of the British Parhament, or of any other Legislative
Assembly, and define its scope and the limit of its sense
and bearing upon his own conduct, especially when the
Act contains many clauses combining prohibitory, pre-
A^entive, and punitive enactments. What he is bound
to do, however, is to take due precautions, by consulting
experts whose office it is to examine and give opinions
on points of law, who are familiar with legal phraseology,
and are acquainted with the precedents and the previous
judgments of the Courts in cases which may have arisen
under the statute, so that he may escape danger of pro-
secution, and be free from the offence of misusing the hos-
pitality of the country which has offered him shelter and
protection. Those precautions were taken before a ship
was bought or built in England for the Confederate
Government, and the opinion of the learned barristers
whose advice was asked has been alread}^ given in a
j^revious chapter.* The only doubt that could be felt
in regard to the advice was that it was founded solely
upon the opinion of the eminent lawyers who gave it,
and could not be confirmed by any precedent or previous
judgment, because up to the year 1863 no ship had been
seized and brought to the test of a trial under the Act.

The Governments at Washington and at Richmond
stood at that time on a precise equality before the general
laws of nations, and the municipal law of each neutral
state. I mean, of course, with reference to their re-
spective rights and duties as belligerents. Whatever was
obligatory upon the one was equally binding upon the
other. Whatever the agent of one could do without
offence, the other could do also. The Foreign Enlist-
ment Act defined the limits to which each could go. It
laid down the precepts which each were alike bound to
* See chap, ii., pp. 66 — 69.

VOL. I. 20

306 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

olDey, and dcfinod tlic consequences of disobedience to
both without partiaUty or discrimination. If an agent
of the United States could perform any service for his
Government in England witliout infringing the law or
laying himself open to the charge of ' criminal evasion,'
an ao'cnt of the Confederate States mio'ht do the same or
an equivalent act with corresponding innocence and pro-
priety.

A member of Parliament — the late Mr. John Laird —
stated in the House of Commons that the Navy Depart-
ment of the United States opened negotiations with
the firm from which he retired at the beginning of the
Civil War for l)uilding a special class of ships. The
correspondence, or at least sufficient to establish the
fact, was read publicly before the whole House, and the
member referred to stated that while he felt bound to
suppress the names of the persons through whom the
negotiations had been proposed, he would, if it was
thought advisable, hand the whole correspondence, 'with
the original letters,' confidentially to the Speaker of the
House, or to the l^rime Minister, in order that the public
should have the assurance that he was not overstating
the facts. One of the extracts read to the House was as
follows : — ' I have this mornins; a note from the As-
sistant Secretary of the Navy, in which he says, " I
hope your friends will tender for the two iron-plated
steamers." '

It is proper for me to mention that in a subsequent
debate, about four months afterwards, Mr. Richard
Cobden stated that he had received a letter fi'om his
friend, Mr. Charles Sumner, of the United States Senate,
informing him that the Secretary of the United States
Navy denied that any order had ' been sent fi*om the
American Navy Department to any shipbuilder in this

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 307

coinitry ' (England). Mr. Laird did not assert tliat an
order had been sent, but that proposals had been made
and negotiations opened on the subject, and that the
firm to which he belonged at the time were asked if they
would undertake to build as desired, ' how soon, and for
how much.' In reply to Mr. Cobden, he said that ' he
was quite prepared, if necessary, to prove every word he
had said in a former debate was perfectly true ; and as
the question was one which affected her Majesty's
Government, he was ready to put his proofs (namely,
the original letters) in the hands of the noble lord at the
head of the Government.'

The debates referred to may be found in Hansard,
vol. clxx. Session 1863 (2), and vol. clxxii. Session
1863 (4). In the course of the latter debate the Prime
Minister (Lord Palmerston) said : — ' I cannot, in the
abstract, concur with my honourable friend' (Mr. Cobden)
' in thinking that there is any distinction in principle
between muskets, gunpowder, bullets, and cannon on
the one side, and ships on the other.' . . . ' Therefore
I hold, that on the mere ground of international law
belligerents have no right to complain if merchants — I
do not sav the Government, for that would be inter-
ference — as a mercantile transaction supply one of the
belligerents not only with arms and cannon, but also
Avith ships destined for Avarlike purposes.'

The negotiations referred to by Mr. Laird were aban-
doned for reasons not necessary to mention in detail.
The firm could not undertake the Avork on the condi-
tions as to time of completion, etc., and I do not knoAv
Avhether the United States made overtures to other ship-
builders or not. The naval resources of the United
States were so immeasurably superior to those of the
Confederate States, both in the supply of materials and

20—2

308 THE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE

the mechanical means for utilizmo- them, that the Navv
Department at AVashington did not probably feel any
anxiety on the score of ships. The chief supplies which
the United States drew from Europe were arms, accou-
trements, ammunition, and men. I say men, because it
is well known that large numbers of emigrants were
mduced to e'o to the United States durin"' the war under
implied promises or allegations that they A\'ould find
remunerative work, and the work supplied them after
arrival was that of bearins; arms in the United States
Army and helping to subjugate the South.

It would be easy for me to name persons of un-
questioned respectability in England, especialty in
Liverpool, wlio were well aware that bands of so-called
emigrants were constantly passing through Liverpool
and other English coast towns, en route for the United
States, often in charge of men who were known to be
agents of that Government. The diplomatic corres-
pondence demonstrates incontestably that a system of
' evasive enlistment ' for the United States army was
practised in Europe during the Civil War, and Con-
federate officers Avould have no difficulty in proving,
if there was any need, that whole battalions of Federal
soldiers were captured during the campaigns in
A^irginia, composed of men who had not been six
months in the country, and who could not speak a
Avord of English.

There were two cases in Avhicli public inquiry was
made as to the character of the passengers by American
ships about to leave Liverpool for New York. Li one
of the cases the piima facie evidence of a clandestine
enlistment was so strono- that the men were forced
to land. I could name the solicitors who were the
chief actors in the above mentioned cases. They are

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 309

one of the leading firms in Liverpool. I am not
repeating merely the current belief or suspicion that
prevailed at the time, nor am I affirming the existence
of a practice the proof of which rests upon such vague
evidence as is often tendered in the phrase ' it is quite
notorious.' Perhaps the subject is of sufficient import-
ance to justify, if not to require me to give a particular
example.

One day in the very height of the war, a gentleman
called at my office nnd told me that he had reason
to feel satisfied that a laro-e number of men would
arrive in Liverpool that afternoon, who were really
recruits for the United States army ; that they were in
charge of a person who he thought was a commissioned
officer in the United States Service ; that they were to
embark on board the American ship Great Western^
then lying in the river, and he thought I ought to take
some steps to bring the matter before the proper
authorities. I replied that my duties could only be
satisfactorily and successfully performed by a prudent
reserve, and by maintaining a retiring and unobtrusive
attitude. If I ventured into the arena of legal strife
with the American Consul, or with persons supposed to
ho. engaged in unlawful proceedings, I should necessarily
be forced out of my retirement, which I thought would
be more injurious to the interests of the Confederacy
than the addition of a few hundred men to the armies of
the United States.

My informant, although an Englishman, was a warm
partizan of the south. He admitted the soundness of
my reasons for not interfering, but was not satisfied to
leave the affair to take its course without some opposi-
tion. He went to a few others wdio w^ere known to be
'■ Southern sympathizers,' and they placed the evidence

310 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

ill the hands of a local solicitor, Avho communicated it to
the Customs authorities. The alleged facts "were
forwarded to London, and a junior solicitor of the
Customs was sent to investigate the case. I believe the
shi]) was detained one or two days, or at least her
clearance was held back. The solicitor of the Customs
who made the investigation re})orted that the evidence
of a violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act was not
sufficient to justify the arrest of any of the parties, and
the shi}) and her passengers were allowed to proceed.
The iicntleman who g^ave me the information went
on board with the solicitor he had consulted, and
he told me that the men, many of whom were Irishmen,
seemed to know that he and those with him were trying
to stop them ; but feeling safe from interference, the}'
chaffed and indulged in a good deal of rough humour,
and he furthermore told me that he saw a person on
board who was a cabin passenger, and appeared to
have charge of the men, and that he wore a military
dress, which some of the men told him was the
uniform of a lieutenant in the United States army.

Now, the foregoing incident would prove nothing if
there were no sequel to it, but in the winter of 1871 I
went to New York on a visit. I was stopping at the
house of a gentleman — a Xew Yorker, of high social
position. He had neither a military education nor
Avliat may be called the military instincts, and being a
man of great practical sense, with a sound j^erception of
the fitness of things, he did not seek a commission
in the army, and he was for too valuable a man to
be wasted in the office of carrying a rifle in the ranks.
But his temperament was too ardent, and his convictions
too strong, to admit of his remaining inactive in the
struggle, which he perceived was likely to be long and

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 311

arduous. There could not have been a man more
loyal to the United States, more willing to make greater
personal sacrifices for the success of the Federal cause.
I believe he did as much as any one to keep up the
spirit of the men in the field, and to animate the hopes
of the desponding who were not in the field ; and
liis services were as important and as conducive to the
final success of the Federal Government as those of any
man at the North who was not in high command, or in
some equally important civil executive ofiice. I could
say much of his personal cpialities, which made him
lovable by those who knew him well, but this is noplace
for a tribute of that kind.

The gentleman to whom I refer was firmly impressed
with the feeling that the neutrality of England was more
favourable to the South than to the North, but one of
his characteristics was to take fair and reasonable views
of other men's motives, and to express his own opinions
with moderation and courtesy. One day we were dis-
cussing the action of Great Britain, the eftect of the
Proclamation of Neutrality, and the manner in which
the municipal law Avas applied in restraining the
operations of the Confederate agents. He took the
ground that they Avere allowed too great latitude, and
that the British Government showed an unfriendly
feeling towards the United States in permitting the
Alabama and other ships to leave England. I, of course,
took an opposite position, and we argued the point in a
temperate and friendly spirit. I contended that her
Majesty's Government could not have stopped the
Alahama without acting arbitrarily, and going beyond
the limits of a fcir, impartial neutrality, and to demon-
strate that the preventive clauses of the Foreign Enlist-
ment Act were not applied very strictly against the

312 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

I'liited States, I cited the incident of the ship Great
Wefitcrn^ which I liave mentioned above.

^iy friend siuilL'd. He could be as reticent as anyone
Avhen there Avas necessity for reserve, but he was too
honest to shrink from admittin_i»- a fact, or to hedge
liimself behind a prevarication in a friendly argument,
lie left me, and went into another room. Fn a few
moments he returned, bringing a small package of ])a})ers,
filed and backed in voucher fcjrm, and then told me that
he had Ijeen, during a portion of the war, a member of a
committee whose office it was to look after men who had
been brought over from Europe without an}- definite
])ur])Ose on their own ])art, and who might therefore be
available as recruits for the army ; that lie had nothing
whatever to do with engaging tlie men abroad, and never
inquired what inducements Avere held out to them to
come over, but when they were safis across and Avere of
Avilling minds, the conunittee paid the expenses, etc.
' These papers,' he said, ' are the documents and vouchers
relating to that voyage of the Great Western you have
just mentioned. And the information upon Avhich your
Liverpool friend acted Avas probabl}' correct.'

We Avere both amused by this accidental discovery
of our common connection Avith a transaction eight
years after the event, and I Avas Avell satisfied to have
such a complete demonstration of the facility Avith
which the United States could and did recruit their
armies, Avithout infringing the l^ritish Foreign Enlist-
ment Act, because it confirmed me in the opinion I had
previously maintained, that the Act Avas not intended
to protect one belligerent from another, but to prevent
prejudice to Great Britain herself by acts done Avithin
the kingdom Avhicli Avould endanger its peace and Avel-
fare. Her ]\Iajesty's Government brought the subject

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EVllOTE. 313

of the alleo-ed enlistments to the notice of tlic American
Minister, and appeared to he satisfied with tlic dcichiration
that there had been none. The Confederate Government
had no recognised diplomatic agent to Aviiom inquiries
could he addressed, and who could make explanation,
and after the departure of tw^o or three ships the com-
plaints and remonstrances of the United States Minister
induced her Majesty's Foreign Secretary on more than
one occasion to seize and detain vessels in which the
Confederate Government had no interest whatever, or,
as the Attorney-General expressed it, to 'strain the law.'
I assert nothing more than the fact that the United
States, by means of authorized agents, did induce many
men to go from Euro])e to America during the war, the
intent being to enlist them into the army after their
arrival. I do not affirm that there was an actual enlist-
ment in any part of Europe, and the disclaimer of the
United States Mmister Avas no doubt justified. The ])ro-
cess was carried out thus : Able-bodied men wxre per-
suaded or stimulated by judicious representations to emi-
grate to the United States, and they were kindly looked
after and cared for on the journey to the ports and on the
voyage across the Atlantic by friendly intermediaries-.
There was nothing illegal in this. Iiifles, accoutre-
ments, and ammunition were bought at Birmingham and
elsewhere, and w^ere shi])ped through the great houses
of Baring, and Brown, Shipley and Co., to the United
States, in the ordinary way of business. There was
nothino' illefjal in that. AVhen the men and the arms
arrived in Xew York, or Boston, or Philadelphia, they
were brought together by a happy accident ; the emi-
grants were persuaded tliat it was a very fine thing to
be soldiers, they were dressed in the traditional ' blue,'
the equipment was conq)leted, and they were marciied

314 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

off to Yiroinia, to be shot down at Seven Pines and
Chancellorsville, or to perish by fever in the swamps
of the Chickahominy.

The Confederate Government did not require men so
much as arms. They were never able to equiji the
fighting population of the countr}'. They wanted, how-
ever, besides arms, ships suitable to cruise and to destroy
the enemy's mercantile marine ; and the manner of
accomplishing their purpose may be briefly described as
follows :

A ship suited in structure and general arrangements
to carry the weight of a battery on deck, to berth a
sufficient crew, and to keep the sea for a long time, was
bought or built in England. She was then desjjatched
to an outport without a weapon or an ounce of powder
on board, and with a crew just sufficient to navigate her
in safety. According to the best advice available, there
was nothing illegal in that transaction. Guns, cut-
lasses, revolvers, ammunition, and stores of all necessary
kinds, were bought in London, Birmingham, Sheffield
and elsewhere, and were shipped in due form, by a vessel
loading in the ordinary way, fjr the AVest Indies, or
other suitable market for such supplies. There can be
no doubt that this part of the transaction was perfectly
legal. The two vessels — one fit to bear arms, but
havmg none ; the other full of arms, but unable to use
them — shaped their respective courses so as to gradually
converge until, at some point far removed from British
jurisdiction, they found themselves in a fortunate con-
junction. The equijDment of the ship fit to bear arms
Avas then completed ; passengers or seamen from the
two vessels, and perhaps from a third, were persuaded
that they might have a jolly cruise, and they donned
the familiar and jaunty serge frock of the man-of-war's-

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 315

man, and ^xent to ' battle the watch ' and to take their
chances under the Confederate flag.

I think the foregoing sketches clearly and fairly
demonstrate the attitude of the two belligerents in
the late Civil War in respect to the British Foreign
Enlistment Act, and I should be much surprised to hear
anyone not biased by prejudice, or pledged in advance
to a particular assertion, say that there is a shade or a
shadow of difference between them, Avhether viewed as a
matter of principle or as a question of evading the law.

Xow that seventeen years have passed since the end
of the war, it is to be hoped that the passions which were
then aroused have sufficiently subsided on both sides to
make it possible for each to take a fair and equitable
retrospect of what the other did. I have met many
Northern men who were loyal to their Government,
who sacrificed their business and risked their lives in its
support, and who never did fall into the frenzied state
of bitterness which many of the political party leaders
manifested, and who never had any sympathy with the
violent and abusive language used by Mr. Seward and
some of his consular agents.

In tlie British counter-case presented to the Tribunal
of Arbitration at Geneva (p. 57), I find the follow-
ing paragraph, Avhich serves as an illustration of the
extreme pretensions set up by the United States, and
the eft'ect produced by the ill-advised complaints and
demands of their representatives. ' Pressed by the
difficulty of distinguishing between their own operations
in Europe and those of the Confederate States in such a
manner as to make it appear that the British Govern-
ment was bound to give free scope to the former and
repress the latter, the United States appear to imagine
that they found such a distinction in two circumstances.

316 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

One of these is, that the needs of the Confederacy were,
as thev alleo'e, more ur^'ent than those of the Union :
the former could only obtain their military supplies fi'om
abroad ; the latter could manufacture some of theirs at
liome.* The other is, that the United States, havino' the
command of the sea, could transport the goods pur-
chased by them freely and openly, or (as it is expressed)
'' in the ordinary course of commerce ;" whilst the Con-
federates were obliged to " originate a commerce for the
purpose" — that is, to get their goods transported by
way of Nassau and Bermuda, wliicli are commonly
places of no great trade — and further, to make use of
those concealments by ^vhich the traffic in contraband of
Avar, when not protected by a powerful navy, usually
tries to elude the vigilance of the enemy's cruisers. Are
we, then, to understand that, according to the views put
forward in the case of the Ignited States, the " strict and
impartial neutrality towards both l)elligerents/" which it
is the duty of a neutral Government to maintain, obliges
it to find out which of the two stands in the greater
need of supplies, and consists in lending aid, by
measures of repression, to the belligerent whose force is
the greater and his wants the less pressing of the two,
and thus assisting him to crush more speedily the
resistance of his w^eaker enemy ? Her jMajesty's Govern-
ment is unable to assent to this novel opinion, advan-
tageous as it would doubtless j)rove to States which, like
Great Britain, possess a powerful navy.'

The last sentence in the foregoing quotation is perti-
nent to a comment I have previously made upon the
pretensions set ujd and exacted by the United States
during the war. They advanced and Avere permitted to
enforce bellio:erent ri2:hts Avhich were strono'ly resisted
* 'Case of the United States,' pp. 310—312.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUllOPE. 317

when applied to themselves in former years, and thus
established precedents which will occasion much trouble
and perplexity to some future Government at Washino--
ton, if the United States should be neutral in a war
between two countries having powerful navies. It is
well known that the great autocratic and monarchical
Powers of Europe had shown a willingness for vears
before the American Civil War to relax the extreme
application of the belligerent rights heretofore claimed
by them, and relentlessly enforced whenever their in-
terests required. England, once so persistent and arro-
gant in practising the 'right of search,' has, during
many past years, taken a leading part in the effort to
modify the harsh restraints upon neutral commerce,
which she herself was formerly so ready to inflict, and
to abolish or prohibit the destruction of private property
on the high seas. The Great Powers who joined in the
Declaration of Paris in the year 1856, agreed to several
ver}' important rules which greatly relaxed the oppres-
sive restraints on neutral commerce in times of war.
The most beneficent provisions of that famous Declara-
tion were those which practically affirmed the doctrine
that ' free ships made free goods,' and which furthermore
exempted neutral goods from condemnation as prize, if
found in an enemy's ship. It is remarkable that the
United States, professing the freest and most liberal
institutions, and up to 1861 vehemently urging and
insisting upon the fullest immunity for their flag, should
have so suddenly made a retrograde movement in the
liberal policy of their past history, while even the auto-
cratic States of Europe were discarding their dictatorial
traditions, and were advancing in the path of greater
freedom to commerce, and less interference with the
rights and privileges of neutrals.

318 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

In the yeai' 18G3 Messrs. Pile, Spence aiid Co., of the
City of London, advertised a Hne of steamers to run
regularly between England and ^latamoras, in ^lexico.
The first vessel despatched on the line was the screw
steamer Gipsy Queen., which performed her voyage and
returned in safety. The second vessel was the Peter]iof\
also a screw steamer. The Peterhoff left London with
proper clearances from the Custom House, but for
greater precaution took a certificate of clearance from
the Mexican Consul. Li the due progress of her voyage
she arrived in the neighbourhood of the island of St.
Thomas, where she was stopped by a United States ship-
of-war and boarded. Her papers were examined and
endorsed with a statement that they were in order, and
she was then permitted to proceed on her voyage. Li
accordance Avith the original intention of her owners,
she went into St. Thomas, replenished her coal, and
sailed aorain for Matamoras. Just as she was lea vino* the
harbour of St. Thomas the United States ship Vnnderhilt
was coming in, and Admiral Wilkes, the senior American
naval officer present, ordered the commander of the
Yanderhilt to pursue her. He did so ; he captured her
and brought her back to St. 'J'homas, whence she was
afterwards taken to Key West to be adjudicated upon
by a prize-court.

The above facts are condensed from a debate on the
subject in the British House of Commons, March 27,
1863 (Hansard, vol. clxx., Session 1863 (2), p. 71, etc.).
Li the same volume (p. 575, etc.), will be found another
long and spirited debate on the ' Conduct of Admiral
Wilkes ' and ' American Cruisers and British ]\Ierchant-
men.' Those debates go further than anything I have
written to demonstrate not only the harsh and rigorous
manner in which the United States enforced their belli-

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 319

gerent rights during the Civil War, but the surprise
which was aroused in England by the sudden and com-
plete abandonment and reversal of their previous prin-
ciples in respect to the ' right of search.' The purpose
of the United States was to hermetically seal up the
Southern ports, to deprive the South of every possible
means of obtaining supplies from abroad, whether by
direct trade or through ports contiguous to it either by
sea or by land ; and to accomplish that purpose appeared
to be of greater importance to the Government at Wash-
ington than to maintain a character for consistency in
the interpretation of International Law.

At the present day the American shipping trade has
fallen to a very low point, but all who are acquainted
with the resources of the country, the activity and com-
mercial intelligence of the people, and the mechanical
skill they have exhibited in the past, will expect to see
their trade revive and American ships again taking their
due part in the marine traffic of the world whenever the
country can persuade its rulers to remodel the naviga-
tion laws. But when the United States resume their
due place among the Maritime Powers, they will require
a powerful and ubiquitous navy to protect their com-
merce ao'ainst the encroachments of some future belli-

O

gerents, who may, and probably will be, inclined to
follow the precedents of 1861 — 65.

The statements in the foregoing pages having refer-
ence to the operations of the United States in England,
and the comparison of their conduct with that of
the Confederate States in respect to alleged violations or
evasions of the municipal law, and of neutral rights, are
not made as a reproach to the former, nor are they
set forth as grounds upon which to found an argument,
or to build up a defence. Whatever was done by a

320 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

Confederate agent in Europe, can be made to appear
neither better nor worse, by proving that some one else
has committed or avoided the same errors, and I heartily
renounce all faith in, and all tolerance for, the weak and
puerile plea of ' Et tu quoque! But the facts which
I have mentioned are parts of the current history of
those troublous times when the American Union was
suffering its great national convulsion, and the general
historian of the future will require information on
all such points, in order that he may have the data for a
fair impartial judgment.

I have stated that before a keel was laid, or a ship Avas
bought in England for the Confederate Government,
advice was taken as to the legality of the proceedings,
and that everything was done thereafter in strict con-
formity with the advice obtamed. I can affirm, without
the least mental reservation, that no deception whatever
was practised upon the Customs authorities in respect to
the registry or clearance of the Alahama, for as the law
then stood, neither registry nor clearance was required,
and with reference to the other ships built or bought by
me, I can state with equal confidence that every require-
ment of the law was complied Avith, whether affecting
the registration, clearance, or shipping of the crews.

But to determine whether the ao-ents of the Con-
federate Government infringed or evaded the municipal
law of England, something more will be required by
those who are interested in the questions than the
mere opinion of lawyers, however eminent, or the
assurance of an implicated party, however conscientiously
he may affirm his innocence of an evil intent. The
course of events has furnished the only authoritative
rule which can be applied to the elucidation of any
doubtful or ambiguous point of law — that is, a trial

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 321

before a duly constituted court, and a jadicial exposition
and decision.

In the well known case, ' The Attorney General v.
Silleni and others,' commonly called ' Tlie Alexandra
Case,' the Foreis^n Enlistment Act was discussed at
great length by several of the most distinguished lawyers
of the English bar, by Sir William Atherton, her
Majesty's Attorney- General, Sir Roundell Palmer, her
Majesty's Solicitor-General, and Sir Robert Philli-
more, the Queen's Advocate, on one side, and Sir Hugh
Cairns, J. B. Karslake, Esq., Q.C., George Mellish,
Esq., Q.C, and James Kemplay, Esq., on the other.
The judgment rendered in the above case lias never
been reversed, and the interpretation of the Act as laid
down by the learned judge on that occasion fixes
its meaning and settles the question of the culpability
of the Confederate agents. The ' Alexandra Case,' was
what lawyers call a prosecution in rem., and the Crown
contended for a forfeiture of the ship for or upon an
alleged violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, chiefl}^
with reference to the seventh section. It will probably
lielp the reader to understand the case, and to duly
estimate the effect of the judgment, if I give a brief
history of the circumstances under which the Act was
passed, and a short explanation of the principles of
neutrality involved in it.

The United States have an Act very similar to that of
Great Britain, both as regards the object of the statutes,
and the causes which appeared to render them necessary.
In the year 1778, the American Colonies, then engaged
in their War of Independence with Great Britain, made
a treaty (in fact, there were two) with the Government
of Louis XYL, by which very large, important and
exclusive privileges were granted to the respective parties

VOL. I. 21

322 THE SECBET SEBVICE OE THE

with reference to the use of each other's ports for
the condemnation and sale of prizes, and for tlie visit,
shelter, and equipment of their ships-of-war. Very
shortly after the execution of Louis XYL, tlie French
National Convention plunged into a war A\"ith England
and Holland.

Whatever may be said of the cruelty and arrogance of
the men who assumed the control of the French Govern-
ment in those days of terror, it must be admitted that
they did not lack audacity and vigour. They appeared
at once to look to the United States as a convenient
2wint (Tcqypul for their naval operations, and jumped to
the conclusion that under the aforementioned treaties of
1778 they would be permitted to arm and commission
privateers in the American ports, to bring into them their
prizes, and to have the prizes condemned l3y the French
Consuls. The French Republic declared war against
England on February 1st, 1793, and one of the first acts
of the Government was to send a Minister to the United
States, to inflame the people against Great Britain, and
to claim and use the rights and privileges conceded by
the treaties of 1778. M. Genet, the person selected for
the mission, was certainly not wanting in the equalities of
self-assurance, energy and presumption. He arrived at
Charleston on the 8th of April, 1793, and began forth-
Avith to organize a system of privateering. He also
issued instructions authorizing the French Consuls to
hold courts of Vice-Admiralty for condemning the
prizes which the cruisers of France might capture and
bring into the ports of the United States. Having
thus put these naval operations in train, he set out for
Philadelphia, and during his journey he resorted to
ever}^ l^ossible means of inciting the people of the country
to acts of enmity against England.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 323

Wasliington, who was then President, and whose wise
judicial mind wonkl have revolted against this pre-
sumptuous conduct, even if good faith to England had
not influenced him, did not wait for a remonstrance from
the British Minister, but issued a proclamation of
neutrality on the 22nd of April, 1793. There was some
opposition to Washington's prompt and decisive action,
for in his Cabinet were several members who were
favourable to the French cause, but his strength of
character and firmness of will enabled him to put his
own views in practice, and to maintain an attitude of
strict neutrality. M. Genet appears to have carried
matters on with a very high hand, and he tried the
temper and the forbearance of the President greatly.
He not only persisted in violating the neutral territory,
but he entered into various oiFensive political intrigues,
and made himself so obnoxious that his recall was
demanded, and the United States Minister in Paris was
instructed to say to the French Government that if M.
Genet persevered in his proceedings the United States
Government would be forced to suspend his functions
before a successor could arrive. The result of those
troublesome proceedings was to bring the majority of
the Cabinet into complete agreement with the President,
and they gave rise to the first Act for the Preservation
of Neutrality, or what may be called the first American
Foreign Enlistment Act, which was passed by Congress
early in ITO-l, re-enacted March 2, 1797, and made final
April 24, 1800.

The Act thus made perpetual in 1800 did not, how-
ever, prove strong enough for the purpose. The revolt
of the Spanish Colonies in South America gave much
trouble to the Government of the United States. Agents
from those colonies came to New York, l)altimore, and

21—2

324 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

other ])orts, and bou^'bt and equipjied vessels to cruise
against Spanish commerce, and American citizens fitted
out vessels which were officered and manned exchisively
by Americans, and after being thus fully equipped for
immediate hostilities they were commissioned by the
several revolted colonies. Those proceedings involved
the United States in constant complaints from Spain,
and in diplomatic remonstrance and correspondence
with her representatives, and finally, to meet the fresh
necessities, a further Foreign Enlistment Act was passed,
April, 1818, which was the American Act in force during
the late Civil War.

The contests between Spain and her American colonies
beginning in 1810, attracted much notice in England,
and were fi-om the first regarded with warm interest by
the people of Great Britain. The old spirit of maritime
adventure, and the passion for enterprises to the Spanish
Main and the ' El Dorados' on the west coast, which
aroused the temper and inspired the actions of Drake,
Cavendish, Hawkins, and their contemjDoraries — those
splendid buccaneers, whose deeds have added piquancy
and glory to the reign of the Virgin Queen — had not
yet been completely superseded by the more peaceful
instincts of the nineteenth century, nor wholly and
effectively shackled by the growing stringency of a
recognised International Code.

It appears that in 1814 Spain was able to persuade
Eno-land that she ouo-ht to do somethini'' to check, if not
to prevent, the participation of British subjects in the
war she was then waging mth her recalcitrant subjects
in the ' Golden South America,' and in August, 1814, a
supplementary treaty was made between the two Powers,
Avhich declared in Article III. that ' His ]>ritannic
Majesty being anxious that the troubles and disturbances

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 325

which unfortunately j^revail in the dominions of his
Cathohc Majesty in America shouhl cease, and the
subjects of those provinces shouhl return to their
obedience to their lawful sovereign, engages to take the
most effectual measures for preventing his subjects from
furnishing arms, ammunition, or any other article, to the
revolted in America.'

The treaty did not, however, meet the purposes which
inspired it, because we find that in 1818 the interest in
the strife had again been greatly aroused throughout
Great Britain, partly in consequence of the instinctive
attachment of the people to the cause of freedom, and
partly in consequence of the extravagant expectations
which interested parties had excited by highly coloured
statements of the wealth of the Spanish American
colonies, and the vast field that their independence
would open up to British commerce and enterprise.
But in addition to the foregoing causes, much irritation
had been produced throughout Great Britain by the
reactionary policy of Ferdinand YII., the prohibitory
duties he had imposed upon British commerce, and the
resentful feelings which were provoked by the alleged
ingratitude he had shown to many British officers who
had served him in Spain.

There was at the time a strong party even in Parlia-
ment who were in favour of supporting the claims of
the colonies and giving them help to win their inde-
pendence. There was an old statute of James I., which
specified the conditions upon which British subjects
might enter into the service of a foreign prince ; and
there were further Acts, in the reign of George II,,
forbidding enlistment or the procuring others to enlist in
a foreign service ' without licence under the King's sign-
manual.' By Statute 29 George II. c. 17, it was

326 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

enacted ' that to serve under the Frencli King as a
military officer shall be felony without benefit of clerg}'- ;
and to enter the Scotch Bri2;ade in the Dutch ser\dce
Avithout first taking the oaths of allegiance and abjura-
tion, shall be a forfeiture of £500.'*

The foregoing may be taken as the substance of
'British neutrality law' in 1(S18, when Spain was
striving to suppress the revolt of her American
colonies. f But neither the treaty of 1814 nor the pro-
hibitory Acts of Parliament were sufficient to prevent
aid beino- sent to the insuro-ents, both in men and
materials of war. There does not appear to have been
any attempt at disguise. Great numbers of Peninsular
veterans, officers and men, went to the revolted pro-
vinces, and gave them the benefit of their experience
and the prestige of their military fame. An adventurer
of some note, who assumed the title of general, and was
known as Sir Gregor McGregor, collected an expedition
in the ports of Great Britain, with which he sailed in
British vessels and under the British flag. He attacked
and took Porto Bello, in South America, then in the
undisturbed possession of a Spanish force. This violent
act of aggression led to strong remonstrances on the
part of the Spanish Government, and the British
IMinistry, on the 10th of June, 1819, introduced a Bill
for the Amendment of the Neutrality Laws, which was
passed on the 21st by a majority of sixty-one. The
Act was strongly opposed, the Opposition being led by
Sir James Macintosh, who denounced it as a ' left-

* Phillimore's * Intei'national Law,' vol. iii., ed. 1857, p. 212.

+ For tlie dates and facts in respect to the origin of the British Foreign
Enlistment Act, see Appendix to Report of the Neutrality Laws Com-
missioners, issued for the information of the House of Commons,
1868, from which the account herein is abridged in the leading points.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 327

banded neutrality, aimed at the struggling- independence
of South America.' In the 3'ear 1823, Lord Althorp
moved for the repeal of the Act, but tlie motion was
defeated, and the statute, as passed on the 21st June,
1819, remained the ' Neutrality Law ' of Great Britain up
to and during the American Civil War. It is known,
and was generally alluded to, as the ' Foreign Enlistment
Act,' and it is the Act which is applicable to all cases of
alleged violation of the neutrality of Great Britain by
either l^ellio'erent in tlie American Civil War.

The passing of the Act of 1819 seems to have pat
an end to the despatch of expeditions from Great Britain
against Spain, for a time, at least ; but it was neces-
sary to put it in force on several occasions to prevent or
to arrest expeditions fitted out to operate against other
countries with which England was at peace. In 1835
an Order in Council was passed exempting British
subjects who might engage in the service of Queen
Isabella of Spain from the penalties of the Foreign
Enlistment Act. Lender the terms of this exemption,
a British legion was formed, which went to Spain under
the command of Sir De Lacy Evans, and served there
durins: the war aofainst the Carlists. In 1862 an Order
in Council w^as again issued suspending the Foreign
Enlistment Act so as to allow Captain Sherard Osborne,
R.IST., to fit out ships and engage British subjects to
enter the service of the Emperor of China.

In the Appendix to the Report of the IsTeutrality Law
Commissioners in the year 1867, it is said that ' in all,
or nearly all, the cases up to the time of the American
Civil AVar, the Foreign Enlistment Act had been invoked
to prevent the enlistment and despatch of recruits and
soldiers rather than the equipment of vessels.' There
are only three cases mentioned of interference with, or

328 THE SECUET SERVICE OF THE

seizure of vessels, uiitl in each of them the ships were so
completely equipped and manned that they might have
engaged in hostilities as soon as the}' were clear of the
British port, or else they had emigrants or volunteers
on hoard which it was proved were intended for the
service of a belligerent, and no case is mentioned of any
vessel being brought to trial.

In order to comprehend the application of the Foreign
Enlistment Act to the cases of Confederate ships built
or boui>"ht in Eno'land, it is necessarv to bear in mind
the circumstances which produced the amendment of the
Neutrality Laws in 1819, and the evil it was intended to
guard against, and to remedy, by the Act of Parliament.

Mr. Canning, in his speech in support of the Bill,
gave a graphic description of an expedition prepared in.
a British port for hostile attack upon some foreign
Power, and he said that if a foreioner visitino- Eno^land
at the time should see the ships Avitli their armament
and crews on board, and the transports with the troops,
he would naturally ask with Avhat country England was
at Avar. Wlien he was told that the country /was not at
■\\'ar, but was in peace and amity with the whole world,
he would doubtless be greatly surprised.

The Attorney- General of that day, in introducing the
Bill into Parliament, said : ' It was extremely important
for the preservation of neutrality tliat the subjects of
this country sliould be pre\'ented from fitting out an}^
ec|ui]:)ments, not onl}' in the ports of Great Britain and
Ireland, but also in other parts of the British dominions*
to be employed in foreign service.' He explained that
by fitting out ' armed vessels, or by supplying the
vessels of other countries Avith Avarlike stores, as effec-
tual assistance might be rendered to a foreign PoAver as
by enlistment in their OAA^n service,' and he added ' that

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 329

in the second provision of the Bill, two objects were
intended to be embued — to prevent the fitting out of
armed vessels, and also to prevent the fitting out or
supplying other ships with warlike stores in an}- of his
Majesty's ports, not that such vessels might not receive
in any port in the British dominions, but the object of
the enactment was to prevent them from shipping war-
like stores, such as guns and other things — other things
obviously and manifestly intended for no other purpose
than war.'

It is usual for Legislative Acts to be headed or pre-
ceded by an explanatory clause, or preamble, as it is
called, which states the object of the Act and the evil to
be remedied by it. The preamble to the English Foreign
Enlistment Act is as follows : ' Whereas the enlistment
or engagement of his Majesty's subjects to serve in war
in foreign service without his Majesty's license, and the
fitting-out, equipping, and arming of vessels by his
Majesty's subjects for warlike operations in or against
the dominions or territories of any foreign Prince,
State, Potentate, or persons exercising or assuming to
exercise the j^oAvers of Government in or over any
foreign country, etc., may be prejudicial to and tend to
endanger the peace and welfare of this kingdom, etc' It
would appear from the foregoing explanations, and the
preamble of the Act, that the object was to j^rovide
against the fitting out of warlike expeditions in the ports
of Great Britain which might be in condition to engage
in acts of hostility as soon as they left the neutral port,
and to prohibit British subjects from practically engaging
in war on their own account, by taking part in the pre-
paration of warlike expeditions in Great Britain, or the
arming of ships for war within the United Kingdom.
This was the view taken by the learned barristers Avhose

330 THE SECL'ET SEUVICE OF THE

opinions were asked before the contracts for tlie Florida
and Alabama were made. They advised that it was not
illegal for a builder to build, or a purchaser to buy, a
ship of any descri])tion whatever, provided she was not
armed for war and no men were enlisted or engaged to
go in her for the service of a foreign State.

The ground is now clear for the report of the test
case which has been mentioned above — a case which
resulted in a judicial exposition of the law, and an
authoritative verdict upon the acts of the Confederate
Government in respect to the building or purchase of
shij^s in England.

About the 7th of March, 18G3, a small wooden screw-
steamer was launched from the building-yard of ^lessrs.
W. C. ]\Iiller and Son, at Liverpool. The material
of which the ship was built, her general arrangements,
and the fact that she Avas launched from the same yard
in which the Florida was built, soon attracted the notice
of Mr. Dudley's spies, and they began to manufacture
affidavits for the information of the American Minister.
On the 28th of March, Mr. Dudley made a formal
' affirmation ' (being, as he stated, averse to taking
an oath) that he had reason to believe that the above
mentioned vessel, which had been named Alexandra,
was intended for the Confederate States. The ' affirma-
tion ' began with the preamble or introductory prelude
■which was commonly adopted by the American Consuls
of the period, namely, that the Government and people
of the United States were engaged in a Avar with
' certain persons who have rebelled against such Govern-
ment, and pretended to set up and assume to exercise the
powers of Government, styling themselves the Con-
federate States of America ;' then was added a synopsis
of the grounds of Mr. Dudley's faith in that to Avhich

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 331

he affirmed, and a declaration of his belief in the truth
of the affidavits of certain other persons, whose state-
ments were duly sworn to at the same time.

The foregoing ' affirmation ' and ' affidavits ' were
forwarded to the United States Minister in London, and
on the 30th Mr. Adams addressed a letter to Lord
Russell on the subject, and an active correspondence
appears to have been carried on between that gentleman,
the British Foreign Office, the Customs authorities, the
Mayor and Head-Constable of Liverpool, the Treasury,
and the Home Office. The correspondence fills twenty-
four pages of the appendix to the ' British Case.' A
synopsis of it would hardly interest the reader. It is
sufficient to say that the upshot of it all was the
seizure of the Alexandra., and a suit in her ^Majesty's
Court of Exchequer for her forfeiture to the Crown.

The little vessel which had occasioned all this commo-
tion had been launched on the day the Princess of
Wales entered London, previous to her marriage, and
had been christened Alexandra, in commemoration of
that interesting event. She was taken into the Toxteth
Dock to complete her outfit, and to have her engines
placed, and there the work went peacefull}^ on, her
builders and owners havins; some consciousness that the
United States ]\Iinister was uneasy al^out her, but
not dreaming that they were doing anything illegal, and
therefore attempting no concealment or disguise.

On the 5th of April, 1863, the Surveyor of Customs
at Liverpool seized her, and all work upon her was
suspended. The trial was not begun until the 22nd of
June, and as the decision was important, besides furnish-
ing the first and the last judicial exposition of the
Foreign Enlistment Act, I feel that a synopsis of the
proceedings would not be inappropriate, and I will now

332 THE SECBET SEBVICE OF THE

give an abridgment of the re])ort which my solicitor got
for me at the time.

The ' information ' in tlie case was dated ]\Iay 25th,
18(j3, and stated that a certain officer of her Majesty's
Customs had seized and arrested, to the use of her
Majesty, as forfeited, a certain ship or vessel called the
Alexandra, together with the furniture, tackle, and
apparel belonghig to and on board the said ship or
vessel. Then followed counts to the number of ninety-
eiofht, charoin*'- the offences bv reason of "which the
shi]) had become forfeited to the Crown. The l^Tth and
l)8th counts were abandoned by the Crown. The re-
maining ninety -six counts consisted of the first eight
counts repeated twelve times, merely varying the
offence charo-ed. Thus, the first eiiiht counts charo'e
that the defendants did equip the vessel, the next eiglit
counts that they did fi(rnif<h the vessel, the next eight
that they (\x<\fit out, then they did attempt or endeavour
to equip, and so on, exhausting the various offences
enumerated in the seventh section of the statute, with
the exception of armin;/ the vessel, which was not
charged at all. The first eight counts therefore rejire-
sented the rest, and were in substance as folloAvs. The
first count charged that ' certain ' persons within the
Tnited Kingdom, without having any leave or license
of her Majesty for that ])urpose first had and obtained,
did equip the said ship or vessel, Avith intent and
in order that such ship or vessel should be employed in
the service of certain foreign States, styling themselves
the Confederate States of America, with intent to cruise
and connnit hostilities against a certain foreign State,
with which her ]\Iajesty was not then at war, to wit, the
Ivepublic of the United States of America, contrary to
the form of the statute in that case made and j)rovided,

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 333

whereby and by force of the statute in that case made
and provided, the said ship or vessel, together with the
said tackle, apparel, and furniture, became and Avas
forfeited. The second count differed from the first only
in charging that hostilities w^ere to be committed against
the citizens of the foreio-n State. The third count
omitted the Avords ' that sucli ship or vessel should
be employed in the service,' etc., and merely charged
that the defendants did eqidp the vessel with intent to
cruise and commit hostilities against a certain foreign
State, etc. The fourth count resembled the third,
merely varying the description of the belligerent j^arty
ao'ainst whom hostilities were to be committed. The
fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth counts resembled the
first and second counts, and merely varied the descrip-
tion of the belligerent parties who Avere affected by the
conduct of the defendants. The intent, therefore, was
stated in two different ways, to meet the ambiguous
language of the seventh section, wherein the clause
' with the intent or in order that such ship,' and the
clause ' Avith the intent to cruise,' may be regarded
either as alternative or cumulative propositions. The
defendants pleaded that the A^essel Avas not forfeited for
the supposed causes in the information mentioned.

At the trial, which took place on the 22nd June, 1863,
and followino; daA's, before the Lord Chief Baron of the
Exchequer (Sir Frederick Pollock, Kt.), the evidence for
the Crown Avas directed to proA^e, first, that the vessel
Avas built for the purpose of a Avarlike equipment ;
second, that she was intended at some stage or other
of her construction for the service of the Confederate
States. It may be assumed that the Crown succeeded
in proving that the vessel was built for the purpose of a
warlike equipment, or at any rate that she Avas suited to

334 THE SECRET SERVICE OE THE

receive a warlike equijiment, but on the second })oint the
witnesses were so (Hscredited on cross-examination, that
neither judge nor jury aj)peared to give much, if any,
credence to their evidence, and the counsel for the flefend-
ants did not call any witnesses. The judge, in cliarging
the jury, after explaining the information, and citing
Kent and Storey, proceeded thus :

' These are authorities' (Kent and Storey) 'Avhicli show
that where two belligerents are carrying on war, the
subjects of a neutral Power may supply to cither,
without any breach of international law, and certainly
without any breach of the Foreign Enlistment Act. all
the munitions of war, gunpowder, every description of
firearms, cannon, every kind of weapon — in short, what-
ever can be used in war for the destruction of human
beings. Why should ships be an exception ? In my
opinion, in point of law they are not.' His lordship
then, havino- adverted to the statute and read the seventh
section, said : ' The question that I shall propose to you '
(the jury) ' is this — whether you think that this vessel
was merely in the course of building for the purpose of
being delivered in pursuance of a contract, which I own I
think was perfectly lawful, or whether there was any
intention that in the port of Liverpool, or any other
English port (and there is certainly no evidence of any
other), the vessel should be equipped, fitted out, and fur-
nished or armed for the purpose of aggression. Why
should ships alone be themselves contraband ? . . . .
What the statute meant to provide for was, I think, by
no means the protection of the belligerent Powers, other-
wise they would have said, "You shall not sell gun-
powder, you shall not sell guns." The object of the
statute was this — we will not have our ports in this
country subject to possibly hostile movements. You

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUllOPE. 335

shall not be fitting up at one dock a vessel equipped and
ready, not being completely armed, but ready to go to
sea, and at another dock close by be fitting up another
A'essel, and equipping her in the same way, which might
come into hostile communication immediately, possibly
before they left the port. Now and then this has hap-
j)ened, and that has been the occasion of this statute.
The offence against wliicli this information is directed
is the " equipping, furnishing, fitting out, or arming."
From Webster's dictionary it appears that to "equip " is
to "furnish with arms." In the case of a ship especially,
it is to " furnish and complete with arms" — that is what
is meant by "equipping." "Furnish" is given in every
dictionary as the same thing as " equip." To " fit out "
is to " furnish and supply," as to fit out a privateer, and
I own that my opinion is that "equip," "furnish," "fit
out," or " arm," all mean precisely the same thing. . . .
The question is — Was there any intention that in the
port of Liverpool, or in any other port, the vessel should
be, in the language of the Act of Parliament, either
" equipped, furnished, fitted out, or armed," with the
intention of taking part in any contest ? If you think
that the object was to equip, furnish, fit out, or arm that
vessel at Liverpool, then that is a sufficient matter. But
if you think the object really was to build a ship in
obedience to an order, and in compliance with a contract,
leaving it to those who bought it to make what use they
thought fit of it, then it appears to me that the Foreign
Enlistment Act has not been in any degree broken.'

The jury found a verdict for the defendants. The
counsel for the Crown tendered a Bill of Exceptions to
the direction of the judge, in order that all the points of
law involved might be argued and decided in the Ex-
chequer Chamber (the Court of Appeal). The Bill of

336 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

Exceptions was subsequently abandoned, and in Novem-
ber, 18G3, tlie Attorney-i^ieneral moved a 'rule' in the
Court of Exchequer to set aside the verdict found, and
for a new trial. In the same month cause was shown
against and for this 'rule' before the Lord Chief r)aron
and the r>arons Bramwell, Channel, and Pigott. The
question was very fully argued, and the four judges
read very long opinions, two, namely, the Lord Chief
Baron and Baron Bramwell, giving judgment for the
claimants of the ship, and two, namely. Barons Channel
and Pigott, for the Crown. Inasmuch as the four judges
were divided, Baron Pigott, according to practice, with-
drew his judgment in order that the Crown might ap-
peal. The Crown subsequently appealed to the Court
of Exchequer Chamber, but the appeal was dismissed
on a preliminary objection of a technical nature. The
appeal Avas then carried to the House of Lords, but was
also dismissed on the same grounds. The judgment for
the claimants of the shij^ therefore remained undisturbed,
and the questions raised as to the interpretation of the
seventh section of the Foreign Enlistment Act have
never received any other solution than that which is set
out in the charge of the Lord Chief Baron to the jury,
which it will be perceived exactly agrees with the
opinions given by the learned barristers who were con-
sulted before any effort to build ships in England was
made at all.

The United States authorities appear to have been
satisfied with the action taken by her Majesty's Govern-
ment in the matter of the Alexandra. On the 6th of
April, the day after the seizure, ]\Ir. Adams -UTote to
Earl Russell : ' It is a source of great satisfaction to me
to recognise the readmess Mdiich her Majesty's Govern-
ment has thus manifested to make the investigations

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUEOPE. 337

desired., as well as to receive the assurances of its deter-
mination to maintain a close observation of future move-
ments of an unusual character that justifies suspicions of
an evil intent.'* ]\Ir. Seward, writins; to Mr. Adams
after the verdict, says : ' You are authorised and ex-
pected to assure Earl Russell that this Government is
entirely satisfied that her ^Majesty's Government have
conducted the proceedings in the case with perfect good
faith and honour, and that they are Avell disposed to
prevent the fitting-out of armed vessels in British ports
to depredate upon American commerce, and to make war
upon the United States. This Government is satisfied
that the law officers of the Crown have performed their
duties in regard to the case of the Alexandra with a
sincere conviction of the adequacy of the law of Great
Britain, and a sincere desire to give it effect.' "j"

It must have been refreshino- to Earl Russell to re-

o

ceive a commendatory notice fi'om ]\Ir. Seward, for the
ofeneral tone of the communications from Washinirton
could not have been ao-reeable reading- at the British
Foreign Office. The satisfaction of Mr. Seward and of
Mr. Adams was confined to the approval of Lord Rus-
sell's readiness to seize the ship, and the zeal disjDlayed
by the law officers of the Crown in the prosecution of
the suit, but they could not have been gratified by the
result of the suit, although it was her Majesty's Treasury
which had to bear the consequences of the failure to
effect a forfeiture. The Imilders of the Alexandra^
]\Iessrs. Fawcett, Preston and Co., made a claim for
damages, and after much delay and negotiation their

* 'British Appendix,' vol. ii., p. 171, and see also 'British Case,'
p. 40.

t 'United States Documents,' vol. ii., p. 291, quoted in 'British
Case,' pp. 40, 4i.

VOL. I. 22

338 THE SECnET SELTICE OF THE

solicitors a<iTeed to receive .ilo,700, 'on the luiderstand-
ing that the amount shall be paid without delay,' and
that amount was i)aid to them by order of the Treasury.

It is necessary to say something in reference to the
Avitnesses brought forward by ]\Ir. Thomas H. Dudley,
the Fnited States Consul, in support of the ' information '
in the ' Alexandrd Case,' in order that the evidence
which her ]\lajesty's Government was urged to act \\\)0\\
in this and other cases ma}' be fully understood, and a
correct judgment may be formed in respect to the action
of that Government in applying the Foreign Enlistment
Act to the operations of the Confederate agents durmg
the war.

I have said in a previous cha]:)ter that the affidavits
upon which the United States Minister based his com-
plaints and accusations Avere for the most part either
wholly false or they contained gross exaggerations. A
man may be deeph' impressed Avith the expectation that
a certain event is about to ha]ipen ; the expectation may
be fully realized, and yet the information upon Avhich
his convictions Avere formed may haA'e been false in all
specific particulars. The Florida and Alabama, as is
now well knoAvn, became Confederate cruisers, and ^Ir.
Dudley's predictions in regard to their ultimate purpose
have been fulfilled ; but the statements made in the
affidavits of Da Costa, Passmore, and others, which
appear in the proceedings before the GeneA^a arbitrators,
are false ; and if either of the ships named had been
seized by the Government, their falsehood Avould have
been proved, not only b}' rebutting testimony, but by
cross-examination of the Avitnesses themselves. This is
precisely AA'hat happened in the ' Alexandra Case.' The
CroAvn proved by its OAvn Avitnesses, Avho Avere experts,
that the ship Avas so constructed as to be Avell suited to

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 339

tlie purposes of a cruiser, but not for jjurposes of com-
merce. When, however, the prosecution attempted to
prove specific facts in regard to the intent to equip, etc.,
the evidence failed, and failed because it was untrue, and
therefore entirely broke down in cross-examination.
Counsel for the defence were so satisfied that the
witnesses had discredited themselves to the jury, that
they called no witnesses to deny their statements. Men
who are employed as spies, or who are paid to give
evidence in regard to matters upon which they can have
no personal knowledge except what they may have
acquired by dishonest and unworthy means, are easily
exposed by skilful cross-examination in the Avitness-
box ; and anyone who was present at the trial of the
Alexandra^ or cares to read the report of the proceedings,
wdll feel a contemptuous pity for Mr. Dudley's three
witnesses — John Da Costa, George Temple Chapman,
and Clarence Randolph Yonge. Sir Hugh Cairns (now
Earl Cairns), in his address to the jury, summed up
and commented upon the evidence of the above-named
' worthies ' as follows :

' I cannot help pausing to remind you of the kind of
evidence that Da Costa gave. He came forward, and
what did he tell us he was ? He said he was a
shipping-agent and a steamboat-owner ; that is his own
account, in the first instance, of his character. I am
sorry to destroy that illusion ; but it turns out, on
cross-examination, that he is a crimp and a partner in
a tug. He says he is a sliipping- agent and a steamboat-
owner. How easily great titles may descend to some-
thing smaller ! He is a crimp and a partner in a tug.
He is brought forward by the CroT\Ti — I beg pardon,
not by the Crown ; he is one of the witnesses of Mr.
Dudley, the Liverpool Consul. . . . My learned friend for

22—2

340 THE SECIIET SERVICE OF THE

the CroAvn could not moderate liim. He had one thing
to say, and lie was always saying it, and Avhatever he
was asked it always came out. " There is a gunboat " —
that is what he came to tell, and he would say nothing
else — the ^'' Phantom'^ and "gunboat;" all I know is
''that was a gunboat." He would give no answer
without mixing up with it that which he thought he
came here to prove.'

After pointing out the irrelevancy as well as im-
probability of Da Costa's statements, Sir Hugh Cairns
proceeded: —

' I have still to deal with the two illustrious mtnesses
who remain — the two spies. I will take first Mr. George
Temple Cliapman. . . . George Temple Chapman's story
is this : He went to the counting-house of Messrs.
Fraser, Trenholm and Co., and has an interview with
Mr. Prioleau ; he represents himself to be a Secessionist,
and a warm supporter of the Southern States. He goes
with that lie on his lips to have a conversation with ]\[r.
Prioleau. Xow, what was the object of telling that lie
on the 1st of April (wliile the seizure is being prepared
for) ? Mr. George Temple Chapman was sent to the
office of Messrs. Fraser, Trenholm and Co., to have an
interview with ]\Ir. Prioleau, and to beguile him by
a false statement into making admissions to him. 1
suppose you will see that Mr. George Temple Chapman
was sent by the American Consul as a spy, in order to
obtain some admission about the Alexandra. Well, what
came of it ? . . . Does he sa}' that he was able to
extract one single sentence from that firm, or to obtain
from Mr. Prioleau, who was confiding in him, believing
in him as a compatriot, — does he say that he obtained
one single piece of information ■^nth respect to the
Alexandra? . . . Nothing of the kind. The whole

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 341

thing is a failure which recoils on the Crown. . . . The
witness who comes forward and tells this story, cannot
put his finger upon a single fact that could bear upon
the case of the Alexandra.^

I was at the ofiice of Messrs. Fraser, Trenhohn and
Co. when Mr. Chapman called, and after his interview
with Mr. Prioleau, he asked to see me. He introduced
himself as an ex-officer of the United States Xavy, and
told me that although a Northern man, his sympathies
were, and had been, wholly with the South, and for that
reason he had been oblio'ed to leave Boston. I instinc-
tively distrusted him, but he had the external appearance
of a gentleman, and I received his visit with as much
courtesy as I could command for the occasion. He
showed me a letter which he said he had got from the
'mulatto wife of Clarence R. Yonge,' mentioned elsewhere,
and he thought I might like to have it. The letter
purported to be a copy of an ofiicial letter Avritten by
me many . months before, and he said ]\lr. Yonge had
kept this copy, and might make improper use of it.
The contents of the letter were of no importance, and I
handed it back to him, merely saying that it did not
concern me. On the trial it came out that his object
was to obtain some admission from me, but he failed,
and his evidence in respect to our interview was false.

After fully exjDosing the character of Chapman, and
the worthlessness of his evidence, Sir Hugh Cairns
proceeded to deal with the third of the trio, thus: —

' Well, but, gentlemen of the jury, I come to the
greatest witness of all in this case, the witness who was
reserved by the Crown to the last, and was brought
forward certainly with some pomp and ceremony. I
mean Mr. Clarence Randolph Yonge. How am I to
describe this specimen of humanity? — the man who

342 THE SECHET SEEVICE OF THE

be2;"an his career by abandoning liis -wife and child in his
native country . . . wlio became Captain Bulloch's jn-ivate
secretary, liad access to his papers, was the companion
of those Avho were ens-aixed in the Confederate cause,
persuaded tliem that lie shared in the feeling of
patriotism which actuated them ; who came over to
England, who still assumed the same character — who,
received b}- Messrs. Fraser, Trenholm and Co., became
possessed of every secret with regard to the proceedings
of those who were engaged in war on the part of the
Southern States ; who accepted a commission from his
native country in her service, became an officer enrolled
in her navy, owning allegiance to her, received her pay,
distributed her money; who then became a deserter,
slipping overboard on leaving the ship of which
he was an officer, in order that he might hj a lying
jDretence of a marriage effect the ruin and plunder the
property of a widow, who had the misfortune to entertain
him in her countr}^ and to be possessed of some property
of her own ; who succeeded in possessinghimself of that
property ; who brought her over to Liverj)ool, and who
then turned her adrift, penniless, on the streets ; who
then hurried up to London in order to pour into the
ear of ]\Ir. Adams, the American Minister, his tale of
treacher3^ betraying every one of his familiar friends,
and every one of his brother officers, and the cause of
the country to which he had promised allegiance ; avIio
stood there in the witness-box before you, who denied
no crime and blushed at no villainv, until, indeed, it was
suggested that the victim of his villainy had been a
mulatto woman, and not his wife, and then all his feeling
of self-respect recoiled, and he indignantly denied the
charge. This, gentlemen, is the man who is brought
forAvard at the end as the climax of the case on the part

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 343

of the Crown ; but I beg pardon, he is not the witness
of the Crown — he is the witness of Mr. Adams, the
United States Minister. It is Mr. Adams who forwarded
him to the Crown to be put into the witness-box before
a jury of Enghsh gentlemen, to repeat the tale which
that unmitigated villain told in our ears. Gentlemen, I
know" the honourable and straightforward character of
my honourable and learned friend, the Attorney-General,
and I felt how he mast have loathed and recoiled from
his task when, reading from the brief of the American
Minister, he put questions to this witness, question after
question, which elicited the tale which we heard from Mr.
Clarence Randolph Yonge. . . . But what was it that
Mr. Randolph Yonge told us, after all ? He gave us a
great deal of information about the Alabama, he told us
how the money was procured to pay the officers on board
the Alabama, he told us where the Alabama went to, etc'
Counsel then pointed out the folly as well as the fatality
of bringing forward such a witness, and added, ' I do
not merely mean to say that this evidence would cover
with shame any case that was ever brought before a jurv,
though that is perfectly true. . . . But consider this. . . .
We have now got laid before us, by one of the agents,
as it was said, of the Confederate Government, everything
they contemplated last April at the time when they were
engaged in the fitting out and sending away the Alabama.
... He has disclosed the secrets of the Cabinet Councils
in Liverpool, and not one single secret of those Cabinet
Councils has reference to the ship you are now trying.'*

* When I went to Savannah in the Fingal, in November, 1862,
Mr. Clarence R. Yonge was an assistant, or clerk, in the paymaster's
office at that naval station. He had served as acting-paymaster on
board of one or two of the vessels of Flag-officer Josiah Tatnall's
squadron, and was reported to be fully competent to perform the
VOL. I.*

3U THE SECRET SEUVICE OF THE

The trial of the^l/(Uv///'//v/ afforded tlie opportunity to
discover and expose the character of the Avitne.sses
which the United States Consul offered to produce in
support of his allegations, and looking over the affidavits
published among the documents laid before the Tribunal
of Arbitration at Geneva, and in the diplomatic corre-
spondence, I find they are nearly all of the same stamp as
those of Mr. John Da Costa, namely, utterly inaccurate
as regards the specific statements. But although the
witnesses in the ^Ahxmidra Case ' were so thoroughly
discredited that the jur^- could not have believed their
testimony, yet the verdict of the jury was really given
for the defendants in consequence of tlie directions
of the Lord Chief Baron on the points of law, which
may be summed up in the following sentence : ' But
if you think the object really was to build a ship in
obedience to an order and in compliance with a contract,
leaving it to those who bought it to make what use they
thought fit of it, then it appears to me that the Foreign
Enlistment Act has not been in any degree broken.'

If it had not been for the trial of the Alexandra^ the

duties of a naval paymaster. Just before leaving the Confederate
States to return to Europe in January, 1862, the Secretary of the
Navy dii'ected me to take Mr. Youge out as my private secretaij",
and to give him an appointment as acting-assistant-paymaster for
the Alahama when she was ready for sea. When Captain Semmes
joined the Alahama, I told him that Yonge was an unsteady and un-
reliable young man, whose judgment and discretion were not to be
trusted, but I had no suspicion in regard to his integrity in money
matters, and, of course, could not have dreamed that he was cajxable
of treachery and treason. He was dismissed from the Alabama in
disgrace, but Captain Semmes did not report the fact to me at the
time. He came to Liverpool, but never came near me ; he went
instead to Mr. Dudley, the United States Consul, to whom he sold
himself, with the results specified in the speech of Sir Hugh Cairns,
the facts having been drawn from him in the course of his evidence.

CONFEDERATE STATES IX EUROPE. 345

judicial exposition of the law, and the verdict of a jury,
there would have been no sufficient and unanswerable
reply to the reiterated assertions of the United States
Consul and of Mr. Seward, that the acts of the Con-
federate Government in attempting to procure ships in
Enodand Avere ' criminal ' and ' nefarious.' But we
have cumulative evidence in almost every form in which
independent and authoritative opinion can be pronounced,
in regard both to the spirit and the letter of the Foreign
Enlistment Act, and I will now give a synopsis of that
evidence, in order that the reader may have the data
upon which to found his own judgment.

First, — there is the legal opinion of the two learned
barristers who were consulted before the contract
for the Alabama was made, and which has already been
mentioned.*

Second, — Lord Palmerston, the Prime Minister of
England, during the Civil War, when all these 'Ala-
bama questions ' were occupying the public mind, in a
speech in the House of Commons, July 23rd, 186o,f
said : ' I cannot, in the abstract, concur with my honour-
able friend ' (^Ir. Richard Cobden) ' in thinking that
there is any distinction in principle between muskets,
gunpowder, bullets and cannon on the one side, and
ships on the other. These are things by which war is
carried on, and }'ou are equally assisting belligerents by
suj^plying them with muskets, cannon, and ammunition,
as you are by supplying them with ships that are
to operate in war.' After citing cases from United
States history, he further said : ' Therefore I hold, that
on the mere gTound of international law belligerents
have no right to complain if merchants — I do not say

* See chap. ii. pp. 66, 67.

t See Hansard, vol. clxxii., Session 1863 (4), pp. 1269, 1270.

346 THE SECHET SEL'FICE OF THE

the Government, for that would be interference — as
a mercantile transaction, suppl}- one of the belligerents,
not only with arms and cannon, but also with ships
destined for warlike purposes.'

Third, — Earl Russell, the Secretary of State for
Forein-n Attairs, in a letter to Mr. Adams, aro-ucs the
question upon the Foreign Enlistment Act, and cites to
the American ^linister two cases — the Independencia and
the Alfred, which were decided in the United States
Supreme Court, and then, appealing to the American
^linister upon the authorities of his o^\^\ country, he
says : ' It seems clear on the principles enumerated in
these authorities that, except on the ground of any
proved violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, which
those cases decided had not been violated, in those cases
her ^lajesty's Government cannot interfere with com-
mercial dealings between l^ritish subjects and the
so-styled Confederate States, whether the object of those
dealings be money, or contraband goods, or even ships
adapted for warlike purposes.'*

Fourth, — her Majesty's Solicitor- General, Sir Roundell
Palmer — now Lord Selborne and Lord Chancellor of
England — in a speech made in the House of Commons,
durinir a debate on the Foreim Enlistment Act, March
27th, 18G/^, said: 'It would be a great mistake to
suppose that the Foreign Enlistment Act was meant to
])rohibit all commercial dealings in ships-of-war with
belligerent countries. It is not intended to do so. Two
things must be proved in every case to render the
transaction ille2:al : that there has been what the law
regards as the fitting-out, arming, or equipment of
a ship-of-war ; and with the intent that the ship should

* Quoted or read to the court by Sir Hugh Cairns in the
Alexandra trial, p. 173.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 347

be employed in the service of a foreign belligerent.''"'
The Solicitor-General then recites two cases in which
decisions have been rendered by the United States
Supreme Court upon the corresponding American
statute, to demonstrate to the House ' what may law-
fully be done on the showing of the Americans them-
selves ;' and he then adds : ' The circumstances of the
case tried l^efore Justice Story were so far exactly the
same as those which occurred in the case of the
Alabama, and, in the absence of any further evidence,
the seizure of tliat ship would have been altogether
unwarrantable by law. She might have been legitimately
built by a foreign Government, and though a ship-of-
war, she might have formed a legitimate article of
merchandise, even if meant for the Confederate States.'

I might cite many familiar cases from the history
of the United States, and from the judgments of the
Supreme Court of that country, in opposition to the
views put forward by ]\Ir. Seward in respect to the
Confederate ships ; but the charge was that Englisli
municipal law was violated and ' criminally evaded,' and
that British hospitality was abused in a manner which
was 'nefarious,' and therefore it is not necessary to
appeal to any other tribunals than those of the country
in which the alleged offences were committed. That
appeal has been made, and the verdict rendered is that
the Confederates have done no violence either to British
law or to British hospitality. We have the judgment
of the Prime Minister of England that there is no dis-
tinction in principle between supplying belligerents with
arms and ammunition, or ' with ships that are to operate
in war,' and that a British merchant may sell either
guns or ships to a belligerent without infringing either
* Hansard, vol. clxx., Session, 1863 (2), pp. 47 — 52.

348 THE SECHET SEL'J'ICE OF THE

local or international duties. AVe have tlie declaration
of Earl IJussell, the Minister especially charged with the
diplomatic relations of the kingdom, that the Confederate
States had the right to procure ' money or contraband
goods, or cvc/i sliips adapted for warlike pur})oses' in
England, provided only they did not violate the ex])ress
conditions of the Foreign Enlistment Act. We have
the Solicitor- General, one of the hi^fhest leoal advisers of
the Crown, stating witli all the authority of his office,
and with all the prestige of his position as a Member of
] Parliament, that it would be a great mistake to suppose
that the Foreign Enlistment Act was meant to prohibit
commercial dealings in shij^s-of-war with belligerent
countries, and assuming that the Alabama was not
' equipped ' in England, she Avas a legitimate article of
merchandise, even if meant for the Confederate States.
Finally, we have had the trial of a test-case, and the
verdict of a special jury, under the direction of one of
the highest judges in the kingdom, and the decision was
that an English shipbuilder may build any kind of ship,
to a commercial order, or merely in compliance with a
contract, and the purchaser may take her away and do
what he likes Avith her afterwards, Avithout any violation
of English laAV.

It is manifest, therefore, that in the opinion of the
highest personages in England, of those Avho during
the Avhole period of the Civil War Avere responsible for
the Government of the country, Avho had the exclusiA'e
authority to interpret the laAV and to administer it, Avho
from their exalted position, their experience, and their
knowledge of public affairs, Avere eminently fitted to pro-
nounce judgment upon Avliat Avas due to her Majesty's
GoA'ernment, both in reference to acts of obedience
and acts of courtesy — in the opinion of such men, ex-

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 3i9

pressing their views- under circumstances of the gravest
official responsibility — the Confederate Government, by
buying or building ships in England, did nothing
contrary to commercial usage, international comity,
or municipal law. If the charges of ' criminality ' and
' nefarious evasions of law ' had been merely cast at me
as an individual, or against any other agent of the Con-
federate Government, I would not have made the fore-
going elaborate explanation, but I have learned the
application of the legal phrase, ' qid facit per alium facit
per .s'6^' I have always felt that the object was to dis-
credit the Government of the Confederate States, as well
as to defeat their purposes, and ever}' feeling of loyalty
has impelled me to give all who care to form an impar-
tial judgment the facts and circumstances which should
be taken into account. The epithets have already passed
into history. They can never be erased from the public
documents which they deface. Some future American
Secretary of State — perhaps now that the country is re-
uni^ted it may be an ex-Confederate or his descendant —
may look over the files of his Department and wonder
at the heat and passion of his predecessor ; but I will
venture to say that no member of the late Confederate
Government, and not one of their representatives abroad,
ever has felt a pang of conscience on the subject, or has
ever had his peace of mind disquieted by the thought
that he was doing, or had done, in respect to the matters
at issue, anything of which a loyal man should be
ashamed — loyal, I mean, in the broad sense of duty to
others as well as to himself.

At some future day, when the actors have passed
away, a true and impartial history of the great Civil
War and its causes will be Avritten, for it was too notable
an event to remain as a mere item in the course of God's

350 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

jH'ovidence. Then the truth, and the whole truth,
will appear, and the world will be surprised to learn
how much the South has been misrepresented, the
motives and doctrines of her public men distorted, and
even the private life and social habits of her people
caricatured for political purposes. Those who Avere
inimical to the South, or were, at least, instigated by
motives of political necessity to misstate facts or to
suppress a part of the truth, have had the oppor-
tunity to publish their statements and to impress them
upon the public mind of the present generation, with
hardly an effort of retort or correction on behalf of the
Southern people.

But the history of the past cannot be wholly for-
gotten. It must be and is known that in the pure days
of the Republic, before the tyrannous ' caucus ' and the
iniquitous ' machine ' had usurped the control and
direction of the public will — when men were judged
upon their merits, and political parties were separated
by honest diversity of opinion, and not by sectional
lines — the South, though greatly inferior in voting
power, furnished four out of five consecutive Presidents.
She has given such men as Clay, Calhoun, Crittenden,
Crawford, and Fors}i:h to the civil service since the
great struggle for independence, and the greatest of the
Chief- Justices of the Supreme Court was a Southerner.
She has contributed many gallant and able men to the
army and navy. The ' Father of his Country ' was a
Virginian planter, and even Farragut, who made his
reputation in helpmg to defeat the South, and has been
called the ' Kelson of the American Navy,' was by birth,
by early training, hy marriage, by all the domestic and
social associations of his life, a Southern man, possessing
in a marked degree the peculiarities, and even what may

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUEOPE. 351

be called the provincialisms, of that part of the United
States.

I have mentioned but a small number of the
Southerners who helped to elevate the national fame
before dissension and distrust had alienated the two
sections, and I feel sure that the day will come when
justice will be done to the Southern leaders of 1861-G5,
and that an impartial posterity will by its verdict free
their names from the calumnies which have been spoken
against them, and will pronounce a retributive censure
upon their traducers. After the trial of the Alexandra,
and the clear, emphatic opinion expressed by the highest
authorities of the kino-dom in re^'ard to the sale and
purchase of ships in England on behalf of a belligerent,
it might have been supposed that the Confederate
Government would have been permitted to supply its
necessities, at least, under restrictions no greater than
those imj)osed upon the United States. But such was
not the case. Whether Mr. Seward's warm com-
mendation of the ' good faith and honour ' of her
Majesty's Government, and the zeal of the law officers
of the Crown in the prosecution of the Alexandra, won
Earl Russell to the Federal cause, or whether he yielded
to the importunities of Mr. Adams in the sj^irit of the
judge ' in a certain city ' of whom we read in Scripture,
that unfortunate ship was pursued with relentless perse-
cution until the end of the war. She was held under
seizure by the Government until April, 1864.* When
released, her name was changed to Mary, her fittings
on deck and below were altered and made suitable to a
vessel of commerce, and in July she sailed from Liver-
pool for Bermuda, and thence to Halifax. Mr. Seward
at once addressed a communication to the British Charge
* See 'British Case,' p. 41.

352 THE ^ECllET SERVICE OF THE

(V Affaires at AVasIiinfrton, and the letter was forwarded
to the Lieutenant-Governor of Xova Seotia. That
functionary replied that lie could not ' interfere with any
vessel, British owned, in a British harbour, on mere
suspicion ;' nevertheless, he ])roniised to institute inquiry
and to liave a strict watcli kept on her. The M'try, findin<j;'
no rest for the sole of her foot, or rather for her keel, at
Halifax, returned in December to J^ermuda, and thence
proceeded to Xassau, where, on the 13th of December,
186-4, slie was seized by order of the Governor, and
proceedings were instituted against lier in the Vice-
Admiralty Court of the colony. The cause was heard
on the 22nd and 23rd of May, 18(55 ; and on the 30th
of ^lay the Court decided that tliere was no ' reasonably
sufficient ' evidence of illegal intent to support a sentence
of forfeiture, and the vessel was accordingly released.
The war had by that time ceased, and the little craft
was freed from further persecution.

Before turning to another subject, I will just mention
that, in spite of Da Costa's sworn statements to tlie con-
trary, I never saw the Alexandra until after she Avas seized,
I never had the slightest control over her, and never gave
an instruction in reference to her. She was built under
a contract with ]\Ir. Charles K. Prioleau, of Liverpool, at
his own private cost and risk exclusively. He told me,
while she was building, that his purpose was to send
her as an unarmed ship to run the blockade into Charles-
ton, if jiossible, and after her arrival there he meant to
present her to the Confederate Government. This trans-
action would have been perfectly regular and unobjec-
tionable, according to the decision in the trial before the
Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer, and the views of
the eminent statesmen whose opinions I have given
above ; but it was violently interfered with and pre-

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 353

vented by authorities deriving their power from those
Ministers who had declared that there was no difference
in principle ])etween selling a gun or a shij) to a belli-
gerent, and no violation of neutrality in permitting it to
Ije done ; and I assume that if a British merchant may
sell a ship, there can be no iniquity in his giving one
away. It must be borne in mind, too, that there was
no evidence that the Alexandra, or Mary, was intended
to be given to the Confederate States. After her release
slie was loaded and cleared for Halifax as any other
British ship.

Under date of September 1st, 18G3, I wrote to the
Secretary of the Xavy at Richmond on this subject, as
follows : —

' The favourable decision in the " Alexandra Case "
has not made our operations in Europe less difficult.
Federal spies have rather increased than otherwise, and
I am convinced that nothing more should be attempted
in England. AVhile the shipment of arms and every
description of warlike implement for the North is freely
allowed, while armour j^l^^tes are being rolled in this
country for United States ships, and recruiting is noto-
riously going on in Ireland for the Federal army, a
vessel cannot clear for an island, even thouo-h it be a
British island, contiguous to the Confederate States,
without inquiry, interruption, and delay ; and a ship
building anywhere in private yards with the external
appearance of a man-of-war, is not only watched by
Yankee sj)ies, but by British officials, and is made the
subject of newspaper discussions, letters and protests
from lawyers, and even petitions fi'om the " Emancipa-
tion Society." The South derives some advantage from
her recognised status as a belligerent, but the neutrality
of Great Britain discriminates too palpably in favour of

VOL. I. 9.S

354 THE SECL'ET SERVICE OF THE

the North to deceive anyone as to the fears, if not the
sympathies, of tlic present Ministry.'

In the Appendix to the Jiritish Case, Geneva Arbi-
tration, vol. ii., there is a list of twelve vessels which
were made the subject of correspondence between the
United States Minister and her Majesty's Government,
and all of them, upon the simple allegations of the United
States Consuls at Liverpool and elsewhere, were inter-
rupted in their loading, and interfered with, more or less,
by the Customs authorities. Some of them were loading
in part with contraband of war, and a portion of the
shipments were on behalf of the Confederate Government.
In none of those ships did the Confederate States have
any interest whatever, except as shippers by them to
Bermuda, the ]>ahamas, and Havana. One of them,
the PJiantom, became a blockade-runner, but she sailed
from Liverpool in a 2:)erfectl}' legitimate way.

Some of the cases demonstrate very strongly the
recklessness of the United States Consuls in their allega-
tions, and the readiness with which Earl Russell acted
upon them. On March 24th, 18{)8, Thomas H. Dudley,
the United States Consul at Liverpool, wrote ]\Ir. Adams
that ' this vessel ' (the Southerner) ' came here yesterday
either to load or to fit out as a privateer. There is no
doubt about this vessel. I suppose it will be impossible
for me to obtain legal evidence against these two
vessels,* and nothing short of this will satisfy the
Government.' f Mr. Dudley never permitted himself to
doubt, and generally indulged in a sneer at the British
Government; but, notwithstanding his positive assertion,
Mr. Adams, in f()r-\\arding the statement to Earl Russell
on the 26th, was obliged to inform his lordship that

* PJuvifinn and Southerner.

t 'British Case,' Appendix, vol. ii., p. 1G7.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 355

Mr. Dudley was mistaken, and that the ship referred to
had not yet reached Liverpool.* The Southerner was a
large screw-steamer, built at Stockton-on-Tees for a
jDassenger and freight trade. She was provided with all
fittings necessary to handle her cargoes, and her saloons
were arranged in every respect as a first-class passenger
ship. No one fairly inspecting her could have supposed
that she would have l3een fitted up in that style if the
intention was to convert her into a ' privateer,' and her
size and draft of water manifestly unsuited her for even
blockade-runnino". Yet the British Foreio^n Office
acted upon Mr. Dudley's allegations, and twenty-four
pages of the ' Appendix ' (pp. 185 — 209) are occupied
with a correspondence in respect to her between Mr.
Adams, Earl Russell, the Treasury and Customs officials,
the Town Clerk, the Mayor, and Head-Constable of
Liverpool. Finally she was surveyed by Mr. T. Hobbs,
Admiralty overseer, assisted by Mr. W. Byrne, Assist-
ant Surveyor of Customs at Liverpool, and Mr. Hobbs
reported to the Controller of the Navy on June 23rd,
1863, as follows :t

' She is fitted with t023-gallant forecastle and poop-
deck, with deck-houses continuous fore and aft with the
same, in the same manner as the Inman line of screw-
boats, now sailing betAveen this port and New York.
She is fitted aft under the poojD-deck with accommodation
for about sixty-six saloon passengers, etc. ... I find
that her topsides are of iron-plates, three-eighths of an
inch thick, and in no way fitted or secured, as I
consider, necessary for the working of guns. ... I
cannot find anything with regard to construction or

* She arrived a few days after.

t ' British Case,' Appendix, vol. ii., p. 206.

23—2

356 THE SECRET SEllVICE OF THE

fittings that would lead me to suppose that she was
intended for belligerent purposes.'

In consequence of the above report, the Head-
Constable of Liverpool advised the ]\Iayor that the
officer especially appointed to watch the ship should be;
relieved, and on the 8rd of July Earl Russell reported
the facts to Mr. Adams, and the ship was permitted to
go about her business. It aj^pears that she went on a
voyage up the Mediterranean, in the course of which she
touched at Algiers, from which ])ort another American
Consul, by the name of Edward L. Kingsbur}", wrote
to ]\Ir. Dayton, the United States Minister at Paris,
on October 2nd, 1863 :

' I have the honour to inform you that, while absent
from my post by special permission, I received informa-
tion that " the suspected pirate steam-ship Southerner''''
was at Malta, en route from Alexandria to Algiers.'*

Mr. Kingsbury then gives a full description of the
ship, her cargo, passengers, etc., which particulars
he got from ' a perfectly competent and reliable gentle-
man of my acquaintance at this place,' and adds : ' I am
also informed that the British and United States flags
are painted upon the partitions of the companion way,
etc., the ship having been built, it is said, to run
between Liverpool and Charleston.'

The Phantom, was detained and watched and written
about in the same way. I have said that she became a
blockade-runner, but she was wholly private property.
The Confederate States never had any interest in her
whatever. Mr. Thomas H. Dudley got a man by the
name of Robert Thomas to swear that he knew me,
and had seen me frequently giving directions about the
Phruifom, and especially on one occasion inspecting and
* 'British Case,' Appendix, vol. ii., p. 209.

CONFEDEIIATE STATES IN EUROPE. 357

giving orders about the scre^v, during a trial which
occupied twenty minutes.* As a fact, I never was
on board the Phantom, nor even alongside of her, in my
life, and never heard of Mr. Robert Thomas until I saw
his name at the bottom of the above affidavit, and
I solemnly declare his statements to be false in every
jmrticular, so far as they relate to me. Mr. Dudley's
affidiivits always had a wonderful particularity in the
details. He seemed to have been determined, as he had
to pay for them, to get his money's worth.

Another one of the suspected craft was an old ricketty
iifty-gun ship called the Amphiun, which had been sold
out of one of her Majesty's dockyards ' as old material,'
and yet the United States Consul at London succeeded
in putting her purchasers to considerable trouble and
expense with the Admiralty about her. One vessel —
the Hector — turned out to be building for the British
Admiralty ; nevertheless, when she was launched Mr,
Adams contrived to get up a correspondence with the
Foreign Office and the Admiralty on the subject. f

It would be easy for me to give many more cases
of interference with the loading and despatch of vessels
from British ports during the war in deference to the
suspicions of the United States Minister. AVhenever an
American Consul thought the Confederate Government
had an interest in the cargo, or he felt the desire
to show his animosity to a supposed friend or sym-
2)athizer with the South, he could always find some one
to make the stereotyped affidavit, and the inquiry,
interference and delay would almost invariably follow.
There is no exaggeration in saying that there was much
difficulty and trouble in making shipments by vessels of

* 'British Case,' Appendix, vol. ii., pp. 171, 172.
t 'British Case,' Appendix, \o\. ii., p. 143, etc.

358 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

any description to Halifax, liennuda, the ])ahamas,
Havana or Matamoras during- the war, and the restric-
tions and necessary conceahnents added much to the
labour and expense of forwarding supplies to the Con-
federate States. And yet it must be remembered that
the trade, by the repeated declaration of her ^lajesty's
Ministers, was perfectly legitimate, and they professed
to enforce their neutrality with impartial fairness, or,
rather, indifference to the interests of either belli-
gerent.

I have stated, in the letter to the Secretary of the
Confederate Xavy cjuoted al30ve, that the neutrality of
England was practised in a way to give great advan-
tages to the United States. While the restrictions
placed upon all shipments which 'were made in vessels
not loading for one of the northern jDorts amounted
almost to a prohibition, I never heard of a single inter-
ruption to the trade in contraband Avith the United
States, nor do I know of a single instance in which
a vessel bound to that countr}^ was delayed a moment,
or asked what was the destination of her cargo, or made
to show whether the purpose was to arm her as a
national cruiser, or privateer, after her departure.

The United States Minister at London gave certificates
to British vessels loaded with arms and other contraband
articles for ]\Iexico during the French invasion of that
countr}', when he had satisfactory proof that the arms
were intended for the ■Mexican Govermnent, Ijut he
refused certificates to others who applied to him without
such proof. The former were protected from capture
by United States ships, but the latter were in several
cases captured on the high seas, and carried before the
American prize-courts (vide the case of the Pete?'hoJf\
mentioned above).

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 359

In Hansard, vol. clxx., Session 1863 (2), p. 576, etc.,
there is a report of a debate in the House of Commons
on the above subject (there were several debates). Mr.
Roebuck, commenting upon one of the permits given by
Mr. Adams says : ' That permit is granted. Why ?
Because that ship carried out arms to the Mexicans, to
be used against our ally, France.' In another case he
says : ' The permit was refused ; and now I must say
that Mr. Adams, the xA.merican Minister, is the ^Minister
for Commerce in England.'

In the same debate another member, ^Ir. Peacocke, gave
a very graphic and circumstantial account of the manner
in which the giving of the permits came about. He
said : ' The Mexican Government ordered supplies of
arms in the United States. Tlie Government of the
United States, however, arrested the vessel wdiicli was
to carry these arms. The ^lexican Government, as
well it might, remonstrated ; whereupon ^Ir. Seward
informed the ^lexican ^linister that he did not wish to
deprive him of a supply of arms to carry on the war
ao'ainst France, but the United States wanted those
arms themselves. " If, however," added Mr. Seward,
" you will send over to England and get arms, we
will give you every facility in our power." ' Mr.
Peacocke then explained that the j\Iexican officer
charged with the purchase of the arms came over to
England, provided with a letter to Mr. Adams, rec^uest-
ing that Minister to give him every assistance in his
power, in order to obtain arms to help the Mexicans in
their war vrith. France. ' It was under these circum-
stances,' adds Mr. Peacocke, ' and not from any
individual action taken on his own responsibility, that
Mr. Adams furnished the pass.' This, it must be
admitted, was permitting a very unusual power to the

3G0 THE SECIIET SERVICE OF THE

ITnitecl States IMinister, and tlic exercise of a very com-
preliensi\c belli <;erei it right.

But in demonstration of the favour and privileges
granted to the United States, as compared witli the
Avatchful restrictions imposed upon the Confederate
agents, it is not necessary for me to go be}'ond the
unlimited freedom to get and to ship whatever they
Avanted for their own use Avhicli the United States
enjoyed during the whole war. I will confine my state-
ment to the official returns, as printed in the British
Counter-case, p. 54, etc. It appears that m ^lay, 1862,
Mr. Adams, in compliance with instructions from ^Ir.
Seward, pressed on Lord Russell, in conversation, the
expediency of revoking the recognition of the belligerent
status of the Confederate Government, and mentioned,
in connection with this subject, the irritation produced
in the United States by the reports of supplies furnished
by private persons in England to the Confederates. Lord
Russell, in his reply, said ' that large supplies of similar
materials had been obtained in England on the part of
the United States, Avhich had been freely transported and
used against the " insurgents." '* Mr. Adams admitted
that at one time a c[uantity of arms and military stores
had been purchased in England ' as a purely commercial
transaction,' for the use of the Federal army ; but said
that he had earl}- objected to the practice, for the reason
that it prevented him from pressing his remonstrances
against a very different class of operations carried on b}'
friends and sympathizers with the ' rebels ' in England,
and it had been discontinued. Mr. Adams added that
' we ' (the Ignited States) ' had, indeed, purchased largely

* Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward, i-eporting the conversation with Lord
Eussell ; the word ' insurgents ' is Mr. Adams's, not Lord Eussell's,
who never speaks of the Confederates in that character.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 361

in Austria, but that Government had never given any
countenance to the insuro-ents.' Mr. Adams, courteous
as he generally Avas, could not, it appears, refrain from
having his fling at Lord Russell on this occasion. He
would have no more arms bou^'ht in Eno-land ' as a
purely commercial transaction,' because so mam' people
sympathized Avith the ' rebels ' in that free country ; he
would go to autocratic Austria, where there was no
sympathy Avitli ' insurgents.'

But Mr. Adams was mistaken in the statement that
purchases in England for the United States army had
been discontinued. Messrs. N^aylor, Vickers and Co., of
NeAv York, Liverpool, and London, bought and shipped
large quantities of small arms to the United States.
They Avere supplied from Birmingham alone Avith
156,000 rifles betvA^een June, 1862, and July, 1863.
They acted A^ery extensively as agents for the United
States GoA^ernment. The Assistant Secretary of War at
Washington, in a letter addressed to them on the 20th
of October, 1862, sanctioned an arrangement for the
supply of 100,000 rifles, and the acceptance of this order
Avas duly notified to the Secretary' of War by a letter
from Birmingham, dated November 4th, 1862. The
arms AA^ere sent to Liverpool for shipment. In December,
1863, fifty 6H-pounder yuns were proved at the Royal
Arsenal at Woolwich, at the request of Messrs. T. and C.
Hood, and after proof they Avere taken aAvay by Messrs.
Naylor, Vickers and Co. and shipped to New York.
There Avere other large purchases on behalf of the
United States.

The general results of these operations may be traced
in the official returns of exports from Great Britain
to the northern ports of the United States, published by
the Board of Trade. These show that, Avhereas the

362 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

average yearly export of small arms to those ports for the
years 1858, 1859, 1800, were 18,329; it rose in 1861 to
44,904, in 18G2 to 343,304, and amounted in 1863 to
124,928. These are the recorded shipments of small
arms ; but there is reason to believe that other
shipments, to a considerable extent, were made under
the denomination of hardware. Of percussion caps,
the average export in the years 1858, 1859, and 1860
was 55,620,000; in 1863 it rose to 171,427,000,
and in 1864 was 102,587,000. Of cannon and other
ordnance the exports in the year 1862 alone were
valued at £82,920, while the aggregate value of
the exports for the other nine years, from 1858 to
1861, and from 1863 to 1867, was but £3,33(;. The
exports of saltpetre for the years 1858 to 1861 had
averaged 248 tons yearly. The purchases for the
United States Government raised tlie amount to 3,189
tons for the year 1862 alone. The amount of lead
shi})ped, Avhich had averaged 2,810 tons yearly, rose in
1862 and 1864 to 13,148 and 11,786 tons respectively.
I might give further statistics in reference to military
clothing and other supplies, but the foregoing is
sufficient to show the enormous quantity of articles
contraband of war which were l30ught by the Tnited .
States in England during the war, and then shipped,
chiefly from Liverpool, without let or hindrance, inter-
ference, vexatious inquiry, or delay, on the part of any
local authority, and I wish particularly to call attention
to the lifty 68-pounders proved at the Royal Arsenal at
Woolwich and then shipped to New York.

The State Department at AYashington, and the
Consuls who received their inspiration from its chief,
induliiX'd often in what Lord Russell called 'figures
of rhetoric ' when addressing her Majesty's Government

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 363

on subjects appertaining to the war. The compilers
of the ' Case ' presented to the Tribunal of Arbitration at
Geneva on behalf of the United States, appear to have
drunk deeply from the same fountain. It is stated by
them, as a complaint, that England was ' the arsenal,
the navy-yard, and the treasury of the insurgents.'
There is no doubt that the Confederate Government
bought supplies of all kinds in England, and that
money was provided to pay for them, and persons were
employed to purchase, forward, and ship them ; but the
quantity of articles bought and money expended must
have been, I was almost going to say insignificant — at
any rate it was small — in comparison with the opera-
tions of the United States.

I have read nearly the whole ' Case of the United
States,' and do not find it asserted that the rifles,
cannon, saltpetre, etc., mentioned above, found their way
to I^ew York without any purchasing or financinl
agents to transact the business. It is probable that
many agents were employed in such large transactions,
and therefore branches of the War, ISTavy, and Treasury
Departments of the United States were to be found in
England, in the same sense that those departments
of the Confederate Government were represented there.
However, we are not left in doubt on this point. From
the documents laid before the Tribunal of Arbitration, we
learn that the United States eno-ao-ed laro;e warehouses
at Birmingham for the reception of arms when com-
pleted, after which they were shipped through the
agency of Messrs. Barings and Messrs. Brown, Shipley
and Co.,* and we have already seen that they had
guns proved at Woolwich. There also appears in
the British Appendix, vol. vi., p. 154, a letter from
* ' British Counter-Case,' p. 53.

364 THE >SECHET SERVICE OF THE

the Secretary of "W^ar at AVashinoton to one of his
agents — a Mr. Schuyler — in wliich he says : ' You
will please express my acknowledgments to Messrs.
Baring Brothers and Co. for their prompt and patriotic
action in facilitating your operations. The terms
ofiered by 31essrs. Baring Brothers and Co., namely
one per cent, commission, and five per cent, interest per
annum, as agreed upon by them Avith the Navy Depart-
ment, are a])proved.'

Alessrs. Baring lirothers and Co. are a very eminent
banking firm, as all the world knows. Their financial
arrangements with the AVar and Xavy Departments of
the United States were no doubt in strict conformity
with neutral duties — at least, that may be inferred from
the statements of Earl Russell, for in a letter to
Mr. Adams already quoted above, he said : ' Her
Majesty's Government cannot interfere with commercial
dealings between British subjects and the so-styled
Confederate States, whether the object of those dealings
be money, or contraband goods, or even ships adapted
for warlike purposes.' The Confederate agents have
advanced this declaration of her Majesty's Secretary of
State for Foreign Aftairs as a complete justification for
all their dealings with British subjects, and they do not
deny that it can and should be applied to the agencies
of the United States with equal j^ertinence and compre-
hensiveness. r)ut there is a special diflerence between
the financial operations of the two belligerents in
England in this particular, that while the Confederate
Government dealt with private merchants and tradesmen
exclusively, wlio ^vere not bound by any specific under-
taking to investigate the spirit and letter of the
neutrality laws, but might fairly and conscientiously
deal in money, contraband goods, or ships ' as jjurely

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 365

mercantile transactions,' the United States had their
Treasury Department in England at the office of
bankers whose leading partner was a member of Parlia-
ment, who was bound by his oath, as well as b}-
the ordinary precepts of loyalty, to follow with scrupu-
lous nicety the spirit as well as the letter of the law, and
to set an example of strict and impartial compliance with
her Majesty's Proclamation of Neutrality.

Mr. T. Baring's name appears in Hansard* as a warm
advocate of the North in the del)ates on the Alabama
question, and he urged the Grovernment to give the
United States some assurance that they would prevent
the Confederates obtaining ships in England, which he
said might ])e the cause of a war betAveen Great Britain
and the aggrieved Republic across the water. Now, the
Government of the United States invariably denounced
the shipbuilders, the tradesmen, the financiers, who in
the ordinar}^ and legitimate course of their business had
commercial dealino's with the Confederate Government.
They charged them with disloyalty, with violating the
neutrality of their country, and endangering its peace,
and often added epithets and insinuations which were
personal and oiFensive. Did Mr. Seward and his Secre-
tary of War really think that the house of Baring
Brothers, with its Parliamentary member, could lend
them money to buy guns, and rifles, and saltpetre —
could forward the goods for them and perform such
other services in ' facilitating the operations ' of their
agents as to earn the highest commendation they could
bestow, and yet be wholly fi-ee from a like criminality
mth those who were only doing the same things in kind,
but hardly in degree, for the Confederates ? I suppose
the use of the word '■jmtriotie' in the commendatory
* See especially vol. clxx., 1863 (2), p. 59.

366 THE SECRET SEE J 'ICE OF THE

letter of the United States Secretary of AVar in reference
to Messrs. Baring- must have been a sli[) of the pen. It
is one of those infelicitous and inappropriate expressions
Avhich sometimes creep into liastily written documents,
or escape from an over-fluent orator. A member of the
Britisli House of Commons is quite free to advocate any
cause which a})peals to his sympathies, and whose prin-
ciples coincide with his convictions ; but when the great
commercial firm to which he belongs embarks in a large
financial operation with a foreign belligerent, however
ably, faithfully, and energetically he may serve the
interests of his clients, we must look for some other
word to describe his conduct than that expression which
can only be fitly used in reference to services rendered
fi'om amor patrice.

I most earnestly and emphatically disclaim the
slightest wish or j^urpose to reflect in any wa}' uj^on the
house of Messrs. liaring Brothers, or to intimate that
the member of the firm who sat in the House of Com-
mons committed any fault. I have mentioned their
name, and commented upon their transactions Avith the
United States, historically. The fixcts are recorded in
the diplomatic correspondence, and in the proceedings
in the Geneva Arbitration, and I have used them, together
with other statements mentioned above, to illustrate the
relative attitudes of the two belligerents in respect to
the neutrality of Great Britain, and to demonstrate that
if England was the ' arsenal and treasury ' of the Con-
federate Government, as has been alleged, the same may
be said in a stricter as well as in a still more compre-
hensive sense with reference to the United States, whose
War Oflices were so completely and definitely established
that they had warehouses for the storing of arms and
the use of public arsenals for proving guns, and whose

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 367

Treasury may be said to have been represented in the
British House of Commons.

In a debate on the Foreign Enlistment Act, March 27th,
I860, Lord Pahnerston,* commenting upon the allega-
tion that the Government had failed to detain vessels
supposed to be intended for the Confederate States upon
reasonable suspicion, said, ' Is it not fair for us to say
that so far as suspicions go, we have been informed —
perhaps erroneously — that not onl}* have arms been
despatched to the Northern ports of the United States,
but that efforts have been made, in Ireland especiall}", to
enlist persons to serve in the Federal army and navy?
Unquestionably a great many cases have occurred in
North America in which British subjects have been
seized and attempts made to compel them to serve
against their will in the Civil War.'

I have already mentioned two cases in which the sus-
picions caused interference with two vessels alleged to
be taking recruits from Liverpool for the United States
army, but I have not been able to discover a single
instance of interference with a vessel loadins^ with arms
and other war supplies for the United States, and I can
find no record of a single ship being detained an hour to
give account of her cargo, or her destination, if she was
clearing out for a IsTorthern jDort, and was duly certified
by the local United States Consul. It was very different
with ships of any description loading for a British colony,
for Cuba or for Mexico. The mere allegation of an
American Consul that he had reason to believe that she
was intended for a Confederate cruiser was sufficient to
cause immediate investigation, often complete stoppage
of the work during the inquiry, and in many instances a
complete prevention of the voyage. Sometimes the com-
* Hansard, vol. clxx., 1863 (2), p. 93.

368 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

j^laints of the United States were conclied in sucli exag-
gerated terms,* and tliey put forward .such astoundmg
chiinis against Great Britain for the depredations of
Confederate cruisers, tliat Lord Russell ventured upon a
retort, as, for exam])le, October 26th, 1803,1 he tells
]\lr. Adams that if her Majesty's Government were to
ap])ly the principle of interfering with the trade of sliip-
building as broadly as the United States wished, a source
of honest livelihood to great numbers of British subjects
would be seriously embarrassed and imjieded : and he
then remarks : * I ]iiay add that it appears strange that,
notwithstanding the large and powerful naval force
possessed by the Government of the United States, no
efficient measures have been taken by tliat Government
to capture the Alnhania.^

I do not propose to discuss the conduct of her Majesty's
Government towards the Confederate States during the
Civil War with reference either to international law or
comity. The result of the Avar has been to obliterate
the jJolitical status of those States as a separate and de
facto Power, and no one is now competent to argue such
questions on their behalf with an}^ practical purpose.
Nevertheless, it will always remain a subject of interest
to the five or six million people of the Southern States
and their posterity, and it will always be an embarrassing
problem for them to determine the reasons A\hy the
British ^Ministry of 1861 — 65 acted towards the Con-
federate States in a manner so inconsistent with their
own interpretation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, con-
firmed as that interpretation was by the unreversed

* See letter of Mr. Adams to Earl Eiissell, dated October 23rd,
1863, 'North America,' No. 1, 1864, Parliamentary Blue Book,
p. 26.

t Reply to Mr. Adams's letter above, p. 42, No. 19.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 369

judgment of a court of law. ' There is no difference in
principle between supplying a belligerent with muskets,
cannon, and ammunition, or with ships that are to
operate in war.' ' Her Majesty's Government cannot
interfere with commercial dealings between British sub-
jects and the so-styled Confederate States, whether the
ol3Ject of those dealings be money, or contraband goods,
or even ships adapted for warlike purposes.' ' The
Alabama might have been legitimately l3uilt by a foreign
Government, and though a ship-of-war, she might have
formed a legitimate article of merchandise, even if meant
for the Confederate States.' ' An English shipbuilder
may build any kind of ship to a commercial order, or
merely in compliance with a contract ; and the purchaser
mny make what use of her afterwards he sees fit.' These
are the official declarations of the two principal members
of the Ministry which governed England during the
American Civil War, of the Solicitor-General under the
same Government, and the unreversed judgment of the
Lord Chief Baron of the Exchecpier.

I think anyone who fairly and impartially examines
the facts connected with the seizure of ships alleged to
have been bought or built for the Confederate Govern-
ment, and the repeated detention of vessels, and inter-
ference with their loading, when it was supposed that
their cargoes were ultimately intended for a Southern
port, will admit that the Foreign Enlistment Act was
not administered in accordance with the above declara-
tions and judgment, so far as the Confederate States were
concerned ; and that the neutrality of Great Britain was
practised in such a manner as greatly to embarrass and
hinder the efforts of that belligerent who most needed
what she could supply, and Avhich the said belligerent
was desirous to buy in a fair way of trade.

VOL. I. 24

370 THE SECni'JT SERVICE OE THE

A\ lien the American colonies rebelled ai^Jiinst the
British Crown, they obtained substantial aid from
France, before the Government of Louis XYI. became a
party to the war. When the S})anish American pro-
vinces revolted from Spain, England and the United
States did not preserve a very ri^^'orous neutrality, but
permitted the strui»'gling' colonists to get much help in
men and ships. When (ireece Avas labouring for her
freedom, almost the whole Christian world sent her
succour of some sort. When (^ueen Isabella was battling
for her crown a^'ainst Don Carlos, the En<>-lish Foreiii'n
Enlistment Act was suspended to permit a British
general, with a British legion, to light in her behalf.
When the conflicting claims of Dona ]\Iaria and Don
Miguel had kindled the fires of Civil War in Portuu'al,
a British admiral was permitted to command the naval
forces of one of the parties and to retain his commission
in the l)ritish navy. When Pope Pio Nono was fighting
for his temporalities, he had his Irish battalion and his
foreign les-ion, recruited without much difficultv among
the Catholic States. When the Italian people were
expelling King ]^)omba and the reigning dukes, the
chief comliatants on the popular side were Garibaldi's
volunteers, including many foreigners and * Garibaldi's
Englishman ' amonc: them. When Servia was striving
to free herself from the suzerainty of Turkey, a
Russian general commanded her active army in the
field, and volunteers from neutral Ivussia filled her
ranks. Even in the Franco -Prussian War of 1870,
Garibaldi, the restless Revolutionist, broke up his
hermitage at Caprera, and brought a band of men in the
traditional red shirt to fight for France.

The list is not exhausted. ^lemory furnishes me
with no record of a struo-o-le for freedom, or between

Do /

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUBOPE. 371

t\YO great contending- factions of the same people, or of
a weaker state strivini'' to maintain itself ao-ainst the
aggression of a stronger, in which the merits of the
contest, the gallantry of the weaker side, or the common
human instincts which have impelled men in all past
time to help those who aj^peared to need help, did not
bring the required succour in some practical form. The
South alone, so far as I know, was left to fight her
arduous and prolonged battle with no foreign aid, and
with but a 2'rudo-ino; allo\Yance of the necessities she was
able to pay for. A few gallant, sympathetic men like
Prince Poli2:nac and Heros von Borke brou<jht their
stout hearts to her aid ; but the men who followed
Lee and Beauregard, Stonewall Jackson, Longstreet,
and other Confederate chiefs, were the sons of the
soil, and a few English and Irish, and still fewer
Germans, who from long residence had come to love
the country and its people and were practically
Southerners.

I cannot call to mind — I believe there never has been
— a great war, fought against such odds, not in men
alone, but in every element of military power, in which
the weaker side has persevered so long and endured so
patiently, and then after defeat has murmured so little
and set so manfully to work to retrieve its losses.

I wish to draw no comparisons between the combat-
ants, and I know too much of both North and South to
doubt that there are thousands of brave, earnest, true,
and loyal men in each and every section of the Union.
Many thousands of gallant men went from every
Northern State to the battlefields of the South, and
sacrificed their lives, honestly believing that the national
life was bound up in the Union of the States, and that
they must fight to maintain that Union. There were

24—2

372 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

hundreds of men in the armies of the United States,
subalterns and field-officers of regiments, brigade and
division commanders, who filled their offices not only
Avith admirable courage, but Avitli all the dash, judg-
ment, and tactical skill that their ])ositions required ; but
taking a comprehensive view of the war at this distance
of time, with temper cool and judgment free from bias, I
am of the o])inion that the United States did not find
the man — he might have been there — I only say that
they did not find the man for a chief-commander, who
displayed more than average ability as a military
strateo-ist.

Sadowa was won, and the Austro-Prussian War was
ended in a campaign of about seven weeks, by the
superior skill of the Prussian Chief-of- Staff". France was
crushed, two of her great armies capitulated, one in the
field, one from the shelter of a strongly fortified position.
The whole of her eastern and northern provinces were
overrun, and her capital was occupied by a German
corps (tminee, after little more than a year's fighting.
No one believes that the Austrians are wanting in
courage, or in high military qualities ; and French
troops have marched as victors over nearly the whole of
Continental Europe. Facts now known have proved
that Prussia in 1866 was better prepared for active
war than Austria, and the German armies were doubtless
more efficiently organized in 1870 than those of France.
But looking at the relative military strength of these
three Powers, their population, wealth, war material in
possession, and ability to keep up the supply, it must
be admitted that the difi'erence, if any, was not sufficient
to account in any way for the quickness and thorough-
ness of the results, and we must look to the genius of
Yon Moltke for the explanation.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 373

The South was ahnost wholly destitute of war
material, and could supply herself only by driblets, and
at very great cost. Almost from the start she was
isolated by blockade from communication with the
countries from which she might have drawn sujjplies.
She had no natural lines of defence, but was open to
invasion along a frontier of many hundreds of miles.
Rivers, sounds, and inlets, which she had no naval force
to defend, afforded access to her very heart. Her means
of inland communication were hardly more than equal
to the requirements of ordinary passenger and goods
traffic, and proved wholly insufficient for war transport.
The difficulty of arming the troops in the field was so
great that they never were supplied with a uniform
weapon, and powder Avas so scarce and difficult to
obtain, that it was found necessary to form artificial
nitre beds for its manufacture, and some of them were
not ' ripe ' for use at the end of the war. The difficulty
of transportation was so great that it was impossible to
get supplies to the front, and the troops in the field
were often on poor and insufficient rations. The
medical staff was so deficient in all kinds of necessaries
for the comfort and treatment of the sick and wounded,
that many men died from sheer want of them, and
thousands were unshod and without greatcoats, even in
winter. When all these drawbacks and deficiencies are con-
sidered, there still remains the important item of numbers,
and I think it is only a fair estimate to say that the
actual fighting population of the South, that is to say,
the number of males capable of bearing arms, was not
more than one-fifth of those of the same class in the
States which adhered to the Union. Thus over-matched,
the South resisted for four years, and some of the most
desj)erate combats of the war were fought during the

374 THE SECBET SERVICE OF TEE

advance upon Tvichmond, and along the lines between
tlie James lliver and Petersburu', durinii" the last months
of the strug-g'le, when she was well-nigh exhausted —
when, as General Grant is reported to have said, she had
' robbed the cradle and the grave ' to supply her armies
m the field.

It appears to me that the South could not have held
out so long if the opposing power had been wielded
with a superior military skill. ])ut I have no wish to
pursue this topic farther. The military historian of the
future will duly consider all these facts, and the generals
who figured in the great Civil AYar will be placed in
theirrelative positions, without reference to the adulations
which partial friendship, or partizan bias, may have
heaped upon them in the years just passed.

The Southern people know that many persons in
England sympathized with them, and that their cause
was not without able and eloquent advocates in both
Houses of the British Parliament. It was very generally
thought that at least two members of the Cabinet were
also very favourably inclined towards the South, but that
prudential and other reasons, and the belief that the
rupture was final, induced the Cabinet, as a whole, to de-
cline committing the Government to an open recognition
of the Confederate States.

The action of the ^linisters, I think, demonstrated
clearly that they were agitated by unsettled views ; they
vacillated and did not act up to their own declarations ;
they did and said things which deceived both sides —
which excited hopes at the South, and caused irritation
at the North ; and this wavering policy ended at last in
the payment of £3,000,000 to the United States, for
alleged offences which Lord Russell had often repudiated,
and for not restrainino- the Confederates from doins^ in

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 375

England what he more than once declared he neither
could nor would prevent. Perhaps now that the w^ar is
over, the States reunited, and the people of the two
sections are drawing near to each other in sympathy, and
in the Ijonds of common interests, it is well that the
South has no debt of gratitude to pay, and that the
Xorth is findino- out that she has no real oTudo-e to
nurse against England. These great political convul-
sions follow the inscrutable laws of Providence, and
W'hen the main issues and the grand results are con-
trolled by a Power we cannot resist, and dare not
question, it is hardly worth while to perplex our minds,
and to vex our souls by snarling at each other over the
paltrj' details.

It is necessary, perhaps, to state that the Foreign
Enlistment Act referred to in this narrative is the Act
of 1818, and all the remarks upon the neutrality laws of
Great Britain, and the registry and clearance of vessels,
have reference to the condition of the law durini>' the
years 1861-65, when the alleged offences of the Con-
federates w^ere committed. Since then (1867) the law
in respect to the clearance of vessels has been changed,
and in consequence of the report of the Neutrality Com-
mission, a new and very stringent ' Foreign Enlist-
ment Act ' was passed in 1870. The statute as it now
stands will prove very vexatious to the ship-building
trade whenever England is again a neutral during a great
wai*. It seems to me that the ship-building trade will
then be at tlie mercy of the Consuls of the contending
parties.

37G THE SECL'ET SELTICE OF THE

CHAPTER YII.

Review of tlie Situation in Xovember, 1861. — Changed purposes of
the Confederate Government in regard to their naval operations.—
Al•nlOur-ck^d vessels required. — Two contracted for with Messrs.
Laird Brothers. — Correspondence concerning them. — Their transfer
to Messrs. Bravay, and their ultimate purchase by Government and
enrolment in her Majesty's navy as the Scorpmi and the JFirern. —
Action of her Majesty's Government and that of the United
States in reference to these vessels. — Inconsistency of the declara-
tions and actions of the British Government.

Ax explanation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, and the
manner in which it was made applicable to the operations
of the Confederate agents in England ap2)eared to be a
necessary part of the history of those operations ; and
the account of the ' xUexandra Case,' which furnished a
practical exposition of the statute, has again carried
the narrative far in advance of the due course of events.
The chief purpose of the Confederate Government in
sending me to Europe was at first to get ships afloat
ca})al)le of keeping the sea as long as possible, and other-
wise fitted to cruise and destroy the enemy's commerce ;
and my original instructions were to jDut six suitable
vessels in commission with all reasonable des^^atch.
Insufficiency of money, and the pressing wants of the
Navy Department in other respects, compelled me to
limit the number to the two whose des23atch from

CONFEDEriATE STATES IN EUROPE. 'ill

England lias already been described ; and it soon became
manifest that they were enough to drive the American
commercial flag away from the principal routes of trade.
But the designs of the Government assumed a broader
range after my departure from Montgomery, and the
reality and magnitude of the war in which the country
was involved had become apparent.

By the time of my return to the Confederacy in the
Fingal (N^ovember, 1861), the battles of Bull Ivun and
Leesburo'h had been fouo'ht : there had been some active
campaigning in Western Virginia ; Port Royal and the
chief inlets of the great North Carolina Sounds had been
occupied by the United States forces ; and a blockade of
the southern coast from the Chesapeake to the Mississippi,
and even beyond as far west on the gulf- shore as Sabine
Pass, had been proclaimed. The coast Avas too long for
the number of ships then on the United States navy-list
to guard effectively ; but Europe, and indeed all the
neutral states, Avere satisfied with the assurance that a
sufiicient force would soon be placed off the ports and
chief inlets to justify the distinction between a genuine
and a proper blockade, and they had acknowledged the
state of war and the legitimate consequences appertaining
to that condition.

The Confederate Government had also removed to
Richmond, the several Executive Departments had been
more completely organized, and there was a general
conviction among the higher and more experienced
officials that the contest would be fierce, and probably
long. Winter weather had set in. Active campaigning
had ceased along the northern frontier of Virginia.
The two combatants were warily watching each other,
and each was preparing to renew hostilities on a large
scale. The United States were organizing a great army

378 THE SECBET SERVICE OF THE

on the Potomac, for an effective, and they hoped a
crasliing, advance upon liichniond in the early spring
of 18{)2, The Confederate Government was straining
every nerve to equip the forces necessary to repel
tlic threatened invasion, and to occupy the many weak
points along the extended line of land frontier and sea
coast.

Although the enemy's naval strength had enabled
him to occupy with but little resistance a number
of important points, such as Port Royal, Poanoke
Inlet, etc., and to place there, under cover of liis ships,
military forces which proved to be a constant and
embarrassing menace, yet on the whole the Ijalance
of success up to that time was in favour of the Con-
federates. The advance upon Richmond by way of
Pull Pun had certainly been the largest and most
important operation of the war at the close of 18G1, and
the invading army had been so thoroughly beaten at
that now historic creek, tliat the remnant fled into
AVashino;ton without oro-anization or collesi^'eness, a
mere flj'ing rabble. General ^McDowell's army at ]3ull
Run was a larger and more efficient force in every
respect than the liastily gathered and ill-armed
volunteers under Peauregard and Johnstone, and I
believe it is generally admitted that his dispositions were
judicious, and that his plan of advance and attack was
skilfully and energeticalh' executed, so far as his own
efforts and those of his staff' were concerned. Accord-
ing to all sound rules of calculation, he ought to
have won the battle in spite of the unquestioned gallantry
and stubborn hardihood of the Southern troops. The
sudden panic which seized the Federal armv. and which
drove whole brigades into confusion, and then precipi-
tated them into a headlong rout of unparalleled confusion

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 379

and dismay, is simply a fact in the history of the war
which I shall not attempt to explain. I saw the effect
in the feeling of hopeful confidence which the event had
inspired among the Southern people, and yet it was
manifest that the hig-her authorities at Richmond were
not possessed by any vain expectation that another
Federal army would run away, or that the Confederate
States would win their independence, except by hard
fighting and patient endurance.

The War Department was steadily and systematically
collecting material, and massing troops. The Xavy
Department was striving to build and equip vessels at
several coast places, and on some inland waters, for
harbour and river defence, and had begun to entertain
hopes of doing something more abroad than to com-
mission ships to cruise against the enemy's commerce.
The Treasury Department was hard at work upon the
finances, devising means of converting the great staples
which remained in the country into money, or discussing
how they might be used as the basis of credit in Europe
to meet the Avants of the two fighting departments of
the Government.

I have already (Chapter III.) given some account
of the views and purposes of the Navy Department
at the time above referred to, and of the es])ecial
duties assigned me. In the subsequent course of the
narrative the change in respect to my own services and
employment has been necessarily mentioned, and now
I must further relate a still more important advance
in the purposes of the Confederate Government with
respect to naval operations against the enemy.

It will be remembered that on my arrival at Savannah
with the Fingal in November, 1861, I was immediately
ordered to Richmond for consultation with the Navy

380 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

Department. Amono- tlie many matters discussed was
the subject of ironclad vessels, and the Secretary of the
Navy (Hon. S. R. ^lallory) was much impressed with
the im[)ortance of getting- vessels of that description to
match the enemy's ' ^Monitors,' and to open and protect
the blockaded ports. He told me that he had sent
Lieutenant James H. i^ortli to England to inquire into
the construction of such vessels, but had not yet heard
from him.

^Ir. ^lallory's earnest desire was to find the money
to build, and to decide upon the best t3'pe of armoured
vessels for operations on the coast. It was impossible
to build them in the Confederate States — neither the
materials nor the mechanics were there ; and besides,
even if iron and skilled artizans had been within reach,
there was not a mill in the country to roll the plates,
nor furnaces and machinery to forge them, nor shops to
make the engines.

I gave all the information I then had on the subject,
and ]\lr. 3Iallory directed me to make further and more
especial inquiries as soon as I got back to England, but
nothing definite was decided when I left Richmond.
Just before leavino- Savannah en route for Wilmino-ton,
to run the blockade of that port, I received specific
instructions on the subject in a letter from the Xavy
Department, of Avhicli the following is a copy: —

' JSTavy Department,

'Richmond, Januari/ 14//t, 1862.

' Sir,—

' I desire more particularly to direct your atten-
tion to the subject of constructing iron or steel clad
ships in France or England than was done in my letter
of the lltli inst. Lieutenant Xortli has had this matter

CONFEDEBATE STATES IN EUROPE. 381

in charge, but has not yet been able to do anything
with it. I earnestly desire to have an armoured steam-
sloop of moderate size, say of about 2,000 tons, and to
carr}^ eight or ten heavy guns, built in England upon
the most approved plan and in the shortest time, and
the evident change of feeling and opinion in England in
relation to our country induces me to believe that we
may now contract for the construction and delivery of
such a vessel.'

Then follow some general comments upon the Gloire.
Warrior^ and Black Prince :

' ]\Iany plans of such a vessel have been submitted,
and herewith I send you the drawings, without specifi-
cations of the one devised by N^aval-Constructor Porter

and Chief- Engineer Williamson I submit this

plan for your information only ; but so anxious am I to
have an ironclad ship built, that should you and Lieu-
tenant North, with whom I associate you in this matter,
be able to contract, or to make the preparatory arrange-
ments to contract, for an armoured, either steel or iron
clad, ship, you Avill proceed with despatch to prescribe
the character of the vessel, and I will place the funds in

England at once

' I am, etc..

' Captain James D. Bulloch,
' Savannah, Georgia.'

' S. E. Mallory.
' Secretary of the Xavy

Anyone who cares to refer to the leading newspaper
articles, and who remembers the general tone of public
sentiment in England at about the date of the above
letter, will, I think, admit that there was a very apparent
tendency of opinion towards a feeling of sympathy

382 THE SECnET SEIIVICE OF THE

with the Confederate cause, and that the Government at
Jiicluiiond had reason at that time to expect, if not
formal recognition, at least that degree of passive en-
couragement wliich would enable their agents to obtain
all necessary 8up])lies without furtlier restraint than was
sufficient to maintain a fair impartial neutrality.

I arrived in Liverpool on the lOth of March, and
began at once to examine into the question of ironclads,
which the Secretary of the j^avy had so much at heart.
On the 21st of ]\Iarch I advised him that I was in fall
treaty with competent builders, and hoped to be able to
send a detailed report, with plans, etc., in a very short
time. I soon perceived, however, by the strict watch
upon the Florida, Avhicli I was then trying to despatch
from Liverpool, and from the espionage upon the
Alabama, and other signs, that the Foreign Enlistment
Act would be most rigorously enforced in respect to all
undertakings on behalf of the Confederate Government,
and in a despatch dated April 11th, 18G2, 1 reported my
fears on the subject, and ventured to ask whether it
would not be well to concentrate all the resources of the
Xavy Department for the defence of the home ports, and
I then added : —

' I find that several parties ^vould contract for any
description of ship, but, as I have before remarked, an
ironclad sea-going ship must be large, and would require
at least a year to complete after the order was received
on this side. I would therefore respectfully suggest that
wooden vessels be laid down at once at the various ports
in the Confederacy, where timber is abundant, then, l^y
sending over scale drawings, or working jDlans, of their
decks and sides, the iron plates, rivets, bolts, etc., could
be made here, marked, and shipped to arrive as soon as
the vessels would be readv to receive them.'

CONFEDEnATE STATES IN EUROPE. 383

Later in the war, vessels were built in the Confederate
States — at least they were begun- — -and engines were sent
from England for them ; but ni}' suggestion did not
promptly reach the ^avy DejDartment, and at the begin-
ning the Grovernment was impressed with the feeling
that the arrogant tone of Mr. Seward's despatches to the
United States Ministers abroad, and the excessive harsh-
ness with which the right of search and of capture was
practised by the United States cruisers upon neutral
vessels, would either create active opposition, and per-
haps interference Avith the blockade, or would so irritate
the Maritime Powers that they would not be over- strict
in pressing their neutralit}' laws. Hence it was thought
advisable to begin a few ironclad vessels at once.

At any rate, it was my duty to carry out the views of
the Executive Government, and I pushed on with all
possible arrangements, so as to be ready to act promptly
as soon as definite instructions were received. Com-
munication by letter with the Confederate States was
generally slow, as our mails had to go to Bermuda and
Nassau, and thence wait the departure of a blockade-
runner which the Government agent would be willing
to trust. Sometimes, however, we sent cypher
despatches through Baltimore, and got very quick
replies ; but this could only be done under great reserve,
and for very special purposes. On the 10th of June,
1862, I received a long despatch from the Navy Depart-
ment, treating of general matters. It was dated April
oOth, and so had been forty-one days coming. That
letter contained sjoecific instructions to begin at least
two iron-clad vessels, and I replied by the first return-
ing' mail for Bermuda, via Halifax.

The following extract from my despatch relates to the
above-mentioned instructions :

384 THE SECUET SEE VICE OE THE

•Finding, on my arrival in England in March, 1862,
that Lieutenant Xorth had, as he informed me, specific
orders to buy or l)uild a frigate, and that he had already
made arrangements to contract for sucli a vessel as soon
as the necessary funds arrived, I devoted myself 2)rimarily
to the especial duties assigned me ; l)ut as vessels (iron-
clad) capable of acting efficiently either in the attack
or defence of our coast must necessarily be of light
draught, I put myself in communication witli eminent
iron-shipbuilders, whose position enabled them to obtain
the official reports of all experiments, with the view of
determining the minimum draft compatible with sea-
worthiness. It resulted, from a close calculation of
weights and form of model, that by using turrets instead
of broadside liatteries, whereby the sides would be
relieved from much strain and the lieav}' Aveights be
thrown over the centre, a vessel might be built of about
the following dimensions : length, 230 feet ; beam,
extreme, 42 feet ; draft, Avith crew and stores for three
months, 15 feet; engines, 3oO-horse-power nominal;
speed, 10^ knots ; tonnage, 1,850.

' I immediatel}'^ directed the plans and scale-drawings
of such a ship to be made, and reported to you by letter
that I would forward them as soon as they were ready
and an opportunity offered. AVhile this was going on —
I think about the middle of May — Lieutenant North
received a remittance of $150,000, unaccompanied by
any letter of advice, as I was informed ; and supposing
it to be for the uses mentioned in his original in-
structions, he prepared at once to close up a contract for
an armoured frigate, and notified me of the fact.

' I advised him that a ship of less size, cost, and draft
could be built ; but he deemed his orders specific and
peremptory as to class of ship, and contracted for a

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 385

frigate of 3,200 tons accordingly. About the lOth of
June I received your letter of April 30th, in which you
say : " I write to Commander Semmes to take command
of the largest of the two vessels built by you, and I
Avrite also to Lieutenant ^orth to take command of the
other vessel ;" and you direct me to furnish those officers
with funds for cruising expenses. As to myself you say :
" I hasten to urge upon you the necessity of having
at least two armoured vessels built and equipped at
the earliest possible moment." " Act upon your own
judgment, to save time. British inquiry and experi-
ments, and your own knowledge of the bars and waters
of our country', will enable you to act advisedly."

' To render these instructions possible of fulfilment,
you inform me that one million of dollars has already
been placed to my credit with ^lessrs. Fraser, Trenholm
and Co., and that you hope to increase the amount to
two millions ver}" soon.

' Fortunately, I was in a position to act promptly
upon those instructions. The drawings and plans
ordered were nearly finished, and on the day after the
receipt of your letter I requested the parties who had
been assisting me all along to make a tender for the
contract, having previously provided myself with esti-
mates fi'om other builders who competed for Admiralty
contracts. In a few days the price was agreed upon,
and I gave a verbal order for tA^^o vessels, so that no
time should be lost in contracting for the large quantity
of armour plates required. By giving the order for
both vessels to the same builders I got a reduction of
£1,250 on the cost of each, and by adopting the same
size and model of ship, and a like form of engines, they
can both be completed in very nearly the same time.
Besides this, experience has taught me that it is far

VOL. I. 25

386 THE SECRET SEBVICE OF THE

safer to keep our business as little extended as possible,
as otherwise the chance of our transactions beini>" ferreted
out by the Federal spies, who abound even in this
country, is greatly increased.

' For full description of these vessels, I beg to refer
you to the drawings. ... A clause in the contract
gives me the right to modify or alter them in certain
particulars, as experience, during the progress of the
work, mav suo-o-est.'

Here follows a minute description of the peculiar
construction and rig of the ships.

' The first of these ships will be ready for sea in
J\larch, I8G0, and the second in Ma}*. Cost of each,
fully equi])p^d, except magazines and battery, £93,750.'

I added that the contracting parties had shown great
confidence in me by taking this large contract upon my
assurance that the money would be forthcoming, and I
hoped that the remittances would be forwarded so as to
ensure prompt payment of the several instalments as
they fell due. The builders with whom I contracted
for the above ships were Messrs. Laird Brothers, of
Birkenhead, and the whole of the arrangements were
made in the same wav as those for the buildins^ of the
Alabama. They treated with me as a private individual,
and the contract was a purely ' conmiercial transaction,'
the agreement being that they should build and deliver
the two vessels to me in the port of Liverpool, finished
according to the stipulated specifications, but furnished
only Avith such fittings and outfit as were required for
an ordinary sea -voyage. In order to avoid every pos-
sible appearance of an intent to arm them within British
jurisdiction, it was arranged that no magazines were to
be placed in either shij^, nor any special places for
stowing shells and ordnance stores.

CONFEDEBATE STATES IN EUROPE. 387

I have stated very confidently that at the time of
contractinof for the Alabama the Messrs. Laird knew
nothing of my connection with the Confederate Govern-
ment, but at the date Avhen the contracts for the two
armoured vessels were concluded, the Florida had already
left Liverpool and the Alabama was nearly ready to
start. ]\Iy name had been often mentioned in the
United States Consul's affidavits as an agent of the
Confederate Navy Department, and they (the Messrs.
Laird) had no doubt been informed of those affidavits,
and knew therefore as much, but no more, than anyone
else whose attention had been attracted to the two
handsome-looking and handy vessels which were alleged
to be the property of one of the belligerents across the
sea.

I wish to make no mystery of these proceedings, nor
to set up a pretence that the Messrs. Laird did not
believe that the two formidable vessels they were about
to build would ultimately find their way to a Confederate
port ; all that I affirm is that they never heard from me
that I was not building the vessels for my own j^ersonal
account, and throughout the whole of the transactions
nothing was said by them as to the intent. They
undertook ' to build the two ships in obedience to
an order, and in compliance with a contract, leaving-
it to those Avho bought them to make what use they
thought fit of them,' a transaction which, it must be
remembered, was subsequently pronounced by the Lord
Chief Baron of the Exchequer to be j^erfectly legiti-
mate.

Before closino- the contracts with the Messrs. Laird,
I had of course considered and discussed with my
solicitor whether armour-plating a ship could be con-
sidered ' equipment ' within the meaning of the Foreign

25—2

388 THE SECRET SERVICE OE TILE

Enlistment Act. He went carefully over the opinions
<iiven by counsel with reference to the Alabama, and
said that the statute did not forbid the building of any
description of ship, tliat the prohibitory clauses referred
to the armino- or furnishino- a vessel with amnuinition
and ordnance stores for warlike purposes. I afterwards
learned that Messrs. Laird took counsel's opinion also
before undertaking to build the ships, and they were
informed that there was nothing illegal in the ])roposed
transaction. It will be perceived that every possible
effort Avas made to get at the meaning and application
of the Foreisfn Enlistment Act, so that there mi^'ht be
no intentional or heedless violation of the municipal
law, and no reckless indifference to the Queen's neu-
trality.

The judgment of the court in the case of the
Alexandra was not rendered until April, 18G3, and the
explicit declarations of Lord Palmerston, Earl Kussell,
and the Solicitor-General (Sir lioundell Palmer) Avere
not made until March, 1863 ; but it was shown in the
preceding chapter that those declarations and that
judgment confirmed the opinion previously given by
counsel, namely, that it was perfectly legal for a F)ritish
subject to build a ship of any description as a purely
mercantile transaction, and deliver her unarmed to a
purchaser, even though the ship was ' destined for war-
like purposes ;' or ' even if meant for the Confederate
States' as the Solicitor -General expressed it.

By the middle of July, 1862, the work on both ships
had fairly begun, and there were reasonable grounds for
hope that they Avould be permitted to leave Liverpool,
when completed, in an unarmed state. They were
known in the yard while building as ' ^U-l ' and ' 295,'
but those numbers did not attract the notice, nor

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 389

suggest the mystery attributed to the figures ' 290,' by
which the Alabama was at first known. The circum-
stances connected with the building of these two vessels,
and the very peculiar arrangement by which they were
taken into the Royal Navy as her Majesty's ships
Scorpion and Wivern, are important and interesting as
historical reminiscences, and to avoid the possibility of
overdrawing them or of giving a fresh colouring to
a single incident, I shall, at the cost of sacrificing some
regularity and smoothness in the narrative, merely give
extracts fi'om my official reports to the Confederate
Xavy Department on the subject, in the precise order of
date, with such other correspondence as may a^^pear
necessary to a ftdl and clear illustration of the whole
matter.

In a despatch dated 'Liverpool, August 11th, 1862,'
I reported as follows : —

' The armour-clad ships are getting on finely, and
I have great hopes that I shall be allowed to use
the revolving turrets. ... If the war continues until
spring, these vessels may yet have important and con-
clusive work in the question of the blockade. The
difficulty of getting them fairly to sea Avill be very great,
however, and I confess that thus far I do not see
the means to be adopted.'

September 10 t/i, 1862, I wrote to the Secretary of the
Navy thus : —

' I trust you have learned by this time what I am
doing in iron, and have received my plans, etc. The
work is going on to my entire satisfaction, and if funds
do not fail, you shall have two formidable ships ready
in the early spring. ... At the proper time I will
suggest the means of getting officers out for these
ships. For the present I think they had better not

390 THE SEC BET SERVICE OF THE

be sent liere. Tlie presence of a number of naval
officers in Eno-land could not fail to excite comment,
and their movements Avould be closel}^ watched. I
do not hesitate to say that embarrassment has already
been occasioned by the iuiml)er of persons from the
South who represent themselves to be agents of the
Confederate States Government. There are men so
constituted as not to be able to conceal their connection
with any afFau-s which may by chance add to their
importance, and such persons are soon found out and
drawn into confessions and statements by gossiping
acquaintances, to the serious detriment of the service
ujjon which they are engaged.

' The proper armament for the turret-ships is engaging
my serious thoughts. Experiments are in progress
at Shoeburyness to determine this very point, and
I will watch the results until the time requisite for the
construction of the guns compels me to make a choice.
... I have resolved to construct the turrets to
revolve, and run the risk of being interfered with, and
there Avill be two guns of the hea^dest calibre practicable
for actual service in each turret, mounted parallel to
each other, and four and a half feet from centre to
centre. The ports will be oval, large enough vertically
to o'ive twelve deirrees of elevation and five de2:rees of
depression, with just width enough to clear the chase oi
the guns, so that an object can be seen over the side
sights.

'I have the working drawings of Captain Cowper
Coles' turret, and Avill send them by first safe oppor-
tunity. You are aware of the difficulty of sending
letters, and the consequent necessity of being as Ijrief as
jiossible. I cannot, therefore, reason upon points of
interest, but must request you to be satisfied with

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 391

simple statements. I am making a collection of all tlie
official reports of exj)nments upon matters connected
with ships and their armaments, and have the evidence
given before the '' Defence Committee " and the " Plate
Committee " of the House of Commons. These are
in pamphlets, are too valuable to be lost, and could not
be replaced, so I must await a safe opportunity to send
them.'

' Liferj/ool, September -l-ith. — ... I have nothing to
add except that the ships are progressing as rapidly as
could be expected, and that I am more pleased with
them every day. The ships being of entirely new
design, I see reasons to modify the plans from time to
time, but only in immaterial points not involving
important alterations. ... I confidently expect to
aiford you great satisfaction in the character of these
ships. I think they will be as near an ap])roach to
cruising ships as can be devised, when the powers of
defence and offence are considered in conjunction with
their lio;ht draft of water, fifteen feet extreme.'

' Liverpool., November Itli., 1862. — . . . Armour-clad
Ships. — An unusual amount of bad weather has some-
W'hat interfered with a certain portion of the work upon
the ships of this description ; but the builders are as
anxious as I am to have them ready in the stipulated
time, and have covered them with comfortable sheds, and
have even introduced gas, so as to insure additional hours
for work durini>; the short foi»'i>'y days of this climate. I
have decided upon the means of getting the first of these
ships clear of British jurisdiction in a manner not to in-
fringe her Majesty's proclamation ; but the attempt will
be attended with difficulty, and will require to be con-
ducted with such caution and secrecy that I fear to
mention the plan even in this way. ... In each

392 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

attempt to <^Qi a ship out a dift'erent plan must be jiur-
sued. As the first of these ships will be ready in April,
it is time to arrano'c for "'ettino: the officers detailed and

o O O

in a position to join her.

' I am still firmly of the opinion that to send a staiF of
officers to this country would excite comment and sus-
picion, and would ])robably end in failure to accomplish
the end in ^•iew. I have reason to be sure that if I had
not sent the Alahania and her armament away before the
arrival of Captain Semmes and his officers, she would
have been stopped. I beg leave, therefore, to throw out
the following suggestion for your consideration. Select
the officers for each ship, also a few leading men and
marines — non-commissioned officers who are natives of
the South, or hona-jidc citizens of the Confederacy — to
give nationalit}- to the crew and to ensure the actual
possession of the ship until the men shipped at large are
got into a good state of disci})line.

' Send the first detachment out in a steamer especially
provided for the purpose, so as to be under the control
of the senior officer, and direct them to jJi'oceed at once
to the island of Madeira. Upon arrival at ]\ladeira, the
senior officer should be instructed to notify me by the
English, as well as b}' the Portuguese, mail, to coal his
ship, have everything ready to sail at short notice, and if
he finds his presence excites comment, to go out on a
short cruise, leaving a letter Avitli her Majesty's Consul,
addressed to Captain AV. Arkwright, British ship Car-

natic The steamer employed for this service

should be sailed under the liritish flag, or, better still,
the French flag, if a French owner can be found for her,
and she should be managed in every way as a merchant
vessel, the officers and their staffs being simj^ly passengers.
The Julia Usher, a small steamer belonging to Messrs.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUIIOPE. 393

Fraser, Trenliolm and Co., will very shortly sail for a
Southern port. If she gets in you might employ her for
the service — or the Giraffe, if she can be supplied with
coal, would be a still better ship, from her great speed.
It would be well to combine movements, so that the
officers should not arriv^e much ahead of the ship they
are to join, and with the state of the blockade under
your OAvn eye, you can arrange their departure from the
Confederate port, so as to reach Madeira about the 10th
of April. ... As Captain Semmes will soon have a
thoroughly organized crew, I respectfully suggest that
one of these ships be put at his disposal. The officers
sent out could be transferred to the Alabama. I am sure
Captain Semmes would be pleased Avith such an arrange-
ment, and I have written him that it was my intention
to bring the matter to your consideration. There may
be difficulty in communicating with Captain Semmes,
but I shall soon know, as he will probably be at the first
rendezvous agreed upon in a fortnight. I have already
sent out a cargo of coal to meet him at Port Royal, Mar-
tinique. . . .

' I will not add anything on the subject of my being
detailed for the command of one of the ships, but beg to
refer to a previous letter in which I have set forth my
feelings and hopes. My ambition is to get afloat, but
after what you say in your letter of July 12th, I feel
bound to submit with becoming grace to any assign-
ment of duty for m3'self 3'ou may think the interests of
the public service may require. You will pardon, I
trust, the personal character of these remarks. They
are induced by that professional pride you are well aware
an officer should always possess.'

'' Liverpool, November 21%t, 1862. — .... The work
upon the armoured ships progresses favourably.'

394 THE SECBET SEEFICE OF THE

^ Liverpool^ December \^t\\, 1S()2. — 1 am o-ratiiied to
learn that you aj)prove of the designs for the t\vo armour-
clad ships. ... As their life must necessarily begin
Avith a sea-voyage of over three thousand miles, it was
absolutely necessary to secure good sea-going qualities
and fan* speed, which I think could not have been
accomplished on less draft and dimensions. I designed
tliese shi})s for something more than harbour or even
coast defence, and I confidently believe, if ready for sea
now, they could sweep away the entire blockading fleet
of the enemy.'

^Liverpool, JaiuuLry '2oj'(J, 18G3. — .... I was pre-
pared for all ordinary opposition, and no mere physical
obstruction could have prevented our ships getting out,
partially equipped at least. There has arisen a political
(question which is very embarrassing. The Ministry
have ordered the Collectors of Customs to examine and
report frequently u])on all vessels building in tlieir dis-
tricts, and armoured ships cannot escape notice. Our
transactions have become well known — Southern papers
received lately publish them, and a letter in the Times
from the South clearly indicates that armoured ships are
expected from this side to break the blockade. I have
been aware that indiscreet persons who should have
known l^etter have written to private persons at the
South on such matters, and I am not surprised at the
result. Lord Russell says in effect that the " 21)0 "
evaded the law, and rather intimates that it shall not be
done again. I am convinced that the present British
^linistr}' will do almost anything the United States
Government asks, and you are well aware that an
" Order in Council " will override the ordinary rules of
law. Parliament meets February 5th, and I am reliably
informed that the question of furnishing supplies to the

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 395

belligerents will come up. I am consulting the best
legal authority, but confess that the hope of gettmg the
ships out seems more than doubtful — indeed, hopeless,
unless there should be a change in the political character
of the Ministry. I will of course go on as if no obstacle
existed, so as to be ready to avail myself of chance
circumstances.'

''February Srd, 18G3 (cypher despatch, via Balti-
more).— .... I have been delayed in giving orders
for ordnance stores, etc., for iron shijDs, by want of money ;
but financial agent authorizes me to order them, and
says in any event he can and will manage to supplv the
necessary funds Avhen the payments are required.
Unforeseen causes have kept back work on iron ships.
Have tried very hard to hasten the completion, but
insurmountable difficulties have occurred. No armoured
ships for Admiralty have ever been completed in time
specified ; whole character of work new, and builders
cannot make close calculations ; great labour and
unexpected time required to bend armour-plates ; and
the most important part of the work, the riveting, is
far more tedious than anticipated. , . . Think British
Government will prevent iron ships leaving, and am
much perplexed ; object of armoured shij^s too evident
for disguise.'

On the 9th of March, 1863, I received a despatch
from the Secretary of the Navy, dated ' Kichmond,
Januar}', 18(53.' In reference to sending out officers for
the armoured vessels, the Secretary wrote thus : —

' I concur with the views you express upon the
inexpediency of sending naval officers to England. The
plan suggested in your despatch of November 7th, 1862 '
(see p. 392) ' is so difficult of accomplishment that I will
at once submit to your judgment another, and request

396 THE SECllET SERVICE OE THE

you to give me your views as promptly as practicable.
It would be (lifHcult, if not impossible, for us to obtaiu
tlie services of a suitable steauier ; and failing in this,
■\ve should be compelled to charter an English sailing
vessel at Xassau for the jjurpose. I suggest to you, there-
fore, that }'0U at once put yourself conhdentially in
communication with ]\lr. Slidell, and learn from him
whether you cannot fit out the vessels at a French port,
in which event tlie officers could go to France, incixj.^
via England, in the ordinary way, and escape observa-
tion. I do not suppose that the French Government
would give any formal assent to this proposition,
but I do suppose that not only no obstacle would be
offered, but that facilities would be extended. ... I auL
not at liberty to state the reasons of this opinion, but
they are sufficiently strong to induce me to press the
subject upon your attention. If you could run over to
Paris and see Mr. Slidell it would be the best, perhaps
the only course to pursue. I do not desire, by any
suggestion here made, to change any plan that you may
deem best for getting the ships to sea. I do not know
your entire plAn, and offer my suggestions for your con-
sideration, content to leave the matter to your uncon-
trolled discretion. I trust you will be able to advise me
of your determination in time to avoid any delay in my
co-operation.'

On the ver}' da}' of the receipt of the above despatch
I was able to send, via Baltimore, a reply in cypher,
dated ' Li^^erpool, March 9.' — ' Completion of armoured
ships having been delayed, change of plan can be made.
You can send officers to France as soon as possible.
Will ffo to consult with our commissioner in France

o

(Mr. Slidell) in a few days,' etc.

I must call particular attention to the cautious inti-

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 397

mation of the Secretary of the Xavy that the Govern-
ment at Richmond had good reasons to suppose that
faciUties would be extended to us in France. The
grounds upon Avhich such expectations were based will
appear very clearly in the subsequent arrangements with
reference to the two Eno-lish ironclads, and in the ac-
count of the efforts to build and fit out ships in France.
On the 11th of May, 1863, T received two despatches
from the Secretary of the N'avy in cypher. The first,
dated ' Richmond, March 10th, 18(33,' contained the
following: —

' Your despatch of February 3rd, 1863 ' (see p. 395),
' reached me yesterdaj^ I share your apprehensions as
to our ships. The importance to our cause of getting
them to sea at an early day renders the subject one of
great anxiety. I am in possession of information which
prompts me to suggest to you the following proposition,
should you find that the [British] Government designs to
prevent their departure. Do not risk correspondence,
but proceed to Paris and consult Mr. Slidell, after con-
ferring fully with Mr. Mason, and arrange, in the manner
which your judgment shall approve after such consulta-
tion, for the transfer of the vessels to French owner,

and their equipment in a French port. M. *, a

Member of the Corps Legislatif, and who is said to
have the confidence of the Emperor, is indicated as a
party willing to receive the transfer and complete the
outfit,' etc.

The second despatch was dated ' Richmond, March
27th, 1863,' and merely enclosed copy of a letter from
the Secretary of the Navy in cypher to Mr. Slidell, our
commissioner to France. The letter to Mr. Slidell was

* The name is suppressed l^ecause the person was not the one
with whom the arrangement ^A^as subsequently made.

398 THE SECllET SEEJ'ICE OF THE

in the Navy Department cyplier, and I was directed to
translate its contents and tlien to act upon tliem in con-
jimction with Mr. Slidell. The following is a copy of
the letter, which 1 transcribe in full, as it bears upon
other o^icrations in France which will be narrated in a
subsequent cliapter : —

'Richmond, 3Tarch 21th, 1863.
' The Secretary of State having laid before me certain
13ortions of your despatch of January llth, No. 23, I
am induced to invoke your aid in such manner as you
may deem most advisable in the attainment of two
objects of the first importance to the interest of our
country. You have doubtless noticed certain indica-
tions in England of a disposition to prevent the depar-
ture of the ships built there for our service. The
officer in England in charge of this duty, a close ob-
server of public sentiment there, expresses much anxiety
upon this subject, in which I fully share. Under these
circumstances. Commander Bulloch is instructed to
confer fully with ^Ir. j\lason and yourself as to the

practicability of transferring those ships to M. , or

other French citizen, with the view of removing them
from England as early as possible, and fitting them out
in France. If this can be accomplished, they might be
probably loaded with supplies for the French army in
Mexico, cleared for Yera Cruz, and sold to us at
Terceira or elsewhere. Our early possession of those
ships in a condition for service is an object of such para-
mount importance to our country, that no effort, no
sacrifice, must be spared to accomplish it. Whatever

may be the terms which M. may prescribe as the

conditions of thus placing them at our command will
be i)romptly met, and apart fi*om all j^ecuniaiy consi-

CONFEDEllATE STATES IN EUROPE. 399

deration involved in the enterprise, its success would
entitle him to the gratitude of the country.

' To the good judgment of Commander Bulloch I
must necessarily leave all details, earnestly asking your
assistance to open and conduct this measure to a favour-
able conclusion.

' The second subject referred to is the construction of
new ships for our country in France. The size and gene-
ral character of the ships would be best determined by
Commander Bulloch, after consultation with the builders,
and due consideration of the means of construction,
the time involved, etc. The character of our rivers and
harbours, however, necessarily demands light draught.
Payment for contracts would be made in interest-bear-
ing bonds, or in cotton delivered here upon demand at
prices controlled by its current value in this market.

' I am, etc.,
' (Signed) S. R. Mallory.'

' Hon. John Slidell,
'Paris.'

Before the receipt of the foregoing despatch, Mr.
Slidell had communicated to me his belief that we
should be allowed much more latitude in our naval
operations in France than in England, and I had already
been in conference with him on the subject. My next
despatch to the N^avy Dej)artment of importance in
reference to the ironclads was under date of ' Liverpool,
June 30th, 1863' :—

' First in importance as well as interest are the iron-
clads already under construction. These should have
been ready for sea between March and June, according
to the original terms of contract. I have already
reported that mechanical difficulties of construction, not

400 THE SEC BET SEEVICE OF THE

within the reach of foresight, liad dehiycd the progress
of these vessels, but the action of the British Govern-
ment in reference to our operations in Great Britain,
cuhninating in the seizure of the Alexandra and lier
trial in the Court of Exchequer, has still further delayed
their completion. As long ago as the latter part of
]\Iarch, I went to Paris to consult with Hon. rlohn
Siidell with reference to a possible sale of these ships to
a French subject. Through M. Arman, a distinguished
naval architect of Bordeaux, Mr. Siidell and I were
introduced to the Messrs. Bravay and Co., of Paris,
with whom a satisfactorj^ arrangement has been made.
Messrs. Bravay and Co. have bought the ships from
me for a nominal sum,* and the contract with tlie
builders has lieen transferred to them, or rather, the
builders have made a new contract agreeing to complete
the ships for the ]\lessrs. Bravay and Co. precisely as
they were to have been finished for me.

' This exchange of property required to be managed
•with great caution, because it was well known that the
true ownership of the vessels was suspected, and that
any attempt to equip them for sea, or even to launch
them, WTjuld result in their seizure and indefinite deten-
tion by means of the interminable proceedings of the
Court of Exchequer. In order that the transaction
might bear the scrutiny of an English court, I thought
it advisable to take the advice of counsel on the points
of Englisli law. His opinion was that the mere building
of a ship in England, for whatever purpose, was not
contrary to the Foreign Enlistment Act ; that tlie

* The precise facts are, that Messrs. Bravay bought the ships for a
specified amount, and they engaged to re-sell them beyond British
jurisdiction for an amount which should include a commission to
them.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 401

seizure of the Alexandra and the stoppage of several
other ships for inquiry in consequence of affidavits
lodged by the United States Consuls were illegal and
arbitrary acts, but that the ironclads were liable to the
same proceedings, and if they should be seized we could
not expect to release them from the Court of Exchequer
during the war, if at all.

' It was known that .... Clarence R. Yonge had
already stated to the United States Minister in London
his belief that the ironclads referred to were intended
for the Confederate Government ; that the United
States Consular spies were already watching their
daily progress, and that the ]3ritish Foreign Office
would act promptly whenever it suited Mr. Adams'
23urpose to demand their seizure. It was tJierefore
necessary to disconnect myself with the ships as quickly
as possible. I Avas advised by counsel that under
any circumstances there would doubtless be a legal
inquiry into the title to the property, and that all the
papers and letters relating to the sale must be such
as would bear judicial scrutiny and tend to prove the
bond fide character of the transfer. As the builders
would naturally be the principal witnesses, it was
absolutely necessary to prevent them from suspecting
that there was any collusion between the nominal
purchasers and myself. With this view I first wrote a
formal letter to the Messrs. Laird, stating that the
interference of the British Government in all attempts to
build ships suspected of being for the Confederate
States was such as to make it certain that they would
not be allowed to complete the ironclads for me ; that I
was not willing to run the risk of their seizure, which
would either result in entire confiscation or my being
kept out of the use of the large sum of money already

VOL. I. 26

402 THE SECRET SEIIVICE OF THE

expended for an indefinite time, and requesting tliem to
sell the sliip!> for such sum as would ensure me a
reasonable profit, and to release me from all further
obligations under the contract.

' Fortunately, just at this time the Russian Govern-
ment made an oifer for the ships, and I hastened to
Paris to regulate the correspondence on the part of the
French purchasers, to suit the advice of my English
solicitor. As you will readily perceive, the affair re-
quired a good deal of management, and occupied far
more time than if the transaction had been a real one.
It is not necessary to go into further details. Suffice it
to say that our two ironclads are now the property of
Messrs, Bravay and Co., of Paris, agents for the Pasha
of Egypt. The papers are all in proper legal form, the
Messrs. Laird are convinced that tlie sale is bond fide,
and I have expressed the most cordial regrets that there
should ha^'e been a necessity for such a proceeding.

' To kec]) up this illusion I can no longer appear
on board the ships, or even in the yard of Messrs.
Laird, but can only direct their further com2:)letion from
behind the desk of the Messrs. Bravay and Co. These
necessary proceedings have created additional delay in
finishing the ships, but the work shall now be pushed on
as rapidty as possible.'

Then follows a specific report of the condition of the
ships.

' The engines of both ships have been ready for
several months. One ship is entirel}' plated, and could
have been in the water six weeks ago if it had not been
for the political necessity of kee2^ing her back. ... I
cannot hope that these two ships will be ready to take
the sea before October. I can only assure you that
e\'ery effort will l)e made to hasten their completion. I

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 403

will keep the Messrs. Bravay under a constant pres-
sure.'

In an historical narrative of this kind it is the duty of
the writer to take care that no persons who were con-
nected with the transactions, and whose names and credit
as men of business are in any way implicated, shall be
left in a doubtful position, by reason of a looseness in
the general statements, or a want of particularity in the
details. I have stated in the letter to the Secretary of
the i^avy, quoted above (June 30th, 1863), that it was
necessary to manage the arrangements with Messrs.
Bravay so that the Messrs. Laird should not suspect that
the sale of the ships was not bond fide and final. Every
step in the business was taken, in conjunction Avith my
solicitor, in the ordinary somewhat circumlocutory way,
Avhich appears to be unavoidable in the legal transfer of
property, and I believe that if the Messrs. Laird ever
read this book, they will receive the first intimation of
the true character of the transaction from the disclosures
on the subject here made. The Messrs. Laird acted as
agents for the sale of the ships, and I simply arranged
with Messrs. Bravay that they should apply for tenders
for two ships in the ordinary way of business. The
Lairds would naturally have preferred building new
ships in resjDonse to this proposition, but they acted with
their accustomed good faith, and promptly reported to
me the offer they had received as a j^robable opportunity
to sell the two ironclads.

When in the course of the arrangements they applied
to me for definite and specific authority to sell the ships
which they could produce to Messrs. Bravay, they wrote
thus : ' It will be necessary that we should have clear
instructions, either direct to Birkenhead or through your
solicitor, of the price at which we are to negotiate the

26—2

404 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

sale.' After giA^inp^ their o^^'n views of tlie price whicli
might be fairl}^ asked, they add : ' As the inquiry
came to us in the ordinary course of our business for
building vessels, and not with any special reference to
vessels we might have in course of construction, we hope
that you will agree with us tliat these prices should
include a commission of two and a half per cent, on the
transaction to us, as we not only lose the opportunity of
tendering to our correspondent for new vessels, but shall
have considerable trouble in making the transfer and
arranging money matters and other details.'

In reply to the foregoing I wrote to the Messrs. Laird
that, having made inquiry through my bankers, I Avas
satisfied in regard to the financial position of Messrs.
Bravay, and had learned that they had executed large
commissions for the Egyptian Government, and had at
the time an open order for two ironclad vessels from the
Pasha. I therefore felt assured that they were able to
carry out the proposed transaction, and it might there-
fore be closed on the terms proposed ; and I added :

' Your claim for a commission upon the amount of the
sale is, under the circumstances, quite usual and justifi-
able, and if two and a half per cent, is the established
commission in such cases, I readily agree to it. ... •
Hoping that in better times w^e may be able to renew
our business associations, which have been as satisfactory
to me as our social intercourse has been agreeable, and
assuring you of my personal esteem and regard,

' I am, etc.,
' (Signed) James D. Bulloch.'

Durino' the nes-otiations an offer was made for the
purchase of the ships on behalf of the Russian Govern-

CONFEDEBATE STATES IN EUROPE. 405

ment, and Messrs. Laircl, looking to tlie official and
therefore reliable source from which the inquiry came,
and the financial security of such a transaction, were
inclined to entertain it. To refuse the offer upon
grounds w^hich would seem reasonable to them was at
first a little embarrassing, but I wrote my solicitor, who
of course knew of the arrangement with Messrs. Bravay,
that the excessively friendly relations which appeared to
exist between Russia and the United States made me
suspicious of any proposition coming from St. Peters-
burg. It was possible, I said, that the Russian
Admiral mio-ht be actins; on behalf of the United States
Navy Department, and the ships might get under the
wrong flag, and I suggested that this w^as a sufficient
reason for declining the proposition.

It is useless to give further details. The sale to
Messrs. Bravay, and the transfer of the property, was
effected by my solicitor and the Messrs. Laird in con-
formity with strict commercial and legal usage and
requirement. The chief object was to keep the Messrs.
Laird free from any knowledge of the secret understand-
ing with Messrs. Bravay, so that they might be able to
answer all inquiries, either fi'om the Foreign Office or
the Customs authorities, without embarrassment or
hesitation. This purpose was effected, as will appear to
anyone who cares to read the official correspondence on
the subject, wliich fills one hundred and forty-five pages
of the Appendix to the ' British Case,' Vol. II.

The arrangement with Messrs. Bravay, regarded as a
mere business transaction, was based upon a letter from
M. Franqois Bravay, the senior partner, dated ' Alex-
andria, Egypt, 28tli December, 1862,' to his brother,
M. Adrien Bravay, who was the resident managing
partner of the firm in Paris, and the reply to that letter,

406 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

dated ' Paris, loth January, 18(18.' In the above-
mentioned letter from M. Francois Bravay, he writes
generally about his business relations with the Viceroy?
but the first paragraph of the letter is the only one
which need be quoted here.

'I write you a few lines' (he says) ' to inform you
that the Viceroy positively wishes me to complete some
commissions for him, in spite of the resolve I have
manifested to him not to execute them. He has ordered
me to have built for him in France two armoured
frigates, after the best and most perfect designs. He
stipulates above everything that it shall not be made
known that they are for the Egyptian Government, for
he has political reasons for that. ]\Iake arrangements to
get designs and the contracts in the best form,'

The reply acknowledges the receipt of the above
letter, and in reference to the particular subject says : —
' Your letter transmits to us the commission which his
Highness the A'iceroy has given, to have built in France
tAvo armoured frigates, after the latest models. We will
at once take the necessary steps for the execution of that
order, in obtaining" from the French Government the
same facilities for its execution that have been already
granted us in reference to the guns that we have had
constructed for his Highness,' etc.

These and other letters, which were shown to ]\Ir.
Slidell and to me, sufficiently demonstrated that the
]\Iessrs. Bravay had extensive business relations with the
Viceroy of Egypt, and that they were therefore in a posi-
tion to justify the purchase of such vessels as the two at
Birkenhead. It was necessary to have the 6' /^^^^i^.v of the
^[essrs. Ih-avay fully established in the above respects,
for manifest reasons of a purely business character,
because the Messrs. Laird would not have paid atten-

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 407

tion to an offer coming from irresponsible parties. But
Mr. Slidell had received private and confidential infor-
mation that the Imperial Government would not inter-
fere with any subsequent arrangement Messrs. Bravay
might make for the delivery of the ships to the Con-
federate Government, after they had been despatched
from England, and, moreover, it was intimated to him
that if her Majesty's Government objected to a private
firm taking the ships away without a guarantee that
the}^ were not intended for a belligerent, the Imperial
Government would state on behalf of Messrs. Bravay
that they were satisfied with the explanations of that
firm, and would request permission for the departure of
the ships as the property of French subjects. This
hint, conveyed to Mr. Slidell through a very direct and
satisfactory source, was the foundation of the whole
agreement with the Messrs. Bravay.

The order of the Viceroy for the two armoured vessels
was dated before we had met either of the Messrs.
Bravay, or had thought of an arrangement of the kind
for getting tlie ships out of British jurisdiction. It Avas
made use of onty as a plausible reason why a private
firm should want vessels of such formidable structure
and armament, and was not manufactured for the occa-
sion. Subsequently it will appear that the Grand Vizier
of Egypt denied that an order for ironclad vessels had
been given to Messrs. Bravay. Perhaps there were
political reasons for the denial, just as there were for
keeping the order secret. Or perhaps the order, being
rather in the character of a request, or what may be
called a ' permissive commission,' the Grand Vizier
might have found it convenient, at the particular time
when tlie inquiries were made, to deny any knowledge
of it.

408 . THE SECllET SERVICE OF THE

The arrangement In' whicli it was lioi)ed that the
departure of the two ship.s from Liverpool would be
assured having now been fully explained, it only remains
to describe the progress and result of the undertaking,
which can best be done by a transcript of such portions
of my official despatches to the Secretary of the Navy as
relate to the subject.

' Pan's, July Sth, 1863. — I have the honour to send
you with this letter a complete set of drawings of our
two ironclad vessels, which in future reports I Avill
allude to as Nos. 29-i and 295. I also send the detailed
specifications upon which the ships are being completed.'
After a full and most specific explanation of the draw-
ings, the despatch continues : ' I reserve my remarks
upon the special service upon wliich it would be advisable
to employ these ships for a separate despatch.'

The Secretary of the Kavy had previously alluded to
the desirability of using the ironclads for re-opening
the Mississijipi and regaining possessionofXew Orleans,
and had invited me to comment upon that proposition.
The work on the vessels had up to this time progressed
without interference, although we had been well aware
that they were closely watched. After the arrangement
with the ]\Iessrs. Bravay, wliich was completed on the
17th of June, 1863, it was of course my duty to proceed
Avith all contingent plans as if expecting that the ships
would be i)ermitted to sail, and I reported on the subject
of their employment as follows : —

'Paris, July 9th, 18G3.
' Sir, —

' The several despatches I will now have the
honour to send you are of such a nature, and treat upon
subjects a knowledge of which by the enemy Avould

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 409

be so ruinous to our interests, that I have thought it
advisable to send them by a special messenger, and have
selected Lieutenant W. C. AVhittle, Confederate States
ISTavy, for this important service. It is possible that
Lieutenant Whittle may be forced to destroy the
despatches, and yet may be able to reach you in person ;
I have therefore fully instructed him as to their contents,
and have given him full verlxil explanations of the draw-
ings of the ships and turrets. . . .

' jSTo very great difficulty was experienced in getting
crews for the Florida and Alabama, and I think any
vessels fitted out to cruise against commerce, thereby
holding out to the men not only the captivating excite-
ment of adventure, but the possible expectation of
prize-money, might almost at any time pick up a goodly
number of passable seamen. But the ironclads are
too manifestly for other purposes to deceive any mere
adventurer. Their grim aspect and formidable equipment
clearly show that they are intended for the real danger and
shock of battle, and I do not think reliable crews could
be obtained from among the floating population of
European seaports. The ships are so rigged as to require
but few able seamen. The actual force of the crews need
be only artillerists, but these must be men willing to
fight for the sake of their country alone, and must be
actuated by the same spirit which has converted our
farmers and backwoodsmen into the veterans who are
now sweeping irresistibly through Maryland and
Southern Pennsylvania under the leadership of our
great General Lee. Engineers and firemen can be got
here, and men enough to work the ships and perhaps
one gun on each. They would thus be able to overcome
any wooden ship, or fleet of them. I respectfully pro-
pose, then, that the ships, when ready for sea, should

410 THE SECllET SERVICE OE THE

he ordered to proceed as quickly as possible to Wilming-
ton, Xortli Carolina. One could fall in Avitli the land at
Xew Inlet, and the other at the main " ship bar " at the
mouth of Cape Fear river.

' By steaming quietly in at early daylight, they might
entirely destroy the blockading vessels — not one should
be left to steal away and make known the fact that
the ironclads were on the coast. Crews might be ready
at Smithville or Fort Caswell, to be put on board the
ships as soon as they had destroyed or disjiersed the
blockaders, and in a very few hours afterwards the two
vessels would be ready to strike a decisive blow in any
direction, north or south. I am earnest and anxious
on the subject of crews, because the ships are too
formidable and too valuable to be trusted in the hands of
a mere set of adventurers, who, actuated by no feeling
of patriotism, and controlled only by force, might fail at
a critical moment, either from indifference or disaffection,
thus disconcerting the best devised plans, or perhaps
even occasioning fatal disaster. When the departure of
the ironclads from Europe can be definitely determined,
say mthin two weeks, a special messenger can be sent
to report specifically to j^ou, so that all necessary steps
may be taken and arrangements made to carry out the
further views of the Department.

' In view of the intimate knowledge I necessarily
possess of the construction and capabilities of the iron-
clads 294 and 295, I feel called upon to throw out
a few sui»'o:estions as to the service for which thev would
be most available, and I trust you will not think
me presumptuous for doing so. I feel confident that
they will be as good sea-boats and as easily handled as
armoured vessels can l)e, but as you Avill perceive from
the drawings and descriptions, the}' are large ships, both

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUBOPE. 411

in length and breadth, and in the rapid current and short
turnings of the Mississippi, they would be at great
disadvantage, and their full force and j^ower as rams
could not be made use of. If they could be accompanied
by smaller and shorter vessels to assist them in turning,
or to occupy the enemy's ironclads while they were thus
engaged, the difficulty might be somewhat removed,
but in such narrow waters they would be very much in
the condition of a boxer with one arm tied behind his
back. I am supposing now that they would have to
fight their way up the river in face of the enemy's fleet
of ironclads. If these latter can be held above Vicks-
burg or Port Hudson, and " 294 " and " 295 " were
simply expected to force their way past the forts and
steam up to the city, that object could easily be accom-
plished. Of course, in such an event, there would be a
movement of troops by land, and also of the Mobile
flotilla, through Lake Pontchartrain ; otherwise, on the
approach of the ships by the river, the garrison of N^ew
Orleans would burn the city, retire upon the lake, and
escape by means of tlieir transports through Ship
Island Pass.

' The Atlantic coast ofl'ers enticing and decisive work
in more than one direction. Without a moment's delay,
after getting their crews on board ofi^ Wilmington, our
vessels might sail southward, sweep the blockading
fleet from the sea-front of every harbour from the Capes
of Virginia to Sabine Pass, and cruising up and down
the coast, could prevent anything like permanent syste-
matic interruption of our foreign trade for the future.
Again, should Washington still be held by the enemy,
our ironclads could ascend the Potomac, and after
destroying all transports and gun-boats falling within
their reach, could render Washington itself untenable,

412 THE SECItET SEliVICE OF THE

and could thus create a powerful diversion in favour of
any operations General Lee might have on foot. Third,
Portsmoutli, Xew Hampshire, ... is a wealthy city
in itself, and opposite the town is an important national
dock and building-yard. The whole lies invitingly
open to attack and destruction. Suppose our two iron-
clads should steam, unannounced, into that harbour on
some tine October morning, and while one proceeded to
demolish the navy -yard and all it contained, the other
should send a flag of truce to the mayor, to say that if
81,000,000 in gold or $5,000,000 in greenbacks were
not sent on board in four hours the city would be
destroyed after the manner of Jacksonville and Blufton.*
Portsmouth could afford to ])ay for its existence.
Philadelphia is another point open to such an attack.
The river is navigalDle, the banks comparatively low, so
that no plunging fire could be brought to bear upon the
ships, and once in fi'ont of the city they could dictate
their own terms. Such operations as are thus hastily
sketched would inflict great damage upon the enemy?
besides creating a striking eftect in Europe, and the
shijis would thus be employed in a manner which would
bring into use their full power, so that no strength
would be wasted. . . .

' I am, etc.,

' (Signed) James D. Bulloch.

* Hon. S. E. IMallory,

' Secretary of the Xavy, Eichmond.'

To the Secretary of the N'avy I wrote : —

'Liverpool, July 20ih, 1863.
' You will remember that Lieutenant R. R. Carter
was ordered to report to me for duty in the ironclad you

* Two Southern towns Avhich had been just then reported to have
been burned by the United States forces.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE, 413

originally intended me to command. Although you
have changed the sphere of my duties, I continue to
employ him as an assistant in the inspection of work
actually in progress, as well as to advise with on all
matters of importance. I propose in a few days to put
him in communication (through the purchasers of " 294"
and "295") with Captain Blakely, to arrange for the
arming of those ships, as it is important that I should
keep entirely out of sight in the matter. I take pleasure
in saying that Lieutenant Carter yields me the most
cheerful and intelligent assistance, and I esteem myself
fortunate in having him with me at this time. . . .

' The opportunity to send this has unexpectedly
occurred, and I am forced to be brief and hurried,
only adding that matters still progress favourably
with " 294 " and " 295." . . . Application will very
shortly be made for permission to arm them in Eng-
land, and the French owners anticipate no difficulty.
If, however, their application is refused, we will have to
transport the armament to a Continental port, which will
involve some delay. . . .

' As I can only shape plans to suit possible changes
of circumstances, it is quite impossible to go further
into detail on this subject.'

Not long after the date of the above despatch we began
to feel the effects of Mr. Adams' representations to Earl
Eussell, especially on the subject of the ironclads. Under
date 'Liverpool, October 1st, 1863,' I reported to the
Secretary of the Navy thus : —

' The newspapers, which seem to pass very regularly
through the lines of the armies, will doubtless have pre-
pared you for disappointment in all our English under-
takings. Of course, I shall continue to act as if certain

414 THE SECRET SERVICE OF TEE

of success, but am forced to acknowledge that I have but
little hope. . . ,

' The articles alluded to in my despatch of June oOth,
1863,* would have been ready for departure now if it
had not been for interference, such as you can readily
imagine. They cannot, however, be wholly lost, for
reasons you will understand by referring to the letter
alluded to above.'

The difficulty and delay in communicating with Rich-
mond was always a cause of great embarrassment in
arranging for co-operative movements and in exchang-
ing views. Opportunities were often lost, from the
miscarriage of despatches, and suggestions which were
approved in purj)0se were only known when it was too
late to act upon them. About October 15th, 18 63, I
received a despatch from the Secretary of the Navy, ad-
vising me of the safe arrival of Lieutenant Whittle with
a large batch of despatches from me, including that of
July 9th, 1863, on the subject of the proper service for
the ironclads. Lieutenant Whittle left Paris on July
10th, and reached Richmond on August 20th. The
despatch of the Secretary of the Xavy just above men-
tioned was dated ' Richmond, August 29th, 1863.' He
said :

' I have very carefully examined the drawings (of
" 294 " and " 295''), and so far as I can form an opinion
of structures so novel in all their details, I think they
will be very efficient shij)S ; and that they will probably
excel all other ironclads of which I have any knowledge
in sea-going qualities. . . . My regret and disap2)oint-
ment at their delay in England is very great, but I
understand the difficulties in your path, and cannot well
see how you could have done better than you have.
* Xos. 294 and 295.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 415

Their presence at this time upon our coast would be of
incalculable value, relieving, as they would be able to
do, the blockade of Charleston and Wilmington, and
nothing must be suffered to interfere with their com-
pletion at the earliest practicable moment. ... It is
deemed expedient to send an officer of rank out to brino-
over " 294 " and " 295," and Captain Barron has been
selected. To him I have communicated jour views as
to appropriate employment for them, and I will thank
you to confer with him freely about them. He will
receive them from you, as did Captain Semmes the
Alabama., for I deem it important that you shall carry
out the plans you have devised for jjlacing them in our
possession. . . . The arrangements made by you for
the completion of "294" and "295" and their final
transfer, seem the very best that could have been effected,
and I doubt not your judgment and discretion will con-
duct the neii'otiation to a successful conclusion. Your
suggestions as to the enterprises to be undertaken by
them command much consideration, and Captain Barron
will receive upon this subject especial instructions.'

In respect to manning the vessels, the Secretary of
the Navy said : ' The method suggested by you would
meet the case if Wilmington should at the time be in
its present condition with reference to the enemy. . . .
You will regard this plan, however, namely, manning
the vessels from Wilmington as suggested by you, as
the one to be carried out unless otherwise changed.' A
great j)ortion of the above despatch w^as devoted to the
subject of supplying funds, which was always weighing
upon the minds of the heads of Departments at Rich-
mond.

Captain Barron arrived in due course, and there came
with or followed him a sufficient number of other officers

416 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

to supply the staff for tlie two ironclads. V>y the time of
his arrival it was already manifest that our expectations
with reference to those vessels could not be realized,
and he retired to Paris and there waited, hoping against
hope that some fortunate turn of events, or some change
of policy in the two chief Maritime Powers, would enable
him to get afloat. Captain Samuel Barron was well
known in the United States service before the war as a
gallant dashing officer, and he had some fine young
officers with him. Sometimes a sense of companionship
in misfortune serves as a consolation, but it was rather
an aggravation than a relief to my own disappointment,
to contemplate those ardent men yearning for employ-
ment and chafing at their compulsory inactivity. It
was a hard case to be so near to a great opportunity
and yet to miss it. The final annihilation of all hope of
o'ettinof our ironclads and so ending the blockade and
securing supplies to the famishing armies in the field,
was reported in the following despatches to the Navy
Department: —

'Liverpool, Odoler 20fh, 1863.

' Sir, —

' In my despatch of October 1st, 18^^, I called
vour attention to the newspaper accounts of the seizure
of the ironclads " 294 " and " 295," which had doubt-
less reached Richmond, but feared to trust particulars to
the ordinary mails. Now, by the hands of Lieutenant
R. R. Carter, I will report in detail all that has trans-
pired in reference to those ships. When the proceedings
in the case of the Alexandra had exposed the extent and
unscrupulous character of the system of espionage the
United States officials had established in this country,
and had developed to the full the great treason of Mr.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 417

Clarence R. Yonge, it became evident that no ships
jjartaking- of the character of war-vessels would be safe
from seizure unless they were known to be the property
of some foreign Government not a belligerent. It was
of pressing importance to destroy any trace of Con-
federate ownership in "294" and "295" at once, and
the arrangements with Messrs. Bravay, of Paris, pre-
viously discussed as a probable and very plausible means
of security, were speedily consummated in the manner
already reported to you in my despatch of June 30th,
1863. The transfer papers, and indeed all the corre-
spondence involved in the negotiation, were so carefully
drawn in accordance with British law, that the solicitor
employed to conduct the sale remarked on its completion,
" The ships are now irretrievably the property of Messrs.
Bravay and Co., and could not be recovered by any
process they might think proper to resist." It certainly
seemed that the British Government, when informed of
the ownership, could and would reply to the further
demands of the United States Minister that, the ships
being the property of French citizens, their completion
and final departure, at least to a French port, could not
be forbidden. Under these circumstances I was naturally
hopeful of success in getting them both to sea, and once
more in our own possession ; for even though the British
Government might refuse Messrs. Bravay permission to
arm them in England, it was difficult to see how that
Government could be compromised as towards the United
States by permitting a French subject to take his pro-
perty, even though in the shape of ships, to his own
country.

' Under any circumstances, it would have been prudent
for me to absent myself from this neighbourhood ; but
at the time of the Bravay operation I was just beginning

VOL. I. 27

418 THE SECBET SEEVICE OF THE

some new contracts on account of the ISTavy Department
in France, and thus my absence from En^'land involved
neither loss of time nor waste of opportunity. During
the montli of 'Tuly everything seemed to ])rogTess
favourably ; the ships steadily advanced towards com-
pletion, and there did not appear any reason to doubt
that they would be ready to take the sea during the
month of October.

' In August it became evident that the United States
officials were getting uneasy, a fact made manifest
by increased activity and boldness on the part of their
spies, and undisguised efforts to tamper with the
employes of the Messrs. Laird. Towards the end of
that month these causes began to operate in such a
manner as to seriously interfere witli and retard the
progress of the work. At the same time the Custom
House officials began to make visits of inspection to the
ships, and to press inquiries as to their destination and
ownership, indicating that the Grovernment was listening
to the affidavits and persistent protests of the American
Minister. Finally, the Messrs. Laird, hoping that
if the Government were furnished with proof that the
ships did not belong to the Confederate States, they
would be relieved from further annoyance and incon-
venience, asked and obtained the permission of the
Messrs. Bravay to avow their ownership of the vessels.
The result of this was a call upon M. A. Bravay at his
house in Paris, by Captain Hore, R.N., who, on the part
of his Grovernment, made minute inquiries as to the
intent of the purchase by Messrs, Bravay of such
formidable ships.* Receiving apparently satisfactory
answers to all of his questions, Captain Hore then
made a direct offer to purchase them for the British
* See ' British Appendix,' vol. ii., p. 372.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 419

Admiralty, which proposition M. Bravay declined to
entertain, at least until the vessels were fully completed
accordino" to their desio'ns, and had been delivered to him
in a French port. This ended the interview with Captain
Hore, and the circumstances were minutely detailed to
me by M. A. Bravay on the day of their occurrence.*

' In the meantime, matters continued to grow worse
at Liverpool. The nature of some of the affidavits sent
up to the Foreign Office by the United States Consul
leaked out, and although most of them were glaringly
false, still they seemed to be whispered into willing ears,
and had such effect that the Lairds were directed not to
attempt a trial trip with either ship without giving
notice to the Customs officials, and were finally forbidden
to do so at all, except with a guard of marines, or other
force from one of her Majesty's ships, on board.

' During most of this time I was in France, coming to
Liverpool only for a day or two at a time to receive and
write letters by the Bermuda mail, yet the United
States Consul, through his spies, was swearing to my
constant presence here, and superintendence of the ships.
The local authorities are well aware that this latter
statement is untrue. It has also been discovered that
most, if not all, the affidavits upon which the Govern-
ment is acting have been furnished by Chapman, Yonge
and others, whose utter want of character was so clearly
proved in the proceedings against the Alexandra. The
course pursued by the Foreign Office can only be
accounted for upon the supposition that the head of that
Department is a partizan of the North, and is acting for
its interest, instead of simply and consistently following
the strictly neutral course he professes to have adopted.

* The statement of M. Bravay is confirmed in all essential points
by Captain Here's letter, ' British Case,' Appendix, vol. ii., p. 372.

27—2

420 THE SECnET SERVICE OF THE

No one would expect this Government to permit the
equipment of a ship-of-war for one belligerent, any more
than it would be expected to permit the open enlisting of
troops for the other belligerent. Yet interference with
eitlier of these should, it would seem, be conducted
according to the law of the land, and not in accordance
with the whim or partiality of a Minister of State.

' The fact that men are constantly enlisted in Ireland
for the Federal army, and have been shipped by hundreds
from this port, is so notorious as to be generally
discussed, yet I have not heard up to this date, that the
rights of a single British shipowner have been violated,
nor his ship detained for a single hour in order that the
destination or character of the passengers might be
inquired into, while in the case of a ship building in
a private yard, this Government furnishes detectives
to watch her progress, listens to and acts upon the
statements of perjurers and avowed traitors, and finally
interferes and prevents her completion in a most
unusual and illegal manner, as I am informed, for fear
that she may at some future time fall into the hands
of the Confederate States.

' The inference is so clear that I shall not suggest it,
but will simply particularize by repeating that the two
rams building by Messrs. Laird have been virtually
seized by orders from the Foreign Office, and are now in
the possession of the Customs officers of this port, assisted
by one of her Majestj^'s gunboats, and a guard of
marines from her Majesty's ship Majestic. The actual
seizure took place only about a fortnight ago (October
9th), although the public has been prepared for such an
event by intimations in the so-called Government organs,
and discussions upon the matter in all the newspapers
of the kingdom.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 421

' I have inquired into the causes of this act, and
learn, fi*om the best possible sources, as follows: — It
has been made known to the authorities that a large
number of Confederate naval officers have during the
past three months arrived in England. The Florida
came off the Irish coast some six weeks since, and
j^roceeding to Brest, there discharged the greater portion
of her crew, who were sent to Liverpool. These circum-
stances were eagerly seized upon by the United States
representatives here, and they have so worked upon
Lord Russell as to make him believe that the presence
of those officers and men has direct reference to the
destination of the rams. At any rate, the declaration of
the Ignited States Consular spies to that effect has been
the cause of their seizure at this time, because the reason
assigned is that the shijDs may be captured on their trial
trips, or even forcibly carried out of Liverpool, without
the consent of the Messrs. Laird, by these very officers
and men.

' The precautions taken to prevent such an attempt
are, under the circumstances, ludicrous. One of the
rams is in the Great Birkenhead Float. To be got out
she must pass through a kind of lock ; a large caisson
must be lifted, Avhich can only be done at a certain stage
of the tide ; and finally, a gate requiring machinery to
move it must be opened to give her egress. I learn
upon inquiry that if it were desired to remove her from
the dock, the keeper would require five hours' notice.
Yet this Government have thought it necessary to place
a gunboat with extra marines alongside of her, the fasts
of the gunboat being actually placed over those of the
ram, and until within the last few days have kept a
sixty-gun fi-igate at anchor opposite the dock -gate, for
fear that this formidable ship might j ump over all the

422 THE SECllET SERVICE OF THE

obstructions and proceed to sea in charge of the afore-
mentioned officers and discharged seamen, without bend-
ino- a sail or li^'htin^' a fire.

' Now, sir, the final issue of this affair is no longer a
practical question. Xo amount of discretion or manage-
ment on my part can effect the release of the ships.
]\Ir. Slidell has always given me to understand that the
Emperor of the French was aware of the nature of the
transaction with the Messrs. Bravay, and that at the
proper time the French Government would come forward
in support of the claims or assumed rights of its subjects.
I have alread}' intimated to ]\Ir. Slidell, in a cautiously
worded letter, what has happened here, and asked what
steps the French Government will take. . . . It is my
opinion that the British Government will not let the
ships be relno^^ed from their present position unless the
French Government comes forward and relieves it from
all responsibility or presumed obligation to the United
States, by requesting that the ships may be allowed
to leave Liverpool as the property of a French subject.
AYhether the Emperor is prepared to change places witli
her Majesty's Government or not can only be determined
when M. Bravay asks the protection or countenance of
his own Government ; and I will do all in my power to
press a decision in the matter, and will report to you the
result at the earliest possible moment.

' I have alwa3^s been under the impression that it
would have been better for the Messrs. Bravay to have
avowed their ownership of the ships at the time of the
assumed sale, and to have asked permission to complete
them. Thus would our minds have been at least set at
ease. If the answer had been " No," we should have
saved the money since expended, and could have sold
the ships in reality, as they were, and have put the

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 423

proceeds to other pressing uses. I waived those views
in deference to those of Mr. Mason and Mr. Slidell, who
thouo:ht that I should not interfere with or dictate too
much to Messrs. Bravay in the management of details,
and who thought that we should await some direct act of
interference on the part of the British Government before
calling upon the French owners to act. My hands are
now tied until those French subjects succeed in effecting
the release of the ships, which can only be done through
the medium of their OAvn Government. Under all the
circumstances, you will perceive how impossible it is for
me to predict the future of these ships. I. can only say
that if they are released from seizure, no time will be lost
in getting them clear of such a casualty again. I feel
bound to say that the presence of the Florida in these
waters, and the discharge of her crew, have very
materially added to our complications here ; but I need
not go into detail upon matters which have already
taken place, and can only be felt in their effects without
the possibility of prevention.

' I have conversed freely with Lieutenant Carter
(bearer of this) upon all our affairs in Europe, with the
view of his mentioning the substance to you, and I
respectfully request that you will give him an oppor-
tunity to explain some things to you which would
unnecessarily swell the dimensions of this despatch, and
which I do not wish to put formally upon paper.
' I have the honour, etc.,

' ( Signed) James D. Bulloch.
' Hon. S. R. Mallory,
' Eichmond.'

I reported in the above despatch that the ' actual
seizure ' of the rams was effected about one fortnight

424 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

before tlie date upon which it was written, naniel}^,
about October 9th, 1863. This was sufficiently correct
for the information of the Kavy Department at that time;
but for a clear and complete exposition of the case in all
its bearings, a more precise statement of dates is necessary.
It appears from the official correspondence that ]\Ir.
Layard, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
wrote to her Majesty's Minister at Washington on the
5th of September thus : — ' We have given orders to-day
to the Commissioner of Customs at Liverpool to prevent
the two ironclads leaving the Mersey. . . . Mr. Adams
is not yet aware that orders have been given to stop the
vessels. You may inform Mr. Seward confidentially of
the fact.'

In pursuance of the above intimation, the Messrs.
Laird were notified on the 9th or 10th of September that
the ships would not be permitted to sail or even to make
a trial trip, without special notice and permission ; but the
actual or formal seizure was not effected until October
9th, 18G3. On the 27th of October a body of marines
was put in charge of the ships, and two gunboats
stationed to watch them, the workmen being sent on
shore.

The facts, then, are briefly as follows. The ships
were ' detained ' September 9th, and ' seized ' October
9th, after which they were closely watched and guarded,
and the work of completing them virtually stopped, to
the great inconvenience and injury of the Messrs. Laird,
who were simply executing an ordinary commercial order.
Finally, after much correspondence and remonstrance,
they were permitted to go on with work, but always
under vexatious inspection and restraint.

This state of affairs continued for four months, during
which long ji^^iod no steps were taken to test the

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 425

legality of the seizure, or to bring any of the parties
alleged to have been implicated in the equipment of the
ships to an account. The particulars of the proceedings
against the ships were reported by me to the Confederate
Navy Department in the following despatch :

'Liverpool, Fehruary 17th, 1864.

' You have doubtless learned by means of newspapers,
which seem to pass very regularly through the lines of
the opposing armies in Virginia, as well as from the
published correspondence between Mr. Seward and the
United States Minister at the Court of St. James, that
every attempt to build a ship for the service of the Con-
federate States is o^^posed not only by the active exer-
tions of the American Minister and his numerous sub-
ordinates, the Consuls of that nation, but that through
Lord Russell the entire machinery of the British
Government which can in any w^ay be used for such a
purpose has been set in motion and put at Mr. Adams'
disposal, not to be w^orked in accordance with English
custom and English law, iDut in such a manner as may
be dictated by the Cabinet at Washington.

' The spies of the United States are numerous, active,
and unscrupulous. They invade the privacy of families,
tamper with the confidential clerks of merchants, and
have succeeded in converting a portion of the police of
this country into secret agents of the United States, who
have practised a prying watchfulness over the move-
ments and business of individuals intolerably vexatious,
which has excited the disgust and openly expressed in-
dignation of many prominent Englishmen, and the
frequent criticism of that portion of the British press
which is really neutral. These practices, though wholly
inconsistent with the spirit of justice and the funda-

426 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

mental principles of constitutional government, are not
only permitted, but to all appearance are directly
countenanced and encouraged by the present Ministry,
and tlie rights of British subjects are violated, and their
pecuniary interests damaged, by the seizure of property
in their hands upon the affidavits of persons who have
already perjured themselves before her Majesty's Courts.*
A nation is undoubtedly justified in the enforcement of
its neutrality by all legal processes, but where the cus-
tomary foi'ms of law are departed from, where a large
latitude is permitted to one belligerent and the other is
watched with a jealous and even vindictive scrutin}", the
obligations of neutrality are violated. That these obliga-
tions are violated in the action of Great Britain to the
Confederate States must be apparent to the world at
large. The point is conceded by many Englishmen, at
any rate.

' The conjomt efforts of Lord Kussell and Mr. Adams
have proved irresistible, and it is now settled beyond a
doubt that no vessel constructed with a view to offen-
sive warfare can be built and got out of England for the
service of the Confederate States. The arrangement by
Avhich I hoped to get the two ironclads, ''294" and " 295 "
beyond the jurisdiction of England, depended, as you
have already been informed, mainly, if not exclusively,
upon the intervention of the Emperor of the French.
It was hoped, and there was good reason for the hope,
that such intervention would come to our aid at the
proper time.

' It Avas confidently believed that if the British

Government, fearing that the Messrs. Bravay would

resell the rams to the Confederate States, should cause

them to be seized, and should demand of those gentle -

* Vide Youge and Chapman in re Alexandra.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 427

men any guarantee that the vessels shoukl actually
be delivered to the Pasha of Egypt, the Emperor of the
French would express to her Majesty's Government his
knowledge of the connection, in a business way, of
Messrs. Bravay with the Egyptian Government, and
would request the release of the ships as the property
of French subjects. In this expectation, based upon
intimations purporting to have come directly from
the Emperor, we have been grievously disappointed.
It has been intimated to Mr. Slidell, through no less
a personage than the Duke de Morny, that the Emperor
cannot make such a request at this time, although
his desire is that somehow or other the release of the
rams should be effected, and their possession by the
Confederate States be again secured.

' Thus reduced to a struggle with the British Govern-
ment, who, in case of a decision favourable to us in
the Court of Exchequer, will exhaust us by continual
delays and appeals even up to the House of Lords, it has
been determined to make a bond fide sale of the ships>
if possible, and I have given Messrs. Bra^'ay instructions
to that effect, in a letter, a copy of which I enclose,
marked A. It is possible that the Government may not
allow the sale of the ships, and we may be forced to
defend the suit, but the lawyers are so confident that the
title of the Messrs. Bravay will be sustained, that I
hope with some degTee of confidence that Lord Russell
may abandon the case and permit Messrs. Bravay to
sell the ships, although I am satisfied he would never
suffer them to leave England, except as the property of
some responsible Government other than that of the
Confederate States.

' Under date of October 20th, 1863, I had the honour
to report very fully to you on the subject of the seizure

428 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

of the rams, and I will now briefly trace their fortunes
to the present time.

* It was naturally supposed that as British subjects of
position and wealth were interested pecuniarily in the
case, and as it was one of great public interest, the
Government would take steps to bring it at the earliest
p)ossible time before the Exchequer Court. ^ly solicitor
was of opinion that it would be brought up during the
January term ; and I patiently awaited the turn of the
year. There seems to be something peculiar in the
construction of the Court of Exchequer and in the mode
of procedure therein. The defendants in a suit have no
power to hasten proceedings, but must await the action
of the j)rosecution. The solicitors for the Messrs. Laird
and for the ^Messrs. Bravay were at first of the opinion
that the Government was only desirous of affording the
United States Minister a hearing in support of his
suspicions, and that in justice to their clients a hearing
would be granted at the earliest possible time. Weeks
passed, however, and no ' information ' was lodged in
the Exchequer Court, nor could the solicitors for the
defendants obtain from the Government any assurance
as to when the case would be tried, or what would be
the precise nature of the indictment, or ' information,' as
it is technically called, in the Court of Exchequer.

'About the end of December (1863) I took legal
advice on the follo\\dng points : ( 1 ) Is there any way of
forcing the Government to take action? (2) Can any
dama""es be recovered from the Government if the
verdict is favourable to the defendants ? (3) Will the
Government permit the ships to be sold to a foreign
Power ? On the two first points counsel gave technical
opinions not necessary to insert here. In reference to
the third, the opinion was ' The Government would

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 429

not probably allow the ships to be sold to a foreign
State, but mio-ht be willino- to settle the whole matter
in full by making the purchase themselves, provided
Messrs, Bravay would sign a quit claim.' My own
solicitor, Avho from his professional as well as political
associations was favourably situated for coming to a
correct conclusion, expressed to me very decidedly his
opinion that Lord Russell would not act in accordance
with law ; that he was in feeling a thorough partizan of
the United States, and, acting in that spirit, he would
create all the delay possible in bringing the case to trial,
and would further embarrass the defendants by succes-
sive appeals from each consecutive verdict. He also felt
convinced that Lord Russell would never permit the
rams to leave England, unless the Emperor of the
French would claim them as French property, and thus
relieve her ]\Iajesty's Government of all responsibility to
the United States.

' My own observation of the progress of the case had
brought me to like conclusions, and on the 27th of
January I went to France to bring the matter to a close
without further delay, and by direct appeal to the
Emperor, through Messrs. Bravay. Although in the
beginning there was good reason to hope that the
Emperor would intervene at this stage of our proceed-
ings, I had for some time begun to doubt it, and on my
arrival in Paris the doubt was confirmed. The Emperor
caused the Messrs. Bravay, as well as the Hon. John
Slidell, to be informed that he could not make the request
to the British Government to release the rams. There
was a good deal said about the personal sympathy of
the Emperor for the South, and his earnest desire that
by some means or other we might get our ships out, but
he could not help us, so the sympathy and the hope

430 THE SECRET SERVICE OE THE

were sheer mockery, when we had been buoyed up ^vitli
the expectation of something more.

' I now laid tlie whole case before Hon. John Slidell,
Hon. James M. Mason, and Captain Barron, all of whom
were in Paris. . . . They expressed the unanimous
opinion that there was no hope of o'etting the ships out,
and that there was nothing- left for me to do but to
recover, if possible, the money expended. I lost no
time in settling preliminaries with Messrs. Bravay, and
to put the transaction in a formal business shape handed
them the enclosed letter, marked A, already alluded to
above — an act which, I assure you, sir, gave me greater
pain and regret than I ever thought it possible to feel.
The British Government have within the last two or
three weeks filed the ' information,' which includes 130
counts. The case is set for trial, I believe, in April or
]May. Messrs. Bravay will not receive an answer to
their application to sell in time for me to report the
result by Commander Wm. L. ]\Iaury, who Avill take
this despatch, but 3'ou will probably see the result in
the newspapers before I shall have an opj)ortunity of
writinof aofain.'

On the 3rd of April, 1864, I received a short cypher
despatch from the Secretary of the N^avy, dated ' Rich-
mond, February 24th, 18G4,' expressing the greatest
reluctance to part with the rams, and saying that nothing
short of the impendmg loss of them would justify
their sale. He had not then received the above ex-
planatory report upon the whole case, and I replied,
under date of ' Liverpool, April 14th ' : —

' You may rest assured that nothing has been done in
the matter alluded to by you except from necessity. I
have freely consulted with ]Mr. i\Iason and Mr. Slidell,
and their opinions were identical with my own. Com-

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 431

mancler Wm. L. Maury is, I trust, ere this in Richmond,
with despatches fully explaining the causes which com-
pelled the course adopted. I send you by to-morrow's
mail, via Halifax, a number of Parliamentary papers
relating to the rams. The affidavit of Chapman, with
reference to a pretended conversation with me, is wholly
untrue. Xot one single sentence which he has sworn
to ever passed between us. As this man perjured him-
self in the case of the Alexandra, his testimony would
not probably be received if the case of the rams is ever
brought to trial ; yet it is upon such testimony as this
that Lord Russell orders the forcible seizure of the
ships. The letter from Commander Maffitt to me, which
you will perceive was used by Mr. Adams to induce the
seizure of the rams, did not reach me through the men
of the Florida, by whom it was sent. When those men
arrived in Liverpool I Avas absent on the Continent.
They got into the hands of a solicitor, and gave him the
letter, which he seems to have sent to the United States
Consul, and the immediate cause of the seizure of the
ships was due to this circumstance.'

On the 2nd of May, 1864, 1 received another despatch
from the N^avy Department on the engrossing subject of
the rams. It was dated ' Richmond, March 21st, 1864.'
The Secretary of the Nav}^ was still ignorant of the
critical state of affairs, not having received my despatches
forwarded by Commander Maury, and he directed me
not to sell the rams ' until that measure shall have been
submitted to the President, with the reasons for it.'

I got an opportunity to reply on the 13th of May, as
follows : —

' I should never think of departing from your in-
structions nor the implied wishes of the President,
except in a case wherein such a course alone would pre-

432 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

vent positive disaster, the danger of which you could
not have foreseen, nor even then without the advice and
support of my natural and proper counsellors, the Com-
missioners of the Confederate States. I may say, how-
ever, that in this particular mstance I am no longer a
free agent, but am in the condition of a disabled ship
taken possession of by a current she has no power to
stem. The rams are in the possession of the law officers
of the British Crown, and they are acting under the
instructions of a ]\Iinister who has on every occasion
shown in practice personal animosity to the Southern
cause, and who seems regardless of the forms of law in
his efforts to prevent our getting any material aid from
Great Britain. Hoping to regain possession of these
much-needed ships, or, failing in this hope, at least
desiring to recover the large sum of money expended
upon them, I have placed the case in the hands of able
solicitors, who are acting in accord with eminent counsel.

' ISTow, sir, unless it is desired to establish a great
grievance against the British Government, and it is
thought that the money already expended upon the ships
may be advantageously sacrificed to gain that end, I
respectfully submit that my duty is to manage the case
in a practical business way, and to be governed by the
advice of the counsel employed. The only chance of
gaining the pending suit rests upon the ability of Messrs.
Bravay to prove their contract with the Pasha of Egypt,
and upon the consistency of their own testimony. If the
case goes to trial and the Bravays fail in the above
points, the verdict will undoubtedly be in favour of the
Crown, and our ships and money will both be lost.

' This is the opinion of counsel, and I am advised to
let ^Messrs. Bravay sell the vessels to the British Govern-
ment if they do not feel quite prepared to go into court

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 433

with a clear case. On the very day of the receipt of
your despatch of March 21st, I notified Messrs. Bravay
to suspend all pending negotiations for the sale of the
rams. The elder M. Bravay is now in Egypt. If on
his return he expresses confidence in himself and in his
case, we will stand to the issue of the trial. If, on the con-
trary, he professes doubt, or unwillingness to submit to a
personal examination, it is Mr. Slidell's opinion that I
should permit the actual sale of the ships, he being
satisfied, as well as myself, that such would be the
decision of the President, and of yourself also, if you
were aware of the actual state of affairs. The solicitors
and counsel employed are of opinion that if the first
verdict is for the defendants the Crown will appeal to the
Exchequer Chamber, and from thence to the House of
Lords, and that the case will not reach this latter Court
of Appeal during this entire year.

' I trust you have not thought that I have been need-
lessly fearful of the result, and have yielded too readily
to the advice of my solicitors. . . I held out as long as
was justifiable, and clung to hope as long as there was a ray
of it. No one could have had stronger inducements to
get the rams to sea than I had. Suppressing all allusion
to patriotic impulses, and setting aside the loyal duty
and allegiance I owe to the country, there are personal
reasons which could not fail to have spurred me to great
exertions. Althouo^h I was not to have had the honour
of commanding either of the ironclads, I felt satisfied
that their qualities and performances would redound to
my professional credit, and if they fail to do service for
the country in this great war for its independence, I
frankly confess that with a feeling of deep regret for the
public loss will be mingled one of purely selfish personal
disappointment. '

VOL. I. 28

434 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

On the 30tli of ^lay, 1864, 1 again received a despatch
from the Xavy Department, written this time with a full
knowledo-e of the state of affairs affectino^ the rams. The
above mentioned despatch was dated ' Richmond, April
7th, 1864,' and began thus : —

' Commander ]\Iaurj reached Richmond on the 3rd inst.,
and delivered your several despatches. The hopes in
which I have long and confidently indulged of certain
important results to our country fi'om your efforts
abroad, and which hopes were shared by thousands
around me, are prostrated by the intelligence he brings.
One reflection alone can alleviate the bitterness of this
disappointment, and this is the reflection that it results
not from any cause within our control, and that your
whole course, as the immediate and principal agent in the
enterprise, has been marked by equal energy, sagacity,
and tact. Knowing from my own what must be your
depression under this great national misfortune, I deem
it proper to say this in reference to your action.'

The SecretarjT- of the Navy confirmed the decision to
sell the rams, and the remainder of the despatch was de-
voted to other matters of business. During the whole
of the time, from the first ' detention ' of the rams, on
September 9th, 1863, until the ' information ' w^as filed
in the Exchequer, namely, February 8th, 1864, a period
of five months, not a single step was taken by her
Majesty's Government to justify the seizure, or to show
cause for the detention. It now appears, from the oflicial
correspondence published in the ' Appendix to the
British Case,'* that those five months were diligently
occupied in looking up evidence and in digesting the
numerous afiidavits of the United States Consul at
Liverpool.

* ' Alabama Claims, British Case,' vol. ii.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 435

That gentleman manifested his usual fecundity of
resource in supplying ' statements.' Those in this case
were of the stereotyped form, the persons swearing to
them being generally of the well-known type of ' affidavit
monger.' They ' believed this,' and had ' heard that,'
but were always wide of the mark when they came
to deal with specific facts.

After the formal seizure on the 9th of October, the
ships were kept literally in a state of siege — Captain
Inglefield, of her Majesty's ship Majestic, was the officer
charged with their special custody. The Government
had been persuaded by Mr. Adams that the dis-
charged crew of the Florida had been sent to Liverpool
for the purpose of forcibly seizing the rams and taking
them to sea, and if there had been a hostile fleet off the
harbour, Captain Inglefield could not have been more
perplexed and anxious, more nervously active and
watchful in his precautions and preparations to discover
and defeat a cutting-out expedition, than he appears to
have been with respect to the alleged hostile seamen
from the Florida, who were probably smoking their
pipes at the ' Sailors' Home,' or were already dispersed
in other ships, in happy or careless unconsciousness of
the agitation they were creating.

On the 6th of October, 1863, Captain Inglefield
wrote, in reply to ' confidential instructions ' from the
Admiralty : ' I conceive the possibility that an attempt
might be made to carry the vessel in question out of
British waters by force.' . . . ' The Custom-house
authorities having placed their means entirely at my
disposal, I have organized a system of espionage which
cannot fail to give me the earliest possible information
of any movement on the part of the ironclad vessel in

28—2

436 TEE SECIIET SERVICE OF THE

question.'* On the 8th of October he received orders
by telegraph ' to give every assistance to officers of the
Customs in effecting and maintaining the seizure of both
iron ships,' etc. ; and on the 9th he wrote in reply if
' .... In obedience to the above, I consider it most
expedient that the LiverpoolX should be moved down
the river to a berth immediately abreast of the entrance
to the Grreat Float, so that she may perfectly command
the basin, and be nearer her guard-boat. The gunboat
will remain "\\'ithin the entrance to the Great Float, and
during the night an armed pinnace will row guard.'
On the 11th of October he reports further : ' The gun-
boat will take up a position beside the ironclad vessel,
and during the daytime the marines will remain on
board of her. After the workmen have left, a sentry will
be placed on the forecastle, and another on the poop of the
ram ; Messrs. Laird's shipkeepers remaining in charge of
stores. ... I shall then direct a lieutenant of marines
to remain on board the iron ship daring the night, only
withdrawing his party when the workpeople return in
the morning. '§ On the 25th of October he wrote again :
' If an effort is made to carry off the rams, I think it will
either be at night, or in such thick weather as we con-
stantly experience at this time of year. Unless the
gunboat arrives to-day, I must employ the ferry-boat
to-morrow morning ; for though the El Mounassir is not
masted, nor are her turrets on board, she is, nevertheless,
an available ironcased ram, which would be of con-
siderable service (even in her present condition) for
breaking a blockade. '|| . . . ' The arrival of the Heron
and Britomart, which I am looking for anxiously, mil

* 'Appendix to British Case,' p. 384. t Ibid. p. 393.

X The Liverpool was a large screw frigate of sixty guns.
§ ' Appendix to British Case,' p. 400. || Ibid. p. 418.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 437

obviate the necessity of seeking tlie assistance of the
ferry-boat, etc'

In consequence of the above letter, the Secretary to
the Admiralty wrote to the Under-Secretary for Foreign
Affairs on October 26th : — ' My lords are quite prepared,
if Earl Russell thinks it desirable, to send the Prince
Consort* to anchor at the mouth of the Mersey.'f

There are more documents of similar purport in the
official correspondence, but the above quotations will
sufficiently demonstrate the great naval force that was
employed in guarding these mastless and turretless
rams from being carried off, the items being : her
Majesty's ship Majestic, say sixty guns ; her Majesty's
ship Liverpool, sixty guns ; three gunboats — say one
pivot-gun each — and the proffered reinforcement of her
Majesty's armour-cased ship Prince Consort.

Captain Inglefield is a gallant officer, I have no doubt
on that point, and he would probably make skilful and
suitable arrangements to repel a sea attack upon the
Mersey, if he should be appointed to the naval command
at Liverpool in a time of war; but I cannot help thinking
that, as he sipped his wine at dinner in thQ Majestic s cabin,
after writing one of the above reports to the Admiralty,
there must have floated athwart his mind a suspicion
that there was a comical side to the whole transaction.
I cannot bring myself to believe that an experienced
naval officer would give credence to such a preposterous
allegation as that an attempt would be made to carry off
the rams by force, or that any effort would be made
to move them from their positions, which could not
have been prevented by tlie remonstrance of a single

* The Prince Consort is an ironclad,
t ' Appendix to British Case,' p. 417.

438 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

Custom House officer, with a pen behind his ear and a
memorandum-l)ook in his hand.

The Confederate Government was imj)elled by every
motive of poHcy, if not of principle, to conciliate foreign
Powers, and especially Great Britain, and it is incon-
ceivable that any Minister of State, nay, I may say
that any reasoning being, could have supposed that the
President of the Confederate States would have coun-
tenanced, or that any responsible agent of that Govern-
ment would have made, such an attempt.

It was said, I believe, that as the Alabama was taken
out of the Mersey without permission, the same thing
might be done with the ironclads, but the cases are not
comparable with each other. There is a great difference
between taking up your hat and quietly walking out of
a man's house without asking his leave Avhen he has not
forbidden your departure, and the act of knocking him
down and stepping over his prostrate body to get out
when he has j^rohibited your going. It has been shown,
and I think it will be admitted by all fair-minded j^eople,
that the taking away of the Alabama infringed no law,
and it has never been alleged that she was restrained in
any way, or that a single false statement was made in
reference to her movements. I mean that her Majesty's
Government have never alleged it. But in the case
of the rams, they were restrained by the orders of
the duly authorized civil authorities from making even
a trial-trip without especial permission, and the Messrs.
Laird would not have connived at their being removed
from their works ; and no one acting on behalf of the
Confederate Government would have dreamed of attempt-
ing a forcible removal. Besides, as a mere practical
question, the condition of the vessels was such that they
could not have been carried off without so much open

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 439

preparation, and so much assistance from local people,
that there could have been no disguise and no coiqo- de-
main. The ' scare ' originated at the United States
Consulate. The arrival of the Florida\s men was
seized upon as a fortuitous circumstance. Mr. Adams
appears to have convinced Earl Russell of ' the desperate
character of the chief persons engaged in the insurrection
in the United States,' of whom he says, in one of the
letters to his lordship : — ' I shall be little surprised at
learning of their resort to any expedient, however
audacious or dishonest, which may have for its object
the possession of these formidable ships.'*

It is well known among business men that a ship
remains exclusively in the custody of the builder, and is
in fact his property, until the last instalment of her
price is paid and the builder's certificate is handed over
to the contractor or purchaser. The latter has, of
course, a contingent interest in her, equivalent to the
portion of the stipulated price he has paid, but he
cannot take possession or remove her until she is com-
pleted and 23aid for. If there is delay in the completion
beyond the time specified for delivery, or injury to the
ship in course of building, the loss falls upon the
builder, and not upon the purchaser.

The inconvenience and injury to the Messrs. Laird by
the seizure of the rams, and the lashing of gun-boats
alongside, and the mounting of guards on board, must
have been serious. They protested, and pointed out the
improbability — in fact, the impossibility — of any party
of men being found who would attempt to take the
ships away from them by force. On the 17th of Octo-
ber, 1863, they wrote to the Under-Secretary of the

* Published in Liverpool Daily Mercury, with other official corre-
spondence, March 10th, 1864.

440 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

Treasury : — ' Both vessels are incomplete, and unfit for
sea-sfoino;. The second vessel has not even ""ot her
masts or funnel in, and both are in the sole charge
of our own people. We believe, further, that if any
such project as the forcible abduction of these vessels
had ever been thought of, it could not successfully have
been carried out in the port of Liverpool.'

At one time it was proposed to stop the work upon
the ships entirely, but this would have compelled Messrs.
Laird to discharG^e a lari»:e number of men, which
Captain Inglefield thought would increase the ill-feeling
already exhibited by the operatives in Messrs. Laird's
yard towards the naval officers and men emplo3'ed in
maintaining the seizure, and the builders were permitted
to o;o on with then- work, althouo-h under such restric-
tions and ' espionage ' the progress was necessarily slow
and un satisfactory'.

Meanwhile, the Government was diligently employed
looking up evidence. They even went to the expense
of sending a commission to Egypt to examine the
Viceroy and his Grand Vizier as to their business rela-
tions with Messrs. Bravay. Finally, after coquetting
for some time about the purchase of the ships, they
sent down experts from the Admiralty, who carefully
examined and valued them, and then, with the law- suit
in one hand and the valuation in the other, they made
a direct offer to Messrs. Bravay, which Avas accepted,
and the preliminary terms upon which the two rams
should pass into the Royal Xavy were settled on about
the '20th of ]\[ay, 1864.

Formal notice of suit for the forfeiture of the rams
had been given on the 8th of February, and in the ' in-
formation,' both the Messrs. Laird and Messrs. Bravay
were made parties to the suit. It is ordinarily supposed,

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 441

when a defendant in a case of this kind abandons his
defence and accepts the terms oifered by the Government,
that he admits the weakness of his position, and the
legality of the proceedings which have been taken against
him. But after the withdrawal of the case by the
Crown it was thought advisable to prevent any such
conclusion with reference to ]\Iessrs. Laird and Messrs.
Bravay. On the day after tlie formal notice of with-
drawal of the suit, namely, May 27th, 186-4, the
Attorney-General, with Sir Hugh Cairns, appeared in
the Court of Exchequer at Westminster, and the former
said : —

' The CroA^Ti had asserted that there was a valid
seizure for a valid cause of forfeiture. The claimants
had to the last asserted that there was no such valid
cause of forfeiture, but the matter had been by aiTange-
ment withdrawn from the cognizance of the court, so
that no determination of it would be necessary, and
that had been done upon the footing that the Crown
had agreed to pay to the claimants the value which the
Crown themselves had placed upon the property, and
that, too, entirely without prejudice to the position of
the Crown or the claimants with regard to the question
that would have required to be tried if the arrangement
had not been made. The mode of doing it and giving
effect to that arrangement had not been finally arrived
at ; but no mode would be adopted that would in any
degree authorize me to say that there was any admission
by the claimants that it was a valid forfeiture.'

The Messrs. Bravay made no concession which could
be taken as a surrender of their right as French sub-
jects to buy or to have built for them a vessel of any
description in England. They did only what other
private parties have often done, namely, consent to

442 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

an arrangement rather than to continue an expensive
and tedious litigation with the State, and it is hardly
probable that the law officers of the Crown would have
advised a settlement which resulted in a pecuniary
profit to the claimants, if they really thought that
Messrs. Bravay had infringed the terms of the Foreign
Enlistment Act. It is fair and reasonable to assume
that, having in remembrance the judgment of the Court
of Exchequer in the ' Alexandra Case,' and also that of
the Vice- Admiralty Court of Nassau in respect to the
Oreto, they had no hopes of obtaining a favourable
verdict, and no expectation of proving that there had
been ' a valid seizure for a valid cause of forfeiture.'

I am bound to say that as soon as it was decided to
get out of the difficulty by buying the ships, the
Admiralty conducted the operation in a perfectly fair
and straightforward way. The ships were valued with
scrupulous regard to their intrinsic worth, and with due
reference to the state of the shipbuilding trade at the
time, and as a mere commercial transaction the sale was
satisfactory, the aggregate amount agreed to be paid by
the Government being about £30,000 in excess of the
original contract price of the two ships, which proves
that they were good vessels of their kind, and that the
work upon them had been faithfully executed. The
whole of the purchase money did not of course revert to
the Confederate Treasury, but onl}^ a part proportioned
to the amount that had been paid on account; and
although the circumstances which brought this pecu-
niary reinforcement to the funds of the Xavy Depart-
ment were most distressing, yet the relief came at a
time when much work would have been necessarily
abandoned, and some important contracts cancelled, if
it had not been obtained. In the month of September,

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 443

1863, I had reported that the prospective wants of the
Department were £705,300 in excess of the A^isible
supply. Mr. Secretary Mallory had made every pos-
sible effort to meet the deficiency, but it had not been
made good, the demands always increasing in a larger
ratio than the means for meeting them. These matters
of finance have, however, been dealt with and explained
in another chapter.

The gratitude of the United States to Earl Russell for
the seizure of the rams was even greater than the gratifi-
cation Mr. Seward expressed for the prosecution of the
Alexandra. As soon as the purpose of her Majesty's
Government was known in Washington, Mr. Adams was
instructed to thank Lord Russell, and to say that the
President was gratified in being able to regard his con-
duct in the light of a sincere desire, on just principles, to
maintain friendly relations with the United States.
Mr. Adams concluded his letter of thanks in these
words : — ' I am therefore instructed to inform your lord-
ship that the Government will hereafter hold itself ob-
lisred, with even more care than heretofore, to endeavour so
to conduct its intercourse with Great Britain as that the
war in which it is now unhajjpily involved may, when-
ever it may terminate, leave to neither nation any per-
manent cause of discontent.''""

The Government of Great Britain zealously fulfilled
its share in accomplishing the purpose which Mr. Adams
so ardently hoped would follow the seizure of the rams.
Earl Russell applied the Foreign Enlistment Act so
stringently with reference to the Confederate States, that
it was very difiicult to forward the most essential sup-
plies, and while the drain of battle, and the lack of neces-
sary comforts were thmning the ranks and wasting the
* Appendix to ' British Case,' vol. ii. p. 400.

4U THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

strength of the armies in the field, and the difficulty of
placing funds in Europe was daily increasing, the
cheapest and most favourable market, that of England,
was well nigh closed to the Confederacy, while the
United States were permitted to buy and ship what they
liked, without hindrance, and at the ordinary current
prices.

I do not msh to overstate the case, but I say without
hesitation, and without fear of contradiction, that the
practice of stopping ordinary merchant steamers and
detaining them for examination and inquiry, unless they
were loading for a Northern port, drove the Confederate
agents to such shifts in order to get their purchases out
of England, that the cost of every rifle and every ounce
of 23owder was greatly increased, irrespective of the high
blockade rates for freight. A notable and distressing
feature of this unequal treatment of the two belligerents
was that the restrictive watchfulness practised over the
weaker side became more cold and rigid as the disparity
of strength became more and more manifest.

But while Earl Russell thus did all in his power to
conciliate the United States, and to conduct his inter-
course with them so that the termination of the war
should ' leave to neither nation any permanent cause of
discontent,' the Government at Washinofton did not act
in the spirit of Mr. Adams's promise. JSTo sooner was the
war over than Mr. Seward began to collect complaints
against Great Britain. He originated what are known
as the '"Alabama Claims.' He began and continued for
several years an active, harassing, and sometimes angry
correspondence with the British Foreign Office, and
finally his successor haled her Majesty's Government
before an International Court, Avith a result which all the
world knows.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 445

Anyone who cares to read ' The Case of the United
States ' in the Geneva Arbitration, will be struck with
the harsh epithets and disparaging insinuations which
are cast upon the Ministry which governed England
during the war, and indeed upon British officials
generally, and will think that the assurance given by
Mr. Adams was forgotten as soon as the occasion which
inspired it had served its purpose.

The Government of the United States did not ex-
aggerate the importance of preventing the departure of
the rams fi*om Liverpool, and the passionate appeals, and
strong asseverations of Mr. Adams are not surprising. He
knew the formidable character of the ships, and foresaw
the havoc they would work if they ever got into the
hands of a competent Confederate officer. The defensive
powers of the rams were quite up to the standard of the
years 1861-63. They were cased over the vital parts
with 4^-inch armour upon twelve inches of teak backing,
and an inner skin of f -inch iron plates. Each had two
revolving turrets with 5 J -inch armour over twelve
inches of teak. In each turret there would have been
two guns of the best possible manufacture, mounted
parallel to each other, and five feet fi-om centre to centre.
Calibre of gun, 9-inch rifled ; weight of projectile, about
220 pounds ; weight of gun, about twelve tons. If one
of the rams had gone into smooth water, and had
suffered a ' Monitor ' to make deliberate practice at her
with 15 -inch shot at short range, as in the engagement
between the Weehawhen and the Atlanta in Warsaw
Sound, no doubt in time her plates would have been
loosened and the backing sj^lintered ; but their power
and speed was such that in open water, with room to
manoeuvre, I think they would have had no difficulty in
running down any ' Monitor ' then afloat, and I con-

446 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

fideiitly believe tliat tliey would have broken up the
blockade completely, and then perhaps they would have
paid New York or Boston an unpleasant visit.

I have now given a full and accurate account of the
formidable vessels ' 294 ' and ' 295/ from the first dis-
cussion of their plans to the time when they became part
of the naval force of Great Britain. Those persons who
permit their judgment to be swayed by political bias,
Avho were unfriendly to the South during the war, and
who have pledged themselves to the opinion that the
Confederate Government should not have been allowed
to get ships in England under any circumstances, may
say that the foregoing confession of the ultimate owner-
ship and purpose of the rams fully justified their seizure.
But I think that those, on the other hand, Avho only
wish to come to a right judgment after a dispassionate
examination of the facts, will be brought to the con-
clusion that there was no valid reason for the inter-
ference of her Majesty's Government, and that the
proceedings against the vessels prescribed by Earl
Russell, and so rigidly enforced by the Customs authori-
ties and by the naval commander at Liverpool, were not
in accordance with the principles of international duty
laid doAMi for its practice by the Government itself, and
that they went far beyond the purpose of the prohibitory
clauses, and were in excess of the powers granted in the
preventive clauses of the Neutrality Laws of Great
Britain, as expounded by the Solicitor -General in
Parliament, and defined by the judgment of the Court
of Exchequer in the Alexandra case.

In forming an opinion with reference to Earl Russell's
proceedings against the rams, it is clearly essential to
consider, not what is known now, but what were the
actual circumstances and the precise position of affairs

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 447

at the time of the seizure ; and it is equally important to
bear in mind the statements made by leading members
of the Government in the House of Commons in ex-
planation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, and defining
what each belligerent might do towards supplying its
Avants without infringing the statute. Without quoting
again in full the principles of action laid down by the
Government, I may for the present purpose merely
remind the reader that the Prime Minister, Lord
Palmerston, said that there was no difi^erence in principle
between supplying a belligerent with rifles or with ships
that are to operate in war, and that on the mere ground
of international law it was quite admissible to supply
either of two belligerents not only with arms and
cannon, but also with ships destined for warlike
purposes ; that the Solicitor- General said it was a great
mistake to suppose that the Foreign Enlistment Act was
meant to prohibit all commercial dealings in sliips-of-war
with belligerent countries, and that even the Alabama,
though a ship-of-war, might have formed a legitimate
article of merchandise, even if meant for the Confederate
States ; and that Earl Russell himself, in a letter to Mr.
Adams, said that her Majesty's Government ' cannot
interfere with commercial dealings between Britsih sub-
jects and the so-styled Confederate States, whether the
object of those dealings be money or contraband goods,
or even ships adapted for warlike purposes.'

The letter fi'om Earl Russell containino^ the above
statement was read in Court by Sir Hugh Cairns, the
leading counsel for the defendants in the trial of the Alex-
andra^ and was commented upon by him as the opinion
of a Minister of the Crown, and it probably had a good
deal of weight, not in determining the * direction ' of the
Lord Chief Baron, but in affecting the minds of the jury.

448 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

AVlien the Messrs. Laird engaged as a purely com-
mercial transaction to build the rams, the views of the
Government were not fully and sj^ecifically known, and
neither those gentlemen nor the Confederate agent had
any other guide to the scope of the Foreign Enlistment
Act than the opinions of their legal advisers. But the
statements above referred to were made in the House of
Commons, and the letter of Earl Russell was written,
several months before the seizure of the rams. They
were not merely the opinions of three eminent men
upon an abstract question of international or municipal
law, but they were the declarations of two responsible
^Ministers of the Crown, and of a chief law officer of the
Government, in reference to a specific Act of Parliament,
and must have been intended to lay do^\ai the j^rinciple
upon which the act would be administered in the
practice of their neutrality. When those statements of
Ministers and of the Solicitor-General were followed by
a judgment of the Court of Exchequer which fully
confirmed their view of the municipal law, it can hardly
be doubted that the Confederate Government was
justified in tliinking that their agents might supply
all their wants in the ordinary commercial way, and that
they might buy in the British markets and from British
subjects, not only ' contraband goods,' but ' even ships
adapted for warlike purposes,' provided there was no
intention that in the port of Liverpool or in any other
port (of the British dominions) the vessels should be, in
the language of the Act of Parliament, ' either equipped,
furnished, fitted out, or armed,' which the Lord Chief
Baron in his summing up declared all meant the same
thing, and referred exclusively to the warlike arma-
ment.

It has been alleged that while any ordinary ships,

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 449

even though well suited in structure and general
arrangements for warlike purposes, might be legitimate
objects of sale by British subjects to a belligerent, yet
armour-cased vessels were fitted for hostile operations,
and could attack and destroy an enemy immediately
after leaving port, without being armed at all in the
sense of being provided with guns, and therefore the
privilege which might be permitted to trade in the
former, would not be permissible with reference to the
latter class. In reply to this I will call attention to the
fact that the official statements previously quoted were
made by Ministers, and the judgment of the court
was rendered, when not only other armoured vessels had
been built, and were building, but when the particular
vessels in question, namely, those bought by Messrs-
Bravay, were well-advanced in their construction, and
that neither in the Ministerial statements nor in the
judgment of the court was there any limitation to
the broad and inclusive declaration, that ' even ships
adapted for warlike purposes ' were on a parity with
gunpowder and saltpetre as articles of commercial
traffic.

But there is something more than mere negative
testimony to offer on this point. On the oth of Sep-
tember, 1863, Mr. Adams wrote a very strong letter to
Earl Russell, which certainly contained an ill-concealed
threat of serious consequences if the rams were per-
mitted to leave England.* Earl Russell sent a brief
memorandum to Mr. Adams on the 8th of September : —
' Lord Russell presents his compliments to Mr. Adams,
and has the honour to inform him that instructions have
been issued which will ])revent the departure of the two

* ' British Case,' Appendix, vol. ii., pp. 352, 353.
VOL. I. 29

450 THE SECRET SEliVICE OF THE

ironclad vessels from Liverpool.'* Now it must be
borne in mind that tlie letter of Mr. Adams, of Septem-
ber 5th, referred exclusively and specifically to the two
rams, ' 294 ' and ' 295,' and Lord Russell's memorandum
of the 8th had reference to them also. On the 11th of
September, three days after, Earl Russell replied in full
to Mr. Adams's letter of the 5th. There was no ques-
tion now of a duplicate Alahama, or of any ordinary
ship merely capable of being subsequently adapted to
warlike purposes. Earl Russell was replying to a re-
monstrance against the departure of the two iron-cased
rams alleged to be building for the Confederate Govern-
ment, and he wrote thus : —

' With regard to the general duties of a neutral ac-
cording to international law, the true doctrine has been
laid down repeatedly by Presidents and judges of emi-
nence of the United States, and that doctrine is, that a
neutral may sell to either or both of two belligerent
parties any implements or munitions of war which such
belligerent may wish to purchase from the subjects of
the neutral, and it is difficult to find a reason ichy a ship
that is to he used for warlike purposes is more an instru-
ment or implement of tear than cannon^ muskets, swords^
bayonets, gunpouxler, and projectiles to he fired from
cannon and muskets. A ship or a musket may he sold to
one helligerent or the other, and only ceases to he neutral
when the ship is owned, manned, and employed in war,
and the musket is held hy a soldier and used for the pur-
pose of killing his enemy. In fact, the ship can never he
expected to decide a icar or a campaign, whereas the other
things ahove mentioned may, hy equipping a large army,
enahle the helligerent which acquires them to ohtain decisive

* 'British Case,' Appendix, vol. ii., p. 355.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 451

advantages in loar.^* Earl Russell, in continuation,
points out very forcibly that if the Confederates had been
able to obtain some vessels and ' a limited supply of
arms from the United Kingdom,' the Federal Govern-
ment had obtained a far greater supply of warlike stores ;
and then he adds that her Majesty's Government had
reasons to believe, although they could not prove, that
agents of the Federal Government had been employed to
encjao'e emisfrants to o-o to the United States for the
purpose of entering into the military service of the
Federal Government.

The linking together of a ship and so great a variety
of contraband goods, as being equally articles of legiti-
mate trade between neutrals and either of two belli-
gerents, and the illustration of the inefficiency of a ship
in comparison with arms to decide a campaign, which
Earl Russell so forcibly employs in the above letter, are
quite in harmony with the declarations previously made
by himself, by Lord Palmerston, by the Solicitor-
General, and with the judgment of the Court of Ex-
chequer, on the right of a British subject to build and
sell, and a belligerent to buy, an unarmed ship in
England.

I think anyone reading the paragraphs of the letter I
have quoted above, knowing that they were parts of a
long argumentative repty to a demand for the seizure
of the rams, Avould naturally expect that they were
intended to lead up to and to justify a refusal ; but in
the last paragraph of the letter Earl Russell confirms the
promise contained in his memorandum of September 8th,
and says that the vessels will be detained ' until satis-
factory evidence can be given as to their destination.'
For several months previous to the seizure of the rams

* See 'British Case,' Appendix, vol. ii., pp. 358—360.

29—2

452 THE SECRET SELTICE OF THE

the Foreign Office had been mundated with affidavits by
Mr. Dudley, the Liverpool Consul. The law officers of
the Crown liad looked with distrust upon these Consular
statements. They recognised probably tlie stereotyped
form with ^\'hich they had become unpleasantly familiar
in the Alexandra case. They saw the names of Clarence
K. Yonge and George Temple Chapman attached to some
of them, and doubtless shrank from aii'ain brino'ino; two
such witnesses before a jury. At any rate, they reported
several times that the * depositions were insufficient,'
that there was 'no evidence capable of being presented to
a court of justice,' etc.

The last time the law officers were consulted before
the seizure of the vessels appears to have been on the
19th-20th of August. The opinion is signed by Sir
Eoundell Palmer, who was then the Solicitor-General,
now Lord Selborne and the Lord Chancellor of England.
He alludes to the fresh affidavits that had been fon\'arded
by Mr. Dudley, and concludes with the following final
opinion : — ' There is in fact no additional evidence, and
Ave therefore continue to think that the interference of
the Government, by seizure of these vessels or otherwise,
would not be warranted by any of the depositions which
have been brought to our notice.'*

I suppose it will be admitted that every Government
has the rio;ht to determine the standard of its oaati
neutrality, subject only to the requirements of interna-
tional law. I mean, that if the municipal law does not
confer the power necessary to comply with neutral duties
as prescribed by international law, the statutes should be
amended ; but if the municipal law is stronger than the
law of nations requires, the neutral is not bound to enforce
it with full rii>'Our.

* vSee 'British Case,' Appendix, vol. ii., pp. 337, 338.

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 453

It is well known that the United States complained
bitterly because her ]\Iajesty's Government, so they
alleged, were precipitate in acknowledging the Con-
federate States as belligerents. The reply was in effect
that the United States had themselves both created and
acknowledged the state of war, and that the British
Government had only recognised a condition of affairs
which alread}^ existed. The South could have urged a
valid plea to belligerent rights, and the claim could
hardly have been denied, but the chief Powers took the
initiative, and acknowledged the existence of a de facto
Government at Richmond, as soon as the President of
the United States proclaimed a blockade of the Southern
ports. This recognition did not, however, carry with
it a diplomatic equality with foreign States, and the
Confederate Government could not therefore com-
municate its views nor uro;e remonstrances in a direct
official manner.

Great Britain laid down at a very early date the
rules of neutrality by which she would be guided.
It was manifest from the very beginning that those
rules, even if administered with scrupulous impartiality,
Avould give the United States an advantage, because
of their open ports and their command of the sea. But
the Confederate Government, perceiving the improba-
bilit}'- of getting a modification of the rules, refrained
from wrancrlino' over them, and was content to use the
opportunities of supplying the wants of the country
to the best possible advantage. One of the chief
requirements of the south was ships, not only for the
purpose of cruising against the enemy, but to run the
blockade.

If there had l^een anything in the municipal law of
Great Britain which prohil)ited the purchase of an

454 THE SECRET SEBVICE OF THE

imarmed sliip for any subsequent purpose whatever,
or if the responsible Ministers of the Crown had stated
specifically that there was a difference in principle
between trading with a belligerent in arms and in ships,
and that they would permit the one and forbid the
other, the justice of the distinction would have been
doubted, and the policy questioned, but both belligerents
would at least have known what to expect. The odds
against the Confederacy, great enough in all conscience at
best, would have been somewhat increased, but the
Southern people would have fought their battle with
none the less spirit, even though with less chance
of success. But the Foreign Enlistment Act (as it
stood in 1861-65) did not forbid a British subject to
build or sell a ship of any kind to an}' mortal man who
could pay for her. This has been settled by the decision
of a court of law, which has never been reversed, and
there is not in the original definition of their neutral
policy, nor in the subsequent statements of Ministers,
any notice or hint that it was their purpose to draw the
line at ships, and to set a ban upon that branch of trade
alone. On the contrary, whether we examine the
speeches of the Prime Minister and the Solicitor -General
in Parliament, or the despatches of the Foreign Secretary,
we find one uniform maxim, one fundamental rule of
action, namely, that there is no difference in principle
between selling a belligerent rifles and gunpowder or
ships, and that her Majesty's Government cannot
interfere with or forbid either.

The feeling of the Government on the above subject
was never more plainly expressed than in Earl Russell's
letter of September 11th, 1863, to Mr. Adams, in which
his lordship not only reiterates the general proposition
that muskets and ships may be dealt in alike, but with

CONFEDERATE STATES IN EUROPE. 455

striking particularity he proceeds to specify a condition
of affairs in which rifles and cannon, swords, bayonets
and gunpowder, may be more useful to one belligerent
than a ship to the other, and says that neither a ship nor
a musket ceases to be neutral until it is in the possession
of a belligerent and is about to be used by him against
his enemy, and 3'et in that very letter he announces the
purpose to seize the alleged Confederate vessels.

It appears from the printed documents that the vessels
were seized by the order of her Majesty's Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs on his own authority as a
Minister of the Crown. There was at that time ' no
evidence capable of being presented to a court of justice ;
the seizure was therefore an act of the State, an exercise
of ^prerogative, and not a process of law. Earl Russell
stated that the object of the seizure was to detain the
ships until the Government could obtain satisfactory
evidence of their destination. To get the evidence the
Government took a great deal of trouble, and must have
incurred no little expense. A special Commission Avas
sent to Egypt to inquire whether the Viceroy, Ismail
Pasha, had really ordered Messrs. Bravay to build two
armour-cased vessels for him in Europe ; and I may
state at once that the Viceroy said he had not. This
was all the evidence the Government ever did get, and
no legal proceedings were ever taken against either the
Messrs. Bravay or Messrs. Laird, except the filing of the
' information.' But was her Majesty's Government under
any obligation to go to all this trouble and expense to
inquire into the business relations of a French mercantile
house and a foreign Government ? Was it not perfectly
legal for Messrs. Bravay, being French subjects, and
their country at peace with both belligerents and with
Great Britain, to contract for any ships they liked in

456 THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE

England ? and did it matter at all, as a question of law,
what they intended to do with them after taking them
away from Liverpool ? Is it to be understood that the
precedent is now established that whenever Great
Britain is a neutral in all future Avars, the Government
will undertake to compel every shipbuilder in the
kingdom to report who he is working for, and will then
require the person, even though a neutral foreigner, to
prove what he is going to do with the ship ? If this is so,
the Consuls of the belligerents uill give her ^Majesty's
Foreign Office more work than any ordinary staff can
accomplish.

When the arransfements were made to sell the two
rams to Messrs. Bravay, there was no necessity for
manufacturing any plea of a pretended contract with the
Yicero}^ of Egypt. It was well known both in Paris
and in Alexandria, and it was known to the French
Government, that the firm had been for years in business
relations with the Egyptian Government, and that they
bad executed large contracts for the Viceroy in France.
The letters from M. Fran(;ois Bravay respecting the com-
missions he had undertaken on account of the Viceroy,
and the re23ly of the Paris house, quoted in a previous
part of this chapter, were written months before any
arrangement in respect to the rams at Liverpool was
contemplated, and therefore could not have been pre-
pared as a cover for that transaction. Indeed, at the
date of those letters neither Mr, Slidell nor I knew any-
thing whatever of ^lessrs. Bravay, and had never met
any member of the firm. It is well known in Europe
that his Highness Ismail Pasha, and his predecessor,
Said Pasha, had vcr}^ large and peculiar dealings with
private persons in England and France, and that they
both made efibrts to add to their military and naval

CONFE DEBATE STATES IN EUROPE. 457

strength secretly, wishing for pohtical reasons to avoid
the interference or inquisitive supervision of the Sublime
Porte.

When the Messrs. Laird were requested to sell the
ships, they were open, of course, to all practicable offers,
and they looked about for a purchaser, just as any other
business men would have done under the same circum-
stances. They knew that the sale of the ships would
involve the release of one contractor, with whose
financial position they were satisfied, and the sub-
stitution of another, as to whose commercial credit they
must be assured. Any ship-builder in England would
have treated the matter in this way, and no other. When
the Messrs. Bravay came forward to buy the ships, it is
not probable that ^Messrs. Laird inquired particularly into
the precise nature of their dealings with the Viceroy.
It did not concern them to know whether the ' order '
fi'om the Egyptian Government was a specific contract
in writing or not ; I do not even know whether they
asked anything about it. As prudent business men,
they inquired into the financial position of the Messrs.
Bravay, and, being satisfied with the security they could
give for the payment of the two ships, they reported
the offer and effected the sale. The whole trans-
action Avas carried out in a perfectly legal way, and the
ships became the absolute property of the Messrs.
Bravay. No process of law could have destroyed their
title. Of this we were assured by eminent counsel.
They made all subsequent payments, and when Her
Majesty's G-overnment called upon Messrs. Laird to say
for whom they were building the ships, they replied 'For
Messrs. A. Bravay and Co., No. 6, Rue de Londres,
Paris.'

The Vicerov had refrained from making a specific

458 THE SECllET SEllVICE OF THE

contract in writing for any ships ' for political reasons.'
When broiiglit to the ordeal of a formal dij^lomatic
inquiry, he reiDudiated the transaction for the same
reasons ; but even though he thus denied the validity of
the alleged commission to ^I. Bravay, how could that
destroy the right of the Paris firm to the property which
they held by a clear, indisputable title in England ? If
a neutral has the right to sell a rifle or a ship to a
belligerent, and her Majesty's Ministers and the Court
of Exchequer have both declared that he has, why may
not a neutral buy from another neutral a rifle or a ship
and sell either or both of them afterwards to a belligerent
for a profit ?

I think anyone who examines this case fairly upon
the facts will be driven to acknowledge, even if he does
not willingly admit, that in seizing the two rams at
Birkenhead, and in brino-ino^ about a forced sale to the
British Admiralty, Earl Kussell departed from the rules
of neutrality laid down by her Majesty's Government,
from the princijiles often aflirmed by himself, and from
the judgment of a competent court, and that he applied
the Foreign Enlistment Act, not merely to prevent the
dano-er of hostile collision, or an infriniJ-ement of law
within the kingdom, which the Lord Chief Baron
said was its intent, but so as to afford protection to
a belligerent, which he distinctly said was not the
intent.

I have not pretended to discuss this question "vvith
reference to international law as commonly understood,
and I do not bring it forward as a matter of complaint
on behalf of the late Confederate States. Arguments
upon dead issues cannot change results or moderate past
disappointments. My whole and only purpose in this
narrative is to demonstrate that the Confederate Govern-

CONFEDEBATE STATES IN EUROPE. 459

ment, in the effort to supply its wants in England
during the Civil War, acted with due circumspection,
and endeavoured to conform to the laws of the realm
and to the principles of neutrality as they were ex-
pounded by the highest constituted authorities in the
kingdom.

My acquaintance with the ]\Iessrs. Bravay began and
ended with the transaction described in this chapter,
I have never seen a member of the firm since. Mr.
Adams, in one of his strongly worded letters on the
subject, speaks of M. Bravay as ' a French commercial
adventurer, proved to have been capable of prevarica-
tion, if not of absolute falsehood.' As a matter of fact,
M. Bravay was not placed in a position requiring him
to prevaricate, and was certainly not tested to the
extreme point insinuated by Mr. Adams. He exhibited
proof of his large dealings with the Viceroy, and showed
the correspondence with reference to the building of two
ships, merely as evidence that he could undertake a large
transaction. I think no one who was conversant with
the circumstances would have doubted that he was
telling the truth in the statement then made, and I have
never heard of his making any other. The firm per-
formed their agreement with Mr. Slidell and me with
perfect good faith as regards all monetary transactions,
and unhesitatingly waived the stipulated commission
when the enterprise failed. The only way in which it
could possibly be said that they misled us was in tliis
respect, that they were very sanguine that the Viceroy
would not deny the verbal order for the ships, and that
even if he did, then, as French subjects, they could get
the vessels out of England and take them to a French
port. In these respects they failed both in their expecta-
tions and in their promises ; but there was a political

4 GO SECRET SEllVICE OE THE CONFEDEllATE ST AT EH.

element in the transaction which liel])e(i to give them
confidence and to mislead us ; and there was another
disappointment in store for the Confederate Government
emanating from the same political source, which will be
fully explained in another chapter.

END OF VOL. I.

BILLING AND SUNS, I'lil NTLRs, laiLIHUKl) ANl> LONDON.

JUli O iwvv